


Vol. XXVI

ISSN 2073-0926



NDU
Journal 2012

www.ndu.edu.pk



NDU Journal

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis
National Defence University, Islamabad

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NDU Journal is sponsored and edited by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Manuscripts and editorial communications may be directed to the editor.

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Website: <http://www.ndu.edu.pk>

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NDU Journal

Subscription for one copy

- Inland Rs. 300/-
- Overseas US \$ 25/-

Request for subscription may be addressed to:

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Website: <http://www.ndu.edu.pk>

Email: ddpubs@ndu.edu.pk

ISSN: 2073-0926

**Published by
National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan**

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'NDU Journal' is an annual publication of National Defence University, the premier institution of security and strategic studies. The subject journal is a unique publication of the country which primarily deals with the national security issues of Pakistan. The journal has its own standing among the students, researchers, experts, policy makers and intelligentsia. It has been enlisted by International Political Science Abstracts, USA, Bibliography of Asian Studies USA and Ulrichs Periodicals Directory. Keeping the flag high, all the articles appearing in the journal are selected after a rigorous scrutiny and blind peer review at home and abroad. It is the testimony of quality of contents of the journal that **Higher Education Commission of Pakistan** has upgraded the subject journal into 'Y' category.

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

After the up-gradation of NDU Journal in 'Y' category by Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan, this is the first issue. Although it got late, yet all out efforts have been done in order to enhance the quality of the contents. The plagiarism issue has also been paid a serious heed and HEC provided software has been used to scrutinize the articles. Moreover, for the first times all the articles appearing in the current issue have been double reviewed; once from national expert; and secondly from the international experts. Keeping the flag high, Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) is continuously engaged in pursuit of serious research and analysis on all current global, regional and domestic security matters, with a view to creating a synergy in the efforts of renowned scholars and security analysts.

Commodore (R) Asif Majeed Butt, in his article titled 'Defence Industry – The Options for Pakistan', has opined that existing internal and external security paradigm of Pakistan presents compound challenges for Pakistan Armed Forces. Therefore, a dire need is felt to develop Armed Forces' capacity and capability to handle multifarious security challenges faced by the country.

The soldiers' perception and understanding about the justification of war against terrorism and enemy has never been assessed. Sino-Pak relationship has stood the test and trial of the history, ever since the development of this startling affinity. Mariam Shah's article 'War on Terror: Perception about War and Enemy among Pakistani Combatants' unearths these perceptions. The soldiers, who remained involved in this war on terror, have been interviewed and the findings indicated that the soldiers consider it a perfectly justified war.

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan has undertaken an in-depth study about the dynamics of Indo-Pak peace process, in which, a realistic way forward is suggested for a stable and long-term peace between Pakistan and India. The author is of the view that peace between both countries is the prerequisite for achieving stability and economic development in South

Asia. But, unfortunately, the peace has always been hindered due to the strategic culture of unpleasantness, the sense of insecurity and mistrust.

Pakistan's economic security is going through inbuilt paradoxes since the beginning of war on terror. Zulfiqar Hussain in his article 'Defining National Security and Economic Security of Pakistan Post 9/11 Era' has made an endeavour to draw attention of the scholars, intelligentsia, academia, intellectuals, experts and policy-makers towards effects of the post 9/11 scenario and subsequent after-effects of the war on terror and performance of the Pakistan's economy.

'Balochistan Unrest: Internal-External Dimensions' is a scholarly discourse by Muhammad Khurshid Khan. Since, security challenges to Balochistan, linked with internal and external factors, are pronounced, the opportunities are also awaiting, which if not cashed expeditiously, the simmering effects of the disturbed region may take the entire Balochistan in loop, where over 95 per cent of people are diehard Pakistani. As things stand now, Pakistan can ignore Balochistan only at its own peril.

Last but not the least is a book review by Air Commodore Zia ul Haque Shamsi, who has reviewed Saira Khan's book titled 'Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan'.

_____ **The Editor**

DEFENCE INDUSTRY

THE OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Commodore (Retired) Asif Majeed Butt

Abstract

Pakistan's strategic location at the cross-roads of three major civilizations, on one hand, offers many opportunities and, on the other, presents some grave challenges. While we have on our east a traditional adversary; to our west is a highly troubled and unstable Afghanistan under a potentially hostile government. In addition to conventional threats, terrorism has emerged as yet another existential challenge impinging upon our national security. Moreover, the race amongst the powers for acquisition of resources makes Pakistan much more susceptible to emerging conflicts at regional and global levels. The existing internal and external security paradigm presents compound challenges for Pakistan Armed Forces. There is a dire need to develop our Armed Forces' capacity and capability to handle multifarious security challenges faced by Pakistan. There is a greater need now for ensuring capability to equip our Armed Forces with modern and technologically advanced equipment to undertake the desired operations. Experience in the past shows that supply of arms, ammunition and defence equipment were cut off by our traditional allies, precisely when they were most needed i.e. during wars. Indigenous defence industry, thus, becomes 'compulsion for Pakistan rather than choice'.

Introduction

All nation states have their own territories, a system of governance, and a policy that is designed to serve national interests and economic, social and security objectives. The territorial integrity of a country assumes paramount importance, if a nation faces a potent threat and has to be defended with strength. The national interests need to be

pursued vigorously through a well-rounded security policy, and the objectives aimed at strengthening the elements of national power have to be accomplished. A nation state that endeavours to maintain a comprehensive national security environment within and for its people is sure to have set the pace for a secure, progressive, prosperous and incredible future. All Elements of National Power (EoNP) work in synergy for such a desirable future by spawning associated efforts for the attainment of common national interests and objectives. Maintenance of territorial integrity happens to be the principal Vital National Interest of all the independent nation states of the world, and Pakistan being no exception. Armed Forces of Pakistan are one of the EoNP mandated to ensure territorial integrity and, wherever required, assist the national government in establishing a safe and secure environment in the country in collaboration with other law enforcing agencies (LEAs). It is for this very reason that development and maintenance of credible Armed Forces are not an option but a compulsion for a sovereign nation state.¹

The necessity of developing a defence industry, side by side with multifarious political, economic and social commitments, arises out of the mandate of national defence. It forms an essential component of a nation's means to safeguard its sovereignty. In abstract terms, 'security of supply' explains why smaller countries may seek their own arms industries. This security protects them from dependence on imports and against the risks such as arms embargo.² In addition, ensuring security of supply means countries can minimize the political consequences attached to weapon purchases from external sources, which in turn decreases constraints. Observing this pattern, some analysts imply that, "the increasing threat, in the post-cold war era, to impose arms embargoes of various sorts might drive even more countries into efforts to produce indigenous weaponry and to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency in, at least, some arms category."

Any society that aspires to progress needs to industrialize and complement growth through offshore acquisitions/ procurements. The capability to produce arms can be

enhanced to a level where these local productions may be exported to earn foreign exchange. Indigenous defence industry of Pakistan not only consolidates national security, by meeting the crucial critical requirements of our Armed Forces, but also saves millions of foreign exchange that could have been spent, had the industry not existed. However, defence industry alone cannot run the economic engine of any country.

During the pre-partition era, around sixteen ordnance factories existed in the Indo-Pak Sub-continent. It was a bad luck that after the partition in 1947 all those sixteen factories went under Indian possession, since not a single one of them was situated in Muslim majority areas, which constituted the State of Pakistan. It became a dire need to undertake certain developmental projects in the field of defence production to attain a degree of self-reliance. Hence, the pursuit resulted in construction/establishment of a number of industrial sectors for defence production. At present over 20 major public sector units and around 145 private sector firms are engaged in the development and manufacture of defence related products.³ Pakistan's defence industry has grown substantially, and has developed the potential to export some defence equipment to friendly states. The export potential in defence industry at present, though not significant to augment our national economy in real terms, is the key to the country's survival in the existing national security paradigm.

While there are positive indicators, Pakistan's indigenous defence industrial sector has certain impediments, which need to be addressed to ensure further meaningful progression. The lack of suitable industrial infrastructure, difficulties in access to needed raw materials, together with inadequate funds, poor research and development, planning, management and organizational inadequacies, unclear political apathies, are all limitations which have affected the arms industrialization process of all the third world countries including Pakistan.⁴

Threat

"We live in a difficult neighbourhood. We are faced with threats to our security. We remain engaged in a struggle for the safety of our citizens. We are the victims of war on terrorism".⁵

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2011 asserts, "in the light of the growing security challenges, the world is likely to face a difficult period of growing uncertainty and fragility, and diffusion of risks and threats."⁶ Pakistan's security concern would remain, primarily India centric, due to unresolved bilateral issues, Indian military capability, its war fighting concepts, which are purely Pakistan specific. Activities by Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in collaboration with Afghan intelligence agency, Riyasat-i-Amniyet-i-Milli (RAM), and other intelligence agencies pose a serious threat to our security. India is observed developing capabilities for delivering limited, swift and 'smart' attacks; as expressed in its 2004 'Cold Start' doctrine, introducing mobilization for limited warfare within 72 hours.⁷ The survey of Indian public opinion in 2010 showed support for Indian Armed Forces development and also clearly defined Pakistan as 'threat', while fearing China's military progression.⁸ Enhanced quantitative and qualitative force differentials will enable India to coerce Pakistan both militarily and economically, by entangling her in an unsustainable arms race.

Growing Indian force development plan, which demonstrates reach and sustainability, presents new security challenges to Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littorals. Unprecedented expansions of Indian Navy (IN) will create critical imbalances in the relative force structures of Pakistan Navy (PN) and IN, which will be exploited by the latter during any future conflict. Indian Navy will attempt to destabilize Pakistan both militarily and economically, through coercion, severance of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), blockade of important Pakistani ports and degradation of maritime

assets. Indian acquisition of sea based second strike capability will alter the equation of nuclear parity.

Indian Air Force's (IAF) existing capabilities provide Indian air power a dominant role to play in the region. IAF would be able to employ simultaneous and parallel operations against adversary rather than the sequential application. Induction of force multipliers would further enhance IAF's combat potential. IAF is planning to be a strategic air force, possessing mostly hi-tech aircraft. IAF's plan 2020-22 is likely to materialize in the long term, as US, the West, Russia and Israel are supporting it.

Asymmetric threat in North Arabian Sea (NAS) and along Pakistan's coast is a new and most likely dimension of threat to Pakistan's eco-maritime assets. The incidents of piracy have started to occur within Pakistan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in addition to narco-human smuggling activities. The Mumbai incident also highlights the influence of non-state actors at sea.

Internal security forms the nucleus of national security policy of any country, and more so for Pakistan, which is faced with extreme internal threats. Internal security is marred by a climate of intolerance, extremism, militancy and terrorism both in the hinterlands and in urban areas, something that is further propounded by criminal corruptions and societal crimes. During 2010 alone, there have been 1986 terrorist incidents, wherein, 478 security forces personnel and 1,361 civilians embraced martyrdom (shahadat), while 1,316 security forces personnel and 3,744 civilians were injured.⁹ The worst to that, Pakistan's, otherwise slim economy, has suffered a loss of over US\$43 billion since 2001.¹⁰ Pakistan is facing an extraordinary security situation and the resources required to cope with the challenges have to be provided, but, "we cannot afford huge military budgets without having a coherent national security strategy, which includes economic, social, political and diplomatic dimensions."¹¹

Pakistan's Armed Forces, in near future, are likely to remain embroiled in providing assistance to the government in handling the internal security paradoxical situation. These forces require apposite equipment and requisite weaponry to handle this type of threat in addition to the conventional threat from our east. The Indian arms' industry meets 30 per cent needs of its armed forces at present, whereas, they have plans to raise self-reliance to at least 70 per cent in the near future.¹² Pakistan's smaller arms industry has difficulties in providing ammunition for LEAs and armed forces, as the intensity of internal conflicts has increased.¹³

Self-reliance Strategy

Pakistan has reasons of varying dimensions to produce arms. The most vital reason remains to be the security concern to acquire a degree of self-sufficiency in crucial items.¹⁴ Pakistan also needs an independent and reliable defence capability and the most dependable and reliable source is the domestic one. Another contributing factor is that increased reliance on defence imports makes a country susceptible to experience embargoes, economic and military sanctions and similar other restraints during an actual conflict.¹⁵ The case of Pakistan, during US-imposed sanctions in 1990s, is a relevant example. Comprehensive national security warrants capable Armed Forces, supported by technically innovative industry. National leaders and the population alike overwhelmingly believe that well-equipped Armed Forces are vital to achieving national security.¹⁶

The activity of arms' production, often referred to as 'Ladder of Production',¹⁷ can be sub-divided into various stages, ranging from highest level of dependency, where a country spends the resources to import arms to meet the defence requirements, to independent R & D, indigenous production and invention of lead technologies. Every nation wants ideally to keep under its control critical defence technologies. However, no country, besides the US, can afford to have a full cradle-to-grave industry in every sector. Pakistan retains a reasonable, open and wide-ranging defence industry,

which delivers a large portion of our Armed Forces' crucial needs. However, complete indigenization is neither attainable nor even desirable. We need to be self-reliant to an extent where we do not get isolated from the rest of the technologically advanced world.

Pakistan cannot afford to maintain a complete cradle-to-grave industrial base in all areas; neither it is desirable nor feasible. The issue can be handled by bringing in greater clarity on the capabilities, which must be retained indigenously, and those which have implication or compulsion can be met from well developed foreign market.¹⁸ We need to consider how best the Ministry of Defence Production (MoDP) should keep engaged with the industrial base, in order to meet our requirements. We need to formulate a prudent Defence Production Policy for Pakistan. Our Defence Production Policy (DPP) needs to focus on the principle of need-based production of crucial equipment for our Armed Forces.¹⁹ Pakistan's Defence Industrial Strategy should promote a sustainable defence industrial base that retains those indigenous industrial capabilities which are needed to ensure our national security. The strategy must yield dividends to all stakeholders i.e. the people of Pakistan, Armed Forces and industrialists. The shortfalls in the essential indigenous defence industrial capabilities that are needed to support self-reliance must be identified and addressed.

We may continue to acquire selective platforms, arms and equipment from foreign countries, with appropriate guarantees, including Transfer of Technology (ToT). However, in the process, we need to keep a close watch on increased risk to maintaining our operational independence during any future conflict.²⁰ With the advent of nay new technology, we need to pick and choose the one, which meets our essential/crucial defence requirements, is financially viable, and then try to acquire requisite technology. Total self-reliance not only isolates industry from technological advancements but also has a potential to isolate a nation state politically.²¹

Joint ventures and collaborative developments in defence industry, with ToT as the binding string, may accrue better dividends. We should go for joint ventures and collaborative enterprises, while ensuring the sovereign ability, to use our Armed Forces in the way we choose. It is mandatory for us to assess our industrial capabilities against national security primacies, which should aim at achieving strategic assurance and crucial/critical defence capability. The capability to produce military hardware, in addition to accruing foreign exchange savings and earnings, also has strategic implications for our country. It is a foregone conclusion that our very existence may be threatened, unless we are able to produce weapons/equipment, to meet our crucial needs for defence and to enjoy relative autonomy from foreign powers in the matters of defence and national security.²²

Desired Capabilities

Pakistan Army

Pakistan Army is intensely engaged in counter-terrorism and fourth generation warfare operations. Despite the advancement in technology, new style and kind of warfare, on the ground, requires highly trained and motivated service personnel to engage in combat at a very personal level. It is in such engagements that state-of-the-art weapons and equipment are essential to provide the superior firepower. Round the clock, all-weather capability is a must to suppress, neutralize and demoralize enemy forces. It is essential that we retain self-reliance in our critical demands and capability for munitions' production.

We also require the ability to develop munitions for specific purposes to match our defence doctrines, however, we need to maintain a balance between technological imperatives, credibility, sustainability and financial constraints. Selective, but a robust through-life defence production indigenous capability is vital. There are some types of complex technologies/weapons that Pakistan's Armed Forces acquire from overseas. We may continue outsourcing

high-tech acquisitions from abroad, remaining cognizant of the security of supply of arms and ammunition at critical junctures.

Hence, there is a dire need for us to retain the capability to support the current inventory, right tactical software and design, and to integrate indigenously developed hardware and software systems.²³ However, in the long term we should endeavour to attain the ability to design, develop, assemble, support and upgrade the acquired state-of-the-art complex weapons and systems. It may sound to be an uphill task, requiring a number of critical and sensitive underpinning capabilities, besides substantial finances, but it is equally crucial for meeting bare essentials of our country's assured security and sovereignty.

We need to work with all the elements of the indigenous defence industry, whether those are in public or private sectors. It is deemed mandatory to maintain a sustainable defence industry that meets our requirements in the most cost-effective manner. There is a substantial potential in our public and private sectors, awaiting exploration and exploitation for industrial consolidation.²⁴ It can only be possible through a coordinated approach that we be able to sustain a viable industrial base, in order to ensure comprehensive national security.

Given the nature of the international terrorist threats, capabilities, previously never thought of, are increasingly deemed necessary for the Armed Forces, in particular, for the Pakistan Army. This reinforces the importance of the counter-terrorism (CT) element of the Armed Forces, and provides greater challenges and opportunities for both industry and the Armed Forces to evolve a developmental strategy, in order to become more cost-effective in the CT field.

Pakistan Navy

In order to ensure seaward defence and security of Pakistan's SLOCs, Pakistan Navy needs to sustain a potent

defensive capability. For this purpose, PN should accord high priority to the attainment of a number of capabilities required to design up to medium size surface ships and submarines. For the foreseeable future, Pakistan Navy should also retain and further mature all of those capabilities, specific to submarines and their propulsion systems, to support their design, development, build & rebuild support and operation.

Our defence industry must demonstrate an ability to drive down and control the costs of such developments in maritime domain. In the pursuit to retain the ability to maintain and support the navy, there are a number of specific key maritime system capabilities and technologies, which we should develop indigenously such as Electronic Warfare (EW) suites, SONARS, echo-sounders, gyros, communication equipment etc. While, Pakistan may continue to venture in techno-advanced markets, it is essential to maintain an industrial base that can support our navy's critical/crucial requirements without interruption, to ensure effective seaward defence and safety & security of our sea-based trade corridor.

Pakistan's defence industry should be restructured to improve its performance. Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW) must maintain the momentum generated by the construction project of F22P frigate and other small crafts, to attain higher technological standards, ensuring quality product. All maritime supporting industries, including Maritime Technology Complex (MTC), Shipyard, PN Dockyard, Pakistan National Shipping Company's technical workshop and the private sector must work in coordination to synergize the production, economize on efforts and ensure sustainability.

Pakistan Air Force

Air power continues to offer the ability to influence the battle space, utilizing its inherent attributes of reach and speed, to enable strategic, operational and tactical agility. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has inducted a new JF17, highly sophisticated combat aircraft in collaboration with China.

Current plans do not envisage Pakistan Air Force needing to design and build another aircraft of a future generation. However, because the current fleet and the recent inductions by PAF are likely to have long operational lives, we need to retain the ability to maintain and upgrade them for a considerable period. The focus must shift to through-life support and upgradation, and what is required to sustain this critical capability in the absence of large-scale production.

A little more investment in the development of a mix of manned (like JF-17) and unmanned aircraft (e.g. Uqaab), if incurred, would also ensure that we make better informed decisions in the domain of national security. We need to move forward with a substantial joint venture with our strategic partners for acquisition of advanced technology in this area. It is essential to implement plans for attaining self-reliance in the industrial capabilities, required to ensure effective through-life support to the existing and planned air fleet and to invest in developing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) technology. There is no supreme requirement to sustain an indigenous capability in large transport and training aircraft. However, we need to focus on attaining knowledge and skill about the systems' engineering and design, and developing capability to integrate new systems, avionics and defensive aids into these platforms.

To support the industrial capabilities, identified after the analysis of Armed Forces requirements, there are a number of areas in which Pakistan's Defence Industry must sustain existing technological strengths. We can venture in other fields, to further develop our expertise, if our resources permit. There are other technologies, showing potential range of defence applications that may have either a large impact on specific defence capabilities or a more subtle impact across many aspects of national security. We need to focus on our crucial comprehensive national security requirements and maximize our capability through cost-effective and judicious approach towards indigenization of our defence industry.

Pakistan's Defence Industry

The concept of developing a military industry is founded on the plinth of support to military forces. Our defence industry offers Pakistan far more reliable means for ensuring national security in today's anarchic world. We need to build our war stamina, sustain our internal security maintenance effort within affordable cost, and most of all break the shackles of conditionalities attached with supply of defence equipment to Pakistan by the developed world.

From the experience of our past, we have learnt that during any crisis, dependence on foreign military assistance (weapons, equipment, sensors etc.) is highly risk prone and may not even be available at crucial times.²⁵ Pakistan has launched an ambitious defence industrialization programme. To a large degree, we have been successful in creating sizeable arms industry, however, the dream of complete eradication of foreign dependency does not look either feasible or desirable, at least in the near future. The typical impediments attached are steering Pakistan to adopt a course in between the complete self-reliance and dependency on foreign sources.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

The cost-benefit analysis indicates many fringe benefits attached to the defence production and subsequent exports to international buyers. Increased job creation, followed by a rise in the income and livelihood of the workforce, will add to poverty elimination efforts. Increased industrial and trade activities in the downstream sector of defence industry will act as a multiplier. The foreign exchange surplus earning against the Pakistani rupee cost incurred on exported products can be diverted for high technological imports to further augment defence production, thus initiating an avalanche effect. Increased production levels to meet export targets will lead to optimum utilization of existing infrastructure, and will, subsequently, reduce the fixed cost. The overall production efficiency, thus, achieved through efficient production and

international standards shall be beneficial for even our Armed Forces, being the largest consumers.

Pakistan has a very strong base for developing its defence products indigenously and our exports had already reached the US\$70 million mark in previous years.²⁶ However, it has fallen to around US\$30 million in 2009-2010, due to Pakistan Armed Forces growing involvement in war on terror (WOT), requiring diversion of indigenous developed arms to own forces rather than to exports. Notwithstanding, we need to increase this export figure into a three digit value. For this, we must increase the number of products being manufactured and obviously bring an improvement in the capability of our existing products. A number of steps have been taken towards product diversification and enhancement of life cycle. Product diversification is an important aspect in enhancing the range of exports and in this area an innovative and dynamic approach needs to be adopted.

Pakistan's growing defence industry is progressing high-tech to keep up with the challenges of a changing world that requires advanced weapons and new strategies, to maintain peace and stability in a hostile neighbourhood. At the same time, Pakistan's defence industry is contributing to scientific, technological, industrial and economic development of the nation, by training and employing thousands of citizens. The investments made in defence production are a good bargain for the companies, their investors and the taxpayers of Pakistan, to help ensure the nation's economic, political and national security against both internal and external threats.

Indigenous Products

Pakistan's arms industry is now capable to produce ships, jet trainers, fighter aircrafts, and main battle tanks, apart from many down streams items and products. The export of arms produced by Pakistan, however, is not matching the perceived expectations as yet, due to various reasons, including lack of political clout in international power corridor, unclear arms export policies, limited access to state-of-the-art technology,

limited product diversification etc. There should be unanimity in policies of public and private investors in the yield of defence production. There are no policy guidelines for MoDP charted in the overall defence policy of Pakistan. There is a need to draw a strategy, which should be international or regional market-oriented to promote indigenous products, depending upon our potential.²⁷ The products should be made reliable, cost-effective and have back-up support. The setting up of Defence Export Promotion Organization (DEPO) was a right step in the right direction by Pakistan.

Pakistan has made significant progress in developing indigenous capabilities for production of sophisticated weapon systems and equipment.²⁸ Pakistan's defence products not only are more cost-effective and affordable but will also be more accessible for the regional countries, such as Gulf countries, due to geographical proximity. Our defence industry would enhance Pakistan's credibility in the international market. It would also help in earning sizeable foreign exchange. Pakistan has achieved reckonable excellence in defence production, which is a breakthrough in the defence field. Experts from different countries have shown interest in Pakistan's Ordnance Factories. Heavy Industries Taxila and Global Industries & Defence solutions equipment especially the Al-Khalid tank, which equals the best tanks of the world in quality.²⁹ Similarly, the products of Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) are of high quality and can compete with European, American and Russian defence equipment from all aspects.

Pakistan's existing defence industry has developed the capacity to manufacture products even beyond the domestic requirements and to export the surplus in order to earn foreign exchange. There are products that we can offer and those can surely interest the whole world. There exists a credible export potential. Our defence exports can increase dramatically by exporting Al-Khalid tanks, small Fast Attack Craft (Missile) and JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft. Our technical knowledge, quality products, skill and professionalism of our people have created a very positive image of Pakistan in the world.

Products developed by Pakistan's defence industries are being projected in the world through participation in International Defence Exhibition (IDEX). IDEX provides excellent opportunity to develop better understanding and friendship, networking of defence industry for trade and joint ventures, and more importantly, seeking affordable solutions to prevent war through conventional balance. Pakistan's participation in international forums, such as that of IDEX etc, is a testimony to the fact that today our defence industry stands at relative parity not only to the other third world countries' industry, but also matches, in certain fields, with that of the developed world.

Role of Private Sector

Globalization has afforded private sector abundant opportunities to enter new markets. Those projects which accrue the best returns for all stakeholders will be the deciding factor. The same compulsions will also be high priority determinants in decision making for the private sector, as to where they should base their projects. This phenomenon holds equally good for private sector, involved in defence related production as well. Therefore, it is essential for us to strategize astutely, as to which industrial capabilities we need to maintain inland. In absence of such a strategy, private defence industry will make independent decisions in line with their personal gains, relegating our vital national interests. This may result in frittering away the essential indigenous capability required to maintain our national security.

Defence industrial base established by the government has a potential to create an opportunity for the rest of the industrial sector, through the use of innovative technology, to improve their operational capability as a whole. For this, the public-private defence industrial partnership needs to be developed in more significant manner, where success of the partnership vitally depends upon mutual respect.

An important aspect in enhancing defence exports is the role of the private manufacturing sector in defence. In some

fields, the private sector in collaboration with the public sector has been able to assist in thwarting certain technological barriers, particularly in communication equipment, missile technology and heavy machinery as well as in certain subsystems.³⁰ The government is now actively supporting the private manufacturers in exploring foreign markets for their products, more so, in the export of non-traditional products and services.

Role of State

There is much more that Pakistani government needs to do to inspire the private industrial sector to venture into defence production sector. At present, due to heightened security concerns and complex bureaucracy, access into the defence production system is too cumbersome. This system, though inflexible to some extent, has dissuaded many new companies with the potential to be involved in defence industry. The government should evolve responsible policies to create an environment where our defence industry can thrive. These must include:-

- Internal security, creating safe and secure conditions, conducive to attracting business in Pakistan.
- Defence export budget, allocating an export budget, and prudent management of financial liabilities.
- Investment in infrastructure, delivering essential infrastructure to maximize economic, social and environmental benefits.
- Innovations; steering Pakistan to the level of investment in innovation infrastructure through the science, technology and allocation of R&D fund and strategic investment in key innovation capabilities. Develop a responsive partnership with defence industry by supporting crucial projects.
- Attractive export regulations ensuring that our taxes and charges are fair and efficient and remain

competitive with other states to attract buyers' market, with a focus on avoiding and removing irritants.

- Export promotion-assisting market's development for defence businesses. Support greater presence of Pakistan's defence capability at national and international trade fairs, exhibitions and events.
- Human resource development, contributing in developing large reservoir of human resource available in Pakistan to highly productive and skilled manufacturing workforce. Target science and engineering in broader skills programmes in the country. Promote defence industry careers, envisaging future defence industry skill needs; develop viable strategies for enhancing the skill capability in the defence industry.

Conclusion

Pakistan's security imperatives will remain the prime concern, while allocating resources to develop defence sector amongst other Elements of National Power. Expenditure is always seen as a matter of concern, due to its incompatibility with the economic state of Pakistan. Due to the lack of availability of financial resources, we are unable to maintain a balance between the military expenditure and the social sector development budget. However, the priority accorded to the military expenditure is solely based upon the threat analysis. The development of defence industry is essential to address the crucial needs of our Armed Forces at the time of crises. The arms production is a relatively expensive and resource-consuming process, as compared to their availability, but it is like an insurance premium for national assets and sovereignty. A prudent nation bears this insurance cost year after year, so that it does not lose the assets altogether. This may seem exorbitant to those, who live in immediate present and have to sacrifice their butter for the guns but, in fact, it is highly economical and worthwhile for those who have larger

perspective like comprehensive national security and for those who have yet to see the sun rising in a prosperous, secure and progressing Pakistan of tomorrow. Hence, today's Pakistan, under the international and regional circumstances, is left with a very limited choice of strategies. Our policy-makers have a real uphill task ahead, as they have to develop strategies which should reinforce our defence, while flourishing the economy.

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³ Lieutenant General (Retd) Shahid Iqbal, Secy MoDP, interview by Commodore Asif Butt, Rawalpindi, November 10, 2011.

⁴ Vice Admiral Khalid Amin, Commander Logistics, Pakistan Navy, , interview by Commodore Asif Butt, Karachi, November 16, 2011.

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- ²⁴ Lieutenant General (Retd) Shahid Iqbal, Secy MoDP, interview by Commodore Asif Butt, Rawalpindi, November 10, 2011.
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WAR ON TERROR: PERCEPTION ABOUT WAR AND ENEMY AMONG PAKISTANI COMBATANTS

Ms. Mariam Shah

Abstract

This study aims at examining the perceptions of Pakistani soldiers about the current war on terror. The soldiers' perception and understanding about the justification of this war and enemy is assessed. Sample of the present study comprised on those soldiers, who remained involved in this war on terror, in the areas including Swat, Bajaur, and Waziristan. Purposive sampling technique and snowball technique was used. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect the data. Later, content analysis was applied for analyzing the data. The findings indicated that the soldiers deem it a perfectly justified war, which is being fought within the borders of Pakistan. This war is more difficult than the conventional war as the enemy and borders were not clearly identified. The enemy is foreign sponsored, multinational and aims to destroy Pakistan. Motivation to fight is faith and sense of commitment towards nation as it is the duty of a soldier to fight. Soldiers felt lucky to be a part of this war as they were not left out when needed. The operations were considered as a success, but there should be a political mode to handle this situation for a long-term solution.

Introduction

The prevailing situation in Pakistan and the war on terror which we are fighting since the last decade has changed the overall scenario of the country including military, politics, geo-strategy and economy. The current situation cannot be fully labelled as a war or even a civil war, as the armed forces are on a full-fledge operations and most of the targeted areas have been evacuated. So, the present study aims to explore a

few very important questions, which have created a sense of confusion and bewilderment among the masses, especially, about the justification of this war inside the country and perception about enemy. In 2003, when army started operations against the militants, it was assumed that military is killing own people and initially this whole episode lacked national consensus. Nevertheless, nation's support and clarity about the rationale of war against terror developed among masses at large in due course of time.


For more than a decade, Pakistan is fighting the war on terror as a major ally of United States, and in doing so there is a great loss of military personnel, civilian lives, destruction of the national infrastructure and the internal peace of the country. Pakistan is the main victim of this war on terror, as it has affected the nation's unity, caused heavy damages to the national assets and the loss of precious human lives. Overall this war has inflicted very deep and mass-scale damages to the country. It is not a conventional war, rather, it is more of a counterinsurgency campaign. Besides a few other countries that are fighting insurgencies in their own lands for quite some time, Pakistan Army is also fighting this war on terror inside its borders for more than a decade now. What are the motivating factors for the combatants to fight this war is one of the main objectives of this study?

In this study, the experiences of Pakistani combatants have been explored through in-depth interviews. As combatants are the ones, who know the ground realities and who face the real situation, that's why, they were identified as a sample for this study. The main focus was on the conception, understanding and justification of this war and perception about enemy figure, besides a few other aspects related to combat have also been explored. Combat is not an easy phenomenon; it demands both physical and mental energies from a combatant. This research also focused on soldiers' motivations and personnel's morale, their expectations regarding the external mission environment and predictability of the situations and also their opinions about the future situation and a few aspects of the combat and soldier's feelings are also

explored in this research. This is a qualitative research, based on in-depth interviews followed by content analysis. The problem statement focused on understanding the perception about the ongoing war on terror in Pakistan among the Pakistani soldiers/combatants. As there are a lot of false impressions about the identity of enemy figure, so this study is an effort to investigate the perception about enemy among the combatants. Else motivating factors are also studied.

War on Terror

The way Pakistan Army and other security forces dealt with the terrorism and tried to secure the borders and maintain internal peace of the country is truly visible and indeed remarkable. The efforts were and are being carried out in the situation, where there exist extreme political instability and the indigenous problems like lack of religious harmony, sectarianism, poverty, serious border problems etc, but still to deal with the terrorists groups which are like some virus, spreading too fast, targeting every place from mosques to the defence installations, is not an easy job. The role of army in this war is major and appreciable. According to Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) around 3,620 soldiers have died and around 11,640 wounded since 2001 to 2012.¹ Below is the figure which shows the military casualties from 2001 to 2010.



Source: Slides provided by the Pakistan Army, taken from Shuja Nawaz, 'The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency; Learning by Doing'. (Atlantic Council. United States, 2011): 11.

Pakistan Army is not new to operate in terrorist environment. From Dir-Bajaur operations to the former East Pakistan and the UN operations, Pakistan Army knows how to deal with the insurgents.² The army was employed in all areas where the insurgents were, and it somehow managed to control, but was not able to eliminate them. Despite the short comings, the performance of the army was satisfactory.³ During the initial years of the operation, Pakistan Army was neither well-equipped nor properly trained for frontier warfare, somehow, it lacked mobility both on the ground and in the air, especially, because of the terrain and uncertainty. In recent years, Pakistan Army has made very momentous advancement in shifting its strategy and focus from conventional warfare to irregular warfare and low intensity conflicts.⁴ Pakistan Army sought the effective coordination and support of other law enforcement agencies to deal with the insurgency, worsening situations on the borders, target killings, suicide bombings and hitting of military convoys etc.

Combat

Combat is the most mentally, physically and emotionally demanding enterprise that a soldier undergoes. Combat is sudden, intense and life threatening. A soldier in combat encounters numerous traumatic events, to include among

others, killing an enemy combatant, knowing someone seriously injured or killed or handling or uncovering human remains. All of these events can have deleterious effects on the mental health and emotional well-being of the soldier⁵. In a general sense, combat is a state of focused conflict between two opposing forces, such as ideals, persons, or armed formations. If we talk about in a more specific term, it describes a direct and physical fighting between two armed formations or individual combatants. In the larger context of warfare and its prosecution, combat as a matter of active fighting is often distinguished from other military operations including logistical activities that do not involve actual conflict.⁶

Why Soldiers Fight?

Apart from general opinions and judgments, there is as such no research carried out on the combat experiences of Pakistani soldiers. It's very general, and we all know that why our soldiers fight, but this phenomenon has not been investigated through proper research so far. The common observation we get on why Pakistani soldiers fight is faith and patriotism. Islam has also served to motivate the army to fight a conventionally greater enemy and the army promotes deep respect for the military value of jihad.⁷ There is no universal explanation why men fight. There are many views, which arouse during different wars at different regions. Historians analyze this perspective in their own way, and the social scientists give their own explanations for the motivation and break down of soldiers. There can be political or ideological basis and also for equality and security, and many soldiers fight because of the notions of freedom, liberation, and democracy.⁸ To identify, why a soldier fights is a little bit difficult question to answer, because a carrier army, a guerrilla army or an army fighting in its own homeland can fight because of different reasons.⁹ There are three things that make soldiers kill: conditioning, recent experience and temperament.¹⁰

Soldiers fight for their colleagues and for their friends; they have to fight because they belong to a group that fights. They have to fight because they have been trained to fight as a soldier, and this is their aim and that's why they are in the combat field.¹¹ It was also found that for World War II soldiers, besides ending task to go home, the most common response was solidarity with one's comrades. For Iraqi regular army soldiers, it was coercion. The US soldiers in the Iraq war, had given similar responses about going home, but importantly, the most frequent response given for combat was "fighting for my buddies."¹² Motivating factors as comradeships among soldiers, personal honour, sense of duty to their country, and many other factors had been used to explain why men fought regardless of how bad the circumstances they faced. In the literature, there are many findings about war veterans that why they fight? What motivates them to fight? There were two very important and repeated responses. One was that the soldiers wanted to go home and the other was very strong group ties and bonding, and did not want to see any of their partner alone or down.¹³ Another view is that, soldiers do not fight for a cause or on some basis but they do it just because they do not want to let their comrades down.¹⁴ Another view is that the death of a comrade can cause soldiers to kill the enemy out of revenge or frustration.¹⁵

Soldiers can be trained individually and collectively to pull the trigger. Individual conditioning includes gunnery and rifle ranges and thus the trigger-pull response becomes automatic. Close supervision and command also affect firing rates among soldiers, and it has been observed that men pull the trigger more frequently under command or in groups¹⁶. In World War II, the infantry unit firing ratios were studied and concluded that only 15 to 25 per cent of infantry-men ever fired their weapons in combat¹⁷. While recognizing the fact, that the soldiers had to be conditioned to fire, the army changed its instruction and training programmes after World War II, and there was a drastic lift in the firing rates. During the Korean War the firing rate rose to 55 per cent. He suggested that gradually more realistic and practical training was needed to overcome the normal and natural reluctance of soldiers to kill,

and during Vietnam War the figure of firing rate reached 95 per cent.¹⁸

Perception of Soldiers towards War and Enemy

Combat can even be experienced as both a greatly positive and considerable experience in a soldier's life.¹⁹ Gray specified, "the soldier who has yielded himself to the fortunes of war, has sought to kill and to escape being killed, or who has even lived long enough in the disordered landscape of battle, is no longer what he was"²⁰. A study was conducted on the perception of Belgian soldiers towards their enemy during the First World War, 1914-1918. The war between Belgium and Germany can be divided into three phases: the first phase is the invasion or attack by the German forces until they were stopped. The second one begins with the deadlock and the development of trench warfare on the Western Front, and the last phase is the pushing back the Germans and final victory. In the first phase with the invasion and brutality of the Germans, Belgian soldiers formed a view of Germans as barbarians, capable of doing anything. With the second phase, the perceptions started to deviate among the men, depending on experience and surroundings of the soldiers; some got used to their new environment. In the third phase, the soldiers became eager again, because of the view of being able to go home. Belgians forgot what happened during the war, nor let go of their views that were formed.²¹

Sample

In order to validate the hunch of the study, purposive sampling was done and the selected soldiers of varying age and rank were interviewed. For the interview data, the respondents were selected through snowball sampling (non-probability sampling technique).

Sampling Criteria

- The soldiers, who have faced combat in the war-struck areas (started in 2003 in FATA), are incorporated.

- The soldiers, who are currently serving in army, are included in this study.
- Soldiers with some psychological disorders or admitted in hospitals are not included.
- Soldiers with combat experience only in Kashmir or Siachen are not a part of this research; they must have been to Wana, Swat, Waziristan, Bajaur, FATA, etc.

Procedure

The first step was to develop an interview guideline that can help and facilitate the collection of data in accordance with the desired objectives of the study. A list of questions was prepared, checked by few of the professionals and, later, it was approved through committee approach. After finalizing a 15-item semi-structured interview guideline, established for conducting the interviews, the in-depth interviews were conducted in different regions (Lahore, Rawalpindi, Kohat, and Attock). The soldiers were of varying demographics, and they had their combat in places including (Swat, Bajaur, South Waziristan and Bannu).

The participants were ensured of their anonymity and also that the obtained data will be confidential and will be used for research purpose only. The interviews were recorded. Later, content analysis was used to analyze the obtained data from the interviews.

Categories of Analysis

Categories were identified from the data for the analysis of responses (data). They are mentioned below:

- Conception & Understanding of War on Terror.
- Perception about Enemy.
- Motivating Factors.
- Feelings for Fellow Soldiers/Combatants Who Died.
- Greatest Achievement/ Loss during War.
- Inferences from Recent Situation.


Reliability and Validity

As in qualitative studies, biases are inevitable, so to reduce the subjective influence on the results, two judges were invited to conduct the coding process of the interviews. To guarantee the reliability of the coding process, the study used the method of inter-judge reliability. The judges were handed over the interviews and asked to identify the existence of a given category in each unit of analysis (interviews), and rate its intensity on a 7-point rating scale. The results from two judges were then reconciled to ensure the reliability of the coding. Frequencies and intensities were obtained for the themes generated later on.

Results


The three flowcharts are explaining the conception and understanding of war on terror, the perception about enemy and soldier's assessment about combat zone (flowcharts are attached).

Figure 1




The above figure shows the concept and understanding of war on terror among combatants who fought it. It's brief description of the key themes which emerged about the concept, possible differences in the conventional and current war scenario, and the inferences which the soldiers drawn from the recent situation after the fighting/combating it. *1 shows the consensus and emphasis of soldiers. *2 show the difference but emphasis of the soldiers.

Figure 2



The above figure shows the concept and understanding of enemy/rival in this war on terror. This is a concise account of the origin, motives and general attributes of the enemy figure according to the narration of the soldiers. *1 shows the consensus and emphasis of soldiers. *2 show the disagreement but emphasis of soldiers.

Figure 3



The above figure shows the assessments of soldiers about their combat experiences which precisely comprise of the feelings, unforgettable experiences and unpredictability of the combat zone. It also shows the motivating factors and losses of soldiers in the current war. *1 shows the consensus and emphasis of solders. *2 show the disagreement but emphasis of soldiers.

Discussion

The main focus of this study was to clarify few important arguments, which have risen in Pakistan due to this war on terror that includes perception about the enemy figure and understanding of this war on terror and its justification. Besides, a few other important things have also been explored, which included motivation, predictability and inference of soldiers towards the war situation. Detailed discussion is given below with respect to each identified category.

Conception & Understanding of War on Terror

Those who are actively involved in the combat of this war on terror, think about this war as perfectly justified, reason being, there was no appropriate solution to it. Moreover, as armed rebels (enemy) didn't accept any plausible rationale for taking up the arms as such, so there was no other option but to fight them out and here was no ambiguity in it. Two of the comrades said if there was any ambiguity in fighting the enemy, they would have resigned from Pakistan Army.

The Just War Tradition believes that war is commenced only, if the nation has attempted all other options and failed. If other strategies, alternatives and required solutions were not attempted before entering war, then such a war is not justified. Therefore, having tried all possible means and alternatives and still leaving the nation with no choice, but to engage in war as a last resort or option, then war is justified.²² Hence, from the responses of the soldiers, the operations started by Pakistan Army in northern areas are very much justified, as there was no other option to tackle this issue. There was also another view that one cannot handover his country to any force, good or bad. Everything that threatens the national security and integrity, it's absolutely right to fight that out. Writ of the state should be functional as a state; it should be ensured, be it threatened from outside or inside.

As it was a complex situation, there were apprehensions in the start and the things were not clear. According to the

replies the combatants, who were in command, first saw and observed things, and when they got fully convinced, they had to fight and never looked back. Operations were done as a last option, first the things were observed; pacts were singed to make the insurgents responsible, and then as a last resort, operations were started, and it was a maximum effort to save people, not to target the innocent civilian population, and to avoid damage. Few of the combatants also revealed that they don't favour war, but there was no other option left, rather to fight them out. Combatant revealed that it was not like that that just after reaching the areas the fire was opened. First the things were observed; pacts were singed and then as a last resort, operations were started. It was maximum effort to save people, not to target the innocent civilian population, and to avoid damage.

This war is hard and difficult than a conventional one. This was the response of most of the soldiers. There are no defined frontiers, war is everywhere, there is no local/national support, enemy is not clear and unidentified, and there is uncertainty everywhere. Here, to identify the enemy, was one of the difficult tasks as all the natives resemble same because of their language and attire, so it created a sense of helplessness among the combatants.

As the American soldiers in Vietnam were unable to understand the language or behaviour of the enemy, it was one of the frustrations for the soldiers. This contributed to the sense of helplessness that many American soldiers had in terms of fighting and identifying the enemy.²³

All the soldiers, who were interviewed, think that this war is perfectly justified, and it was the need of the time. More or so, the general feelings of the soldiers about their own combat in the war on terror was that all of them felt lucky to be a part of this war; there was a complete sense of satisfaction that they did something for their country, they were working for a cause, and this was the basic purpose, the Nation and Army brought them up. Most of them volunteered in order to become a part of the fighting spirit and active army. One

soldier said, "I never thought of getting out of here. I feel satisfied." Another said, "I am much better than those who have not been a part of this war." According to the responses, there was a sense of commitment among the soldiers. There was no such thing to show weakness or to get rid of this duty, and go back to their homes. For all of them, the entire tenure was memorable, but the dominating memories were of the ambushes and deaths of fellow comrades.

Perception about Enemy

The perception of enemy among most of the combatants is that they are worse than non-believers, they don't know how to pray, they don't know the "Kalma", they have grown beards and hairs but they have no inclination and understanding of Islam, they slaughter men and also mutilate the dead bodies. It was the common observation of all the combatants. One soldier said, "Enemy is enemy. They are wild, we are not. We are an institution. They used to mutilate our dead bodies but we never did."

There also lies a consensus among the soldiers that the enemy is foreign sponsored, as the weaponry and ammunition they hold is far better than that of army. Every one of the interviewed combatants stressed upon the fact that enemy is heavily sponsored by foreign hand, especially the anti-Pakistan elements are actively involved in funding and supporting the enemy faction, which is *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)*. One soldier said, "they get instructions on pamphlets; they have a channel, a network." One said, "enemy is taking advantage of lack of our unity, and it's an effort of enemy to create conflicts among our sects." Another soldier shared, "they know how to plant an Improvised Explosive Device (IED); they are well trained and equipped."

The main concept of the enemy lies in the fact that they have challenged the government, they are rebels and terrorists. Perception about their aims varies; few said that they want to gain power, money, terrorize people, and weaken Pakistan and to destroy Pakistan Army; a few said that

because of revenge they have developed. It has also been stated that they all are multinational people, ultimately linked with Al-Qaida. So a general perception was that the enemy doesn't have the inclination and understanding of Islam, and they are exploiting the name of Islam. The enemy easily merges in the locals, so it's difficult to identify them. They created an uncertain and unpredictable environment, and they have found another way to fight, instead of fighting on the borders. This shows that few anti-Pakistan elements are fighting their proxy wars inside Pakistan to destabilize the functions of the state.

In the Vietnam War, American soldiers also referred this as that those who were allies during the day might be enemies, at night.²⁴ This assessment also stands true for Pakistan, as identity of the enemy was difficult to find among the combatants. According to findings, one of the main aims of the enemy soldier identified was that they want to weaken Pakistan, and destroy the infrastructure; inflict damage to the security forces, schools, mosques and assets. TTP is a foreign sponsored organization, which aimed at destroying Pakistan and weakens the state structure. They have sophisticated weaponry and better arms and ammunition than Pakistan Army. One of the combatants revealed that enemy has snipers and better weapons to fight.

Motivating Factors

Combat motivation is a major factor in enabling conventional armies to win conflicts; in the case of Israel's army, it has been referred to as the, 'secret weapon' of the Israel Defence Forces.²⁵ Intrinsic motivations are those motivations that the civilian brings into the military as genetic, cultural, or social endowments. Extrinsic motivations are those which are consequent of the military by socialization, training and other forms of conditioning.²⁶ During this war, the basic motivating factor for the soldier, primarily, was faith, which can refer to as "a secret weapon" for a Muslim soldier here, then patriotism and then the feeling that they owe this to their country, as army and nation has

trained them for this purpose. So, both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations were present. There can be political or ideological basis and also for equality and security, and many soldiers fight because of the notions of freedom, liberation, and democracy.²⁷ At the primary or individual level, there are other factors that provide Israel Defence Forces with high levels of morale and combat motivation, aim, a role, and a reason for self-confidence.²⁸

The Pakistani soldiers revealed their motivation factors are faith, patriotism, and devotion to cause, comradeship, training and orders. One combatant shared, "Army is very much committed in these conflicts, so why not volunteer today to secure a better tomorrow". The spirit of volunteerism was also visible as two of the combatants volunteered for this war. The combatants have a feeling that army has nourished them and trained them to fight, so it's the time to pay back.

According to the replies of the soldiers, they were clear in their motives and there was no ambiguity. It disclosed a fact that clarity of the purpose and mind is necessary to fight and go to war. Orders for the soldiers are also important, as two of the combatants said, "Whenever there was an order they were always ready to go." The junior rank combatants shared, "when they had a feeling that they are not going alone to fight was enough to motivate them to move on." Here a feeling of comradeship develops, and it's also one of the major motivation factors for today's soldier. From the replies of the soldiers, it can also be said that our soldiers fight because they belong to a group that fights. They fight because they have been trained to fight as a soldier, and this is their aim and that's why they are here in the battlefield.

Most Israeli reservists who report for reserve duty not only do so because they feel a duty to protect Israeli citizens, but also because they do not want to let their comrades down and face their criticism the next time they report for reserve duty.²⁹ The similar view was also shared by soldiers here, as they don't want to let their comrades down and be counted among traitors. Pakistani soldiers reported that the time of

death is predetermined, before that time, they will not die; this was also a factor, which kept them moving at the battlefield. Conviction and honour were also acting as the motivating factors, as reported by the three combatants.

Lambrecht briefly explained, "as comradeships among soldiers, personal honour, sense of duty to their country, and many factors have been used to explain why men fought regardless of how bad the circumstances.³⁰" According to the responses of the combatants, personal honour and loyalty to the nation and army were also among the motivating factors.

Feelings for Fellow Soldiers/Combatants Who Died

The soldiers think about the fellow combatants who died in this war as *martyrs*. It is Allah's will; they were selected for this job. They were the chosen ones, and they embraced martyrdom. They were destined to die an honourable death. All those who died were great people and of high character, at the peak of morality and ethics. When one has to achieve something, one has to sacrifice, and in the situations like war, there are a lot of sacrifices, which includes the loss of human lives and the destruction of the infrastructure. It is evident from the answer of one of the respondents who said, "this is the cost of the war, and we have to pay it."

In the military "morale" and "motivation" are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights the condition of the group (or the unit), while motivation describes, principally, the attribute of an individual.³¹ According to the responses of combatants, loss of a soldier's life used to affect the fellow combatants and sometimes morale do pulled down for losing a life. But faith 'whosoever dying is a martyr' used to cover that grief. One of the commanding officers said that during combat, loss of the first man used to break the spirits of the combatants, but once they realized that they had to sacrifice lives for a cause and certain goals then it did not affect too much of the morale. One combatant said, "it was a routine there, and we were always prepared to face some loss".

It was also noted from the responses that soldiers want to take revenge; they want to pay back the enemy. Morale is different in the different situations of the war. When they were losing, a single martyrdom would de-motivate the individuals, but when they were winning then martyrdom would charge everybody, and they would want to avenge the death of their comrades. A few think that a death of an officer affects the troops, as they become directionless, but they fight with more courage and bravery to avenge the death of their officer.

Greatest Achievement/Loss during War

As the soldiers had a tough time of their life in the battle field, they achieved victories and suffered losses during their tenures and the achievements, and losses vary between national and personal levels. The responses vary on the greatest achievement and loss during the war on terror. The general view regarding achievement was the victories and successes in the operations and the defeats of the enemy. A study stated that the soldiers need to achieve definite and tangible objectives in order to sustain high combat motivation.³²

Achievement varies from tangible to the abstract phenomenon as saving lives, defeating enemy, protecting some ideology, doing something for others or some personal level achievement. One soldier referred as, "we not only defeated them physically, but also morally, ethically and psychologically. This is my gain." Another soldier, who was commanding the troops, feels the motivated and sensible behaviour of the troops as his achievement. Not losing the territory to enemy and completing a difficult task with meagre resources was also an achievement, as shared by one of the combatants.

The task given to soldiers is a responsibility for them, if they fully do that, it's an achievement for them. Tribal areas are a part of Pakistan; and the people there, are true and honest, but misguided and used. Young people or youth is an asset for the nation, and if it is not on the right path, then

nation suffers a lot. For more than a decade, these areas are under war, and the youth there is getting destroyed. Doing something for them, as they are very much a part of this country, is an achievement for one of the combatants. Every soldier tried his best to help the people of the tribal areas. According to replies of the combatants, the education of the children over there was not neglected, and it was the maximum effort to avoid damage to any innocent life. This shows the positive attitude and feelings of soldiers towards their countrymen.

In this war, thousands of army men have died, and thousands have become crippled and disfigured. For one of the commanding officers, the individual who have become crippled, who lost their limbs is a great loss for him, as life would be difficult for them now. During this war, there is huge destruction to the schools, hospitals, mosques and other assets. The areas in which the schools have been blown up, the children there are the worst victims, as their future will be at stake, thus the future generation of tribal areas will be in ignorance, and this is one of the greatest losses, one combatant shared. He also emphasized that it should be a concern for all. The economic loss is also huge. Pakistan is not a developed nation, and the collateral damage by this war has affected the whole economic condition. Pakistan is the largest victim of terrorism, but somehow, the image of Pakistan as a terrorist nation has been built by western media. All the combatants felt and shared that the way the image of the country has been distorted is deep and the ideology and religion has been misinterpreted. The word Muslim is being paralleled with terrorist, the image of Pakistani nation is coined with a terrorist nation. So it's a huge loss to our country, religion and ideology.

Inferences from War on Terror

War on terror is more than a decade old phenomenon in Pakistan. Those who are fighting and combating the terrorists, think positively about the future of this whole condition, as they think that the enemy is being eliminated, and army is

always there to fight and protect the motherland from such insurgency and all the operations are successful. Soldiers were of the view that army is not the solution for this thing, army is always there to fight, there is no unwillingness to sacrifice, army has proved that it can handle, it has done its job but there should be a political mode to solve it. Army is just an instrument, and all the instruments should be used to completely solve this problem, war is never a solution to anything, it needs a wholesome strategy at national level.

A report by Atlantic Council 'The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency; Learning by Doing', also stated that Pakistan military cannot win this war alone; it needs the cooperation of the civilian government and other political actors. Unless the civilian and military build a network of mutual trust and support, army will be fighting the unending battles. Political and civilian strategy has to be materialized and to cooperate with Pakistan Army to solve this problem.³³ There lies a consensus that this war is more tough and hard, than a conventional war, as enemy and borders are not clearly defined. One combatant shared that this tough time for Pakistan Army, in shape of this war, is training, and the conventional war is far easier than this one. One soldier said, "Army can't have a much better training than this war; we are very well trained to seek out the conventional enemy now." According to the report by Atlantic Council, "Pakistan's Army has learned by doing in its fight against the insurgency and militancy that has challenged the writ of government. It has very rapidly shifted its focus to better training and response to the challenge."³⁴

A few critics/ pseudo intellectuals are in a state of confusion about this war and have criticized a lot the army's role, not realizing the sacrifices made by them. According to the respondents, the basic irritant for a soldier is the lack of awareness, unity, understanding of the enemy, lack of realization of the sacrifices made and least concern about any national thing. The insensitive attitude of said critics decline to support the sacrifices made by the law enforcing agencies, then this affects the motivation of those who are fighting.

Their pessimistic approach on the role of army, in the war on terror, is a major factor to de-motivate the soldiers. The attitude and perception of the soldiers is affected by their criticism. In this grave situation, no one will be willing to go and fight in tribal areas, but there is something that motivates and charges these souls to go and sacrifice their lives. The national support to the security forces is one of the major tools for a soldier and this has been emphasized a lot. A soldier alone is not sacrificing or being affected rather his whole family gets affected. If a soldier shows a sense of commitment towards nation and remains in the battle field till last, so the nation at least owe them the honour and respect they deserve, and all the combatants stressed upon this.

Unity of the nation and support to the security forces is highly emphasized. Soldiers have felt the lack of unity and support to the armed forces from the nation. Wars are not fought by the armies; rather the whole nation fights them. The stance of the nation should be on one thing, they should be united against the enemy, but this is not the case in Pakistan, as the supporters of enemy are there as well, that's why many people think that it's not a justified war. This is a modern era, where the media over rules everything. Same is the case here, who has the power to influence media, is winning. Two soldiers shared this aspect that media warfare and propaganda by the enemy is very strong as they are using media as a tool. Soldiers, in overall, are quite hopeful, as the operations were very successful, but there is a need to switch from fire fighting to political solution. The solution of this problem is not army; it should be sought out through a much focused and political leadership. Army has done its job, and it will do again when needed, but the nation should realize the sacrifices made by them, and get united on this cause as early as possible, because the more we will delay, the more we will lose time to solve it. So it's the time to realize and recognize the enemy and support the security forces.

Conclusion

From the findings one can conclude that the war, which Pakistan Army is fighting inside the borders, is perfectly justified, as there is no solution to it and the enemy is heavily backed by anti-Pakistan elements. The enemy is playing games at the support of foreign elements, which aims to destroy Pakistan and its security forces. There lies consensus among few concepts and marked difference in other few. Justification of war, unidentified enemy and borders, sense of commitment to nation and faith to fight the war were few findings, where there was a consensus. Destruction of country, harm to ideology and the loss of innocent lives is a depressing thing for everyone. One can also conclude that army is there to fight but there is a need to sort this out through political mode, and hope is there, if timely acted upon this issue.

Every study has some limitations and there is always a room for improvement. First limitation is with the reliability and validity of the coding process. The human error cannot be neglected, although the experts were given the task of coding. Owing to scarcity of time and resources the availability of sample was limited, because, it was difficult to trace the right soldiers. Being a sensitive issue, it was not easy to convince combatants to give interviews. As it was the first research of its kind, so there was no Pakistani literature available, apart from the opinions and judgments. Access to battle zone is not allowed to interview the combatants, therefore, it remains a hindrance to attain true assessments and the first hand know-how about the ground realities of the combat zone and combatants.

As for suggestions, it can be done with more soldiers of varying demographics, to make the phenomenon more clear, understandable and visible. There can be a study parallel to it, focusing the soldiers, who have their combat in Kashmir and Siachin, so as to make a comparative analysis on the results of both. Personnel from Air Force can also be included in the future studies, who were involved in aerial combat for the

better understandings of the combat and related concepts about the war on terror.

As there is no research on this area, so this research can provide some literature on the subject, especially regarding the soldiers. This study will help in creating mass awareness about Pakistan's role in fighting this war on terror. There is a need of mass level awareness, which both print and electronic media can play about the role of Pakistan, in specific, and Pakistan Army, in particular, in this war on terror. Pakistan herself is a victim of terrorism, so the western nations should realize it and appreciate the efforts done by Pakistan. This study can also create national consensus on this issue, and aware the public to support the armed forces. This study has highlighted a very important phenomenon regarding the impression of enemy among the soldiers. This concept needs to be more explored by the researchers to make it clearer.

Author

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THE DYNAMICS OF INDO-PAK PEACE PROCESS

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

Abstract

Indo-Pak history is marred with revulsion, mistrust and hostility. A generation of the post-colonial era of this region has departed without having the slightest feeling of amity or trust between the two geographically contiguous neighbours, having a long history of living together with a joint struggle against the British Colonialism. Indeed, peace between India and Pakistan is the prerequisite for achieving stability and economic development in South Asia. In the past, efforts were made at both bilateral and multilateral levels to normalize the relationship between these key South Asian neighbours, however, these attempts only resulted in limited economic interactions. There was little genuine determination or effort to address core political and bilateral issues that were a cause for belligerency between the two. The strategic culture of unpleasantness, the sense of insecurity and mistrust, and the divergent geopolitical interests of the great powers have also contributed to this environment of distrust and antagonism. Consequently, peace remained a distant dream for the people of Subcontinent. This research is an attempt to investigate the bilateral, regional and global factors that have hindered the peace process between India and Pakistan. The paper critically analyzes the strategic culture, political issues, and geo-political interests of major global actors that have, somehow, hampered the peace process in the region. It also enquires the attempts at economic integration between both the countries that have failed to materialize. Towards the conclusion, a realistic way forward is suggested for a stable and long-term peace between these key countries of South Asia.

Introduction

The history of regional associations is testimony to the fact that without achieving political understanding, an

environment of trust cannot be generated. The critical nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan needs particular attention at the bilateral, regional and global levels. Arguably, tensions between both rivals has the potential to bring the world to the brink of nuclear disaster,¹ on the other hand, the resolution of core issues between the two, would bring the region to new heights of peace and economic prosperity.

The adoption of a people-centric approach is the recipe needed for addressing the core issues of conflict between India and Pakistan. Such an approach would bring economic prosperity in South Asia, thus alleviating the worst poverty, currently rampant in the region. In order to improve the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, a composite dialogue process was started in 1997.² Unfortunately, there remained inconsistency in this process mainly due to sporadic incidents on both sides, and a lack of trust, political will and determination to resolve the bilateral issues between the leaderships of both countries.³

Analysing the case study of the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), one learns that, Europe united following the collapse of Communism in early 1990s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall,⁴ the Europeans buried their hatchets for the sake of the economic well-being of their people and regional development. In 1993, upon finalization of 'Maastricht Treaty' on European Union⁵, a single market of Europe came into being, based on freedom of movement of goods, services, people and money. ASEAN also came into being in 1967, to promote regional economies and social growth. Since its inception, "ASEAN has successfully nurtured the cooperation in political, economical, social and cultural fields with shared interest."⁶ The leadership of these regions had the political will and determination to resolve their bilateral differences and political issues for a greater cause; the regional concord, stability and economic prosperity. Conversely, the South Asian neighbours, however, failed to produce an environment of trust,⁷ mainly due to some unresolved political issues, and have remained hostage to

animosity for the last sixty-five years. So far, the Indo-Pak relationship has been driven by aversion and mutual distrust.

Historically, the Indo-Pak independence was marked by the beginning of the cold war, which was characterized by the realist paradigm of international relations. Realists believe that peace and security through strength is the organizing principle of international relations.⁸ Having been placed in opposite ideological blocks, India and Pakistan remained hostile to each other over numerous issues, indeed, one of the most critical but unresolved issues of contemporary international relations.

The perpetual divergences between India and Pakistan have many implications, which are not only local in nature but their prolonged continuance also has regional and global repercussions. The leading inference being that, South Asia could not be integrated as a region, politically as well as economically.⁹ Undoubtedly, in the process, India and Pakistan were able to attain the status of nuclear powers, but over 27.5%¹⁰ people of both countries still suffer from abject poverty and deprivation. Being major countries of South Asia, their animosity has held back the economic wellbeing of the people of other South Asian countries besides their own. On this account, it is possible to argue that the ineffectiveness of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is also due to the mistrust between both countries. Indeed, peace is a continuous process, therefore, there is no place to start and certainly no place to end policies for peace.¹¹ In order to ascertain some of the impediments in the way of normalization of relations between major South Asian rivals, there is a need to analyse the strategic culture that existed from the time of their independence.

Indo-Pak Strategic Culture

The division of India was not only a political event; it had ideological and religious dimensions too. Indeed, despite living together and ruling the majority Hindu population for over 800 years, Muslims of the Subcontinent maintained their

separate identity, and so did the Hindus. Neither side merged into each other's culture and civilization despite living side by side for hundreds of years. After independence, the ubiquitous societal divergence between the Muslims and the Hindus gave birth to two distinctive strategic cultures.¹² The radical class of the Hindus did not accept the partition of India and developed a thinking according to which they were determined either to end the very existence of Pakistan or to make it politically and economically subservient to India. The concept of Hindutva remained the strategic thinking of the leading ruling Hindu class, who dominated the Indian political landscape. They believe that the Hindus are the real masters of the Indian Subcontinent.

This Indian supremacy was undesirable in Pakistani strategic culture. In fact, after having won independence based on the two-nation theory, the state of Pakistan remained under a constant security threat from India. Indeed, in the post independence scenario, the issue of Kashmir became the focal point of rivalry between India and Pakistan. Pakistan claimed Kashmir based on the Indian partition plan,¹³ under which geographically contiguous Muslim majority areas were to become part of Pakistan. After the Kashmir War (1947-48), the UN intervened, and it was decided that Kashmir issue would be resolved as per the wishes of its people, through an impartial plebiscite. India, however, initially dilly-dallied and later refused to conduct plebiscite, claiming it to be its integral part, based on a so-called instrument of accession. Nevertheless, Kashmiri people and neutral historians like Alastair Lamb, consider this as a one-sided fabricated story.¹⁴ Pakistan still declares Kashmir as a disputed area, whose future should be decided by its people under UN resolutions. There are over twenty-five UN resolutions, supported by the international community, all demanding the resolution of the Kashmir issue as per the wishes of its people, through an impartial plebiscite.¹⁵ Hence, on Kashmir, it is the Indian stringency versus the international community and Indian repression versus the right of self-determination to Kashmiri people.

Within Pakistan, no leader could dare compromise on Kashmir. Even, the most popular leader of his time, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had to accept during Simla Agreement-1972, that domestic compulsions did not allow him any bargaining on the Kashmir issue.¹⁶ This unresolved issue, remained dominant throughout in the history of Indo-Pakistan peace process, where the weight of domestic pressure did not allow the political leadership to contravene the basic stance over the issue. For Pakistan, Kashmir is a very important issue to be resolved as per the wishes of its people. Besides, considering the political and diplomatic support of Kashmiri people as its moral obligation, the resolution of issue would give geo-economic and geopolitical advantages to Pakistan. India too has its geo-economic and geostrategic reasons for holding on part of Kashmir under its control. The difference is that, while Pakistan has been focussed on respecting the wishes of the Kashmiri people, India, on the other hand, has sought to suppress their wishes. At the minimum level, what India should embark upon in the Indian-held Kashmir is negative peace. Negative peace is the absence of violence of all kinds.¹⁷ Furthermore, India is aspiring to secure a permanent membership in a future re-structured United Nations Security Council, therefore, it has to resolve its issues with Pakistan, especially the issue of Kashmir.¹⁸

The development of antagonistic cultures in both states is visible at the political as well as societal levels. In both countries, the young generation is taught this culture at the academic level. The historical heroes of one another are portrayed as usurpers and malevolent. In some cases, history is distorted and redrawn in favour of each other's strategic culture. In military terms, the naming of weapons, like Prithvi, Ghouri missiles etc, expresses an emotional bias against each other.¹⁹ The presence of hardliners, in terms of their respective strategic cultures, in both countries strengthened each other's position in the society by counter opposition.

A graver problem is the covert quasi-alliance that "hawks" on both sides establish by thriving on each other's prejudices. This has an impact

*on domestic politics, in that the objective, value neutral, apolitical commentary by hardliners reinforces if only unwittingly reactionary forces in polity. This can be witnessed on both sides of the border.*²⁰

Insecurity and Mistrust

“Of all the dilemmas in world politics, the security dilemma is quintessential. It goes right to the heart of the theory and practice of international politics.”²¹ Pakistan got independence in an environment of insecurity. The geographical size, economic strength and military prowess of India remained a big threat for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. This threat was further enhanced by the fact that successive Indian governments had not completely reconciled with the reality of Pakistan; the Indian role in the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, being one such example. Therefore, right from the outset, the chief priority for Pakistan was to address its security dilemma vis-à-vis India.²² The security of the country was a top priority and the main objective of foreign policy was the state’s defence. Since, militarily the state was not capable enough to ensure its defence from a foreign aggression, thus, Pakistan opted for military alliance with the United States to balance out the Indian military power, which later proved otherwise. Highlighting the need for a strong defence of Pakistan, the former President of Pakistan, late Muhammad Ayub Khan, once remarked:-

*More than ever before our Armed Forces must enhance their effectiveness and remain at a high state of readiness to secure our rights, to deter and, if necessary to defeat aggression. This must continue to be done till such time as we find ourselves in a friendly and healthier environment, where all disputes could be settled by peaceful means.*²³

This message conveyed two important guidelines of Pakistan's foreign policy. The first was that Pakistan would never accept Indian hegemony and secondly, until India came to terms with Pakistan on equal footings with peaceful intent, the government would keep on deterring Indian aggression. It suggested that without the resolution of political problems, peace could not be established with India.

Along with the security dilemma that Pakistan has been facing, a number of other Indian intentions and acts have become the source of mistrust for Islamabad. The refusal to solve Kashmir issue, based on the wishes of its people was the first and foremost cause of mistrust against Indian leaders.²⁴ Similarly, disintegration of Pakistan through aggression in East Pakistan, the Brasstacks exercises and the alleged involvement of India along with Israel in the plans of attacking Pakistan's nuclear facilities at Kahuta reinforced the perception that India could not be trusted. India's big-power ambition and the desire to play a global role by becoming a member of United Nations Security Council further alarmed Pakistani decision makers that anyhow, Indian leadership is all out to make India a regional hegemonic power, and Pakistan is the sole and final irritant towards this design. Military steps taken by India to pursue its global agenda have always created power imbalance vis-à-vis Pakistan.²⁵ In response, Pakistan had to build its military and strategic capability to address its security concerns. Indian advancement in conventional military equipment and missile development are two cases in point. After the nuclearization of South Asia, the power balancing game between both adversaries took a new dimension, expressed in the following words:-

In order to keep the low intensity conflict within sub-tolerance threshold, India requires a viable conventional capability. To redress the conventional imbalance, Pakistan deems, it requires a nuclear deterrent. And to prevent operational employment of the Pakistani

*nuclear capability, India posits unacceptable damage.*²⁶

This is a situation created by the application of action-reaction phenomenon. When one state develops its military component of national power, though not specifically for a particular country, the concerned state tends to respond in similar terms. In the case of India and Pakistan, India has always taken the lead and prompted Pakistan to engage in an arms race. Although India has often tried to justify that it was a global level power, and its military development was not Pakistan-centric, yet its conventional and strategic moves have created a security dilemma for Pakistan. Moreover, in order to survive, Pakistan had to develop its military capability for strengthening its defence. After all, there have been three wars between India and Pakistan and just a border clash between India and China in 1962, during which US and West helped India militarily, politically and financially. They even warned Pakistan for taking any aggressive act against India during this border conflict.

On its part, India misperceived that Pakistani membership of SEATO and CENTO defence pacts, was meant against it and that the military aid received by Islamabad from these pacts would eventually be used against it. Nonetheless, the real US objective was that this military assistance to Pakistan was meant for the containment of Communism. Pakistan, however, used this US weaponry to defend itself against India in 1965 and 1971, and was admonished by US accordingly. The initiation of 'Operation Gibraltar' before the outbreak of 1965 war, support for the Kashmir liberation movement and the Kargil conflict-1999, created further mistrust between both countries.

In conventional military capabilities, there is asymmetry between India and Pakistan, to the advantage of the former. India's hegemonic designs in the South Asian region backed by military might have been a source of concern and distrust for all the nations in this region. Just to quote, Nepal, the only Hindu state in the world, is highly influenced by Indian

policies.²⁷ Bangladesh is facing acute water shortages owing to Indian water manipulation, being upper riparian.²⁸ In Sri Lanka, Indian involvement during the insurgency has been a dreadful phase in the history of that country.

Geopolitical Hindrances

Although promotion of economic activities, trade and business is essential between India and Pakistan, yet trust building and restoration of peace and harmony is even more important. Alongside economic engagement between India and Pakistan, there is a need for political understanding, based on the very theory of mutual interests. In the case of India and Pakistan, many projects of geo-economic significance are feasible, but the clash of their respective geopolitical interests becomes a hurdle in their implementation. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline projects are two cases in point.

India is a big consumer of energy. Parallel to its economic growth, it needs huge amounts of affordable and easily accessible energy. The Central Asian Republics, especially Turkmenistan, offer the region with required energy in the form of natural gas. However, India has no geographic contiguity with the Central Asian landmass. India will have to import Turkmen natural gas either via sea routes or through the territory of a third state. The ideal pipeline route with respect to cost and distance is Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite agreement, New Delhi is hesitant to get natural gas through this route because of the fear that if this route is materialized, it would enhance Pakistan's geopolitical significance at the cost of Indian interests.

In the Indian perspective, it is thought that dependence on Pakistan for energy and trade needs would make the Indian economy hostage to disruption of supply by Pakistan. Consequently, Indian political leverage vis-à-vis Pakistan

would be neutralized. Therefore, India is considering other options to gain access to Central Asian hydrocarbon resources. In the past, India refused to become part of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline on a similar pretext besides US pressure.²⁹

Geopolitical hurdles in the way of Indo-Pakistan peace process are not limited to the bilateral level. The geographical significance of South Asia attracts the involvement of global powers for serving their own interests. The US has always exploited the countries of this region for pursuing its global agenda.³⁰ If Pakistan's geostrategic significance was used against the spread of Communism and the later disintegration of the former Soviet Union or for fighting the war on terror inside Afghanistan, the Indian geopolitical significance is being exploited for the containment of China, regionally as well as globally.³¹ The US has had a policy of favouring one state at the expense of another to serve its own interests. This superpower could have played a positive role towards normalization of Indo-Pak relations, had it really wished a stable and peaceful Subcontinent.³²

Factors Impeding Economic and Political Integration

The Liberal theorists of international relations believe that economic engagement between adversaries not only provides absolute gains to each party, but it also brings political stability in their relationship. At the bilateral level, the followers of liberalism justify their theory by citing the precedence set by France and Germany after World War-II.³³ Both states were bitter enemies during the first and the second world wars, but afterwards, they buried their hatchets by jointly pooling their resources of coal and steel. This arrangement made the grounds for the improvement of their political relations, and eventually, they were united in the European Union. The European model inspires the current peace process, predominantly focusing on economic integration, which in turn gives way to political integration.³⁴ Some of the lessons of EU may be useful for the South Asians, but unlike EU, India and Pakistan have different ideologies.

At the multilateral level, the substantiation of the liberals' claim can be found in the economic integration of South-East Asian countries into ASEAN. These states were also involved in various bilateral and multilateral disputes, but for the sake of economic development of their respective countries, they implemented joint economic ventures, which resulted in unprecedented growth in their economies and normalization of their political relations too.

Liberalism is one of the dominant thoughts in international relations theory, especially its significance after the cold war cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the application of this theory in the case of Indo-Pak relations has not been materialized due to some significant factors. One of the dominant factors, which reconciled the interests of countries of European and ASEAN, was the fear of a single external enemy. The threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe and that of China against ASEAN was so strong that they had to reconcile their political differences. In case of India and Pakistan, there was no common enemy, whose hegemonic design could have brought South Asian neighbours closer together on economic and political grounds.

Secondly, US political and economic support played a considerable role in the formation and strengthening of the European Union and ASEAN.³⁵ The same nature of political and economic support for South Asian integration is absent at either the bilateral or at the multilateral level. In relation to India and Pakistan, some acts of great powers, especially USA, give an impression that its vested interests are served better if the conflict between both countries perpetuate, while remaining within a manageable level. During the cold war, although US supported Pakistan as an ally, yet evidence suggests that it also extended military and economic support to India as well.

Both sides had been fortified with modern weapons purchased mainly from the United States. US built jet fighters battled each other — some bearing Pakistani insignia and flown by

*Pakistani pilots, the others bearing Indian insignia and flown by Indian Pilots.*³⁶

In this respect, the defence related interests of industrial powers also play a significant role. According to the estimates of defence analysts, Pakistan roughly spends “Rs 15 million a day to maintain three battalions at the Siachen Glacier. In a way, this comes to Rs 450 million for a month and Rs 5.4 billion in a year. On the Indian side, the deployment is thick with seven active battalions costing India Rs 50 million a day, Rs 1.5 billion a month, and Rs 30 billion a year.”³⁷ This fact makes South Asia a big market for the sale of military equipment, and if India and Pakistan reconcile their differences, the exporting countries would lose huge profits in military hardware.

At the regional level, the prospects of economic integration through SAARC have never been materialized. The major reason behind SAARC’s failure is one of the principles of this organization, under which bilateral and contentious issues are not allowed to be discussed at this forum.³⁸ Secondly, the SAARC Charter also requires that decisions at all levels be taken on the basis of unanimity.³⁹ In the presence of many conflicting political interests between India and Pakistan, unanimity is hard to attain. Since, SAARC has no mandate to resolve the political issues at its forum, thus its role would be limited to trade and tourism. Being a huge economy, India would obviously reap economic advantages from mutual trade within the South Asian region, but the smaller economies would suffer from this arrangement.

Grant of Most Favoured Nation Status

At the bilateral level, it is often suggested that the peace process between India and Pakistan would gain momentum, if Pakistan accords Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India.⁴⁰ MFN status is accorded by one state to another in which the recipient enjoys equal trade advantages by the country granting such treatment. However, it has to be based on principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. India

accorded MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, however, Pakistan has principally decided to give India this status just a few months back. The process will take another few months to formalize it. However, India has not fully granted the trade concessions that are required under MFN status.⁴¹ Therefore, the current volume of trade between both countries is just \$2.7 billion.⁴² Owing to many barriers, goods worth of \$10 billion are traded illegally through smuggling or via third country. If trade is formalized according to the true essence of MFN, smuggling between the two countries would end and high custom generation would take place, benefitting both sides.

Following the Pakistani Government's decision to grant MFN status to India, those who favour it anticipate that this move would be advantageous for Pakistan in a number of ways. Firstly, they contend that industrialists and businessmen would get access to larger Indian markets, which would enhance efficiency and improve the quality of their products. Secondly, by mutual trading, Pakistani consumers will benefit from the greater quantity and low prices of the Indian products. Thirdly, opening trade with India would transfer technology as Indian industries have expertise in pharmaceuticals, genetic engineering, biotechnology, etc. Fourthly, since the geographical distance between the two countries is less, therefore, the costs of import and export would be low. It would decrease expenditure, which both countries could spend on development activities. Moreover, most importantly, granting India MFN status would serve as a great confidence-building step, positively affecting the normalization of their political relations.

Nonetheless, opponents have argued that mutual trade without protection for local industry would threaten the survival of domestic markets. As compared to India, Pakistan has a weak market structure due to the high cost of production. In order to protect the local industrial structure, the Government of Pakistan will have to give a subsidy to the local industry, which seems impossible as the government is under severe financial strain. Secondly, it is feared that

allowing financially strong Indian businessmen access to Pakistani markets might give Indian entities control of the mega projects.⁴³ The possibility of such an opportunity is enhanced by the fact that due to political instability, there may be a flight of local investment from Pakistan. Such an eventuality would attract strong political backlash from interest groups and political parties, which follow specific strategic culture of animosity with respect to India. The Government of Pakistan would also face pressure from business lobbies, who, for the protection of their respective industries, would like to include their products in the negative list, on which mutual trade will not be possible with India. It will be very difficult for the government to sustain this pressure especially in an election year.

Above all, the most important consideration for Pakistan would be to expect reciprocity of trade concessions from India. In the presence of the parallel culture of hatred present on both sides of the border, it would be very difficult for India to provide trade related concessions such as reduced tariff and preferential treatment to textile and agro-based products, though liberalization of visa has already been agreed. Furthermore, it also remains to be seen, whether the provision of MFN would move the Indian government ahead in initiating the composite dialogue. In an environment of mistrust, created due to the Mumbai attacks and allegations against Pakistan of supporting terrorism, the possibility of such a development may take some time.

The Future Prospects and the Way Forward

There have been negotiations and peace talks between officials, at ministerial level and even at the level of top leadership to shed away the environment of distrust between key neighbours of South Asia. These talks even continued during the period of extreme tension between both countries as track-2 diplomacy.⁴⁴ During last two years and particularly in 2012, there have been some very positive developments between the two countries almost in all spheres, including political, economic and people-to-people level. Indeed, under

the changed environment of interdependence and with pre-eminence of soft power, social constructivism and liberalism in the international politics, there is realization among the South Asian neighbours to shed the differences and move forward.

After having followed mutually destructive policies for several decades, the people of both countries had over the last few years began to count their losses, the misery caused in the name of national security, the missed opportunities of mutual benefits through cooperation in the fields of economy, culture and scientific development, and extinction of the role South Asia could have played in international councils by virtue of its size and resources.⁴⁵

Political Engagement

In the same connectivity, on September 7-8, 2012, a meeting was held between Pakistani Foreign Minister Ms Hina Rabbani Khar and Indian External Affairs Minister Mr S.M. Krishna in Islamabad. Indeed, this visit of the Indian external affairs minister was reciprocal to Pakistani FM's visit to New Delhi on July 27, 2011, and as part of continuation of the peace process between these two South Asian countries. Two aspects were agreed upon during this meeting; the liberalization of visa regime, and revival of the joint commission.⁴⁶

Agreement on liberalized visa later operationalized in December 2012, facilitated many on both sides through people-to-people contact, particularly the members of divided families, business community, old citizens and those among the academic circle. The joint commission, however, will look into the new avenues of cooperation between India and Pakistan, apart from the eight issues already part of foreign secretary level talks. Continuation of peace process between Pakistan and India is a welcoming step. Indeed, under the changed international environment, where globalization is the order of the day, immediate neighbours like India and

Pakistan cannot afford a strained relationship for an indefinite period. Therefore, negotiation and peaceful resolution of the core bilateral issues between these South Asian neighbours is the only way forward.

The positive aspect is that, in the joint statement, both sides expressed satisfaction over the increase in high-level bilateral exchanges between the two countries particularly, “between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi and Tehran in April and August 2012, the first ever bilateral visit of the Speaker of Lok Sabha to Pakistan at the invitation of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan, visit of the Commerce Minister of Pakistan to India, in April 2012, and the first-ever bilateral visit of the Commerce and Industry Minister of India to Pakistan in February 2012. The ministers underlined the importance of continued high-level exchange between the two countries.”⁴⁷

Following the foreign minister level meeting, Pakistani FM Ms Hinna Rabbani Khar said, "We are willing to forge ahead with a different future, which is people-centric, which is development-centric, which is centric to the common citizens of India and Pakistan, which is committed to creating stakeholders in the economic interests and the future of the two countries."⁴⁸ In the joint statement issued after the meeting, it is said that both ministers have reviewed the status of bilateral relations and agreed to hold talks and meetings on all other issues. These issues include counter-terrorism (including progress on the Mumbai trial) and narcotics control, humanitarian issues, commercial and economic cooperation, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, Siachen, peace and security including CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir and the promotion of friendly exchanges, enhance cross-LoC travel and trade.⁴⁹

Commercial and Economic Cooperation

The 7th round of the Indo-Pak talks on Commercial and Economic Cooperation⁵⁰ was held from 20-21 September 2012

in Islamabad. Commerce Secretaries of both countries led the talks on behalf of their respective countries. During the meeting, three agreements were signed to facilitate bilateral trade between India and Pakistan. The first agreement includes cooperation and mutual assistance in custom matters, whereas, the second will help redressing trade grievances. Third pact is about conforming standards; the Bureau of Indian Standards and the Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA).⁵¹

Relevant ministries of both countries would frame procedures to implement these agreements through a mechanism. Both sides agreed to sign another agreement between Export Inspection Council of India and Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA). The Indian side offered 100 locomotives to the Pakistan Railways and offered assistance in setting up the coal, hydro and gas power plants. As indicated in the joint statement, the “roadmap drawn in the earlier ministerial meetings for liberalized and preferential trade regimes would be scrupulously adhered to.”⁵²

Promotion of Bilateralism and Regionalism

Regional forces and interests must be nurtured rather than cultivating closer ties with "outsiders" who will always use such a relationship in favour of their own national interests. Instead of putting ourselves in an awkward situation, the need is to expose the “hawks” on both sides for their false hopes, destructive agendas and empty rhetoric, and allow economic benefits to enrich the lives of the common person on both sides.

Apart from bilateral problems, the geopolitical interests of extra-regional powers have also hindered the peace process between the South Asian archrivals. At the bilateral level, the strategic culture of acrimony on both sides of the border has always led to the failure of the peace process. It is generally realized that whenever the leadership of both countries managed to reach some understanding, the process was

derailed either by an act of terrorism or by strong internal pressure. For instance, during Agra Summit-2001, the leadership on both sides had reached an understanding on resolving the issue of Kashmir; when Indian hawks prevailed and forced PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee to abstain from agreement on a joint statement.⁵³ It happened during the finalization of agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek in 2005-06.

Trust Building and Reciprocity

This all is accredited to deep mistrust between both countries. India's exceptional military advancement for attaining great power ambition has always resulted in a security dilemma for Pakistan, thus, giving way to unending arms race. Indeed, such a situation halts progress towards bilateral economic integration. Analysts believe that by offering MFN status to India and through bilateral trade and commerce, there will be reduction in the distrust prevailing between both countries. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that MFN status and mutual trade depend upon reciprocity in the relationship. Despite granting MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, India, yet, has to fulfil all the conditions associated with it. Furthermore, it does not seem that given the feelings of insecurity and misperceptions against each other, both countries would honour the commitments linked to MFN status.

The key toward the future lies in a joint regional coordination on many strategic levels, if the region is to prosper. As the struggle against the British rule demonstrated, it was only when the Hindu and Muslim political direction overlapped regarding independence, did the region rid itself of its masters. Secondly, the peace process should be one directed from Islamabad and Delhi, not from extra regional capitals. Given the role and history of the US in using and indeed fuelling enmity between the two, it would not be wise to allow history to repeat itself. It must be realized that major powers too would benefit from a peaceful South Asia.

Going forward, the Kashmir issue must be dealt with, and it would only be possible, if the domestic environment on both sides is conducive towards it. If the complete valley can be “shared” economically, people’s dignity respected and benefits distributed amongst the people on both sides, there is no reason as to why there would be a need for outsiders to meddle in regional affairs. Except for self-help and self-reliance, the region has no alternative. There is a need for the adoption of rational approach and trust building between India and Pakistan. This indeed is the only way forward.

Moving Forward from the Status-quo

Indeed, in the renewed peace process, both countries have resorted to a gradual approach, thus remained guarded to talk loudly on the core issue(s).⁵⁴ Political analysts feel that peripheral issues of less significance remained the focus of discussions, while making promises only on the core issues. Definitely, resolution of core issues needs a change in mindsets, thus would take time. But certainly, there is a need to understand that the peace process has been derailed many a time owing to the unresolved nature of the core issues between India and Pakistan. Indeed, over the years, maintaining a status-quo on these issues produced many other issues, which have now attained their separate identities and significance. In the presence of unresolved core issues, non-state actors would repeatedly find opportunities of spoiling the trust between both states. As a result, the nuclear rivals would again turn to the mobilization of troops, risking nuclear disaster.

In the realistic paradigm, the only worry is that, in the presence of unresolved core issues, the peace process can be derailed even on the occurrence of any sporadic incident as happened in the past, like the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. Under such a scenario, there would be a constant threat to the recently agreed cooperation for the promotion of trade and commerce between India and Pakistan. At the end of the day, both the countries must devise a mechanism to keep the peace process on track for the ultimate solution of core issues.

This is only possible by adopting an optimistic approach; positive thinking about each other and rejecting the non-state actors, rampant on either side of the divide.

Conclusion

For a durable peace and stability of the Subcontinent, there is a need that the leadership of India and Pakistan realistically visualizes the future of the region and accepts the ground realities through an optimistic mindset. Embarking upon the path of promoting trade and commerce, alongside making headway for the durable solution of core political issues and bridging the trust deficit, is the best way forward. In collaboration with the Kashmiri leadership, India and Pakistan will have to find a durable solution for Kashmir, the major irritant and potential threat. Indeed, except Sir Creek, all other issues and mistrusts are the product of this issue. Therefore, India and Pakistan must continue talking to each other, remain engaged in negotiations, take all measures for the promotion of peace and tranquillity, initiate more CBMs and develop their economies to eradicate poverty widespread among their masses. This is only possible by giving peace a chance, ending antagonism by bringing concord among the leadership and the people of two countries. This process would provide opportunities for enhancing economic development and social integration in the Subcontinent.

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DEFINING NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY OF PAKISTAN POST 9/11 ERA

Zulfiqar Hussain

Abstract

All macro and micro indicators of the economy of Pakistan show that it is passing through a critical phase of its economic security. This has been adversely affected owing to Pakistan's participation in the US-led War on Terror, started after 9/11 incident. Pakistan's economic security is going through inbuilt paradoxes since the beginning of war on terror. The economic fundamentals indicate that the economic security of Pakistan needs serious efforts by the policymakers, having responsibility for leading the sluggish economy towards revival, strengthening and ultimate sustainability. This paper would be an effort to draw attention of the scholars, intelligentsia, academia, intellectuals, experts and policy-makers towards effects of the post 9/11 scenario and subsequent after-effects of the war on terror and performance of the Pakistan's economy. It goes without saying that owing to the War on Terror, our industrial growth and export potential received serious upheavals. Nevertheless, Pakistan is located in a region, which has a history of involvement in wars against rival ideologies. Now, as a result of rising militancy, the economic security of the country is not stable rather it is in doldrums. Recent dreadful drone attacks in northern part of the country, Pakistan's actions against militancy has resulted in unprecedented growth of terrorism that has shaken the foundations of Pakistan's economy.

Introduction

All the indicators have been showing that the economic security of Pakistan is jeopardized after the decision of the participation of the country in the *global war on terror*. The development of non-conventional weapons, undoubtedly, has

given an unprecedented boost to the national security of Pakistan. However, lessons learnt from the modern history of war and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remind us that mere nuclear capability, without economic security, is not enough for defence of a country. Former Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear weapons, missiles and latest warheads, but it collapsed without firing a single shot despite having all the might of WARSAW pact and latest weaponry in its hands. The Soviet economy collapsed like a house of cards and as a result of, thereof, the world changed from bipolar to the unipolar phenomenon.

In this era of challenges and crises for Pakistan, it may not be in the fitness of event that the policymakers and the experts may forget the historic lesson learnt from the fateful collapse of one super-power that simply ignored the most critical factor, which was the economic stability. The writing on the wall may not be overlooked that living beyond means for an individual as well as for a nation is dangerous and leads towards instability and ultimate failure.

Developing Concept of Security

Economic security is an important instrument of national security, which cannot be ignored for a longer time by any sovereign state. The growth rate of economy of Pakistan when compared with other regional countries such as China 9.7%, 2010-11¹ and India 6.1%, 2010-11²; indicates that our economic security has fallen prey to the vicious circle created by the global war on terror (GWOT) in the post 9/11 era, that has adversely affected the foundation of national security resulting into the jeopardizing human security, under-development, increased unemployment ratio and unbridled poverty leading towards the overall depression. In view of this, it would be appropriate, if we may, in the first instance, analyze the historic development of the concept and define the security and scrutinize our quest for national security.

Security is one of the most prominent problems being faced by the humanity. State, which is the highest form of

political order, is responsible to provide security to individuals, but these states have not yet been able to sustain permanent relationship and coexist with each other in complete harmony. Historically, each state remained insecure from another state and pursuit of national interest by one state resulted in antagonism by another state, and ultimately resulted into a horrible war. Now having the nuclear weapons and powerful military technology at the disposal of a state, war is the most imminent threat and a constant danger to the general masses.

Traditional Realist School of the International Relations, pioneered by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, favours the concept of the power. "Victory is the paramount concern of warring nations."³ Realists may observe certain rules of conduct with regards to the victims of warfare. Realists will not forgo the use of all the weapons, which have been produced owing to their warfare technology. The observance of prohibition of the use of poisonous gas in WW-II is an apparent exception in the scenario.

Realists argue that their concept has already attained the fundamental pattern of capabilities in international arena, but also connected with the prime motive for the behaviour of actors. They attained the wealth of insights attached with longstanding study of 'power in politics'. On the other hand, the approach of the Idealist School of thought is peace. They argue that their approach leads them to see the problem in a holistic manner. Idealists approach focuses on the essential issues of war. Barry Buzan⁴ argues that the two aforementioned approaches (realists and idealists) have dominated the thinking about the national security issue and have done so, for decades, if not for centuries. In view of this, a fully developed concept of security can exist between the concept of power and peace.

Collective security is a term that has specific meanings. This concept is being applied to many dissimilar arrangements. Originally collective security means that all nations could be secured if all were guaranteed their territorial

integrity and existing political independence against external aggression by any state or states.⁵ In the cold war era, we can see many examples of collective security such as NATO, WARSAW, SEATO and CENTO.

John Hers introduced the idea of 'security dilemma' in early 1950s. He indicated a structural notion in which the self-help practice by the state automatically looked after their security. It leads to rising insecurity for others as each state interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures taken by another state as threatening. The idea of security dilemma is widely acknowledged in the literature but aside from some notable work by Robert Jarvis, there has been almost no attempt to build on it.⁶

Leonard Beaten has emphasized for the urgent need to expand conceptions of security, outwardly, from the limits of parochial national security and to include the range of systemic considerations.⁷ On the other hand, Stanley Hoffmann stresses for the need to begin "turning national security into an aspect of world order policy."⁸ Hedley Bull emphasizes against excessive self-interest in approaches to national security, and underscores the need for a broader view in which common interests and linkage among national securities would receive greater attention.⁹ More generally, L.B. Krause and Joseph Nye have observed that "neither economists nor political scientists have paid enough attention to the complexity of the concept of security."¹⁰ Besides, the Brandt Commission has called for a new concept of security, which would transcend the narrow notions of security of military defence and look more towards conditions conducive to peaceful relations.¹¹ The common theme underlying these voices is that a notion of security bound to the level of individual states is inherently inadequate. Such a notion creates the dangerously ambiguous symbol outlined by Woofers, "while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possible deceptive name."¹² In this scenario, it drives the concept of security to such

strength that it begins to look like the model of those who see international relations as a continuous struggle for power.

Defining Security in Modern Era

In the first instance, it would be appropriate to define the concept of security in the modern age. The Oxford Dictionary defines security as "security means, simply, the absence of threats."¹³ Here the word absence indicates the possibility of being safe from danger as well as conveying psychological feelings of safety. On the other hand, Waltz's observed "in anarchy, security is the highest end."¹⁴ While Michael Howard points out, "discussion regarding security is frequently marked by conceptual standards: "pronouncements about military power and disarmament are still made by public figures."¹⁵

Amitai Etzioni suggests in his book "Security First" that foreign policy, drawing on the principle of the primary life, is pragmatic. Its core value is the recognition that all people have the right to security. The concept includes freedom from deadly violence and torture. This right is more fundamental than all the other rights.¹⁶ Here indication is that freedom from violence and torture are included in the fundamental rights. Hence, security is foremost requirements of man and the foreign policy is to focus on primary life of human beings.

Neville Brown in his book "*The Future Global Challenge: A Predictive Study of World Security 1977-1990*" encourages "a wider perspective on security than that encompassed by the traditional forces on national military policy."¹⁷ He argues specifically from the multi-faced trends and developments in world affairs. He concludes that changing character of the international environment necessitates a broader view of security.

Buzan Barry in his book, "*People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*" calls security as the core concept in international relations and defines security for a state is "the pursuit of freedom from

threat".¹⁸ He argues that a whole range of phenomena which are usually studied separately, such as arms race, the arms industry, international trade and investment, foreign policy working, state system dynamics and sovereignty can be connected into a meaningful pattern by real concept of security. He emphasizes that purely military approaches cannot solve the issue, because they do not encompass the issue of security comprehensively.

In the afore-mentioned backdrop, we can develop our own definition that security is freedom from threat; in military terms, it is protection from war; in political terms, security from aggressor's oppression and for territorial integrity of a state; in economic terms, security from poverty and hunger; in social terms security from discrimination and equal opportunity for human rights; in cultural terms, security from persecution and for just and equitable treatment, and in environmental terms, security from devastation of the climatic change.

After going through the concept of security, now it would be appropriate, if we may examine briefly the question of Pakistan's quest for national security.

Pakistan's Quest for National Security

Since the inception of Pakistan, hegemonic and hostile Indian designs created a sense of insecurity in the minds of Pakistani policy makers, who were constantly looking for the pursuit of defence and a struggle for the survival of Pakistan as a sovereign and independent state. New Delhi always refused to resolve the outstanding issues including the core issue of Kashmir, in line with the principles of equality, justice and fair play. Pakistan had to face the wrath of hegemonic Indian attitude, whether, it was the issue of transfer of assets, flow of rivers or the succession of princely states. India tried her best to impose her will to utter disregard to the agreement of partition. Having disparity of resources, India created hurdles in resolution of outstanding issues through peaceful manners and never dithered to use force or threat of using

force. Indian refusal to honour the solution of Kashmir issue, as per the resolution of the UN Security Council, created a sense of urgency and quest for stability in the minds of Pakistani leadership. History witnesses that Pakistan has always responded Indian sheer show of force, humiliating dictations and egoistic behaviour in unprecedented classical style. Pakistan has left no stone unturned in search of stability and reliable friendship. It has always been looking for formidable allies and ways and means to strengthen the “sinews of statehood”¹⁹ and has been constantly striving to protect its sovereignty and security against the hostile India. In this view, Pakistan had been striving to equip herself with sophisticated weaponry, looking for arms for its security, and assistance for economic development and substantial growth.

In short, Pakistan remained in quest for security throughout her history. Pakistan has always looked for balancer against archrival India and succeeded in establishing all-weather friendship with China. In the search of security, Pakistan started nuclear programme in 1970s and went for nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan declared to use its nuclear capability as a deterrent. The development of non-conventional weapons, undoubtedly, has given an unprecedented boost to the national security of Pakistan. However, the lesson of the modern history reminds that mere nuclear capability, without economic security, is not enough for defence of one’s country.

Economic Security of Pakistan in Post 9/11 Era

On September 11, 2001, the deadly terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon started conversion of world politics with far-reaching impacts as the hijacked planes crashed into America’s most brilliant symbols of trade and military power. Approximately, 3,000 people got killed in these fatal attacks. Material losses were estimated over \$100 billion. The un-imagined and exceptional attack on US mainland was more devastating than Japanese attack on US marine at Pearl Harbour in 1941. The American nation infuriated and wanted revenge. President George W. Bush

showed a ferocious determination to hunt down the wrongdoers, who were responsible for organizing and planning the terrorists' brutal attacks. The whole world, utterly shocked, severely condemned the brutality and explicitly expressed heartfelt condolences and showed unconditional unity and solidarity with American public. President of Pakistan immediately issued a strong worded condemnation statement and showed sympathy with American people. He expressed unwavering resolve to join US to combat terrorism in the region. US Media pointed out the name of Osama Bin Laden as architect of the most dreadful attacks and implicated Taliban government as well. Now, writing on the wall became as clear as crystal that Taliban government would have to face serious consequences.

On September 13, 2001, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage summoned the Ambassador of Pakistan and conveyed a list of seven steps to be taken by Pakistan. Pakistan was given the choice that either it was with US or not? The seven steps included breaking of relations with the Taliban government, if the evidence found Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda guilty and the Taliban continued to harbour them²⁰. Islamabad indicated a positive response, when US request was received.²¹

In this backdrop, the economic security of Pakistan has been facing the grave consequences of the global war on terror (GWOT). The factor of macro and micro economic solidarity and stability is most important for the generation of new jobs and improvement in quality of life. The economic security of Pakistan is under dire duress and facing the continuous upheaval of the war on terror. The worst global oil and financial crisis had added insult to injury. In addition, internally the country suffered from the adverse effects of unparallel calamity of devastating and destructive super floods in 2010. The worst floods ruthlessly damaged the economy at tune of US \$10 billion²² caused for reduction in the growth rate of already sluggish economy by another 2%. As per World Bank and Asian Development Damage and Needs Assessment, 9.6 million people were adversely affected

in Sindh and Baluchistan owing to these rains. Total damages to essential sectors amounting to Rs.324.5 billion (US\$3.7 billion)²³. Other losses including all the crops at 50,000 Sq. km were abysmally washed away. During the period 2010-11, oil prices went up from \$70 barrel to \$125²⁴ barrel, resulted into serious threat to the macro-economic structure in Pakistan.

It would be in the fitness of thing to make a comparative study and to judge the adverse impacts of the war on Sri Lankan economic security against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the period from 1990 to 2004. Sri Lanka suffered from imposition of extortion by LTTE, brutal violence against general masses, creation of sensitive security zones, hurdles in free fishing, planting of land mines, practical stoppage of highways, diminishing transport facilities, enormous internally displaced persons, shortage of electricity, scarcity of health and teaching professionals and suffering from dearth of physical security for general masses. Moreover, “embargo imposed by the Government of Sri Lanka from 1990 to 2001 was the most important cause of the economic and social decline.”²⁵

Participation in global war on terror, on behest of the sole superpower on the globe i.e. USA, and frequent drone attacks, serious internal threats by the extremists/fundamentalists against the security of Pakistan, worsening law and order situation in the country, led to depressive growth rate, which remained the lowest at 3.7% in 2011-12. Unquestionably, the growth trajectory can be improved, having a lot of potential in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which are also adversely affected by power shortage and unprecedented floods. Unwarranted war on terror imposed on Pakistan being a non-member ally of NATO in pursuit of the terror in North West of Pakistan has proved economically detrimental and unfavourable decision. It may also be mentioned that failure of chief crops, such as cotton and rice depressingly affected a minus 4 per cent growth in the particular sector in 2010-11. In the financial year 2011-12, major crops growth rate remained as 3.2 per cent²⁶ only.

In the complex system of international trade, through multi-national agreements, mutual inter-dependence and availability of natural resources etc, the freedom to follow choice of policies to develop a nation's economy in the manner desired, forms the essence of economic security. Economic security today forms, arguably, as important a part of national security as military security.²⁷ The manufacturing sector growth was negatively affected by a number of reasons including terrorism and ever worsening law and order situation, governance issues, flight of capital, unprecedented floods and severe energy crisis. That is mainly due to circular debt trap. However, manufacturing sector growth rate remained as 3.1 per cent for the year 2011-12.²⁸ The services sector has performed poorly with 4.0% against the target of 4.4% during 2011-12. Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) have to be slashed down owing to the diversion of utmost needed resources to rehabilitation of poor flood affectees. By taking certain austerity measures, some of the effective initiatives regarding macro-framework and extra resource mobilization, the overall loss to the exchequer was tried to be mitigated. Nevertheless, more bold initiatives are still required to re-establish the reforms agenda and to rebuild the confidence of the development partners. State Bank of Pakistan has warned that the real fear is the rising prices of oil. If political uncertainty remains and spreads further in the Middle East/North Africa region, oil prices could increase even more sharply than the recent past. "Although this trend will hurt the global economy quite severely, the impact on Pakistan could be disproportionately larger."²⁹

Owing to excessive expenditures on flood victims, relief in power and energy sector, subsidies in petroleum products, deteriorating law and order situation as a result of intensive GWOT and growing militancy, it has become imperative for the government to make public investment at massive level. In the same line, overall investment remained at the lowest ebb as compared to the recent past. Inflationary pressures are likely to remain strong through the rest of the financial year 2013. State Bank of Pakistan indicates, "The trend in core

inflation is worrying because of the likely implications, if Pakistan experiences same conditions later this year."³⁰

The most critical challenge of GWOT since its inception has been hindering development and adversely affecting the overall performance of the economy. The corrective measures adopted by the government, yet, could not contribute for sooner recovery and recommencement of growth at an accelerated pace. The budget deficit, one of the key indicators of macro stability of economy, has touched unique figure as a result of the complicated state of affairs. The budget deficit reached to the level of 5.3% of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in budget 2012-13. The vicious circle of the circular debt crippled the whole energy sector and government had to pay Rs.120 billion as subsidy to the power sector, in spite of all resource constraints. So, budget deficit pushed to overall 6% deficit. If the prevailing circumstances, such as dreadful continuation of war on terror, the budget deficit would further increase diametrically in the forthcoming years.

Owing to the civil war in Sri Lanka, northern provinces adversely suffered during the period 1991 to 2005. The north provinces economy altered to a services-oriented economy from the agrarian economy. Hence, 70 per cent of the provincial gross domestic product (PGDP) had to depend on the services sector only. The biggest contributor to gross domestic products in the north provinces remained public administration and defence related sub-sectors. Although agriculture sector share reduced to 20 per cent, yet 56 per cent population employed in this sector only. In terms of livelihood, "agriculture was the dominant sector in the north in Sri Lanka."³¹

Federal Budget for financial year 2011-12 has been presented by the Finance Minister, Dr. Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, in the National Assembly on June 1, 2012, showing total outlay of Rs.3,203 billion; indicating that the size is 15.8% higher than the size of budget estimates of 2011-12. To meet expenditure, bank borrowing has been estimated at Rs.484 billion. Expenditure on general public services is estimated at

Rs.1,877 billion — 71.9% of the current expenditure — which is an alarming figure in the budget 2011-12.³² State Bank of Pakistan has pointed out that some of the key risks to real sector performance originate from persistent energy shortage, rising prices for oil and industrial inputs as well as “further reductions in development spending due to fiscal constraints”.³³

Owing to the war against terrorism, unprecedented distressing floods, imbalance in revenue and expenditure sides as well as below fiscal performance, fiscal development has been adversely affected. Moreover, policy readjustment, owing to the rising prices of energy globally, has to be made by the government. The estimates and expectations need to be revised due to hard realities of time. Preliminary assessment indicates that alarming fiscal deficit is expected to be 4.7%³⁴ of GDP in the current financial year. GWOT is the main cause, including increase in security related expenditure and important need to mitigate the impacts of the distressing super floods. Other causes including increasing trend of subsidies, undue delay in stern tax measures, monopoly by a few petroleum companies and vicious trap of the circular debt. It is high time for broadening the tax base, austerity measures at the state level and expenditures are needed to be rationalized. Now government is following the strict statutory requirements and restricting bank investment in government securities. To attain the purpose, extensive marketing efforts are being undertaken to sell off the government securities to non-banking institutions and individuals. Moreover, National Savings mechanism is being strengthened to activate non-bank resources.

It may be stated that in Sri Lankan eastern provinces production of onion, rice and chilli increased during the period 1980 to 2001, while the production of such commodities abnormally decreased in the northern part of the country for the same period. Despite all efforts by the Sri Lankan government, north provinces could not attain the level of production of pre-conflict years. Furthermore, "due to

impacts of December 2004 tsunami, production of crops declined in Eastern Provinces as well."³⁵

Global war on terror promoted terrorism domestically, which resulted into 36,120 deaths with serious consequences to the socio-economic security of the country. Although there were a few incidents of violence in the country before 9/11 events, yet their intensity increased over the time. In 2003, 189 persons were killed including 140 civilians, 24 security forces personnel, and 25 terrorists/insurgents. Cumulatively, from 2003 to 2010 a total of 36,120 persons were killed, which comprises 12,273 civilians, 3,517 security forces personnel and 20,330 insurgents. There was an increase in the overall death toll during 2009 but there is substantial increase in killing of terrorists mainly due to military operation in Swat, Dir, and Buner districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The year 2011 was the worst hit by a plethora of crises while during 2010, there was decrease of 21, 15 and 16 per cent in the number of terrorist attacks, killed and injured persons, respectively to the previous year.

Terrorism and increasing conflict in different parts of country is the result of GWOT. Growing terrorist attacks with new tactics have become more common phenomena. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) has become an epicentre of the terrorists. Table 1, given below, shows the nature of reported assaults by terrorist attacks, followed by clashes between security forces and militants, operational attacks by security forces, ethno-political violence, inter-tribal clashes, drone attacks and border clashes, and as a result increasing injuries and death toll in Pakistan.

Table 1: Nature of Attacks during 2010 in Pakistan

Type of Attacks/ Clashes	Incidents	Killed	Injured
Terrorists Attacks	2,113	2,913	5,824
Clashes between Security Forces and	369	2,007	877

Militants			
Operational Attacks by Security Forces	260	2,631	1,495
Drone Attacks	135	961	383
Border Clashes	69	65	53
Ethno-Political Violence	233	660	966
Inter Tribal Clashes	214	766	685
Total	3,393	10,003	10,283

Sources: PIPS, 2011

Physical infrastructure has been severely damaged during struggle against the terrorism, which has serious and far reaching impacts on the economic security of Pakistan. The major targets of terrorists are government and security forces installations. These brutal attacks also include on security forces check posts, police stations, bridges, communication towers, power generation centres, gas pipelines, railway tracks, schools, basic health units, videos/CDs/music and barber shops, etc. The major government agencies under attacks were Special Services Group (SSG) at Tarbella, Army Training Centre at Dargai, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) at Rawalpindi, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) at Lahore, Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah, Police Training Centre at Hangu and Manawa, Rescue-15 building at Lahore and Islamabad, besides a large number of police and military installations. Meanwhile, terrorists also targeted five-star hotels like Sheraton in Karachi, Malam Jabba, Ski Resort in Swat, Marriot in Islamabad and Pearl Continental in Peshawar.

As a result of rising terrorism, 119 schools, predominantly, girls' schools/colleges were destroyed only in KPK during 2008. Major incident were reported from Swat, where 90 schools were attacked, which has serious effects on the eco-social security of the country as mentioned in Table 2.

Table 2: Attacks on Schools in KPK during 2009

Places	Girls' Schools/ Colleges	Boys	Co-Education	Total Attacks
Swat	88	1	1	90
Peshawar	4	1	1	6
Dir	5	0	1	6
Buner	2	0	0	2
Malakand	1	0	0	1
Mardan	1	0	0	1
Bannu	1	0	0	1
Charsadda	1	0	0	1
Tribal Areas	8	0	3	11
Total	111	2	6	119

Source: PIPS, 2010

The aforementioned discussion indicates that GWOT and as a result mounting terrorism and militancy particularly in the northern part of the country has not only serious consequences for the national security of the country but also are affecting negatively the socio-cultural and ethnic fibre of society. Destruction of physical infrastructure and particularly educational institutions in KPK is a cruel effort by the militants to plunge the whole society in the darkness of illiteracy and ignorance. It is a desire of extremists that simple people, should be misled through hollow slogans, to be brought into their fold on the name of religion, and even they are trying to grip their innocent children, in the modern and enlightened world, as they had destroyed hundreds of the modern educational institutions. But nefarious designs of the militants/extremists/fanatics have finally been exposed as their real intention is political power through the sheer force of naked arms.

Comparatively, the Civil War in Sri Lanka adversely affected the industrial sector as terrorism is affecting all sectors of Pakistan's economy. During the period 1983 to

2003 in Sri Lanka the share of the industrial sector employment reduced to half of percentage of the provincial employment. As far as infrastructure is concerned northeastern region of Sri-Lanka had "lowest road density, number of telephones per capita, and households with electricity in the country in recent years."³⁶ Sri Lankan War against LTTE in Eastern and Northern provinces marked disappointingly in environment, education and health sectors, which had been leading towards absolute deprivation and poverty. Environmental degradation has become order of the day. As far as education is concerned northeastern region students scored lowest marks in "primary and lower secondary exams."³⁷

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the scenario of 9/11 has changed altogether the Pak-USA relationship as US, which left Pakistan in a lurch after Afghan debacle in 1990s, came back with fury of revenge and hostility. In her own interest, USA declared Pakistan as the most trustworthy and reliable non-NATO ally in South Asia. Since 2001, United States of America has committed \$20.7 billion aid to Pakistan, which is 0.1% share of \$3 trillion, the sole superpower is spending on the global war on terror (GWOT). The commitments include security related aid amounting to \$14.7 billion, Coalition Support Fund (CSF); socio-economic aid amounting to \$6.5 billion and Kerry Luger Bill (KLB) commitment of \$7.5 billion³⁸ assistance package for Pakistan.

So far \$3 billion under KLB, \$275 million and \$676 million including flood relief donation of \$500 million that is less than half have been released in a two-year time. Out of the committed assistance two-thirds aid relates to military uses, while the remaining one-third to social sector and economic development. While cumulative loss of Pakistan in global war on terror is estimated to \$68 billion.³⁹ The imperative grave impacts include abysmally decline in foreign investment, flight of domestic capital, breach of confidence of local and foreign investors on Pakistan, decline in industrial production,

hyper inflation, enormous unemployment and loss of physical infrastructure. Mathematically speaking, the ratio of Pakistan losses against US aid stands at 7:1.

On the other hand, since the start of GWOT, Pakistan has been facing the issues of rising terrorism and extremism, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), lowest growth rate, hyper-inflationary trends, trade deficits, severe problems of balance of payment, deficits including budgetary deficit and ever-increasing security related expenditures. Every new day bring new challenges for the nation as sectarianism and extremism is also on rising trend. In recent history, we are passing through the phase of uncontrolled prices of petroleum products. Destructive and demoralizing floods result into unbearable losses of life, crops, livestock and devastating effects on the physical infrastructure. It is the need of hour that the government should show iron determination to overcome these challenges by taking difficult decisions with strong political will and following the pathway of reforms. The economic and fiscal measures, including increase in taxation base, essential constitutional amendment for fixation of limits for government borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan, tackling menace of poverty by the horns and grants of subsidies to the poorest of the poor, are also needed. Additionally, it is high time to follow the reform agenda at micro and macro levels in sphere of financial and economic sectors including:-

- Essential reforms and restructuring of public sector enterprises including PIA, Railways, Wapda, Pakistan Steel Mills and various other institutions.
- Fundamental debt disbursement and management strategy.
- Introduction of most needed austerity measures to decrease fiscal deficits and strictly compliance mechanism.
- Most needed tight monetary policy to hold the unbridled inflationary trends.
- Taking obligatory measures for sufficient foreign exchange reserves for sound and stable exchange rate.

- Introduction of vital reforms for promotion of exportable items.
- Overture of indispensable incentives for home remittances.
- Strengthening the social fibre of society and safety networks to minimize the impact of poverty.
- Adoption of measures for promotion of accelerated growth and promoting domestic savings/revenues.
- Most crucial reduction in unnecessary subsidy to reduce ever-increasing pressure on the budget result in more budgetary deficit.
- Introducing additional saving schemes for active mobilization of domestic resources.
- Introducing immediate measures to take the bull of energy crisis by the horns that are adversely affecting the economic security of the country.

The finance managers would have to adopt macroeconomic stability measures, and to multiply growth rate via innovative growth stratagem/framework. Instead of building markets, people and soft sides of intervention, it is high time that government should concentrate on physical and mental infrastructure. Adequate growth will become possible, when people are educated, healthy and empowered, and their capabilities are enhanced to the level where they can compete boldly at national and international levels. It may be recalled the old maxim that in diplomacy, there is no permanent friend or foe but only permanent national interest. So, imperative decisions on the political and diplomatic fronts, though bitter, may be taken by the leadership at this critical juncture of history, keeping in view all the essential impacts upon Pakistan's national security.

To sum up the whole discussion, owing to GWOT Pakistan has been facing rising trends of extremism/terrorism, and as a result worsening law and order situation in the country. Consequently, the country has been facing issues like growing poverty, rising unemployment level, shortfall in investment, declining currency value, mismanagement and mis-governance. Private sector is shrinking day by day. The

relationship with the neighbouring countries is in disarray and masses are not comfortable. It goes without saying that we are one of the most strategically important countries of the globe. We have sixth largest dynamic population. There are many opportunities for Pakistan and post-war Afghanistan is one of the boosting factors. We can avail the opportunity through dynamic foreign policy and friendly relationship based on the mutual interest of both the neighbouring states. Secondly, resource-rich Central Asian States are looking forward for the trade-dynamic route for export of petroleum, gas and other natural resource linkages through Gwadar seaport. We are trying to develop friendly relationship with Russia, which is also a positive factor in the region. Thirdly, Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline to be managed as a vital source of social and economic development as we have been facing acute shortage in energy arena. Fourthly, Arab awakening needs a peaceful transition for flourishing and democratic future. Fifthly, Indian Ocean Rim from the African Coast, Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf to the straits of Malacca is an area of growing economic development, and Pakistan has a pivotal role in the region. Sixthly, our immediate neighbour China is fast growing and has become the second largest economy of the world, and Gwadar seaport can become new epicentre of economic development in the region. All these factors indicate that with dynamic economy, vibrant foreign policy and determined political will, the dividends can become quite enormous for Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan's geography and demography have great advantage, which provide a foundation stone to the market-based economy, energetic governance strategies, and future development & growth. It may be recalled that South Korea, an economy of \$8 billion only in 1970, through better alliances, market economy and good governance, has become economy of over \$1,000 billion in 2011-12. All such potential is available with Pakistan. We have to build globally integrated economy having a dynamic foreign policy and wipe out domestically the menace of terrorism. No doubt, Pakistan has a very bright future!

Author

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BALUCHISTAN UNREST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

Muhammad Khurshid Khan, Asma Sana and Afifa Kiran

Abstract

Since centuries, geographical constraints continued to cause serious impediments to the development of Balochistan. Even the British, who ruled India for two centuries because of their intelligence and administrative skills, could hardly contribute anything towards the development of this province. Unfortunately, even after independence, the province remained at the discretion of 'Sardars,' who were more sincere to themselves rather than the public. Thus, the successive regimes both in the centre as well as in the province stand responsible to the backwardness of Balochistan. Though General Musharraf's regime took bold initiatives and launched a number of mega projects, yet many of them were shelved by the last government because of multifarious reasons including incompetence, corruption, resource constraints and most importantly the security challenges. Even the initiatives like NFC Award failed to make any material difference because of the corrupt practices. While security challenges to Balochistan, linked with internal and external factors, are pronounced, the opportunities are also awaiting, which if not cashed expeditiously, the simmering effects of the disturbed region may take the entire Balochistan in loop, where over 95 per cent of people are diehard Pakistani. As things stand now, Pakistan can ignore Balochistan only at its own peril.

Introduction

Balochistan, a strategically significant province of Pakistan, continues to remain central to the 'New Great Game' since the late 1960s. The present unrest in Balochistan has not emerged overnight. Since the time of the creation of Pakistan, Balochistan history represents an unending account of the

incessant conflicts. While the transition process during 1947 was smooth, unfortunately, the small irritants created at that time continue to distort the facts, creating an impression as if Balochistan was never prepared to join Pakistan. Thus, besides many other core causes, the longstanding resentment, dating back to its merger with Pakistan, has led to law and order issues in 1948, 1955, 1958, and 1973. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the situation presents not only the new challenges, but also opportunities; the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 adds another dimension to the scenario.

From British perspective, Balochistan did not appear as an important region, however, it served as a buffer zone against Afghans. As rightly pointed out by a scholar, "At the time of independence, Pakistan was the 'backwater' of the Subcontinent, whereas, Balochistan was the 'backwater' of Pakistan and unfortunately continues to remain as such even today after 65 years of independence."¹

Besides other reasons, including its geographical and political constraints, lack of communication infrastructure and scarcity of water had been huge barriers to the development of new cities and towns and bringing about rapid development in Balochistan even in the 21st century environment. Nevertheless, one has to realize that it is no more the British Balochistan of the 19th century. It is the largest of Pakistan's four provinces in terms of geographical area and extends from seaboard running along the Seistan region of Iran and ends up at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.² The province contains duly confirmed natural resources worth billions of dollars.³ Reko Diq is an asset of rare earth elements that are even more precious and in much greater demand for manufacturing the latest high-tech equipment.⁴

Balochistan lies in commanding position vis-à-vis the Strait of Hormuz.⁵ The port of Gwadar is about 350 miles away from the Strait of Hormuz. In the west, it has 814 km long border with Iran; and finally in the west and north-west, it has a border of 1,096 km with Afghanistan.⁶ About 8.5 million Pakistanis reside in the province. Thus, keeping in

view, the strategic significance of Balochistan, the current unrest has to be viewed from the prism of both internal and external security environment.

The recent plight of 'missing persons', ongoing issues linked to the sectarian strife and the negative role being played by media are fuelling the fire much to the encouragement of the militants and non-state actors and thereby, inviting more trouble for the government. The current level of unrest is manageable and well within the means, but if due attention is not paid now, the simmering impacts of the disturbed areas might trickle down to the peaceful areas of Balochistan, which will have serious security implications later on. It is viewed that setting up of a Parliamentary Committee on National Security by the government and its upcoming recommendations on 'missing persons' and terrorist acts are steps in the right direction.⁷ Additionally, Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2012, can also contribute meaningfully, provided, it takes legal cover.⁸

Regrettably, the comfort zone between Islamabad and Quetta remained at the lowest ebb since the creation of Pakistan. No serious effort has been made to bridge the gap. It was easy for the successive governments in Islamabad to rule this province through handpicked '*Sardars*', who were more sincere to themselves than to the masses. Therefore, while the successive provincial governments led by '*Sardars*' stand accountable for the backwardness of Balochistan, the successive regimes in Islamabad led by various political parties and juntas are equally liable for the present state of the province.

Notwithstanding the above scenario, one must not forget that Balochistan was 'backwater' of Pakistan at the time of independence. Due to the poor communication infrastructure and lack of resources, it could not get benefit of the untapped wealth. Realistically speaking, even if the available resources were utilized judiciously, Balochistan could still not have been brought at par with other provinces due to its geographical constraints. There is, yet, another perception being promoted

as part of a propaganda campaign that the provincial resources are being utilized elsewhere. However, fact of the matter is that, all provinces are interdependent and none is self-sufficient in all respects. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that selective justice might have been done to the people of Pakistan. Yet, despite barring a few selected areas, a large percentage of the population remains diehard Pakistanis.

In this backdrop, this paper endeavours to address the internal and external factors that impinge the Balochistan unrest. The topic is covered in the following sequence: One, brief history of Balochistan in the British and post-British era; two, strategic importance of Balochistan, the centre of 'Great Game'; three, governance issues and challenges; fourth, the proposed strategy and finally the conclusion.

Political History of Balochistan

One of the most striking facts in the history of Balochistan is that, while many of the great conquerors of India have passed through this land, they have left few permanent marks of their presence.⁹ Mir Chakar Rind formed the first Balochistan state in 1550 AD and the Khanate of Kalat was established in 1554 AD.¹⁰ According to another study, Baloch Confederacy also known as 'Kalat Khanate' came into existence during the rule of Mir Ahmed Khan (1666-1695). However, in the Baloch history, Kalat state touched the height, in terms of expansion and development, during the era of Naseer Khan (Khan-e-Baloch, 1749-1817), a great leader in the history of Baloch. He gave an unwritten constitution mainly based on customs and traditions of the Baloch community.¹¹

As regards to the British presence in Balochistan, it was not until the nineteenth century that the British deepened its interest in this area, first during Napoleon's menacing presence in Egypt, and later on during the time of the first Anglo-Afghan War in 1838. A British expedition was sent into the area to pave the way for the building of the Indo-European telegraph line, which passed through Makran. On the line's

completion in 1863, Major F. Goldsmid was posted to Gwadar as a British assistant political agent. In 1872, a firm boundary between Persia and British Balochistan was established.¹² The basic objective of the British entry into Balochistan was to create a buffer state to protect British India's security and commercial interests by keeping Tsarist Russia and France away from India, France was then active in Iran.

The occupation of Balochistan was according to the British imperialistic policy of 'Divide and Rule'. They occupied Kalat in November 1839 and applied different set of rules to maintain their control in Balochistan. Category of directly administered areas came under the classification of the territories administered by the agents to the Governor General, which also included territories obtained by the ratification of boundaries with Afghanistan during 1893, consequent to the Durand Line agreement signed between Amir Abdur Rehman and the British India. These areas contained agencies of Zhob, Chagi, eastern part of Quetta, Sanjavi, Kohlu, Barkhan as well as strip of land along the railway line.¹³

Under the arrangement, agent to the Governor General known as the political agent appointed by the British, held an absolute power and made the Khan of Kalat, a mere spectator in his own 'free country'. The Government of British India introduced a new *Shahi Jirga* — a consultative body of tribal elders, *Sardars* and aristocrats that had the authority to deal with the local issues. At the very onset, Quetta city became the administered capital of the British Balochistan. On the other hand, the Pashtuns had their own tribal chiefs. After the arrival of the British, the same system was introduced in the Pashtun areas as well.¹⁴ The second category of area constituted on the native states, which were Kalat and its feudatory states like Lasbela and Kharan, while third category included the tribal areas of Marri and Bugti. Khan of Kalat continued to get money for the area leased to British Balochistan.¹⁵

Balochistan after Independence

At the time of partition, on 29 June 1947, the *Shahi Jirga* of the British Balochistan, along with the elected members of the Quetta Municipality unanimously passed a resolution forming Balochistan as a part of Pakistan. On July 18, 1947, the province of British Balochistan was to become a part of Pakistan without any other qualification or any provision.¹⁶ However, the Khan of Kalat decided to stay away and offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan in the sphere of defence, foreign affairs, and communication.¹⁷ In the meantime, when the process was still on, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah met the Khan of Kalat, occasionally, and convinced him to join Pakistan. On Quaid's advice, Khan decided to merge his territory to form part of Pakistan.¹⁸

At the time of creation of Pakistan, Balochistan was divided into two parts: the British Balochistan comprising Quetta, Pishin, Zhob, Loralai and Lasbela, and the native Balochistan constituting Kalat, Kharan and Makran. Makran became a district within the province of Balochistan, excluding an area of 800 km around Gwadar, which was part of "the Sultanate of Oman over which the Khan of Kalat had granted suzerainty to Taimur Sultan, the defeated ruler of Muscat during 1783."¹⁹



Province	Balochistan
Districts	30
Area(km ²)	347,190
Population (1998)	6,566,000
Density (people/km ²)	18.9

The Map is taken out from the Pakistan forum.²⁰

Until 1958, Gwadar continued to remain part of Oman. Pakistan purchased it in September 1958 and later on merged it in Balochistan Province in 1977. Thus, present Balochistan came into being on July 1, 1970, with the abolition of 'One Unit' in West Pakistan. The administrative divisions of Quetta and Kalat were merged to form this province. Currently, it has 6 divisions and 30 districts.²¹

Waves of Unrest in Balochistan

Some anti-state elements have never liked this turn of events and continued to cause problem occasionally. To date, there have been five instances, when unrest in selected part of Balochistan was created with a view to develop distrust between the province and the central government, starting from 1948, 1955, 1958, and 1973 and lately in 2006 after the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti.²²

The first wave of unrest was the result of accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948. The brother of Khan of Kalat, Shahzada Abdul Karim with about 130 tribesmen tried to create unrest through armed struggle against the state of Pakistan but failed to cause any impact. The second attempt was the result of 'One Unit' scheme in October 14, 1955. Balochs showed their resentment against the new constitutional arrangements. Soon after the declaration of Martial Law in October 5, 1958, third upsurge started, because of the arrest of Khan of Kalat. In 1962, the Khan was pardoned and released with full amount of Privy Purse. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's era witnessed the fourth wave of unrest, when he dismissed the Chief Minister of Balochistan government, Sardar Attaullah Mengal. The Marri and Mengal armed tribesmen revolted against the federal government, which was crushed militarily. The last and latest phase is the result of the tension mounted between the Bugti tribe under the leadership of Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti and the provincial and federal authorities. Bugti demanded greater autonomy and put up his 15-point agenda. This resulted in a clash between the Baloch militant force and state armed forces. The death of Nawab Akbar

Bughti on August 26, 2006 in mysterious circumstances further aggravated the situation.

Ethnic Composition

The population of Balochistan consists of about 13.162 million people, as recorded in 2011, which is 6.85 per cent (vis-a-vis 4.9 per cent, according to 1998 census) of Pakistan's total inhabitants, represents an amalgam and a fine blend of ethnic communities.²³ The Balochistan population is divided into three main ethnic groups, Baloch, Brahui and Pashtun. The racial origin of Baloch group is not precisely established.²⁴ Ethnic Baloch (including Brahui) is about 6.8 million, over 50 per cent of the total population for which Brahui accounts for about 0.7 to 0.8 million. Of these, about 55 per cent of its population lives in Balochistan, while about 27 percent Baloch live outside Balochistan, mainly in Sindh and about 35 per cent of the Balochistan population is Pashtun.²⁵

It is also providing home to roughly half-a-million ethnic Punjabis, or nearly six per cent of its population, and to an even smaller percentage of Urdu-speaking and a small number from northern India. They "ironically are still known as 'Settler Balochis' despite being part of the province for generations".²⁶ This ethnic and religious balance is likely to be threatened in the wake of prevalent militancy in the Baloch and Brahui areas.

Due to the tribal nature of this society, the *Sardars* are considered as the most powerful persons in the province. These tribal heads have formulated their own small political parties, as they are not ready to accept each other's domination. Mainstream political parties have failed to make an effective ingress in Balochistan. The militants have virtually exploited this political space and one should be mindful of the geographic realities as well.²⁷

External Dimension of Unrest in Balochistan


Balochistan's geography influences the power politics of the regional and international players. The prevailing geo-strategic environment in the region makes it more vulnerable to external threats.²⁸ Mr. Durrani, a politician from Balochistan, while speaking at the Workshop held at National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, opined that Balochistan had always been the chessboard of the 'Great Game'. In the 19th Century, it was the *raison d'être* behind all rivalries of the imperial powers including the British and the Tsarist Russia. During the Cold War, Soviet interference also caught the limelight leading to the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979. After the incident of September 11, the region has seen a 'New Great Game'. The main players of this game are China, Iran, India, the US and Afghanistan, besides Russia, UK, Israel and Gulf States.²⁹

While history has been unkind to Balochistan, its geography has been its greatest strength, which provides an energy corridor to Central Asia. The untold wealth, which remains buried in the triangle where the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan meet with Iran, increases its importance, especially for the international players. The region also provides across the country energy corridor for oil and gas pipeline projects from Central Asian States, Iran and Qatar.³⁰

- **China Factor:** China has invested heavily in Balochistan, including building a deep-water port at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to give access to Gulf oil supplies as an alternative route for catering its vulnerabilities of oil imports through the narrow Strait of Malacca. Precisely, it is because of this reason that despite unrest in selected areas of Balochistan, China continues to cooperate with Pakistan and prepares to invest more in Gwadar.³¹ Several US security analysts claim that China will also use Gwadar for military purposes as part of its 'String of Pearls' strategy designed to project power into the Indian Ocean and secure access to key Middle Eastern and African

resources. However, China denies military ambitions, claiming that it seeks a 'harmonious ocean'.³²

- **Chah Bahar Port vs Gwadar Port:** Iran's decision to involve India in its Chah Bahar port project is indicative of its interest in the region, in order to secure economic dividends. It is opined that the quest for energy security has made India and China competitors in the global energy game. In fact, India considers Chah Bahar port facility as her main entry port for energy and commercial trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caspian region.³³




➤ Involvement of Foreign Elements

- The reports of the involvement of foreign hands in Balochistan unrest are not new. For its strategic importance, "the province of Balochistan remains all the time in the vortex of fiercely rivalling international spy agencies for infestation". Mr. Rohrabacher has actually drawn the attention of the US' master planner, the CIA, to gear up the project

of establishing a 'Greater Balochistan' which was designed during the Bush era.³⁴ Ralph Peters in his testimony supported the idea of an independent Balochistan as per his article 'Blood Borders' published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006 with a map of 'Free Balochistan'.³⁵

- Due to its geo-strategic importance, particularly for Central Asian States and Afghanistan, US thinks, "holding, capturing or creating an independent state in the Balochistan region will provide her remunerative strategic advantages. That includes an easy access to the Gulf through the Gwadar Port, disintegration of lonely nuclear Islamic state, dominance over China, Russia, the Persian Gulf and other Islamic countries."³⁶



Map by Lt Col Ralph Peters, published in the US Armed Forces Journal in June 2006³⁷

- Additionally, the US attraction for Balochistan also revolves around its virgin coastline, vast hinterland with untapped natural resources, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, Iranian nuclear issue and the ongoing covert operations against Iran.³⁸ Besides, it will also be helpful for power projection of the US in the region thus, snubbing Iran.³⁹ It is viewed that Israel's interests also coincide with the US thinking because of Iran's disputed nuclear programme. Therefore, Israel would also like to join the US and help her in undermining Iran by supporting establishment of 'Greater Balochistan'.
- There is a consensus in Pakistani community that both Afghanistan and India are also involved in the internal affairs of Pakistan through Balochistan. It is understandable as the two countries continue to accuse Pakistan for interfering in their internal affairs. It is opined that India also wishes to monitor Chinese interests. Since, the US and Indian strategic interests coincide in Balochistan, therefore, the Americans seem to provide tacit support to India using Afghanistan soil which is under US occupation.⁴⁰
- Concerning Russia, one may not have any doubt that given an opportunity, Russian would not hesitate to harm Pakistan, reasons are well registered in history. Russia's KGB along with India's RAW continued to meddle in Balochistan since early 1980s but then, the context was different. In the changed political and geostrategic environment, though their objectives have changed, yet the method continues to remain the same. Their intelligence agencies are extending their support to separatist elements in coins as well as with arms and ammunition.⁴¹

- In the fast changing political and security environment, Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries too have interests in the region that is to counter the Iranian influence. Additionally, in the Gulf States, development of Gwadar Port has not been welcomed, because, it is seen as a competing port to Dubai. Probably, this was exactly the grounds because of that Gwadar port project remained in freeze for years, as successive leadership in Pakistan could not afford to annoy the Gulf States' monarchs.

Internal Dimension

➤ Governance Issues

- The lack of law and order in the province has created vacuum for the drug mafia and arms mafia, who have become more powerful. The highest court of Pakistan has already expressed its serious reservations, when it gave the decision, "there was absolute constitutional breakdown in the province, and the government's writ was completely missing."⁴² A weak and undemocratic political culture, lack of social development, and over centralization have caused a strong sense of political deprivation.
- It has seldom happened that over the past five years, Balochistan Assembly had ever completed quorum to sit and legislate people's friendly policies like education and health. The literacy rate is at 51.5 per cent, the 3rd lowest among the four provinces, unemployment in Balochistan stands at 0.06 million compared to the national volume of 3.05 million, which is much higher than its share in the total population, and finally, it has the lowest annual growth among the provinces.⁴³ Sasuie Abbas Leghari opined in one of his articles, "our rulers

have only paid lip service to the problems of the province instead of taking concrete measures."⁴⁴

➤ **Sardari System**

- The roots of Balochistan unrest lie in partition of British India. The legacy of ‘Sardari System’ of governance was taken over from British rulers that continue unabated. Unfortunately, the government at centre has remained weak to pick up enough courage to challenge the status-quo. Sensing the weakness of Islamabad, the *Sardars* continued to exploit the situation for promotion of their self-interests. The old timer ‘Sardars’ continues to defend ‘Sardari System’ even today.⁴⁵
- On March 1, 1976, Mr. Bhutto made an endeavour to abolish ‘Sardari System’ by passing an Act through parliament but nothing changed.⁴⁶ Even, General Zia felt powerless to control corruption in Balochistan.⁴⁷ The ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package’ is also considered as a ‘Ministers Package’, which failed to reach to the deserving people of the province. Regrettably, there has never been an accountability and transparency in spending. According to an editorial published in *The News*, “the ruling political elite have abdicated all responsibility to Balochistan while reserving for itself the role of plundering the resource-rich province and enjoying the perks and privileges of power.”⁴⁸
- With the change of regime from military led General to the democratically elected government, the situation on ground deteriorated from bad to the worst. It is opined that even the announcement of hundreds of ‘Balochistan Rights’ packages will not make any material difference on ground in the ill-fated province, if the issues of provincial autonomy,

control over resources and administrative freedom are not sorted out. The successive governments followed only traditional shortcuts of pampering a few of the selected ones while ignoring the real issues.⁴⁹

➤ **Corruption in Bureaucracy**

- There is another perspective to the governance issues in Balochistan. While the political leadership is chronically corrupt, regrettably, the bureaucracy is very ineffective and corrupt too. There is no writ of the government anywhere in Balochistan. When asked why, the police in Quetta had failed to uproot lawlessness, the Governor Balochistan while quoting the Inspector General of the Police in Quetta, said, "Every time a criminal was rounded up by the police, high officials from the provincial government would make a phone call to entice the police to release the criminals."⁵⁰ The Governor wondered, "how democracy, justice and tranquillity would prevail in a society which was so badly dominated by the influential war lords."⁵¹ The only remedy, according to him, "is a social change led by the educated people of Balochistan." The government in Quetta has not uttered a word in response to Governor Magsi's harsh comments.⁵² The security environment is a basic hurdle in development of the province. Target killings, kidnapping, bomb blasts and attacks on governmental installations have become a routine matter, which has caused serious blow to the developmental process in the province.⁵³

➤ **Decline of Educational Institutions**

- While in education field, Balochistan was already lacking, however, the indifferent behaviour of the government towards this particular issue has only

encouraged the militants. According to a faculty member of Balochistan University, "the university has been hijacked by the militants and academic activities have been marginalized. The university administration has lost their control and the so-called student organizations are busy in polluting the minds of youth." He further explained, "regrettably, the university is even unable to hoist Pakistan's flag and the national anthem is not played even at the historical national events like 14th August and 6th September right in the Capital City of Balochistan."⁵⁴ Mir Muzaffar Hussain Jamali has already paid the price for hoisting Pakistani flag and playing national anthem in his private school at Kharan. He gave his life but did not budge. The government failed to provide him protection. He was murdered on May 17, 2012, in broad daylight hours.⁵⁵ It is viewed that the government has never tried to improve the educational system, a factor that generates economic activities as well as patriotism.⁵⁶

➤ **Role of Intelligence Agencies and Non-state Actors**

- Mr. Mehmood Khan Achakzai, a well-known politician from Balochistan, opined that the people of Balochistan need rule of law, justice and equality but regrettably, the public has lost trust in the leadership. He also viewed with concern that the secret intelligence agencies are the eyes and ears of a country, but then, they should be more agile and competent than the foreign intelligence agencies. But sadly, he said, "today, the situation has changed totally in Pakistan, as people have started feeling insecure at the hands of the government institutions like police and army, etc." ⁵⁷ He suggested that we must allow the masses to find and choose their own leaders and respect their will.

- The first and the foremost threat, which has become an obstacle in providing good governance in Balochistan is the lack of capacity. Groups such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundullah have an active presence in the province. Free movement across the Pak-Afghan border, presence of a large Pashtun community in Balochistan having links in Afghanistan, an extensive network of *Deobandi* madrassas and the Afghan refugee camps in the province are some of the key support and recruitment factors for Taliban who are in alliance with other decedent groups.⁵⁸ The lethal nexus of drug mafia, Baloch separatist elements and Taliban presence in the province cause serious threat to the existing security setup in Balochistan. Pakistan's intelligence agencies in Balochistan, lack capacity to give a matching response unless the civil society and general masses stand behind them. However, it is observed that people are showing an indifferent behaviour towards the issue and expect law-enforcing agencies to do everything.
- While the governing issues are primarily domestic, but it has an international perspective as well. It is claimed that Quetta Shura is carrying out attacks into Southern Afghanistan against NATO forces, which Pakistan is unable to stop. For the Iranians, Jundullah organization, while using Pakistani land, carries out attacks into Iran allegedly armed by the Americans and Israeli secret services. There is also the issue of gas pipeline from Iran, which the US wants to discourage and hence pressure remains on Pakistan to ensure that the deal does not materialize.⁵⁹ The conflict in Balochistan is directed and stage-managed by the foreign intelligence services and other international players. As indicated earlier on, Pakistan's intelligence agencies are hardly prepared to give matching response.⁶⁰

- The government and the law enforcing agencies are under tremendous pressure. Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, a seasoned politician from Balochistan, has accused the agencies and said, "state agencies are involved in extra-judicial disposal of militants and it is also true that those, who were killed, were, involved in anti-state activities. But there should be a difference in the behaviour of the state from that of criminals." He further said, "there may be some foreign hands involved, but then what is the state doing."⁶¹ Similar views were also expressed by former Inspector General of Police, Balochistan, Mr. Tariq Khosa who said that agencies have no role to carry out extra judicial killings. He said. "all criminals must be brought to justice by giving them equal opportunities to defend themselves".⁶² The 'missing persons' case has become one of the most divisive issues plaguing the province, which has pitched the government against different political groups and also caused ethnic tension between the indigenous Baloch, Pashtun population and Punjabi settlers.⁶³
- Nevertheless, the other side had different story to present. It is opined that, wherever, foreign sponsored elements take up arms against the state, the agencies do play a role and in this process sometimes advertently or inadvertently excesses also occur. The opinion makers also view that many of the so-called 'missing persons' are not the innocent people, therefore, it must be seen in the context of the entire situation on ground.⁶⁴ In the same context, Major General Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmad, Director General Military Operation, while speaking during the workshop at NDU, opined that the case of 'missing persons' was not so simple. He said, "many of them who have been declared missing were sitting either in Ferrari Camps or have gone across Afghan border to get themselves

trained. Therefore, the role-played by media needs revisit about the statistics that they have provided to the public."⁶⁵

Development Activities in Balochistan – An Overview

Apart from the above state of affairs, it does not mean that nothing has been done in the past. General Musharraf during one of his briefings explained, "what we did and achieved in Balochistan in eight years can be safely said to have been more than what was done during the previous decades since independence."⁶⁶ The government created a new deep-sea port at Gwadar and linked it with Karachi. In addition, a number of other mega projects were initiated including construction of more than 500-km-long Kachhi Canal to irrigate barren lands of Dera Bugti and Jhal Magsi. Over Rs.10 billion were spent on an underground water project for Quetta to overcome the critical drought conditions of the city.⁶⁷ He claimed that his government converted the entire 'B' areas into 'A' areas and also raised additional police force and 10 wings of the Frontier Corps.⁶⁸

In addition, an extensive work was initiated to educate the Balochistan youth including the opening of cadet colleges, IT University and a Women's University in Quetta, a Marine Sciences University at Lasbela, Military College Sui and an Engineering University in Khuzdar. Vacancies for the Balochistan's youth were increased in medical and engineering universities in Punjab and Sindh. Baloch youth was given special concession for induction in the armed forces. The Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah, the Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), the Aeronautical Complex were all told to select Baloch youths for training and induction in their respective workshops. Uniquely, General Musharraf said, "the public sector development projects fund allocation for Balochistan was more than that for Punjab."⁶⁹ The present regime has reversed some of his important decisions and lost what all was achieved earlier on.

During a briefing at Headquarters, 41 Division, Quetta, on 20 June 2012, it was disclosed that Chamalang Project, launched a few years back by the Army, has catered for 80,000 employees and also helped educating over 7,000 students. Over 4,500 students from all over Balochistan are being given free education at Quetta including boarding and lodging.⁷⁰

Notwithstanding, the problem areas and achievements as referred above, both Islamabad as well as the provinces are in a state of fix because of multiple challenges with which Pakistan is confronted to. While wisdom, sincerity and will to do can make the difference, the state in fact lacks capacity and thus, in isolation cannot deal with the ongoing security challenges. With respect to Balochistan, it has become 'strategic battlefield' where the external players are extensively involved, employing their intelligence agencies.

Recommended Options

From the above referred study, one may safely conclude that drastic changes are needed to take this province out of the current mess. Some of the important steps which cater for immediate, mid- and long-term measures include:⁷¹

- Improving law and order is the prerequisite for better governance. An effective legislation is, therefore, important at both federal and provincial levels for dealing with non-state actors and other terrorist groups. The Anti-Terrorism Act must be expedited so that it gets legal cover to make it effective.
- It is viewed with strong apprehension that the present democratic culture in Pakistan might fail to bring the true representative of the people even if we go through the exercise of free and fair elections especially in the context of Balochistan because of the existing 'Sardari' culture as well as perceived insecurities prevailing in the province.

- The current system of governance in Balochistan should be improved by evolving a mechanism by which a small and effective cabinet could be formed which should have an effective oversight by the federal government.
- Capacity building of Police and Judiciary would need considerable time, therefore, Frontier Corps must be brought in direct support of the administration to fill up the deficiencies of the police department. In order to succeed, at no time the militants/terrorists should feel free to act at will. They should be pressurized to remain on the run until they either are apprehended forcefully or submit willingly. 'No go areas' within a state must not be tolerated.
- On economic front, a comprehensive long-term sustainable approach is needed for the rapid development of Balochistan. The government should work out a comprehensive strategy for the developmental projects, focusing on all sectors such as education, health, fisheries, exploration of minerals, mining, livestock, agriculture and electricity generation. The political leadership may be asked to identify the projects, which should be implemented through an 'Independent Implementing Body', formed jointly by the provincial and central government. This practice is also required for other provinces as well.
- Economic development in the province cannot take off without the road infrastructure. The government should make an all out effort to complete the ongoing mega projects of road connectivity in the province.⁷²
- On the educational front, the province must be brought at par with other provinces, by putting education at the top of the policy agenda. Youth exchange programmes are beneficial in this regard, however, this could be a stopgap arrangement, the real work on education sector will have to be initiated by the province itself.

Provision of the foolproof security to the government/private sector academic institutions is vital to enhance the capacity.

- The capacity building of the people of Balochistan is equally important. Since, there is a shortage of technical staff and experts in the various departments, it is, therefore, imperative to establish 'professional colleges and polytechnic institutes' in the entire province and the existing institutes be made fully functional. However, until the requisite staff is trained and made available to these technical schools, the staff acquired from various provinces should be provided foolproof security with sufficient incentives to stay on.
- Media has already appeared as one of the strong organs of the state influencing the decision-making bodies of the country as well as perception building across the globe. Regrettably, the media personnel in Balochistan are operating under extreme threats from militants, therefore, their coverage lacks objectivity, as they are unable to project the aspirations of an overwhelming majority of the patriotic people. Hence, the security and freedom of the media personnel should be ensured. Nonetheless, they should not be allowed to promote anti-state agenda, the state interest must be protected at all cost.
- Concerning ethnic and sectarian issues, all communities should have due share in all organs of the state and public services. No community should be left out. The current sectarian issue should also be seen in the regional context. The nation must resist and should not fall prey to the trap of outside forces. A joint and well-coordinated response by Pakistan's civil society including all religious scholars will play a positive role in creating harmony and goodwill within various sectarian groups in Pakistan.

- On the security front, the government should improve vigilance on Balochistan's borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Foreign interference in Balochistan in particular and Pakistan in general should strictly be kept under watch by exercising caution at all levels. Additionally, Pakistan's law enforcement agencies should be fully prepared to tackle any crisis situation that may emerge in the aftermath of the ongoing push by the few handpicked militants with the full support of foreign actors.
- The sacrifices of the Army and other law enforcing agencies including the Frontier Corps, Police and other patriotic citizens, who lost their lives due to the ferocious atrocities of militants, should be acknowledged and appreciated. While the Army takes full care of its employees, the families of innocent victims, including the Frontier Corps, Police and Levies must be paid reasonable compensation. About the incentives given to the Frontier Corps personnel, an excellent model exists in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
- It is good news that 'nationalist parties' have taken a principle decision to take part in the forthcoming election. Taking advantage of the presence of their leaders, it is opined that high powered commission, headed by influential politicians from Balochistan background may be constituted, which should have due representation of all stakeholders, including the Judiciary, Army, Frontier Corps and other law enforcing agencies to prepare a comprehensive plan to address all issues of Balochistan. It may also serve as a 'Truth and Reconciliation Forum', in order to negotiate with left-out estranged Baloch elements, provided they lay down their arms. The hard-core anti-Pakistani who have no respect for Pakistani 'Flag' must be dealt differently.⁷³
- An effective civil defence system needs to be developed and activated throughout the country, in order to equip

the citizens with essential military training as well as personal licensed weapons. Similarly, the erstwhile National Cadet Corps (NCC) need to be revived in the colleges and universities. These systems, if activated, will augment the armed forces, in case of national-level exigencies.

- The perception that rest of Pakistan is usurping the resources of Balochistan must be changed. People of Balochistan must be made conscious of the fact that problems of all provinces are common and so are the interests. Interdependency, therefore, cannot be removed by having one set of resources only.
- Finally, the Foreign Office should pursue a proactive foreign policy with all neighbouring, regional and international powers in order to communicate the concerns of the people of Pakistan regarding the involvement of foreign agencies in fuelling the unrest in Balochistan. In this regard, Senator Mushahid's proposals may be given a serious thought.⁷⁴

Conclusion

The situation in Balochistan has been ignored in past years because it has been considered as an 'internal matter' until recent past. But in changed geo-political and geo-strategic environment of the region, Balochistan has now become a chessboard of power politics, thus, the problem has evolved as of a greater significance and scope. As things stand now, Pakistan can ignore Balochistan only at its own peril.

While Balochistan is strategically important to the US and other regional players, what is happening within the province is largely an internal affair of Pakistan. In principle, there is nothing wrong which cannot be put right within the country's embattled constitutional framework, given a genuine commitment by all relevant parties and state willingness to exert proper governance, law and order. Therefore, establishing writ of the government at the earliest time to

ensure security for the people is of foremost importance. After restoring the writ of the government, socio-economic activities must take off at all levels. Honest, dedicated and corruption free bureaucracy and political leadership is vital for bringing investment in the province.

Author

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BOOK REVIEW

Saira Khan. *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan*. (New York; Routledge, 2010).

Air Commodore Zia ul Haque Shamsi

The book 'Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan' by Saira Khan explores how introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia has transformed the protracted conflict into an insolvable puzzle. The book is divided into two parts and ten chapters. The first part, comprising three chapters, deals with 'Theory' and the second part, spread over seven chapters, is written on 'The India-Pakistan protracted conflict'. Keeping in view author's vast experience and expertise of the regional affairs, this book appears to be a lucid narrative of the historical facts and incidents of distant and near past, with very sound theoretical base.

In her introduction, Dr. Khan states that studies revealed that the motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons derive from systemic, domestic, and individual factors, whereas the security was the primary driving force for most states' tendency to proliferate. She is of the view that one of the most important reasons for proliferation — the existence of protracted conflicts — was ignored by proliferation scholars. (p-2) In other words, if protracted conflict states proliferate to enhance security through deterrence, how does that impact the conflict relations? Proliferation scholars never probed this significant research question, neither did conflict scholars. The book underscores the relevance of nuclear weapons to both war avoidance and peace avoidance. The possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has changed the pattern of the relationship between crisis, conflict and war in South Asia. The 1986-87, 1990, and 2001 crises substantiate the belief that serious crisis may not escalate to all-out war. However, those frequent crises during the nuclear period also confirm that peace between the two countries is unlikely. Peace initiatives, such as the Lahore Peace Process of

1999 and the Agra Summit of 2001, could not prosper owing to the eruption of serious crises in the conflict setting. Among others, the primary policy recommendation of this study is that major powers need to create a propitious environment for states to terminate their intractable conflict. The transformed India-Pakistan protracted conflict could be terminated with the help of a facilitator, a third party; without this help, a congenial environment for conflict resolution may never be created by the two states in their frequent crisis-prone confrontations.

The Chapter-I titled 'Studies on Conflict Transformation' describes theoretical constructs of conflict management. Conflict management is a term used to describe a "situation where a conflict continues but where its worst excesses are avoided or mitigated. Conflict management would, in particular, seek to avoid or terminate violence between parties." Thus, conflict management is often sought when some form of conflict control is necessary but complete resolution seems impossible. For example, peacekeeping forces can calm a situation and, thus, manage a conflict. However, such endeavours can never resolve the conflict but only provide temporary solutions (p-10). Conflict management is also often achieved by strategies of mutual deterrence. Thus, changes in the attributes of the participants can manage a conflict. The acquisition of nuclear weapons can be used to manage conflicts through deterrence. Dr Khan writes that this does not, however, resolve the conflict which is one of the primary conclusions of the present book.

Dr Khan refers to Charles Osgood's strategy of 'Gradual Reduction in International Tension' (GRIT), according to which 'one of the parties to a conflict announces its intention to take some conciliatory moves designed to reduce tension and then implements those moves. Words are followed by deeds. This is done regardless of whether the other side decides to reciprocate. The other side is invited to reciprocate and is likely to follow the lead of the first state, but the decision is entirely its own. Experimental studies agree that strategies like GRIT, which involve a series of conciliatory

initiatives taken by one side independently of the other's actions, are more effective than strategies requiring reciprocation directly and immediately. However, Dr Khan points out certain deficiencies in that GRIT cannot be utilized for conflict resolution. It never spells out how and under what conditions it can be used to resolve a protracted conflict.

The chapter two deals with the theoretical constructs of 'Ramifications of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition'. She is of the view that there is lack of scholarship on the implications of nuclear weapons acquisition for the conflicts that states are engaged in. Also, she highlights the inadequacies of studies in further protraction of a protracted conflict as a result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (p-26) She also dilates on the nuclear black market making a mention of Dr AQ Khan's network, and quotes Allison who described it as 'Wal-Mart of nuclear proliferation'.

The Chapter-III is titled as 'Elucidating Conflict Transformation with Nuclear Weapons'. It is aimed at understanding as to when and under what conditions a protracted conflict moves to a level of almost indefinite protraction. Dr Khan writes that protracted conflict transformation is a function of the absence of war and presence of crisis, which are products of nuclear weapons acquisition by the states in conflict. She also explains the life cycle of a protracted conflict. (p-41) She further states that deterrence is the most attractive strategy for such states that are both weary and fearful of war in the conflict setting.

In Chapter-IV, 'Life-cycle of the Protracted Conflict', she writes that India-Pakistan conflict in the South Asia region stands out as one of the world's intractable conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. She refers this conflict as a territorial dispute in which war remains a probability due to territorial aspects. Kashmir is a symbolic and nationalistic issue for the contending states. For Pakistan, acquisition of Kashmir is the completion of its identity, so this dispute is of a difficult nature. India regards it as a symbol of the ethos of secularism. (p-62)

She further states that the four crises in the nuclear period — the Brasstacks crisis, the 1989-90 Kashmir crisis, the Kargil crisis, and Indian Parliament Attack crisis — were all severe in terms of escalation potential. Most significantly, in seventeen years the two countries had four crises (the last in 2001). In contrast, in the pre-nuclear period, there were seven crises in thirty-nine years, of which three led to war. (p-71) Dr Khan is of the view that India-Pakistan conflict has not been able to move forward to reach the de-escalation and cessation phases. This means that it became frozen as the parties became nuclear states and for the stability/instability paradox dynamics.

In Chapter-V, Dr Khan argues that because a nuclear deterrent capability was the primary goal for both states, deterrence stability was desired and achieved at the war level, making room for strategic calculations and decisions, and creating a crisis-prone environment non-conducive to conflict resolution. The introduction of nuclear weapons into the India-Pakistan conflict had the unintended consequence of making the protracted conflict intractable. (p-76)

Dr Khan is of the view that the negative effects of nuclear weapons acquisition are real and have impacted the conflict. There are no extended peaceful periods due to the frequent eruption of violence short of actual war. Instead of bringing peace, the introduction of nuclear weapons to the India-Pakistan conflict has created a long-lasting non-peaceful environment.

In Chapter-VI, 'Crises and Wars in the Pre-nuclear Period', Dr Khan outlines that the rivalry between India and Pakistan has resulted in a total of eleven inter-state crises since 1947 to date. Seven of these occurred in the pre-nuclear period, 1947-86, whereas four of these seven occurred between 1947 and 1962, three between 1963 and 1978, and none during the 1979-86. (p-89). Dr Khan briefly explains the causes and conduct of wars and crises between India and Pakistan in pre-nuclear era. She concludes that three crises escalated to war

(in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971), whereas she declares the period of 1979-86 as the transition to nuclear weapons. (p-99)

In Chapter-VII, Dr Khan writes that India and Pakistan faced four serious crises in the nuclear period; none of which escalated to full-scale war, although each had the potential to do so. These crises were 'Exercise Brasstacks in 1986', the Kashmir crisis of 1990, the Kargil conflict of 1999, and the Indian Parliament Attack crisis of 2001. Two of these occurred in the post-overt nuclearization period. Khan quotes Samina Ahmed, who argues that "nuclear weapons played a major role in shaping Pakistan's military strategy toward India in the planning of the Kargil episode and during the onset of the crisis. At the tactical level, Kargil was a typical limited probe involving a small, carefully controlled incursion along the LoC, in which Pakistan thought it would be able to reverse course if it met firm Indian resistance. However, in fact, the US pressurized the government of Nawaz Sharif to de-escalate as fast as possible. The possibility of a nuclear war made the Americans persuade India and Pakistan to end Kargil."

Chapter-VIII, 'Futile Peace Initiatives in the midst of Violence' deals with certain bold overtures by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf of Pakistan. However, none could last long due to deep-rooted mistrust and enduring conflict. Dr Khan quotes Muchkund Dubey who argues that, "Solving the Kashmir issue has become more intractable with the possession of nuclear weapons."

In Chapter-IX, Dr Khan writes that "India and Pakistan seem to be comfortable in the present situation of no war and no peace. Since stability is a function of no war and no crisis, and crisis still characterizes the conflict, the parties have become quite accustomed to the situation. They sense that wars are unlikely and crises and violence will continue; they are prepared to face low-medium-intensity violence and are unsure about the permanence of any peace process." (p-128).

In Chapter-X, Khan reiterates that this book's primary purpose is to demonstrate the negative ramifications of nuclear weapons acquisition for the India-Pakistan protracted

conflict. However, it also aims to highlight the salient roles of actor attributes and situational attributes in resolving the conflict. The purpose is to illustrate that a conflict is likely to become protracted when the two sides acquire nuclear weapons, a unit-level attribute, unless there is a significant change in an actor attribute such as leadership or political/economic capability, or in a situational attribute, such as third-party intervention in order to terminate the conflict. (p-141)

In conclusion, Saira Khan writes that “this book sought to expose the negative effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on conflict resolution. It made a causal connection between nuclear weapons acquisition by two warring states and the indefinite intractability of a protracted conflict.” (p-155). The book has argued that in the absence of nuclear weapons, a conflict usually reaches the cessation phase as a result of war, the traditional conflict termination mechanism used by most belligerent states in the world.

Khan concludes that her study ‘disproves the realist theoretical paradigm that states are more secure when they build up their military capabilities. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has not made India and Pakistan secure. Although at the strategic level they avoided war, serious crises erupted more frequently in nuclear period of the conflict, and each of these could have escalated, increasing insecurity. She contends that both India and Pakistan need to end their long-drawn-out conflict by finding ways to deal with the most important issue, Kashmir. Whatever the benefits of their current cooperation, leaving the central issue aside is not helping resolve the conflict.

Dr Saira Khan’s book is a well-researched and very well orchestrated academic work. She has done tremendous amount of work to gather the relevant theories to identify the lack of scholarly work in the field of conflict resolution of the protracted conflicts due to acquisition of nuclear weapons. This book is a much-needed exploration of when, and under what conditions, could a conflict transform to a level of almost

indefinite protraction. Saira Khan argues that with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states in a conflict, the situation is transformed to a level of indefinite protraction. She maintains that such crises are embedded in each protracted conflict and that their escalation to war depends on the nuclear status of the adversaries. However, author ignores Pakistan's legitimate security concerns due to non-resolution of disputes with India, particularly Kashmir. While asking India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes, she does not suggest any framework to do so when India continues to avoid resolutions of disputes of even smaller scale i.e Siachin and Sir Creek.

This book is an analysis of how nuclear weapons acquisition can transform a conflict. It is a brief book and a bit theoretical for the general reader, but its conclusions will be of interest to everyone. This book will be of use to all students of strategic studies, international relations and security and is recommended for researchers, and professional collection.

Book Reviewer

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