

LOW YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SCOPE OF LIMITED WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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Abstract

This paper examines the scope of limited war between India and Pakistan after the introduction of Low Yield Nuclear Weapons (LYNW), which are often called Battlefield Nuclear Weapons, and Pakistan's strategic rationale behind the manufacturing of these weapons. It is an attempt to explore the possibility of limited war between both countries with the changing deterrence posture of Pakistan, how transformation of deterrence took place vis-à-vis India and how LYNW are considered to be the credible response against India's limited war doctrine, which was aimed to wage a limited war within the perceived gap below the nuclear threshold. Moreover, Pakistan's "Full Spectrum Deterrence" also has been encompassed in this study to analyze its characteristic whether it is war-fighting strategy or war-deter strategy with its implications on limited war and how it plugs in the perceived gap below the nuclear threshold contributing to the stability between India and Pakistan.

Keywords: Low Yield Nuclear Weapons, Limited War, Nuclear Threshold, Deterrence Posture.

Introduction

Comprehensive analysis of conventional limited war is complex in modern day because of changing dynamics of 'war' and its both 'conventional' and 'unconventional' variants. For instance, today, the concept of warfare has emerged as multi-layered phenomenon, such as, 5th generation warfare, cyber warfare and proxy wars. Given all the possible extent of hostilities, limited or total conventional war seems less possible to be waged. In the contemporary era, the chances of conventional war, state on state, are declining more than ever.¹ In the case of India and Pakistan, the picture of warfare is slightly different. Both countries have extensive experience of wars fought among each other including total wars and limited conventional wars. The history of wars of 1949, 1965 and 1971 demonstrates the potential of the experience that both countries possess. The Kargil Crisis of 1999 shows that limited conventional war also has been tested by India and Pakistan. In this paper, an attempt has been made to explore

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the scope of limited conventional war between India and Pakistan, especially with the introduction of Low Yield Nuclear Weapons (LYNWs).

India is considered to be foremost rival of Pakistan in terms of conventional capabilities. However, the emergence of nuclear weapons has balanced the asymmetries between both countries. India pursued the alternative root by remaining under the nuclear threshold to counter the nuclear deterrence posed by Pakistan as the strategic environment was completely changed in subcontinent with tests of nuclear weapons in 1998. Keeping in view the strategic environment, India, again, engaged in calculating the possibilities to punish or deter Pakistan without triggering Pakistan to go for nuclear weapons despite the fact that tactics and operations utilized in the past lacked effectiveness. Therefore, introduction of the “Cold Start Doctrine” was expected to work under the given strategic environment, created under the umbrella of nuclear weapons, in favor of India. This doctrine seemed to be effective, given the conventional capabilities of both India and Pakistan.

However, this doctrine was met with counter-initiative of Pakistan namely LYNWs. Though, there might be various other factors, which have limited the scope of conventional war between India and Pakistan, yet, the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, as argued in this study, proved to be the primary reason, which has minimized the chances of limited conventional war between India and Pakistan. Therefore, a thorough and comprehensive study is made to establish the fact that the development of LYNWs by Pakistan has not only minimized the scope of limited conventional warfare, but also proved to be adequate addition in the strategic stability of South Asia.

Moreover, the aspects of multi-dimensional nuclear deterrence, particularly ‘full spectrum deterrence’, have been encompassed in this study to examine the relevant questions: How LYNWs was the credible response by Pakistan? What measurements favor the feasibility of LYNWs? And, how LYNWs are being considered effective in the strategic environment of south Asia? Deterrence has been malleable and it is always deployed by Pakistan in an effective way giving the desirable results and avoiding the nuclear exchange between both nuclear powers. Emergence of nuclear weapons in South Asia though heightened the security concerns, yet the underlying dynamics to a greater extent remain the same between India and Pakistan.

Therefore, by the standpoint of dynamics of traditional rivalry, in this paper it is endeavored to analyze the strategic rationale behind the development of LYNWs including the factors which led Pakistan to develop battlefield nuclear weapons. Furthermore, deterrence gesture of Pakistan is also incorporated in this study to get the

cohesive picture that nuclear strategies of Pakistan are war-deter strategies or war-fighting strategies, because arguments are made in the wake of LYNWs that whether it would deter war or instigate war, which may lead to nuclear exchange between both countries.

Limited War below the Nuclear Threshold

“Indian political and military leaders and strategic analysts believe that there is a clear strategic space for a conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold, because nuclear weapons are not weapons of war-fighting. They are convinced that for Pakistan, as argued by Gurmeet Kanwal, it would be suicidal to launch a nuclear strike against India or Indian forces, as it would invite massive retaliation”.² This shows the Indian aspirations to demonstrate the conventional superior capabilities under the nuclear threshold. By the time, India gained conventional superiority, nuclear deterrence had changed the entire strategic environment of subcontinent. In the Kargil Crisis, both countries fought the limited conventional war below the nuclear threshold.

Though, the environment of south Asia was soured because of this crisis, yet, this event also implied the maturity of the states as far as the nuclear capabilities are concerned. Somehow, these crises led India to develop the perceptions that it can wage a conventional war against Pakistan below the nuclear threshold. When, the Indian Parliament was attacked in 2001, Pakistan was blamed and alleged to sponsor the terrorist attacks and Indian forces were quickly moved to Pakistan borders. This step taken by the Indian government unveiled the intents of India to wage war against Pakistan through the conventional forces. However, because of certain failures on tactical and operational level, Indian government discovered the lack of effectiveness both tactically and operationally.³

Thereafter, Indian strategists and decision makers came up with the idea of “Cold Start Doctrine.”⁴ This doctrine contains the armed forces structure, which is rapidly deployable. Its primary objective is to *punish* Pakistan in case of attacks allegedly sponsored by Pakistan.⁵ Under this doctrine, the independent forces will act quickly in a way that brought the attention of international community to force compliance of Pakistan with demands of India while not crossing the nuclear threshold that could lead to nuclear exchange. In short, the Cold Start Doctrine was considered the best way to inflict the pain and cost on Pakistan avoiding the nuclear trigger. Supposedly, it was well calibrated and well-articulated strategy to confront Pakistan while remaining below the nuclear threshold. Brig. Najeeb Ahmad, a defense analyst, described one of the aspects of Cold Start as:

It offsets Indian mobilization differential vis-à-vis Pakistan by preplanned configuration of the offensive content of defensive/pivot corps, termed Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) applied within 48-72 hours of the opening of hostilities. The offensive corps simultaneously mobilize in three different Army command areas as Theatre Force Reserves (TFRs) to fuse with IBGS within 72-96 hours and carry on the offensive at opportune points, with limited objectives, in order to remain below Pakistan's perceived nuclear thresholds.⁶

Undoubtedly, the chief advantage of India lies in its superior conventional forces vis-à-vis Pakistan. Therefore, India finds the most suitable option to wage the war against Pakistan conventionally while keeping in view the nuclear thresholds. The launch of the Cold Start Doctrine, which is both proactive and aggressive in its nature, shows that there had been enough possibilities to wage a war below the nuclear threshold.⁷ In order to respond to this doctrine, Pakistan developed the low yield nuclear weapons or LYNWs.

Low Yield Nuclear Weapons as Credible Response

In the current situation, Pakistan is facing the various invisible bindings. The economic administrators of Pakistan find tough to create the proportionality or balance of security requirements with the needs of people.⁸ Several anti-terrorist operations and campaigns are ongoing within Pakistan and have yielded desirable results. The changing situation in Afghanistan also has certain impacts on the internal security of Pakistan. Increasing economic, military and intelligence presence of India in Afghanistan is an obvious concern to Pakistan as the most of the anti-terrorist campaigns are in those areas of Pakistan, which are neighboring regions of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Pakistan is fighting on various fronts, which would only substantiate the resolve of this country on nuclear deterrence more and more. Therefore, Pakistan always remains in the complex situation to choose a certain path in order to counter existing threats by all means. In given situation, Pakistan met with the aggressive limited war fighting doctrine of India, which has to be responded in a rationalized and credible way.

Advent of LYNWs by Pakistan, was the exclusive and credible response to Indian aggressive Cold Start Doctrine.⁹ Development of these battlefield nuclear weapons was met by different views in Indo-Pak security debate. However, LYNWs substantiated the deterrence of Pakistan on all levels of conflicts. Introduction of LYNWs was followed by the test of Nasr, a battlefield ballistic missile having range around 60 km. After the test, Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) issued the statement that:

*Nasr was developed to add deterrence value to the Pakistan's Strategic Weapons Development Program at shorter ranges. The Nasr could carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy and had shoot-and-scoot attributes, essentially a quick response system that addressed the need to deter evolving threats.*¹⁰

In order to grab the idea of how LYNWs are credible response and meeting with the threat at all level, the primary characteristics of the Cold Start Doctrine are necessary to be discussed briefly. According to this doctrine, up to eight armored brigades can penetrate up to 30 miles into Pakistan within 48-72 hours of the opening of hostilities, while remaining below the nuclear threshold. Furthermore, Theatre Force Reserves (TFRs) was the back-up force to fuse with the armored brigades within 72-96 hours. It was considered as the direct outcome of failure of India, when the element of strategic surprise was lost by the Indian forces in the protracted deployment along the border in 2001-2002.¹¹ According to the map given below shared by Feroz Khan in presentation, red cities and the area of cities mentioned by bold red line along with border are the target points and at stake in case of Cold Start incursion by the Indian Army.¹²



Source: Abdullah, Sannia. "Cold Start in Strategic Calculus" IPRI Journal XII, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 1-27.

If armored brigade advances toward target area along the border, Pakistan can use 1-Kiloton weapons at height of 150 meter within the territory of India. It can destroy the brigade of 10 tanks (if they are spaced with the distance of 100 meter) and Indian

march can be halted. Anyhow, Pakistan may face the repercussions of radioactive fallout. If nuclear weapon of 1 kiloton exploded furthest from Pakistan's territory within India's territory at the height of 100 meter, radioactive fallout can be minimized significantly. By increasing the weight of weapons in kilotons, more destruction can be caused. However, the risk of radioactive fallout will be increased similarly. Nonetheless, Dr. Mansoor Ahmed claimed that "besides short range missiles like the Nasr, the TNW role can also be filled by nuclear artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions".¹³

The LYNWs of Pakistan, according to imagery analyses, are believed to range from less than 1 Kiloton to 15 Kilotons.¹⁴ Deployment of tank brigade can be countered by the battlefield nuclear weapon of 1 kiloton, which can destroy ten tanks and radiation can disable 110 tank crews, if the tank formation has the distance of 100 meter as shown in Table 1 below. Similarly, the more you increase the range of LYNWs, the more destruction can be imposed on brigade.

Table 1: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons against Tanks Separated by 100 Meters¹⁵

Yield (kilotons)	Number of tanks destroyed by blast	Number of tank crews disabled by radiation
15	64	360
10	48	290
5	32	190
1	10	110

Mostly, decision-makers and military strategist of Pakistan believe that LYNWs was not only the complete and credible response, but also the imperative counter-weight to the Cold Start Doctrine of India.¹⁶

Strategic Rationale behind Low Yield Nuclear Weapons

Strategic rationale behind the development of LYNWs is closely associated with India. India has always been the arch rival of Pakistan. After the war of 1971, Pakistan desperately looked for the safety both on conventional level and nuclear level, which led this country to develop nuclear weapons. India kept on building its conventional capabilities and implicating threat postures toward Pakistan. The aid, which was being provided to Pakistan by the US, was of only military hardware to fight terrorism, which was not enough to deter India for any misadventure and its arms build-up was intensely troublesome. Moreover, conventional forces of India in bulk are deployed on Pakistan borders.¹⁷ The glimpses of the unfortunate prospects and intentions of the Indian

military can be analyzed and counted by the everyday violation of ceasefire at Line of Control and Working boundary.

Therefore, these kinds of gestures of conventional forces and their deployment along with the borders of Pakistan indicate that there was the margin of conventional limited or total conventional war under the red lines of nuclear threshold. Furthermore, in the wake of attack on Indian parliament, leading to the crisis of 2001-2002 in which India mobilized its conventional forces on larger level, implied that it was intended to wage the conventional war without nuclear exchange. Introduction of the Cold Start Doctrine further substantiate these gestures. Increasing conventional asymmetries brought Pakistan to pursue the development of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a renowned Pakistani scholar, made assertion that LYNWs can be used in the war at theater level. Resources of Pakistan are the obvious constraints as compared to India; therefore, LYNWs can help Pakistan to diminish the conventional asymmetries, which are increasing because of the larger import of weapons by India. By the utility of LYNWs, the threat of limited conventional war can be countered and minimized in long run.¹⁸

Moreover, Maleeha Lodhi, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the UN, also supported the strategic rationale of Pakistan, as LYNWs have extended the deterrence posture of Pakistan. It was further argued that LYNWs are necessary, well-timed, and useful to manage the conventional asymmetries bolstered by India. Creation of Cold Start doctrine has changed, to great extent, the threats posed by India.¹⁹ Change in deterrence has limited the scope of limited war and broadened the deterrence on various levels.

Transformation of Deterrence: Full Spectrum Deterrence

Pakistan had endeavored to maintain the “minimum credible nuclear deterrence” vis-à-vis India before the materialization of LYNWs and this deterrence has been very complex to define as there are elusive and mix definitions of this deterrence.²⁰ Buzan defined minimum deterrence as “a secure, second strike force of sufficient size to make threats of Assured Destruction credible.”²¹ Whereas Lebow and Stein claim that “too much deterrence...can fuel an arms race that makes both sides less rather than more secure and provoke the aggression that it is designed to prevent”.²² Indian strategic planner, K. Subramanyam stated that “minimum deterrence is not a numerical definition, but a strategic approach. If a country is in a position to have a survivable arsenal, which is seen as capable of exacting an unacceptable penalty in retaliation, it has a minimum deterrence (as) opposed to an open-ended one aimed at matching the adversary’s arsenal in numerical terms”.²³

This argument provides the greater sense of understanding of minimum deterrence in the landscape of south Asia. Because, the contemporary practices of minimum deterrence by India reflects the soundness of this argument. Standards of Pakistan's nuclear minimum deterrence are acute to be discussed and analyzed to get the clear picture of deterrence. Pakistan's leading names on policy making describe the minimum deterrence vis-à-vis India in a way that:

*Minimum deterrence has been and should continue to be the guiding principle of Pakistan's nuclear pursuit. Of course, the minimum cannot be defined in static numbers. In the absence of an agreement on mutual restraints, the size of Pakistan's arsenal and its deployment pattern has to be adjusted to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception. Only then can deterrence remain efficacious.*²⁴

By this description, it can be derived that Pakistan's minimum deterrence was based on the fixed nuclear weapons to deter India for any misadventure. According to Major General (Retd) Qasim Qureshi, there are four strategic objectives of Pakistan's deterrence:²⁵

- Persuade or compel India to alter the status quo in Kashmir.
- Deter India's conventional military threat.
- Deter India from attempting or supporting initiatives to de-nuclearize Pakistan.
- Deter India from wrongfully exploiting the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty.

Dr. Farah Zahra argued that there are five core elements on which Pakistan's strategic deterrence strategy is based:²⁶

- An effective conventional fighting force
- A minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine
- An adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems
- Survivable strategic forces
- Robust strategic command and control.

By taking into account these statements and arguments, it has become obvious that Pakistan's deterrence was working on the strategic level. It implies that there was a deterrence gap on tactical level, which might lead India to impose the limited war below the nuclear threshold. Emergence of LYNWs filled this gap as reaffirmed by Lieutenant General (Retd.) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, who has been the long serving head of Strategic Plan Division (SPD), that TNWs enhanced the deterrent capability of Pakistan "at all level of threat spectrum" including the strategic, operational and tactical levels.²⁷ In this way, a transformation of force posture of deterrence took place with a scope which

ranges from strategic, operational level to tactical level. These developments and introduction of new deterrence namely “full spectrum deterrence” have lessened the scope of limited war between India and Pakistan. General (Retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai has rightly remarked that:

*Pakistan needed short range tactical nuclear weapons to deter India’s Cold Start Doctrine and having tactical nuclear weapons would make war less likely. These weapons were developed in response to concerns that India’s larger military could still wage a conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear weapon.*²⁸

By following the threat spectrum posed by India and deterrence spectrum brought by Pakistan, it can be argued that Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence is war-deter strategy, diminishing the scope of even limited war, rather than war-fighting strategy and, in a larger context, promoting the strategic stability in the region.

Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence: War-Deter Strategy or War-Fighting Strategy

Whether Pakistan’s new deterrence doctrine is a war-deter or war-fighting, has been under debate since its inception. However, deterrence force posture emulated by the statements of several persons, who have been representatives or spokespersons of Pakistan on different forums, can provide the adequate insights to determine the nature of deterrence strategy. Former official of SPD, Feroz Khan stated that “Pakistan has no plans to move toward battlefield weapons. The introduction of Nasr is meant to bolster conventional deterrence by creating strong barriers that will deter assaulting forces at the tactical level”.²⁹ David O. Smith, who was the US Army Attaché to Pakistan, mentioned that Lieutenant General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai has said various times in private that primary purpose of TNWs is to “pour cold water on Cold Start”.³⁰ Thereafter, Sartaj Aziz, Advisor of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, asserted that “Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons were a response to a potential sudden Indian conventional attack.”³¹

These claims and arguments explicitly imply that deterrence-based strategies of Pakistan are focusing to deter India to launch attack on any level and to curb the warmongering attitude of India. Pakistan’s deterrence postures are responsive in their nature, which drives by the force postures of India. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office narrated that “Pakistan’s strategic posture, including nuclear, is clearly framed around its perception of the threat from India”.³² Some observers have expressed deep concerns that LYNWs could increase the risk of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. There could be reasons for such increase in risk. Commanders of Pakistani military may lose the art to prevent the use of these weapons. If weapons’ launch

platforms of these weapons possibly get preemptively attacked by India, Pakistan may use these weapons to counter that attack.³³

There could be various scenarios to raise the concerns that LYNWs could be lethal, which may augment the risk of nuclear conflict. However, these concerns are what make full spectrum deterrence to be effective. Uncertainty, created by manufacturing of these weapons, make strategic environment more feasible for deterrence to work and maintain military distance of both rival countries. Pakistan's plans have not included the precise counterforce targeting objectives of India as evident by the statement of Feroz Khan: "Pakistan's government believes that LYNWs can deter any Indian military aggression through proactive military operations because the Nasr generates tactical uncertainty, strategic hesitation and international resolve to prevent nuclear war. However, introducing LYNWs brings a host of operational dilemmas."³⁴

Moreover, no evidence has been brought forth by any means that Pakistan has made the deployment of LYNWs or formulated its operational strategy to carry out nuclear war-fighting. Therefore, full spectrum deterrence of Pakistan seems more to be the war-deter strategy infusing the sound step to add to the stability of South Asia. Introduction of Cold Start Doctrine by India rendered the realization of conventional asymmetries leading to distortion of deterrence stability in region. However, strategic environment of South Asia, created by the deterrence stability, appears to be stabilized by the advent of LYNWs.

LYNWs as Addition to Strategic Stability between India and Pakistan

Pakistan is suffering from grave conventional asymmetry lowering the nuclear threshold to perilous extent. Increasing asymmetry is destabilizing the strategic balance as there isn't any treaty or institution, which could maintain strategic balance between two countries.³⁵ This asymmetry may invoke the military elite of India to launch the limited military campaign against Pakistan to achieve desired results without triggering the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. Moreover, in this way India may degrade the conventional forces of Pakistan by utilizing the gap in deterrence formed by the strategic nuclear weapons. Along with that, rising asymmetries in technology and military strength will contribute to India's perceived sense of superiority, which might lead India to follow escalation dominance in a limited conventional conflict, in order to terminate hostilities on its own terms. The gap supported by the increasing asymmetries was acute to be filled in order to clear the blurred and uncertain picture of strategic stability. Strategists of Pakistan chose to go for filling this gap by developing the LYNWs and transforming the minimum credible deterrence into full spectrum deterrence or "deterrence on all levels".

Besides, simultaneously, Pakistan kept on attempting to fill the gap in conventional forces as much as possible. Security calculus for India becomes complicated leaving minimum space to maneuver in realm of “limited war” against Pakistan. Indian conventional force postures and increasing asymmetries were rapidly negatively affecting the strategic stability between both countries. The changing scenario of strategic stability was managed by Pakistan through the induction of LYNWs in its deterrence force posture. Pakistan’s LYNWs are intended to reinforce the deterrent value of conventional forces. Deterrence stability can be prolonged only, if conventional balance does not move tremendously in the favor of India. Stability between India and Pakistan is deeply associated with the threat and force posture of India. Pakistan’s strategies on all three levels, i.e., strategic, operational and tactical level, are more responsive and reactionary in nature towards India. Brigadier (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal, who is the Director of Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, argued that:

The new doctrine (Cold Start Doctrine) may, therefore, be perceived to be destabilizing by Pakistanis, despite all the precautions that India might take to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Hence, the Cold Start Doctrine is a good doctrine from India’s point of view, but one that could adversely impact strategic stability since Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is premised on countering India’s conventional military superiority with a nuclear shield.³⁶

Despite having comprehensive knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence posture, India opted limited war doctrine leading to exert the negative impacts on strategic stability. Scenario of deterrence and strategic stability was worsened. Developments of LYNWs not only transformed the deterrence posture of Pakistan providing safeguard on conventional level, but also brought strategic and deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.

Conclusion

It appeared that Cold Start Doctrine theorists did not take into account the elementary premise of the Pakistan’s minimum credible deterrence that was aimed to deter conventional forces by virtue of nuclear deterrence. Whether the threshold was higher or lower, India intended to attempt to find a place between the two to wage a limited war. Scope of limited war was broad, because of the nuclear weapons that could be used for strategic gains only. At operational and tactical levels, Pakistan was not supposed to go for strategic nuclear weapons. But, manufacturing the LYNWs provide Pakistan with ability to act with nuclear weapons both at operational and tactical level leading to the reinforcement of deterrence on all levels. Because of the asymmetry, the pendulum of conventional capabilities was swinging in the favor of India. Growing asymmetries in conventional forces between India and Pakistan is evident by the weapon import ratio of both countries. These asymmetries had created a gap for India to wage

limited war against Pakistan below the perceived nuclear threshold. India tried to utilize this gap as evident by the crisis of 2001-2002 and crisis of 2008. India developed the limited war doctrine "Cold Start," which led Pakistan to develop the LYNWs. By the development of LYNWs, the gap seems to be plugged prodigiously and the space for limited war almost diminished. LYNWs have limited the scope of limited war against Pakistan by India.

In the given circumstances, Pakistan seems to have come up with considerably credible response to counter the Cold Start Doctrine, because economic constraints also imply that Pakistan was suffering from the race of arms build-up. Hence, development of LYNWs brought the transformation in the nuclear deterrence of Pakistan from minimum credible deterrence to full spectrum deterrence. Full spectrum deterrence now would be able to deter India from any aggression on all levels including strategic, operational and tactical levels. The Cold Start Doctrine exerted the critical impact on Pakistan, which resulted in the emergence of LYNWs that changed the picture of conventional war. Now, it is hard for India to find the ideal gap to fight a limited war and do not meet with non-strategic nuclear weapons or battlefield nuclear weapons which are specially designed to be used in limited war.

In the light of various arguments made by the renowned scholars, academicians and strategists, Pakistan's strategy of full spectrum deterrence appears to be the war-deter strategy in order to minimize the scope of limited war. Pakistan's force posture of nuclear deterrence apparently has plugged in the gap which was created by the increasing asymmetries and nuclear threshold. Deterrence of limited war has more prospects to prevent the nuclear war between both countries. Deterrence stability and strategic stability is enhanced by the introduction of LYNWs because stability was being affected by the growing asymmetry, which was widening the scope of limited war. However, test of Nasr brought change in the strategic calculus of both countries. Deterrence posture of Pakistan was changed and scope, gap and space for limited war became limited and LYNWs can be regarded as the viable and rationalized approach to create peace, stability, and prosperity in the South Asian region.

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