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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ

TAUGHT MAN THAT WHICH HE KNEW NOT

## NDU Journal

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis  
National Defence University, Islamabad

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## **SUMMARIES**

### **Madrassa Reforms – Problems and Prospects**

*Major General Nasrullah Tahir Dogar*

Madrassas are under sharp scrutiny for their real as well as perceived association with sectarianism and terrorism. The governments have done only half-hearted efforts to reform these powerful institutions. Attitude has been confrontational in nature than cooperative. This paper argues that the only option is to help these institutions to modernize, leading to a win-win situation. Moreover, any reforms based on better economic incentives will not only work but will also cause internal pressure on the system towards reformation.

### **Civil Military Relations -The Impact of Internal and External Factors in Shaping the Balance of Civil and Military Power**

*Brigadier Raashid Wali Janjua*

The article highlights factors that contribute towards an ideal balance in the civil-military relations. It examines the three important variables contributing to the divergences and frictions between the civilian political leadership and military experts. This paper analyzes three different case-studies by applying two concepts of controlling the military i.e objective control and subjective control. At the end, conclusions have been drawn for an ideal civil-military relationship.

### **Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan**

*Brigadier (Retired) Naeem Ahmed Salik*

The history of CBMs in South Asia is long, however, the existing CBMs have not been followed by the two sides in letter and spirit and it appears that CBMs as a concept have somehow failed to find much attraction. These have also been generally viewed with skepticism and it may, however, be unfair to completely discount their contribution in alleviating tensions and avoiding conflicts between the two arch rivals. This paper highlights that CBMs may not be a panacea for all the ills afflicting the Indo-Pak relations, but

these can contribute, may be to a small degree, to prevent the recurrence of hostilities in a crisis prone and tension-ridden region.

### **Nuclear Terrorism – Are we prepared for it?**

*Brigadier (Retired) Tughral Yamin*

Nuclear terrorism is being touted as the latest on the list of emerging threats. Theoretically speaking, acts of nuclear terrorism can take place during the transportation of radioactive materials. A number of government agencies in Pakistan are working in this regard. This paper aims to examine the international perceptions about nuclear terrorism and proposes a joint strategy to counter nuclear terrorism by taking all official and non-official stakeholders on board.

### **Strategic and Regional Implications of Indian Naval Expansion**

*Colonel Dr Raja Muhammad Khan*

Indian Maritime Doctrine is aimed at transforming it from a brown water coastal defense force to a formidable blue water navy. This unprecedented Indian Naval expansion will have serious implications for the Indian Ocean littorals. Domination and monitoring of the sea-lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and patrolling up to Persian Gulf will give India an edge over the other regional countries, especially Pakistan and China to operate freely. In this connection, this paper evaluates the strategic and regional implications of Indian Naval Expansion.

### **National Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism**

*Brigadier Mirza Kamran Zia*

National Strategy Paper is one of the major research activities, conducted by the National Defence Course participants of the University. It is a Group Research Paper, developed by eight authors on “National Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism” to critically evaluate the existing counter extremism and terrorism strategy. The authors have proposed a new national strategy in this regard.

# **MADRASSA REFORMS – PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

*Major General Nasrullah Tahir Dogar*

## **Abstract**

Madrassas in Pakistan, unfortunately, have become a symbol of sectarianism, extremism and terrorism. It is a need of the hour to reform these powerful institutions, keeping in view the fragile security environment. External as well as internal compulsions are also demanding reforms in the madrassa system. This study proposes policy measures for madrassa reforms with an underlying fact that confrontation will not resolve any issue, rather it may exacerbate the problem. The only way to deal with the issue is positive dialogue and engagement and not refutation and repudiation. The process will be slow, but will yield results depending on the amount of seriousness exhibited by the policy makers and those charged with implementing the government policy.

## **Introduction**

Madrassas are the flag bearers of Islamic education, and are considered as the custodians of Islamic tradition, culture, values and ethos. Another point of view considers the madrassas as the sole cause of the trouble faced by nation today, citing their role in sectarianism, and now in terrorism also. The reign of terror leashed out by Taliban and episode of Lal Masjid is keeping the issue alive and burning. In this backdrop, topic for my research, Madrassa Reforms – Problems and Prospects assumes added importance. Dealing with madrassas is both complex and challenging because of the influence they yield and sentimental affiliation of general public towards Islam, of which madrassas claim to be the sole custodian. Duality of their stance i.e. apparent openness and considered effort to keep veil, the real intentions make the research further complex. The fact that they have been able to successfully thwart the efforts of the government, have given them another lease of life. Madrassas are there to stay. They also perform some social welfare functions.

**Statement of the Problem.** Madrassa have been part of life in Muslim world and more so in the Subcontinent for centuries and have served the community well. For long, these have been the only system of education for Muslims. In addition, these have also been a source of social welfare where free education, and boarding and lodging, are provided to the poor. However, madrassa education has remained frozen in time, failing to reform and update, in keeping with the modern requirements. The graduates produced by the madrassas have fixated and rigid mindset which prefers conventional wisdom to rationalism and argument. Lately, there have been allegations of linkages between madrassas and terrorism.

Recent events at national and international level have forced the government to consider regulation and reformation of madrassas. Half-hearted efforts by the government, and resistance from madrassa organizations, have effectively stalled the process. In the process, madrassa organizations have taken the form of almost a movement in self-defense. There being no alternative to madrassas, at least in foreseeable future, the prospects of reforming madrassas need to be deliberated upon despite all the problems. In view of this, prospects of reformation of madrassas will form the basis of the research, covering problems and prospects, with a view to suggesting viable policy options for short and long terms reformation.

**The Significance and Scope of Study.** The study has profound significance due to prevailing security environment where madrassas have become suspect with government as well as certain segments of the society. Foreign pressure is also demanding reforms in the madrassa system. All stake-holders appear to be stuck to their points of view. In the given situation, there is a need to evolve a solution which is peaceful and practical. The underlying fact is that confrontation will not resolve any issue, rather it may exacerbate the problem. Scope of the study has been limited to reformation without extra-focus on sectarianism or links to terrorism which are the favorite topics under the prevailing environment.

**Review of Literature.** All literature available in the NMC library has been used for the purpose of research. Most of the

research carried earlier out, deals with sectarian aspect of madrassas. Some books were also purchased from the market. Jamia Manzoor, a leading Madrassa in Lahore was visited more than once to avail the services of their library and understand the mindset of administration through interaction which enabled taking of an exclusive interview.

**Methods.** Interviews were held with the administrators of Jamia Manzoor, a leading madrassa in Lahore, and Madrassa Salfia in Islamabad.

## **Historical Review**

**Education in Islam.** Islam, as a religion started with the word Iqra which means ‘read’. This places the importance of education and learning in Islam in correct perspective. However, knowledge in Islam is treated as one whole thing without any compartmentalization. Following verses of Qur’an and ahadith lay down the foundation of learning and define the scope of knowledge and give some insight into the types of education:-

### ➤ **Knowledge in Qur’an**

- And He taught Adam the names, all of them; ... (2:31)
- Allah bears witness, and (so do) the angels, and those possessed of knowledge that there is no god but He, upholding justice ... (3:18)
- (He) Who taught by the pen, taught man that he knew not (96:4-5)
- Say (to the unbelievers) Allah suffices as a witness between me and you, and whosoever possesses knowledge of the Book (13:43)
- And We gave David and Solomon knowledge ... (27:15)
- And We have brought to them a Book that We have well distinguished, based on knowledge (7:52)
- Ask the followers of the Reminder, if you know not (16:43)
- Are they equal – those who know and those who know not? (39:9)

- Allah will raise up in rank those of you who believe and those who have been given knowledge (58:11)
- Only those of His servants fear Allah who have knowledge ... (35:28)
- (Thy Lord hath decreed) ... pursue not that thou hast no knowledge of ... and walk not in the earth exultantly ... that is (among the precepts) of the wisdom thy Lord has revealed to thee (17:39). (A Messenger) ... to teach them the Book and the Wisdom (62:2) – (the Wisdom is more than knowledge, an intellectual vision as explained by a saying of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him): the world of wisdom is a lost (treasure) of the believer; therefore, wherever you find it, he has its prior right (to acquire it) (Tirmidhi)

➤ **Knowledge in Sunnah (Hadith)**

- Seeking knowledge is a bounded duty of every Muslim – men and women (Ibn e Majah)
- Learn knowledge and teach it to human beings (Baheqi)
- He who treads the path to seek knowledge, Allah facilitates for him the path to Jannah (Muslim)
- He who embarks on seeking knowledge, he is on to the way of Allah until he returns (Tirmidhi)
- The angels place their wings before the seeker of knowledge in deference to them (Abu Dawood)
- Allah bestows only to him the understanding of His din (the way of life) whom He wishes to do favour (Tirmidhi)

It can be concluded from above that Islam takes a very broader view of education and accords central place to knowledge in the life of a Muslim. Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) was Messenger of God and was ordained to communicate the religion of Islam, a religion which is a complete code of life, and being the last divine religion, was meant for all times and climes. Hence, it must contain a very broad and dynamic view of education, knowledge and learning which in fact it does. Prophet Mohammad (Peace by upon

him) was a Messenger and Teacher of religion and, thus, arranged essentially for education of religion only, leaving the other fields to experts. Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon him) once commented against the artificial pollination of dates, which led to drastic reduction in yield of dates. When Prophet Mohammad ((Peace be upon him)) came to know of this loss, he said that in worldly affairs his comments, like a commoner and should be taken like that<sup>1</sup>. The system of education which emerged in the time of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) was:-

- **Informal<sup>2</sup>**. Groups of different Arab tribes would travel to Madina, stay for few days to learn essentials, go back and teach others.
- **Formal<sup>3</sup>**. Dar ul Arqam was the first madrassa established in Makka and Suffa located in the vicinity of Masjid-e-Nabwi was the first residential academy/ university/ madrassa of Islam for religious education established in Madina under the direct supervision of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace by upon him).
- **Classification of Knowledge**. Knowledge in Islam has been classified into two broad categories: Revealed (perennial) or knowledge about religion based on divine revelations as contained in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and all that can be derived from them, with special emphasis on Arabic language as a key to understanding both the Qur'an and Sunnah. Acquired or worldly knowledge including social, natural and applied sciences as long as long as consistency with the Shari'ah as the source of values is maintained<sup>4</sup>. Imam Abu Hamid Mohammad Al Ghazali of Madrassa Nazamia was the first Islamic Muslim scholar and philosopher to have “differentiated” and “classified” knowledge between Religious and Worldly knowledge. According to him Religious knowledge included ethos (Ikhlaq),
- **Metaphysics** and politics while worldly knowledge included mathematics, logic and physics etc<sup>5</sup> and Worldly education was neither mandated to nor imparted by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). Most knowledge related to the religion which radiated from institutions

co-located with mosques. Word madrassa was never used at that time.

Mosques, therefore, became seats of learning for religious education and knowledge with some allied advice for worldly affairs. Being common rallying points, worldly affairs would also might have been discussed. Also, at that time knowledge was based on the knowledge of customs, traditions and experiences and knowledge and education as is known today, did not exist. At that time, there was not much differentiation between religion and worldly knowledge. It is in this background that a narrow vision has been developed which was actually not the purpose and intent of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and the madrassa he ((Peace be upon him)) established.

The madrassa as an organized institution was formulated in the eleventh century in Baghdad in 1067 AD<sup>6</sup>. The first state-sponsored madrassa in the Muslim world is said to have been the Nizamia Madrassa at Baghdad, founded in the eleventh century<sup>7</sup>. The institution aimed at the training of class of experts in Islamic law, the ulema who would go on to staff the bureaucracy of the state as qazis (judges) and muftis (scholars) as well as administrators.

### **Madrassas in the Subcontinent.**

Tradition of madrassa in the Subcontinent was by saints who came from Arab lands, Iran and Central Asia. Initially, they were mere centers of preaching which later turned into mosques and madrassas<sup>8</sup>. “Proper start” of Muslim education was done under the patronage of Sultan Qutabuddin Aibak (1210 A.D.) in whose time hundreds of mosques became centers of learning and knowledge. In these madrassas, worldly education was also imparted in addition to religious education. In the late 12<sup>th</sup> century, when sultan Mohammad Ghori conquered Ajmer in 1206, he set up a madrassa under official tutelage<sup>9</sup>.

As Turkish rule expanded over the parts of India, Muslim rulers established madrassas in their own domains, providing them with extensive land grants. The syllabus employed at these

madrassas went through a process of gradual transformation over the time, and included 'rational disciplines' (ma'qulat) in addition to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).

A major reform movement was undertaken by Mulla Nizamuddin (1748), which gave rise, to a revised syllabus known as dars-e-nizami and that was to become a standard for times to come<sup>10</sup>. The syllabus included essentially the core subjects of the Nizamia Baghdad madrasa, with some modifications.

**Pre-Colonial Era.** During the times of Moghuls, madrassas and other autochthonous institutions like khanqahs were places of learning for both the Muslims and Hindus in the Subcontinent<sup>11</sup>. In pre-colonial era, most madrassas had the official patronage. Sometimes Jagirs were allotted to meet the expenditure of the madrassas. Religious leaders of repute managed such madrassas though kings and rulers always kept some leverage with madrassas where possible. Persian was the main language<sup>12</sup> used for learning followed by Arabic as second language of teaching. Since Persian was also the state language or official language, graduates of madrassas were normally admissible to governmental appointments which gave the madrassas a particular élan and prestige. In those times madrassas were the sole seats of learning catering to the educational needs of the society. Madaris produced doctors, astronomers, judges and administrators. This gave a very high social status and some official protocol to those who managed madrassas with exception of those scholars and sufis who refused to bow down to the rulers. However, a policy of non-interference in the state affairs and running of the government was the currency; conflict between the state and the madrassas was a rarity. Madaris maintained their neutrality and had the capabilities to produce all specialists to serve the state as well as general public. Mystics or sufis played an important role in the transmission of knowledge; they were the ones who taught the aqliyat<sup>13</sup>.

**The Colonial Era.** With the arrival of the colonial rulers, traditional educational institutions were more and more marginalized. The British substituted new formal system, tailored to the British needs<sup>13</sup>.

## **Muslims' Reaction to Colonial Initiatives**

### **Post Independence**

- Ayub Era
- Reforms by President Ayub Khan in the early sixties
- Zia Era

## **Rise of Madrassas**

**Government patronage.** The education policy of 1979 recommended establishment of religious institutions where modern subjects would be taught together with specialization in religious disciplines. A 'Madrassa Reform Commission' was formed that proposed a number of changes in the curriculum of the religious institutions.

**The Present Era.** The education policy of 1998 which recommended establishing 'Model Madrassas' where students would receive instruction in some modern disciplines together with specialized studies of the traditional subjects. A committee was mandated to formulate model curriculum.

## **Registration of Madrassas**

### **Allegation of involvement with terrorism**

**The Present Madrassa System.** At independence, there were 245 or even fewer, madrassas in Pakistan. By year 2000, the figure reached 6,76,114 and the latest figure is 12,15,316 with over 1.5 million students, about half a million being females. They belong to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shias. Among the Sunni, there are three sub-sects: Deobandis, Barelvis<sup>17</sup> and the Ahl-i-Hadith<sup>18</sup> (salafi) though the last group claims separate identity. Besides these, the Jamat-e- Islami,<sup>19</sup> which shuns sectarian tag, also has its own madrassas. Five independent Boards oversee madrassa education, each catering for respective sects. The boards frame syllabi, conduct examinations and award certificates and degrees.

## Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan<sup>15</sup>

Name	Sub-Sect	Place	Established	Number
Wafaq ul Madaris	Deobandi	Multan	1959	8199
Tanzim Ul Madaris	Barelvi	Lahore	1960	1952
Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia)	Shia	Lahore	1959	381
Rabta-tul-Madaris-al-Islamia	Jamat-i-Islami	Lahore	1983	371
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia	Ahl-i-Hadith	Faisalabad	1955	318

A brief description of the five Boards is as follows:-

- **Wafaq-ul-Madaris.** Caters for the Deobandi school of thought and has its roots with the Darul-Ulum Deoband mentioned earlier. The number of students exceeds hundred thousand and the number appearing in the Aalemiyah (MA) examination exceeds 5000. The number of registered madrassas in Pakistan is 7000.
- **Tanzim-ul-Madaris.** Caters for the Barelvi sub-sect which is inspired by Sufism. Here too, the Dars-i-Nazami forms the core syllabus.
- **Wafaq-ul-Madrais-al-Salafia.** Caters for the Jama'at Ahl-i-Hadith school of thought, who do not follow any particular school of jurisprudence. The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas also teach the Dars-i-Nazami.
- **Rabta-ul-Madaris-al-Islamia.** The Board works under the aegis of the Jamat-e-Islami. The Jamat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (1903-1979) who believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such, he favored a more modernist education than what was prevalent in the orthodox madrassas. Traditional texts are taught in the Jamat's madrassas but politics, economics and history is also emphasized with a view to impart a more modern education.
- **Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia).** Caters for the Shia school of thought.

**The Syllabi/Curriculum.** Most madrassas follow the syllabus standardized by Mulla Nizamuddin known as Dars-e-Nizami. This syllabus has been modified over time but still retains that basic essence. Madaris see themselves as preservers of Islamic tradition, identity and culture. The table shown on the screen compares it to the structure of the mainstream learning in Pakistan.

**Levels of Instruction in Madrassas<sup>16</sup>**

Wafaq ul Madaris Arabia		Mainstream System	
Level	Duration	Level	Duration
Ibtedaiyah	5 Years	Primary	5 Years
Mutawassetah	3 Years	Middle	3 Years
Thanviah-e-Aammah	2 Years	Secondary	2 Years
Thanviah-e-Khassah	2 Years	Higher Secondary	2 Years
Aaliah	2 Years	Bachelors	2 Years
Aalemiyah	2 Years	Masters	2 Years
Takmeel	1 Year		

**Analysis and Discussion.** Analysis of the syllabus of Dars-e-Nizami leads to conclusion that the books taught are very old and present day knowledge has not been allowed any access into the syllabus. There are total of 120 books<sup>17</sup> of all subjects, the age these belong to is tabulated:-

Analysis of the above data reveals following:-

- Most books belong to 6<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> century.
- Hardly any book from 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup> century has been added.
- There appears to be bankruptcy of intellect as it has not been able to produce books which can be used as text books in the madaris
- Failure of madaris to update and keep up with latest developments.
- Focus on religious education only

- Old and outdated books
- Knowledge Frozen in time

**Emphasis on Book and Not Knowledge.** Book carries the central place in madrassa learning, every aspect of educational life in madrassa revolves around book. Modern teaching techniques are unknown to madrassa. After book, the teacher carries the importance. The student or child which should be the main focus does not get attention and is not involved in the process of learning. This system was designed for Middle Ages when book was the only source of information and education, in addition to a competent teacher. This was an era of darkness for Europe and thus this teaching system was most modern which produced academic giants. Madrassas have closed their doors for any knowledge which is outside their books. Students are not exposed to any sources of information and learning outside the syllabus and that too syllabus of particular madrassa and sect. Any student who carries ideas contrary to those of the administration and faculty must do at the risk of expulsion from the institution. A student is required to learn what is given in the book as explained by the teacher. Independent thinking is not encouraged and in fact is discouraged. Questioning the teacher is a matter of insult. Similarly, the teacher dare not question words given in the book. This distorts the personality of the child.

**Emphasis on Memory and not Knowledge.** Text is sacrosanct in madrassa teaching system; even explanation is limited normally to the notes and explanations given on the margins. The student is expected to remember the text and any student who can remember/ memorize maximum text and words will perform best not only in the examination but also in the practical life as a teacher or prayer leader (Imam). No effort is made to relate the words to the present day life.

**Importance of Maslik.** Maslik carries almost place of faith without saying it. Almost every madrassa has its foundation on a particular maslik or sect<sup>18</sup>. The syllabi of no madrassa or madrassa board include any book, which carries hate literature but books based on hate are frequently found in the madrassa.

**Teaching of Qur'an.** Teaching of Quran is the essence of any madrassa. Qur'an is a divine book which at times becomes specific but mostly keeps things open ended, all with a purpose as it is a book effective for times to come. Instead of using this diversity and beauty of Qur'an, more emphasis is given to tafseer thus once again closing the doors for thinking and reflection<sup>19</sup>. Most of these tafaseer carry point of view of a specific sect. This results in limiting the understanding and thinking to explain of a particular sect thus leading to creation of a narrow mindset.

**Teaching of Hadith.** Learning of hadith also suffers from similar contradictions; focus is on teaching the text and not spirit of text and understanding of the hadith and issues it deals with. Based on teaching techniques of hadith, there are three types of madrassa<sup>20</sup>:-

- The madaris which teach the seven books up to the prescribed syllabus.
- The madaris which teach selected chapters of hadith books and do not complete any book.
- The madaris which in addition to teaching seven hadith books teach remaining hadith books in last year.

In fact two types of schools, students are exposed to a large reservoir of hadith but they do not gain any mastery on the subject. In third category, it is just running through the books<sup>21</sup>. Resultantly, none of the groups gains a grasp where they understand the application of hadith in present day life; ijtehad<sup>22</sup> has lost its place. The result is that our concepts are frozen in time.

**The Language Education.** Teaching of language, especially Arabic, forms the major part of learning in the madaris. During the Mughal Era, most of the education in madaris was in Persian language<sup>23</sup> while Arabic was also taught. Persian, then language of the state, was neither spoken by the people (local language) nor language of religion; it was accepted and adopted but when language of the state changed from Persian to English with the arrival of British, there was an outright rejection of English

language, being a language of Farangi (non-Muslim). This dichotomy cost a lot both to madaris in particular and society in general as one major avenue to vast reservoir of outside knowledge was lost/denied. With independence of Pakistan, Persian language faded away and was replaced partially by Urdu but English was still not allowed.

The syllabus of madaris is so frozen in time that the Arabic language taught is of Middle Ages and all the books used for teaching Arabic language are much old. Resultantly, the students can neither communicate in Arabic nor benefit from the reservoir of knowledge in modern/ present-day Arab World in Arabic language<sup>24</sup>. According to Saeed Ahmed Akbar Abadi, 'the books used for learning religion are arranged in such a sequence that these are not achieving the purpose. Our students can read Arabic literature... and still cannot read or speak Arabic language'<sup>25</sup>. This observation proved correct during an interview with administration and teachers of Jamia Manzoor, Lahore<sup>26</sup>.

**Questioning, Reasoning and Research.** Culture of questioning and reasoning the written words and explanation of teachers is absent in madrassa education system<sup>27</sup>. Sometimes normal questions are taken as questioning the basic article of faith which effectively closes the avenue of reasoning and rationale. Questions are only meant for other religions and sect with no threat to own faith. This tendency has produced conformists with no aptitude for inquiry and research. Therefore, madrassas have no culture of research, writing is the privilege of established scholars.

**The Teaching System.** This teaching system adopted by madaris engages minimum facilities as explained in the following table:-

<b>Comparison- Teaching Techniques</b>	
<b>Modern</b>	<b>Traditional</b>
Seeing	Books
Listening	Lectures
Study under supervision	
Study from original source	
Survey	
Laboratory	
Problem solving	
Projects	
Lecture	
Discussion	

It leads to conclusion that minimum faculties are used for leaning, which is a good indicator to the level of learning and understanding in the madaris.

**Personality Development.** Development and grooming of personality has been the weakest link in madrasa education. It is not fair to assume that by reciting religious material and offering five times prayers a balanced personality can be produced<sup>28</sup>. Religion does not mean transfer of information only. According to Dr SM Zaman, former Chairman, Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan, who had the opportunity of interviewing, students of madaris, said “if you ask them about issues like *noor aur bashar*, *rohani bait*, *Ameen Bil Jehar*, they will reason out in detail and with conviction but if you question them about issues faced by Muslim Ummah in the present-day or even if you discuss Quran and Hadith from intellectual point of view, you will be disappointed”<sup>29</sup>.

**Rigidity in Thought – Maslik and Modernization.** There is rigidity in thought, both from point of view of maslik as well as modernization. Despite claims that they are very open and ready to modernize their education, the fact remains that the organization is stuck to very fixed and rigid mindset. This is highlighted by the type

of syllabus they teach, kind of books held in the libraries, absence of TV for students and inability to use computers. Libraries mostly do not have contemporary books.

**Syllabus Frozen in Time.** The syllabus of madrassas (“madras”) does not include present day requirements. While nothing can be added to basic injunctions of Islam, the need to update to accommodate today’s requirements has been ignored. The language taught is academic and students cannot speak and understand conversation in modern Arabic. Students after graduation will have a centuries old mindset and thinking ability.

**Outdated Teaching Techniques.** The teaching techniques are outdated. Effort is on memorizing and thinking ability is generally not encouraged as students must follow what teacher says or is given in the books without question.

**Madrassa – A Social Issue.** Madrassa is a more of a social issue which later gets converted to religious concern. Most of the students who join madrassa do not come with some religious motivation but due to financial problems and with the kind of education provided, they become religious zealots.

**Assistance by the Government.** The “madaris was” not receiving any assistance especially financial assistance from government. The feeling was that government financial assistance can lead to some audits and procedures which the management would not like to get into.

**Absence of Government Regulatory Body.** Madaris was not answerable to any government regulatory body. Even registration of madrassa is done under the Societies Act which indicates seriousness of the government towards the issue; it appears that when pressure of registration of madaris came on government, no effort was made to enact appropriate laws and someone decided to register madaris under Cooperatives Act.

**Social and Welfare Issue.** This madrassa also handles some social and welfare issues which create goodwill in the surrounding community. These include:-

- Educating children of poor people free of cost.
- Boarding and lodging facility will make one person less for feeding.
- Provides free food from lungar for some poor people of the area.

**No Alternative to Madaris in Near Future.** There is no alternative to madaris in near future. The state and society is not prepared psychologically and financially to take on this load. In reality, madrassas if properly managed are doing a great service to the nation.

**Quality of Teachers.** Quality of teachers in the “madaris” is not satisfactory. They had almost never received any training about teaching either organized by government or Wafaq-ul-madaris.

**Material Benefits and Social Status.** Madaris provide material benefits and social status to those who manage it which makes the stakes for management very high.

**Poor Management.** Madaris are generally characterized with poor management and organizational ability.

**Madrassa Reforms.** Madaris came into positive focus during American proxy war in Afghanistan against Soviet Union. American funding to Jihadi groups, who drew their strength from and had their basis in madaris, led to rapid growth of new madaris and strengthening of existing ones; owning a madaris meant guaranteed flow of funds and other resources and facilities. With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, both American administration and Pakistan government lost interest in the madaris leaving them at their own. Left directionless, some madaris got linked to organizations like Taliban and Al-Qaida. Events of 9/11 once again brought madaris into sharp focus but this time they were in negative focus. Policy of abandoning madaris as well as jihadi organizations came to haunt everyone. All of a sudden, there was a realization that there is a need to reform and mainstream the madrassas. By now

madaris had strength of their own, roots in the society (which they always had), sympathy of part of public and above all political ambitions and financial stakes. With hardened stance by those managing madaris, reform became a hard nut to crack.

With madaris coming into focus second time, there was a talk of 'reforming madaris' all over. The big question was, is it possible to reform madrassas? 'Within the hallowed walls of madaris, enlightened people guide pupils to solve some intractable math problems, discuss the mysteries of modern science and pursue English-language course in additions to receiving religious education. An improbable scenario indeed'<sup>30</sup>.

**Madrasa Reform Programme (MRP).** Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Education launched Madrasa Reform Program in 2002<sup>31</sup>; five year program with Rs. 5729.395 million budget with the aim of 'mainstreaming' the 8000 madrassas. The Ministry of Education was tasked to carry out reform project with following objectives<sup>32</sup>:-

- To teach English, Mathematics, Social Studies/Pakistan Studies and General Science at Primary level in 4000 Madaris, at Middle and Secondary level in 3000 Madaris while English, Economics, Computer Science and Pakistan Studies at Intermediate level in 1000 Madaris to integrate religious education with formal education system and to bridge the gulf between two parallel<sup>33</sup> streams of education.
- To open lines of communication with the Ulema who run the Madaris to impart religious education and formal education for promoting Islamic values at national and international level<sup>34</sup>.
- To generally improve the quality and scope of education being imparted in 8000 Madaris through supply grant salaried, costs of textbooks, stationary items and sports facilities.
- To provide cost of five computers, two printers and demonstration equipment for computer lab at Intermediate level to 1000 institutions.

In brief, the reforms agenda aimed at following:-

- To mainstream the madrassa education system by introducing formal subjects in their syllabi,
- To open lines of communication with the elaborate network of seminaries.

The results have not been encouraging if not complete failure. Dr Hanif Project Coordinator revealed, “In the last five years we reached out to only 507 madaris”<sup>35</sup>. According to a senior official of the MRP<sup>36</sup>, “we failed to develop the capacity to utilize all the funds which were allocated for the project: the total expenditure in five years was less than 2.8 percent of the total allocation of 5759.395 million rupees”. The second important aim of the project was also unsuccessful. Right from the start, the Ministry of Education lacked clout with the madaris leadership and failed to build bridges with latter. Madrassas were also insisting in dealing through Ministry of Religious Affairs and not Ministry of Education for their own reasons; “possible” they considered that Ministry of Education will be more intrusive as compared to Ministry of Religious Affairs where they would be able to deal with the subject as more of issue of ‘religion’ than ‘education’. This indicates their intention. In addition, usual bureaucratic red-tapism also played its part which created doubts about the seriousness of the of reform process, “it took roughly 24 months to release funds to a madrassa once we completed the process of identification and selection”, a senior education ministry official disclosed<sup>37</sup>. A clearance was required from Ministry of Interior and provincial home departments which not only created coordination problems but also delayed the process. Most of the assistance went to madaris belonging to Barelvi school of thought and only 13 recipients were Deobandi - the actual school of thought which was the target of the reforms.

**Registration of Madaris.** Madrassa Reform Program did not yield any positive and substantive results. In the wake of this failure, Ministry of Religious Affairs attempted another effort, this time to register madrassas. Madrassas were motivated, partially successfully but with major concessions, to register under Societies Registration (Amendment) Act 2005. According to Vakil Ahmad Khan, Secretary<sup>38</sup>, “Approximately 6000 madrassas were already

registered with the government under the Societies Registration Act 1860<sup>39</sup>, before the registration exercise was launched. Currently, the total number of registered madaris is roughly 15102<sup>40</sup>. For this success, Ministry of Religious Affairs had to make critical concessions to madaris which have, in a way, provided further strength to madaris. For instance, they have been permitted not to disclose their sources of income and government has virtually conceded to degree - awarding status of the madaris. The efforts came to a halt with the incident of Lal Masjid where radical and stanch leadership was able to hijack the process, leading to major setback to government efforts to reform madaris.

**Madrassa Welfare Authority.** Pakistan People's Party has plans to initiate a new department titled Madrassa Welfare Authority. The details of this project are unclear so far.

### **Conclusions**

- Madrassa Reform Program failed due to lack of seriousness, absence of well thought-out plan, coordination problems between various ministries and departments and lack of cooperation from madaris.
- Most of the madaris which received assistance belonged to Brelvi school of thought whereas actual target, though undeclared, was Deobandi (and also Ahl Haddith) school of thought.
- Absence of coordination is visible from the figures maintained by various departments. Ministry of Religious Affairs claims to have registered madaris far more than total number of madaris present in the country by any estimates.
- Incentives and assistance planned for madaris was cosmetic in nature therefore had not much attraction specially, when seen against their sources of income (which no madrassa is willing to declare).
- There was no political will and political ownership of these policies. Madrassa Reform Program (2002) was initiated on the directions of the then President and in the entire process no political name came to fore. Provincial

governments were slow to take off and always considered these initiatives as responsibility of Federal Government.

- Government failed to take ulema on board and creating stakes for students of madaris.
- MRP is classic example of failure of implementation and coordination because sufficient funds were made available for the project to take-off. Extremely low utilization of funds indicates this as well as failure to build capacity for utilization of funds.

### **History of Education in England in Comparison to Islam<sup>41</sup>**

Muslims were far ahead in organized education as compared to Europe. England which is considered today as leader in education in Europe was far behind Muslims in organized education. In England, the education during the later part of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was not State controlled and it was carried out by private individuals under the aegis of the Church. The “charity schools” provided religious education by the philanthropic to the poor. Such schools were started by the society for Promoting Christian Knowledge as early as 1698. These schools were associated with parishes, and catered mainly for day pupils, although some had boarders. Charles Dickens portrayed in 1836 the pathetic picture of the parish schoolmaster. The curriculum of the charity schools included religious instruction and reading; in some cases writing and arithmetic were added. For the children who would become labourers or domestic servants such subjects as spinning, sewing, knitting, gardening, and even ploughing were taught. The Sunday schools started with the aim of imparting religious and social rather than intellectual education by the society for establishment and support of Sunday schools, founded in 1785. The Sunday schools had a rapid success; in 1787 they had 250,000 pupils in Great Britain and in 1801 there were 156,490 in London alone. A word about the ‘circulating schools’ in Wales, which were started in 1737 in order to enable the poor read the Bible and obtain religious instructions. During the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the monitorial system of education was initiated in England which

meant setting children to teach children. In the monitorial school, the headmaster was in sole in charge. This was primarily introduced on large scale by Andrew Bell (1753-1832) and Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838). Lancaster gave an account of his book, "Improvements in Education", which was published in 1803. In fact the system was one of mass education.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

**Consistency in the Reform Policy.** There is a need for the government to have consistency in the reform policy. Registration should be done under some proper act and with Education Department and not under Societies Act or good incentives should be kept for the madaris which decide to cooperate. A separate organization dealing with madaris should be created.

**Policy of 'Improve' than 'Eliminate' and 'Motivate and Change'.** Government should follow policy of improving the madaris without going into confrontation mode. Presently, both sides have become repulsive of each other which need to be looked into seriously as this has led to almost a deadlock on madaris issue.

**Strong Regulatory Mechanism and Effective Monitoring.** There is a need to create a strong regulatory mechanism and effective monitoring. Half hearted efforts will only further exacerbate the problem; possibly in the form of some high-powered board which should include representatives of madaris as well, but should have total government control to ensure implementation of government policies.

**Extensive Training Programme and Salaries of Teachers.** Government should arrange extensive training programmes for teachers and those who qualify should get some special pay package.

**Uniform Education System with Incentives.** Government should formulate a uniform education system which should include traditional as well as modern subjects. Testing should be done by a government board like normal education boards. Those who qualify should be able to get normal jobs on competitive basis.

**Creation of Model Madaris.** Government should create few model madaris if possible, one in each district under a phased programme. These madaris should impart religious education with modern techniques, making the students useful members of the society. The degrees should equate to normal degrees of education. Islamic University is a good model.

**Alleviate Sense of Deprivation.** There is a need to alleviate sense of deprivation.

**Regular Funding and Audit.** Regular and substantial funding should be provided to those madaris which decide to cooperate with government. This money will go for education of those who deserve the most and will payback. A law should also be enacted to regulate donations including audit. It should be made mandatory to declare the donation to anyone.

‘There are many, including senior government functionaries, who are of the view that madaris provide a much-needed service in the society like Pakistanis<sup>42</sup>. ‘Furthermore, the students are taught that it is okay, in fact their duty, to impose their view of religion on the rest of society – by force if need be – and that in doing so they will be fulfilling their duty as a good Muslim’<sup>43</sup>.

### **Author**

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*Command and Staff College Quetta and Armed Forces War College. He commanded an Infantry Battalion and an Infantry Brigade twice. Presently, the General Office is commanding 16 Infantry Division at Pano Aqil.*

## Notes

- 1 Another hadith says that all words said by Prophet Mohammad are words of God. It is this hadith which is used by religious scholars and ulema to limit the boundary of knowledge to what has been taught by the Prophet (PBUH). Taking lead from this hadith, they tend to discard/exclude or underplay the importance of other fields of knowledge as these were mostly not taught directly by the Prophet (PBUH).
- 2 Mohammad Muslihuddin, *Islami Taleem aur Is Ki Sargazasht* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Private) Limited, 1988), 18.
- 3 Ibid. 18.
- 4 Niaz Erfan and Zahid A Vaie, ed. *Recommendations of the Four World Conferences on Islamic Education: Education and the Muslim World – Challenges and Response* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995), 4.
- 5 Mohammad Muslihuddin, *Islami Taleem aur Is Ki Sargazasht* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Private) Limited, 1988), 34.
- 6 A. H. Nayyar, “Madrassah Education Frozen in Time”. In *the Education and the State – Fifty Years of Pakistan*, ed. Pervez Hoodbhoy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 216.
- 7 Mohammad Muslihuddin, *Islami Taleem aur Is Ki Sargazasht* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Private) Limited, 1988), 33. It was established by Nizam Ul Mulk Toosi who was a scholar himself and had great service for education. This madrasa however got merged into madrasa Mustansariya in 1393 and lost its individual character. Imam Ghzali was one of the most famous scholars to have remained affiliated with madrasa Nazamia.
- 8 A. H. Nayyar, 219.
- 9 Saleem Mansoor Khalid, ed., *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2005), 93.
- 10 Mohammad Muslehuddin, 49.
- 11 Jamal Malik, *Colonisation of Islam – Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, (Dhaka: The University Press, 1999), 121.
- 12 Ibid. 121.
- 13 Ibid. 122.
- 14 Saleem Mansoor Khalid, 145.
- 15 Tariq Rehamn, *Madrasahs: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies, 2005), 2.
- 16 Saleem Mansoor Khalid, 144. To be updated from latest sources.
- 17 Saleem Mansoor Khalid, 365.
- 18 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 268.
- 19 Ibid, 269.
- 20 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 272.

- 21 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 273.
- 22 *Ijtihad* is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
- 23 Kees van den Bosch et al., "Islamic Education in Pakistan; Introducing government approved subjects", Report 2008-2, pp. 10.
- 24 The participants of 89th NMC visited Jamia Manzoor at Lahore. The library did not contain any contemporary Arabic book nor was any Arabic newspaper or magazine which indicates either inability to understand modern Arabic language or lack of interest in contemporary affairs.
- 25 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 272.
- 26 The administrator of Jamia Manzoor was asked as to how much Arabic language his students understand. According to him, they cannot speak or understand modern Arabic but once it comes to interpreting old books, the Arabs would also run away, our students are so good.
- 27 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 278.
- 28 Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, 287.
- 29 Dr S. M. Zaman, "Deeni Madaris aur Khud Ehtisabi ki Rah", in *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, ed. Saleem Mansoor Khalid, 39.
- 30 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 57.
- 31 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 57.
- 32 Govt of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *PC -I Madrasa Reforms (Teaching of Formal Subjects in Deeni Madaris)*, 2004.
- 33 There are minimum three parallel streams of education in Pakistan and not two as indicated in the PC -I on Madrasa Reforms; the standard govt syllabus, the syllabus followed by most of private institutions (A, O level) and the syllabus followed by Deeni Madaris.
- 34 Attempting to promote Islamic values at 'international level' can have serious consequences for the project and the Madaris which get affiliated with the project'.
- 35 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 57.
- 36 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 58.
- 37 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 60.
- 38 Umar Farooq, "Falling Flat", *The Herald*, July 2008, 58.
- 39 Registration of madaris under Societies Act speaks of the seriousness of the government and indicates towards a lack of deliberation and absence of any well-thought-out policy. In total four to five ministries and departments (Religious Affairs, Interior, Education ministries and home and cooperative departments) have been dealing with the issue. This must have allowed the madaris administrations to exploit the policy voids and take advantage, in addition to causing delays.
- 40 This number is far more than the total number of madrassas in the country as per the figures of Ministry of Education, even when all the madaris have not been registered, which indicates the lack of coordination between ministries and seriousness of various government agencies.

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41 HC Barnard, *A History of English Education*, (London: University of London Press limited, 1963 Second Edition, Second Impression).

42 The News, *Wither madressah reform?*, (Lahore: The News, 7 July 2007).

43 The News, *Wither madressah reform?*, (Lahore: The News, 7 July 2007).

# CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN SHAPING THE BALANCE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY POWER

*Brigadier Raashid Wali Janjua*

## **Abstract**

The paper highlights the contours of ideal civil-military relations and misbalancing factors leading to deterioration of working relationship between both the institutions. The civil-military relations have been the subject of scholarly discourse since antiquity. This paper examines three important variables, contributing to the divergences and frictions between the civilian political leadership and military experts. Two concepts of controlling the military i.e “objective control” and “subjective control” are highlighted by taking three case studies in the subject in order to draw conclusions for an ideal civil-military relationship

## **Introduction**

*“The republic would be better served even by foolish working than by enlightened shirking.”*

*(Peter D. Feaver)*

The coinage of the term “Crossing the Rubicon” owes its origin to Roman separation of the civil and military spheres of influence by which they ensured distancing of the military power from the civilian political institutions. The jeremiads like prognostications of scholars like Finer and Laswell have not helped matters for an apprehension free civil-military compact. Laswell has based his concept of a “Garrison State” on the military elite’s propensity to prefer war over peace.<sup>1</sup> While Laswell espoused the notion of armed forces personnel as specialists conducting the military operations, Finer put forth the idea of the military as an institution prone to interventions in domestic politics because of its corporate discipline and sense of social responsibility.<sup>2</sup> The leading thinkers on civil-military relations like Huntington and Janowitz

have argued about civilian control of the military and the need to achieve an optimal balance between the civilian primacy and the military effectiveness. They have posited theories about the civilian control in their quest for the holy grail of a balanced civil-military equation.

The ideal civil-military equation is achieved with a military “strong enough to do anything, the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”<sup>3</sup> The challenge that confronts the civil-military hierarchy indubitably is the attainment of an optimum-balance between the functional imperative of the military to protect the society and its societal imperative to protect its values, ideologies, and the institutions. The above balance is indeed the holy grail of the ideal civil-military equation.

The impact of the external and internal threat environment on the delicate civil- military power balance also needs some elucidation in order to understand the complexities of civil-military relations in contemporary era. As the Cold War certainties have given way to a unipolar uncertainty, the threats to national as well as international security have also metamorphosed into a complex series of non traditional and non state threats. The primacy of the political factors that was well-understood at the politico-strategic or the grand strategic level, has now transmuted into a primacy of political effects at the operational level of the war.<sup>4</sup> The above reality has resulted in a renewed jostle for political control of the military by the civilian leadership. According to Feaver, there has been a simultaneous divergence and convergence between the civilian and military functions after the Cold War due to overshadowing of the traditional threats by non-traditional threats.<sup>5</sup> He also believes in the absolute primacy of civilian policy and holds the belief that “the principle of military subordination means that civilians should be obeyed if they are pursuing wise policy.”<sup>6</sup>

What then is the ideal balance of civil-military equation and what factors impede or facilitate its fructification? The ideal civil-military relations are predicated upon a symbiosis of civilian political direction/oversight and the military effectiveness. The

optimal balance between the civilian and military functions and the concomitant efficacy of the military instrument as an element of national power is predicated upon a number of factors that include external as well as internal threats, the strength of political/civil institutions, and the ideological orientation/perceived role of the armed forces in the national polity.

The first part of research paper will focus on some theoretical underpinnings of the factors that are expected to define the civil-military power equation of a nation. The analysis of the civil-military power equilibrium of countries like United States, Israel, and Pakistan with a view to highlight the frictions in the decision-making process will be the thrust of the second part while the third part shall comprise main conclusions and recommendations about a balanced civil-military power equation that ensures a symbiosis between the military effectiveness and the civilian primacy. While the thrust of first two parts will be analysis/examination of main ideas, the third part will be prescriptive and inductive throwing fresh vignettes on the topic in the shape of recommendations.

### **Theoretical Underpinnings**

Before examining different factors that impinge upon a smooth civil-military relationship, it is pertinent to discuss few scholarly conclusions about the civilian control of the military. First of all, why is it that the militaries need to be controlled by the civilian political leadership? The answer lies somewhat close to the piquant observation of the French statesman George Clemenceau that “the war is too important a business to be left to the generals.”<sup>7</sup> According to Feaver a military must be strong enough to attain its objectives and at the same time soft enough in order not to pose a threat to the society it protects.<sup>8</sup> A military can weaken a society in three primary ways i.e direct seizure of power, draining of national resources due to high expenditure on maintenance, and involvement of societies in undesirable wars.<sup>9</sup>

The control of the military by the civilian leadership is ideally achieved in the shape of the definition of the control proffered by Pigeau McCann according to which “the control is the structures and the processes devised by command both to support it and manage risk.”<sup>10</sup> They go further in defining command and control as “the establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action.”<sup>11</sup> The establishment of the common intent is both an insurance against a military encroachment of the civilian domain and the civilian propensity to exercise intrusive control. According to Huntington, the antidote to possible military defiance to the civilian leadership is the military professionalism. Two forms of civilian control ensure the reining in of the military. The first is the subjective control that coopts the military into the decision making processes of the civil government and the second is the “objective control”<sup>12</sup> that entails separation of the military from the civilian political structure. In attaining the objective control, the military subordinates itself politically but attains professional autonomy. The objective control in turn is dependent upon military professionalism despite its purported belief in the “Hamiltonian pessimism with respect to the human nature and the inevitability of the war by some scholars.”<sup>13</sup>

According to Huntington, the objective civilian control is in direct contrast to “subjective civilian control that achieves its objectives by civilianizing the military by involving it in politics.”<sup>14</sup> Huntington believes that the objective control was always sought by the militaries while the subjective control was desired by the civilians. According to him, a unified (Tri Service) officers corps would “tend to increase its authority vis-a-vis other government institutions.”<sup>15</sup> There was a down side to the military professionalism however, that was pointed out by Huntington as well as such scholars, Janowitz that culturally separated the military from the mainstream society. According to Huntington, the American military was not significantly different from the rest of the population prior to the Civil War. The military grows more conservative as the society grows liberal and longs for a war where it could ply its trade and remain relevant to the society.<sup>16</sup>

A sociologist whose classic work on has shaped our understanding of the civil-military relations is Morris Janowitz. He also regarded professionalism as an essential requirement for military effectiveness as well as subordination to the civilian leadership. Where he differed however from Huntington was his linkage of military effectiveness with the changes in environment. He for instance, believed that in Cold War, the US Army should adopt the attributes of a constabulary force that should be more aware of the consequences of its military actions and the primacy of the political objectives.<sup>17</sup> He also recommends “greater legislative oversight, the extension of civilian control into the lower levels of the military organizations, and the greater civilian involvement in officers’ professional education.”<sup>18</sup>

An interesting work on the military influence on civilian decision making was done by Richard Betts in the shape of his book i.e *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. He concludes after analyzing a large data of military recommendations and the civilian decisions that “the military professionals rarely dominated the decisions on the use of force and the military’s influence was greatest when the military professionals argued against the use of force.”<sup>19</sup> The US military’s professionalism got a shot in the arm after the Vietnam debacle, as a consequence of a number of reforms in military structure, training, and doctrine. The apogee of military professionalism was the sterling performance in 1991 Gulf War albeit against a less adroit adversary as compared to Vietnamese. Soon after the war, however, the murmurs of discontent by the US top-military commanders about US military’s employment in nation-building and humanitarian missions were palpable.<sup>20</sup>

In order to rationalize the aberrant military behaviour, Peter Feaver postulated his theory highlighting the need for an enhanced civilian monitoring of the military commanders. According to his theory, the military leadership acts as agents for its principals i.e the civilian political leadership. He states that “when military agents become professionals by internalizing their duty to serve the principals’ ends, there would be no need to devise an optimal incentive structure with some sort of contract bonus for each political objective achieved during a military campaign.”<sup>21</sup> The

principal-agent model of Feaver also predicted an inherent friction between civilian principals and the military agents who display a tendency of shirking the responsibility assigned by civilian principals based upon cost of monitoring and the possibility of punishment.<sup>22</sup> The military leadership, therefore would be required to be kept in check through a process of civilian monitoring. The concept of micromanagement and intrusive monitoring of the military through information technology was therefore introduced as a “magic bullet for ensuring civilian control.”<sup>23</sup> According to Feaver the “civilians are better positioned to judge the political underpinnings of military policy” and that they should have the final say in decisions even at the cost of errors.<sup>24</sup>

The seminal work on the impact of external and internal threats on the civil-military equation has been done by Michael Desch enshrined in the *Civilian Control of the Military*.<sup>25</sup> The main theme of his discourse is that a combination of external and internal threats determines the nature of civilian control of the military. According to the author, “the civilian control should be best in times of high external and low internal threat and worst in times of low external threat and high internal threat.”<sup>26</sup> The application of the above theory leads to an interesting conclusion about the weakening of US political control over the military after the Cold War because of a heightened internal threat and low external threat.<sup>27</sup> According to Paul Staniland, however, the military proclivity to intervene in domestic politics under above conditions is kept in check with strong institutions and civilian legitimacy.<sup>28</sup> He argues that a high political culture (strong political institutions, high legitimacy, and effusive public participation in society) acts as a shield against the military interventions in national politics.<sup>29</sup>

There are scholars like Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, who have tried to establish a relationship between the military’s effectiveness and the civil-military harmony. The authors cite Iraq’s civil-military disharmony as the main cause of Iraqi poor air defence performance as against the North Vietnamese civil-military harmony as a contributory factor towards improved use of available air defence technology.<sup>30</sup> There are scholars who have tried to establish a linkage between the military effectiveness and the characteristics

of the regimes. According to one such statistics based study, the democratic societies impart better leadership skills and initiative as compared to authoritarian regimes.<sup>31</sup> On the similar lines Risa Brooks has researched on the linkage between the “highly centralized and initiative sapping command structures of Arab countries and the poor battlefield performance.”<sup>32</sup>

### **Analysis of Civil Military Relations-Israel, Pakistan and United States**

In case of liberal democracies of industrialized countries with stable political institutions, the danger of a direct seizure of power is remote. The tensions in the civil-military relations in such countries therefore are played out on a different turf. The force development and employment of the military, ostensibly the prerogative of the specialists, is also challenged by the civilian political leadership in its quest for oversight. The issue of political control and oversight of the military actions has assumed added importance in the post Cold War environment, where the boundaries between the political direction by the civilian principals and the action by military agents are becoming blurred. A flawed military strategy with concomitant risks might result due to the “marginalization of military advice and flawed collaborative civil-military relations.”<sup>33</sup>

In USA, the military has the leverage to manipulate the national security decision-making through several measures. These include a delicate balancing act while presenting the policy options to the executive and the Congress. The division of powers for military control between the President and the Congress as per the US constitution gives adequate space to the military to try and influence the defence policy in its favour. According to Clotfelter, “the Congress has the constitutional power to control defence policy but it acquiesces to the military as the leading Congressmen want to tread the path set out for them by the military.”<sup>34</sup> The military’s predominant role in influencing political decision-making has been evidenced by military’s aggressive advocacy of air and ground campaign despite McNamara’s urging for restraint.<sup>35</sup> According to Myers and Kohn, “General Westmoreland adopted the

counterproductive strategy of attrition of People's army of Vietnam through a use of big battalion level sweeps through the wooded terrain."<sup>36</sup> The subliminal impact of military's clout on civilian leadership's imagination is also brought to the fore by President Lyndon Johnson's asking of General Westmoreland, if his decision not to stand again for the US Presidency might be construed by troops as an act of desertion.<sup>37</sup>

Huntington defines professionalism as a "balance among expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."<sup>38</sup> If any element of above trinity is disturbed, the result would be a distortion in the civil-military relations. Colin Powell has been accused of influence-peddling during Bosnian War through his statements that criticized the concept of limited use of force i.e "As soon as they tell me it is limited they do not care whether you achieve a result or not."<sup>39</sup> Few civilian scholars have criticized him for using the expertise in the trinity of professionalism to promote the two remaining elements for the corporate benefit of the institution.<sup>40</sup> The Powell Weinberger doctrine about use of military force in pursuit of clear political goals that are achievable with military means, by overwhelming force, with a clear exit strategy and support of US people came in conflict with Rumsfeld doctrine of minimal use of force through agile, lean, and hitech military.<sup>41</sup> Similar rifts occurred between Rumsfeld and Tommy Frank on the issue of force quantum and employment strategy in Afghanistan. The military influence due to adroit orchestration of its expertise, is aptly summed up by the statement of the White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan when he remarked that "the lessons from the past, including Vietnam are that we should not try to micro-manage military decisions from Washington."<sup>42</sup>

The growing military propensity for independent professional decisions, however, was not left unchallenged as the civilian leadership also evolved means of controlling the military through close monitoring. The micromanagement of military planning by such US political leaders as President Kennedy has received its due share of criticism. President Kennedy's reduction of the bombing missions to Cuba during the "Bay of the Pigs" invasion and the micromanagement of the blockade have been regarded as

militarily puerile decisions by the defence establishment.<sup>43</sup> The choosing of targets for aerial bombing in Vietnam by President Lyndon Johnson was another unsuccessful example of trying to micro-manage the conduct of military operations. It was due to the fears of undue intervention by the civilian leadership that Colin Powell “clearly stipulated to the political leadership that the White House communications would extend no further than General Norman Schwarzkopf’s headquarters in Riyadh.”<sup>44</sup>

Despite objective control of the civilians over the US military, the growing influence of the military commanders especially the Combatant Commanders has started raising few hackles in the civilian and academic circles. President Eisenhower had similarly warned about the menace of the military industrial complex in his farewell address when he held forth unequivocally against the avarice of a clique that might engender conflict as a profit motive.<sup>45</sup> The post Gold Water and Nicholas Act powers of the US Combatant Commanders and the increasing influence of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in the department of defense is causing some unease in civilian decision-making echelons. The growing clout of the US Combatant Commanders has been captured well by Dana Priest in her book, “The Mission”. According to her, “US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Zinni was welcomed like a royal by hundreds of Persian Gulf officers and Shieks, and by seventy US and civilian defence officials in attendance. Officially, Zinni was outranked by six American ambassadors to the Persian Gulf countries but in any motorcade he rode in the lead car.”<sup>46</sup>

Another example of US military’s growing self perception as the best interpreters of the political objectives of a campaign is the US military officials’ recent appeal for more flexibility in a proposed legislation that would increase aid to Pakistan. According to the Voice of America (VOA), “while stressing upon the fragility of the situation, officials urged the lawmakers “to trust the US military to hold itself and Pakistan accountable for progress, rather than set rigid conditions.”<sup>47</sup> The above is but a small example of US military appropriating to itself a political objective and making a strong pitch for it, ostensibly due to the primacy of its strategic

objectives in Afghanistan. The US military has recommended this policy option at a time when the political leadership is being advised caution in disbursing aid to Pakistan by media, independent advocacy groups and government's own political advisors.

## **Israel**

The application of the Israeli example to the theories discussed above would yield interesting facts that would point towards the importance of external and internal threats, the political systems/institutions, and, the ideological orientation of the armed forces in shaping the civil-military systems. Israel is a democratic state with reasonably stable political institutions and a high external as well as internal threat. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) is one of the most heavily indoctrinated outfits in the pantheon of ideologized militaries. Israel is a country where the Huntington's theory of objective control of the armed forces seems to be merging with the subjective control. Like the US during the Cold War, the political culture of Israel has been transmuted by a heightened threat assessment and strong ideological fervour of IDF into a militaristic culture. "The gist of this militarism is that the military considerations are always defined as the national security issues and receive higher priority than political and economic considerations."<sup>48</sup>

The involvement of IDF in national politics is evidenced by the fact that till 2006 out of 16 Israeli Chiefs of General Staffs (CGS), only three chose not to enter the active politics.<sup>49</sup> According to Yoram Peri, "the defense establishment has always been a major factor in determining Israel's national policy. This ascendancy was determined by the Ben Gurion at the beginning of the 1950s, when he stated that the foreign policy was to serve defense policy."<sup>50</sup> According to the same author the change in the geostrategic and geopolitical thinking of Israel in 90s owed itself as much to Yitzak Rabin as it did to the changed thinking of IDF that viewed peace as a better option after a cool cost-benefit analysis of all options.<sup>51</sup> The military officers from the IDF's Policy and Planning Directorate mostly participate in the diplomatic parleys and enjoy a lot of clout in major policy formulation at national level.

The Israeli CGS is a *de-facto* permanent member of the Israeli cabinet and attends all important cabinet meetings. The senior officials of the IDF had flatly refused the Prime minister's order to force evacuation of Jewish settlers from Hebron after the massacre of Palestinians on October 25, 1994.<sup>52</sup> The Israeli PM instead of punishing the defaulters, dissociated himself from the plan. All initiatives regarding comprehensive security based upon diplomacy, development, and peaceful alliances with the Arab states, have foundered on the rocks of a military-centered notion of security.<sup>53</sup>

Despite wielding a disproportionate influence in national security decision making, the Israeli military has desisted from praetorianism. The conditions that contribute towards praetorianism include "ineffective and army sustained political structure, a low level of political institutionalization, weak political parties, a lack of common ideological purpose between military and civilian institutions, and a decline of professionalism."<sup>54</sup> In case of Israel, most of above conditions did not exist fortunately. The strong political institutions undergirded by the common ideology, a common ideological purpose, and military professionalism have resulted in a military restraint in not attempting to seize direct power.

Despite above, there are other reasons that contributed significantly towards a military proclivity to wield behind the scenes influence rather than seize power through coups. One reason is a high turn-over rate of Israeli military due to which its barrack time is minimal. The Israeli military therefore gets integrated into the civilian life with a greater regularity than a normal standing army. According to Perlmutter, "the relatively short military career open to Zahal officers militates against the formation of a rigid and conservative professional weltanschauung."<sup>55</sup> The military officers have been integrated easily into the bureaucratic and industrial world. Consequently, "the organizational, administrative, and human resources have been successfully exploited by Israeli society."<sup>56</sup> The ideal symbiosis of civil and military elites' ideological and pecuniary benefits has therefore given a strong stake to the military for the preservation of the political system without ceding control of national security decision making. The downside

to this has obviously been the adoption of military-centric notion of security by the state at the cost of a development and diplomacy-driven notion of security.

## **Pakistan**

Pakistan has had a chequered history of civil-military relations since its independence, due to a number of reasons. The chief reason for the above has been the primacy of the military at the cost of civilian institutions due to peculiar security environment right at the beginning of the country's journey as an independent state. According to Hasan Askari a noted Pakistani scholar on civil-military relations, "Pakistan's troubled relations with India and Afghanistan's irredentist territorial claims presented a serious threat to national identity and territorial integrity which led to allocation of substantial portion of national resources to the military."<sup>57</sup> At independence in 1947 Pakistan inherited 30% of British Indian Army, 40% of its Navy, and 20% of its Air Force.<sup>58</sup> The three services expanded sedulously carefully nurtured by the respective praetorian rulers especially during their direct rule. During the decade long rule of first military dictator i.e President Ayub Khan, the defence expenditure ranged between 50-55% of the total national expenditure.<sup>59</sup>

The military has seized power directly in coups on four occasions i.e in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. Overall the military dictatorship has held the reins of the country for 33 years out of 62 years of independence. For rest of the time, it wielded a disproportionate influence in the national politics with all major national security and foreign policy decisions vetted by the military leadership. The chief reasons for the military domination included weak political institutions, an ambivalent political leadership, a very high-security threat environment, and an overweening ideological orientation of the armed forces. Out of the three soldierly models propounded by Amos Perlmutter i.e praetorian, revolutionary and professional,<sup>60</sup> Pakistan's officer corps fits a hybrid of praetorian-professional model. The military's British traditions and insular outlook also contributed towards development of a separate identity from the civil society and political institutions.

The leadership vacuum in political leadership due to the death of the founder of Pakistan Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah within a year of the country's independence, stultified the political institutions "leaving his successors divided or confused."<sup>61</sup> Due to infighting amongst the weak political leadership, the "country's military establishment, civilian bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus saw itself as the guardians of the new country."<sup>62</sup> The military according to Askari "maintained a professional, disciplined, cohesive and task oriented profile with a strong *esprit d' corps* and was viewed as important to state survival."<sup>63</sup> According to Gavin Kennedy, at the time of the first military coup in 1958 by then Army Commander in Chief Ayub Khan, all the conditions for a military intervention were present.<sup>64</sup> These conditions include; a high internal and external threat environment, weak and discredited political parties and an overwhelming sense of ideological superiority over civilian institutions. According to Feaver, "Pakistan presents a classic case of military intervention in a national polity beset with domestic instability under an overhang of a high-external threat."<sup>65</sup> The civil society's amenability to military rule in the past has always resulted out of a deep distrust of civilian institutions and leadership. Feaver also regards the "favorability toward the military directly proportional to dissatisfaction of people especially the under privileged, with the governance and state institutions."<sup>66</sup>

The impact of direct military interventions and indirect control of foreign and defence policy has resulted in a decision making milieu, overly dominated by the national security considerations. The disproportionate influence of military on political decision-making in Pakistan has resulted in militarization of the society where religious ideology is usually conflated with national security. Some writers have also argued about the large corporate interests of the military that have resulted in diversion of scarce national resources in the shape of subsidies to military run welfare business projects.<sup>67</sup> A military-centric security viewpoint coupled with obduracy of predatory neighbours, has squelched all peace initiatives based upon give and take cramping space for diplomacy. The high incidence of external threats from India and Afghanistan and internal threats from ethno-sectarian particularism

has also contributed significantly to a strengthening of military influence in national decision-making.

### **Major Conclusions**

Some of the major conclusions extracted from the above analysis are given below:-

- The civil-military relations are a product of a country's socio-political history, threat environment, strength of civilian political institutions and the ideological self image of the military.
- The skewed civil-military relations in three kinds of states i.e USA, Israel, and Pakistan give rise to different issues. In a liberal democracy like USA, with a moderate to high risk threat environment, strong political institutions, and a professional military, the problems of undue interference from civilians might result in a sub-optimal military effectiveness. A weak political oversight contrarily raises the specter of a disproportionate recourse to the use of military instrument in pursuit of political objectives.
- The complex security threats of this era characterized with ideologically-driven insurgencies and terrorism call for an employment of political and military instruments in tandem. The notion of objective control, therefore, is dated when viewed in the context of present security milieu. The principal-agent interaction between the civilians and the military calls for a non-intrusive but effective civilian oversight of the military instrument. The present security threats call for a modified form of subjective control of the military by the civilian institutions, with a balanced fusion of both, in national security decision-making.
- In democracies like Israel that are beset with existential security threats, the strength of the political institutions and the ability of the society to absorb the military professionals in national economic mainstream on a regular basis acts as an insurance against direct military intervention. The ideological fervour of the military cohort suitably burnished by an implacable wave of

internal and external threats, however results in a disproportionate military influence in defense and foreign policies that continues to exact heavy diplomatic and economic costs.

- In unstable democracies with a checkered record of direct military interventions like Pakistan, the military develops a praetorian memory and corporate interests that leads to a praetorian-professional hybrid, the influence of which could only wane through a combination of several factors. These factors include an attenuated threat environment, an assertive civil society, narrowing of ideological gap between the military and the society and strengthened political institutions/processes.

### **Recommendations**

In case of liberal democracies greater fusion of civilian and military institutions and structures needs to be ensured, in order to have a balanced representation of both in national security decision making process. While accomplishing the above, care should be taken, however, to eschew the propensity of over intrusive monitoring, induced due to technological advancements in command and control means.

The stable but high threat environment, democracies like Israel need to develop the civilian institutions further to enable them to make better use of diplomacy and political compromise while seeking solutions to national security problems of intractable nature. The strength of the parliament and the cabinet needs to be enhanced significantly, in order to exercise the desired level of clout over the military for attainment of the required balance in the national decision-making process.

The unstable and emerging democracies like Pakistan beset with a high threat environment need to develop strong political and civilian institutions, led by capable political leadership in order to minimize the reasons that attract military coups and praetorianism. An independent media, voluble intelligentsia, and assertive civil society need to be promoted as a societal bulwark to interventionist

proclivities of praetorian military. The negative aspects of military corporate exclusivism also need to be countered through a system that integrates the members of armed forces in national mainstream of business and government service like Israeli military. And finally, the threat environment needs to be moderated through bold diplomatic initiatives employing a human security-centric national security paradigm.

In all societies and polities, the narrowing of the *perceptual* as well as the *expertise gap* should be attempted. The perceptual gap can be narrowed by winnowing down the carapace of ideological isolationism with which the militaries surround themselves to preserve their warrior culture against the assault of enervating forces of political liberalism. This can be attempted by a regular interaction between the civilians and the military in professional as well as educational development process. In all countries in general and in high threat environment countries in particular, the balanced ethnic and geographical representation of armed forces is de rigueur. The expertise gap between civilians and the military can be minimized through greater civilian involvement in defence and security matters and the exchange tenures for on job training and acculturation between civil and military departments.

One of the best ways to achieve a *perceptual* and *expertise unity* is the common educational experience between the military and civilians. Educating the civilians in the national security aspects through programs in the military universities and the corresponding exposure of military professionals to higher civilian education will go a long way in straightening the ideological and perceptual angularities.

Greater political control of the military through a whole of the government approach in complex security and humanitarian interventions should be the key tenet of future civil-military relations. Greater involvement of political leadership and civilian experts in the planning phase of the military strategy and its linkage with the national security strategy would also foster a commonality of thought while tackling complex security challenges of contemporary era.

## **Conclusion**

The quest for the Holy Grail of the balanced civil military relations led me to examine the three important variables contributing to the divergences and frictions between the two pillars of national security. The three variables that were examined were the threat environment, ideological fervour/self image, and the strength of the civilian political institutions. While in case of stable liberal democracies with moderate to high threat environment the need for greater integration of civil and military leadership emerged as the desired panacea, in case of democracies faced with high threat environment, the requirement to strengthen civilian political institutions was highlighted as the way ahead.

The most serious challenge however to the equilibrium of civil military relations was found in the emerging democracies with a record of military interventions. The anti dote to military interventionism under such conditions is the strong and altruistic political leadership supported by an assertive civil society, independent judiciary, and stable political institutions. The quality of leadership both civil and military would determine to a large extent the quality and character of civil military relations in such polities. According to Feaver it is the civilian leadership that bears the maximum onus of failure of civil military relations due to its putative role as the final decision making authority.<sup>68</sup>

The growing complexities of security challenges in contemporary world continue posing new challenges to civil and military relations analysts. The notion of civilian primacy although accepted as the dominant credo in most of the modern polities would be tested to its limits especially in the complex counterinsurgency warfare environment. Since the equipoise of the civilian and the military leaders would be seriously strained under these conditions a *Modus Vivendi* needs to be evolved to deal with these complexities without a stultifying intrusiveness on part of civilians and a shirking isolationism on part of the military. A narrowing of the gap between the civil and military belief systems is the scarlet thread that promises to hold together the fabric of civil military cooperation in future as in the past.

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# CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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## **Abstract**

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are widely recognized concept in the contemporary era and include a wide range of measures encompassing military, political and economic fields. The term CBMs has broader connotation as the term is specifically used by some writers to describe military related confidence building measures while a new term TCBMs (Trust and Confidence Building Measures) was also introduced in a Conference held at Geneva in 1998. CBMs can be broadly categorized into military, political and socio-economic measures. Within the military sphere they can be further classified into conventional or nuclear CBMs. In this connection, this paper examines various types of CBMs between India and Pakistan.

## **Introduction**

CBMs or Confidence Building Measures are a widely recognized concept in the modern day world and includes a wide range of measures encompassing military, political and economic fields. It is generally believed that the concept of CBMs originated in Europe during the 1970s in the backdrop of East-West confrontation. There is, however, sufficient evidence to suggest that the process had already been practiced in many parts of the world although not necessarily characterized as such. For instance, in South Asia, there have been many such agreements between India and Pakistan. The 1949 Karachi Agreement, the Liaquat-Nehru Pact of 1950, the 1960 Indo-Pak Border Ground Rules Agreement, the 1962 Indus Water Treaty, the Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and the 1972 Simla Agreement are cases in point.<sup>1</sup> While the term CBMs has broader connotations, the term CSBMs denoting Confidence and Security Building Measures is specifically used by some writers to describe military related confidence building measures.

In a 1998 Conference held at Geneva under the auspices of UNIDIR (United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research) a new term TCBMs (Trust and Confidence Building Measures) was also introduced. One may argue that this addition of a 'T' or 'trust' does not really add any new substance to the existing concept since 'confidence' and 'trust' are synonyms and the addition may have been aimed at making the concept more eye catching. Former Pakistani Foreign Minister Mr. Agha Shahi, who was one of the participants of the Conference however, opined that: *"UNIDIR has rightly joined trust to confidence-building measures for India and Pakistan as the panacea for the lack of mutual confidence in the performance in good faith of their obligations towards each other"*.<sup>2</sup>

As pointed out earlier CBMs can be broadly categorized into **military**, **political**, and **socio-economic** measures. Within the military sphere they can be further classified into conventional or nuclear CBMs. The most comprehensive, elaborate and well documented model of CBMs to-date can be found in the 'Helsinki Final Act' of 1975 which was implemented with a great degree of success and resulted in formalizing the status quo in Europe. The Helsinki agreement was further supplemented and expanded in scope through the Stockholm Accord which in turn was followed by the two Vienna Agreements in 1990 and 1992 respectively.<sup>3</sup> It may be appropriate here to dilate upon the concept of CBMs and their various ingredients before embarking upon its relevance to and history in South Asia.

According to Johan Jorgen Holst<sup>4</sup> :-

*"Confidence building measures (CBMs) may be defined as arrangements designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trust-worthiness of states \_\_confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military security. In fact, the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical and social relationships."*

## Stages of Implementation of Confidence Building Measures

The distinction between Conflict Avoidance and Confidence Building Measures is not easy to make and it is not a simple task to categorize various measures under the rubric of either the Conflict Avoidance Measures or Confidence Building Measures. Michael Krepon considers Conflict Avoidance Measures as a first step which then leads on to CBMs and then further on to 'Peace Building Measures'. He has, therefore divided the whole process into three distinct stages<sup>5</sup> as under:-

- **Stage-1 - Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs):** These are the steps undertaken in the early stages of the process and are aimed at avoiding unwanted wars and unintended escalation. The 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan regarding pre-notification of large scale military exercises and establishment of no fly zones along their common border is a typical example of CAMs.
- **Stage - 2 - Confidence Building:** This is a relatively more difficult stage which involves the difficult transition from Conflict Avoidance to Confidence Building. Its complexity is based on the fact that much greater political stakes are involved at this stage especially when the relations between the two parties are marred by deep seated mistrust. The South Asian example is again instructive in this regard where the diametrically different and hardened views of the two antagonists on the core issue of Kashmir have made the graduation from CAMs to CBMs extremely difficult. Another factor detrimental to any progress in this regard has been the less than satisfactory track record of the functioning of the existing CAMs between the two countries. The third impediment is the domestic political cost for any government which appears to be making conciliatory gestures towards the other side. According to Krepon, *"CBMs can become a vital companion to peacemaking, but not a substitute for it in regions of great tension. Indeed without CBMs ..... Politically*

*risky peacemaking efforts can easily fail.*” Steps such as acceptance of foreign military observers at pre-notified exercises are part of the transition process from CAMs to CBMs.

- **Stage- 3 - Strengthening the Peace:** This stage encompasses the post-peace phase when after having avoided war and successfully negotiated peace, CBMs can still be employed to strengthen the fragile peace. This will entail institutionalization of existing cooperative arrangements and expanding their scope by developing socio-economic links. In this phase measures beyond pre-notification and invitation to military observers could be initiated such as placing constraints on the size and location of military exercises to make them as non-provocative as possible. Former Pakistani Ambassador to the US and UK, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi has suggested some specific measures in this regard, such as *non-deployment of long range artillery in the proximity of borders, tank-free zones, rearward location of 1/3 of frontline forces and mutual consultation on acquisition of new weapon systems and technologies*<sup>6</sup>. However, implementation of most of these proposals will pose serious practical difficulties in the prevailing environment due to serious trust-deficit between India and Pakistan. There would be technical difficulties as well in for instance, categorizing artillery pieces into offensive and defensive. Similarly, all tanks are not part of the strike formations – some of these have defensive roles as well, and rearward location of forces will be a complex proposition in view of the disparity in the geographical sizes of India and Pakistan.

### **CBMs in South Asia**

History of CBMs in South Asia has been long but checkered due to the intractable nature of the political disputes and the depth of mistrust between India and Pakistan. There is also a widespread skepticism regarding the utility of CBMs especially in South Asia with some justification. Dr. Lodhi, for instance, has expressed

serious doubts about the utility of CBMs in Indo-Pak context especially when these are considered to be an end in themselves and a substitute for conflict resolution saying that:-

*“.....CBMs cannot stand alone and can only work in a broader context. The presumption of priority for CBMs is that underlying problems are not resolvable, and therefore, by freezing the status quo, CBMs can somehow reduce tension and avert the danger of war.....Meant to be a step towards conflict resolution they can often be used as a substitute. They have frequently been pursued in South Asia under external prodding or pressure and at the expense of problem solving.”<sup>7</sup>*

The historical experience also lends credence to this view. Many instances from the recent past can be cited to prove the erratic performance of CAMs between the two South Asian rivals. First, despite an Indo-Pak agreement reached in August 1992 on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, India continued to maintain stockpiles of chemical weapons which only came to light when under the obligations of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) India finally disclosed its stockpiles<sup>8</sup>, thereby making a mockery of the agreement in both letter and spirit. Second incident relates to 1988 agreement regarding ‘non-attack on each others nuclear installations’. In May 1998, intelligence reports indicated Indian preparations, raising fears of an imminent pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear infrastructure. The crisis was only averted when Indian High Commissioner to Islamabad was summoned to the foreign office around midnight and told in unequivocal terms of the repercussions of such a venture. Third event pertains to the agreement, regarding pre-notification of major military exercises. In October 1998, India conducted its largest exercises since Brass Tacks, involving land air and sea units. Although as per the letter of the agreement India did notify holding of these exercises, but the selection of an area in close proximity of Pakistan’s land and sea boundaries, constituted a violation of the spirit of the agreement coming as it did in a period of enhanced mutual tensions. In 1999, in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict, India shot down an unarmed ‘Atlantique’ aircraft of Pakistan Navy ostensibly for an alleged

violation of Indian Airspace.<sup>9</sup> In view of the Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations, they should have lodged a protest through diplomatic channels on occurrence of such a violation instead of shooting down the aircraft. The Indians on their part would also have complaints regarding instances of Pakistani violation of or non-compliance to the existing CBMs.

A well known Pakistani security analyst has come up with an exhaustive list of objections from various quarters against the CBMs process. The list includes the following:-

- “CBMs are mere eyewash. They cannot solve complex and deep rooted problems of South Asia....
- How can CBMs work in present conditions of highly strained relations between India and Pakistan?
- CBMs may lead to complacency whereby a stronger determined adversary could easily take potential advantage over its weaker adversary.
- CBMs are of Western origin and hence cannot be applied in South Asian conditions which are entirely different.
- CBMs can hardly prove beneficial unless there is strong mediation by some big power or an international organization for the resolution of outstanding disputes/problems.
- Because of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, there is no possibility of a future war. Therefore, what is the great need for the CBMs?
- Both India and Pakistan have now parliamentary democracies in place and since democracies generally do not go to wars, all CBMs talk is therefore redundant”.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the criticism contained in the above mentioned list is justified. However, quite a few objections are based on lack of knowledge/ understanding of the nature and purpose of the CBMs. For instance, CBMs are not designed to solve the problems by themselves but are only meant to facilitate the process. In the tension charged relations between India and Pakistan, the process has not been able to complete the transition to the second stage and most of the existing agreements pertain to CAMs which have at least

partially helped in avoiding undesirable conflicts. The term itself may have originated in the West but not necessarily the concept and in any case so many other Western precepts most notably the concept of *Deterrence* are in vogue in South Asia and elsewhere. In the existing deterrence situation CBMs have not lost their utility. It may in fact be essential to devise specific CBMs to enhance the stability of deterrence. Again the observation with regard to democracies not fighting each other is a sweeping generalization and its applicability to fledgling post-colonial democracies can at best be doubtful.

Michael Krepon, however, has a more optimistic view about the prospects of CBMs in the post- Cold War world and considers these as 'a growth industry' because in his view, the negotiation and implementation of CBMs is comparatively much easier than formal arms control agreements. In a similar vein, Mr. Agha Shahi while describing the past experience with CBMs as discouraging, recognizes the greater significance assumed by the CBMs in the aftermath of the nuclearization of the two countries. In the post nuclearization phase in South Asia, the US has also been encouraging both India and Pakistan to negotiate a nuclear restraints regime to avoid unauthorized or accidental nuclear war in the region. India considers its 'no first use' offer as a nuclear related CBM, while Pakistan perceives it as a ploy to degrade Pakistani nuclear deterrent against any conventional attack and thus designed to allow India to exploit its advantage in conventional forces. Both countries have, however, announced unilateral moratoria on further nuclear testing which if formalized as a 'regional test ban agreement' as proposed by the Pakistani Prime Minister at the SAARC summit held at Colombo in July 1998, could form part of the CBMs. Pakistan again made this offer during the first round of expert level talks on Nuclear CBMs in New Delhi in June 2004. India however, turned it down.

In Mr Shahi's view, present non-deployed state of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in South Asia is akin to a virtual de-alert situation which if formalized into a bilateral agreement would constitute an important CBM. He however, cautions that problems related to verification of de-alert status would have to be identified

and sorted out beforehand. Some of the other CBMs suggested are halting of missile testing and refraining from stationing the nuclear capable missiles close to the borders<sup>11</sup>. These suggestions are idealistic and oblivious to technological complexities and political difficulties. For instance, given the acute lack of trust devising an intrusive verification mechanism for monitoring the de-alert status is a near impossibility. Secondly, both Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile programs are still in the evolution stage and there are technical requirements for missile flight tests to verify the design parameters of various missiles to achieve confidence in their performance. Halting of missile tests, therefore, is an unrealistic expectation. There could, however, be other mutually agreed constraints on unbridled missile development. Thirdly, the suggestion regarding refraining from stationing nuclear capable missiles close to borders is again not on sound footing as most of the nuclear capable missiles in the Indian and Pakistani inventories have sufficiently long ranges to be able to reach their targets from their deployments well in the depth and in any case neither there is any need to deploy such systems close to the borders nor is that the normal practice.

### **Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia – Problems and Prospects**

The concept of nuclear risk reduction and restraints is relatively new to India and Pakistan. In the pre-1998 era these ideas could not be explored owing to the covert nature of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. The only existing nuclear CBM was the 1988 agreement on ‘Non-attack on each other’s nuclear facilities’. In October 1998, during the nuclear risk reduction talks between Indian and Pakistani experts at Islamabad, Pakistan presented a comprehensive ‘strategic restraint regime’ proposal. The Indian side however, expressed its inability to discuss it without having read it carefully and analyzed it thoroughly. Some of the ideas from the restraint regime were later reflected in the Lahore MOU of February 1999, which contains eight measures for the promotion of a stable environment of peace and security between India and Pakistan. Out of these, five measures are directly related to nuclear risk reduction, while two others i.e. a review and oversight mechanism to monitor

the implementation of the existing CBMs and up-gradation and improvement of existing communication links are complimentary to the nuclear risk reduction measures. The last remaining measure pertains to avoidance of incidents at sea, which in the context of the likely future development by the two countries their respective nuclear triads also has a potential linkage.<sup>12</sup>

The five specific nuclear risk reduction measures pertained to bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, pre-notification of ballistic missile flight tests, national measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, abiding by their respective moratoriums on nuclear testing and bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these in the multilateral forums. Understanding on these issues was to be converted into formal agreements after working out the technical details at subsequent expert level meetings. Unfortunately, the meetings of the experts could not materialize due to break down of the negotiations as a result of the Kargil conflict followed by the military standoff in 2001-02.

The dialogue process finally resumed following an agreement during a January 2004 meeting between PM Vajpayee and President Musharraf,<sup>13</sup> on the sidelines of SAARC summit in Islamabad. However, even after a lapse of over a decade since it was first mooted, the Strategic Restraint Regime proposal has not yet been taken up formally in the ongoing composite dialogue, despite several attempts by Pakistan to place it on the agenda. Before getting into the details of the proposal or discussing its future prospects it may be useful to take a stock of the progress made in the peace process in four years of negotiations ranging from the expert level talks to the Foreign Secretary level talks and the deliberations between the two Foreign Ministers before it came to a grinding halt as a result of the Mumbai incident in November 2008.

The composite dialogue was based on the agenda agreed upon by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan in July 1997.<sup>14</sup> The subject of strategic stability and restraint measures falls under the rubric of 'Peace and Security' and involves deliberations

between experts from the two countries. So far four rounds of expert level talks have taken place. The overall pace of the composite dialogue remained slow and both countries seemed inclined to take small tentative steps rather than coming up with bold initiatives with the exception of Musharraf's proposals on Kashmir which have been criticized in Pakistan by many as amounting to giving up Pakistan's principled stand on Kashmir without any reciprocal concessions by India. These proposals were not taken up in the formal dialogue process but were discussed in the form of back channel deliberations between the special envoys of the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani President. While there are no results to show as far as resolution of disputes is concerned, some substantive CBMs related to nuclear and missile issues have been agreed upon. During the course of the negotiations, India insisted upon following the Lahore MOU in letter and spirit, which is reflected in repeated emphasis on this point in almost all joint statements. India has also avoided any discussion of the Pakistani proposal on a 'Strategic Restraint Regime'.

The first round of expert level talks held at New Delhi in June 2004 was significant due to the fact that it set the stage for the subsequent rounds of talks. The two sides accepted each other's nuclear status recognizing the fact that the respective nuclear capabilities of the two countries are based on their national security imperatives and 'constitute a factor for stability'. They also committed themselves to taking 'national measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons to adopt bilateral notification measures and mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations' and to 'work towards strategic stability'. They also agreed to upgrade the existing hotline between the DGMOs and to establish a dedicated hotline between the two foreign secretaries, besides agreeing to finalize the technical parameters of pre-notification of missile tests. India however, did not agree to a Pakistani proposal for a bilateral declaration of nuclear test moratorium and instead insisted on reiteration of their respective unilateral moratoriums. The two countries also agreed to consult each other on security and non-proliferation issues in the context of multilateral negotiations on these issues.<sup>15</sup> There was nothing to show in terms of results in the second round of expert

level talks held at Islamabad in December 2004 other than reiteration of commitments made in the first round.<sup>16</sup> The third round held at New Delhi in August 2005, proved to be more productive and the text of a ballistic missile flight test pre-notification agreement was finalized.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, India handed over its draft of an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of accidental and unauthorized nuclear use. This was deliberated upon and a mutually agreed draft was finalized during the fourth round of expert level talks held at Islamabad in April 2006. It was subsequently signed into a formal agreement during the Foreign Ministers' meeting at New Delhi in February 2007.<sup>18</sup>

Given India's insistence on strictly following the formulations of the Lahore MOU, a look at the results achieved so far in the expert level talks on nuclear risk reduction measures indicates that almost all the objectives of the Lahore MOU in this respect have been achieved and the dialogue on nuclear CBMs seems to have run its course. To carry the process further would need some creative thinking on both sides to come up with new ideas and a willingness to embrace new proposals even if they emanate from the other side now that there is no agreed upon agenda to fall back on. The only left over item from the Lahore MOU is bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issue to harmonize their positions on these issues in the multilateral forums. Despite the fact that on many of these issues, the two sides have common concerns and have been taking identical positions, no effort seems to have been made to coordinate their positions. Obviously, it involves considerations of international politics rather than bilateral or regional factors and more often than not states tend to align their positions with major powers on a quid-pro-quo basis. In case of India, after the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, it has all the reason to harmonize its positions with the US rather than Pakistan as has been evident in its approach on the Iranian issue in the IAEA.

In the meantime, hotline between the DGMOs has been upgraded to a fiber optic link with a higher degree of reliability and much greater capacity for voice as well as data transmission. The old hot line working since the early 1970s had many technical snags.

The line which was partly based on fiber optics and partly on overland copper line was at best a patch up of different media. Consequently, it was noisy and unreliable with frequent breakdowns. Along with the technical up-gradation of the DGMOs' hotline, a dedicated hotline has also been established between the two foreign secretaries, specifically for the purpose of prompt exchange of information in the event of a nuclear incident or to clarify any misunderstandings particularly during crises. This line is also based on the fiber optic link. Pakistan and India have also inked an agreement on avoidance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. However, this agreement though symbolically important lacks in substance and relies mainly on unilateral good faith measures by either side rather than any bilateral framework. The most effective agreement so far has been the ballistic missile flight test notification agreement which has worked well and both sides have been regularly pre-notifying each other of their intended missile tests. As a result, missile tests by either side now are taken by the other as a routine technical matter and do not cause any alarm. However, this agreement does not cover notification of cruise missile tests which both sides have been conducting over the past few years.

As far as the Strategic Restraint Regime is concerned the Pakistani proposal rests on three basic pillars i.e. *nuclear restraint, conventional balance and resolution of political disputes*<sup>19</sup>, which appear to be eminently reasonable. In terms of nuclear restraint, it covers whole gamut of issues related to the development, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons and nuclear capable missiles besides calling for prohibition of development, induction or deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Many of the measures suggested by Pakistan were also part of the Lahore MOU and have been codified into formal agreements. Why then India shows abhorrence for the concept? One reason could be that since it is seen as a Pakistani proposal, India does not feel comfortable in accepting it and has even shown its distaste for the term 'strategic restraint itself'. Secondly, China factor weighs heavily in India's strategic calculus and it does not want to accept any constraints on its nuclear options by entering into bilateral agreements with Pakistan which could limit its options vis-à-vis China at a later stage. Many Indian analysts also believe that Pakistan acts as a proxy for China by

keeping India engaged in South Asia and thereby curtailing its ability to compete with China. This line of thinking has been encouraged by analysts such as Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, who project India as a possible strategic counter weight to China. It is, therefore, obvious that India has no real incentive to embrace a bilateral strategic restraint regime with Pakistan. The dialogue process currently frozen would on resumption is likely to continue to pursue modest goals mainly confined to CBMs to maintain a semblance of strategic stability in the region. Moreover, as the time goes by the command and control structures established by the two countries will mature along with their thinking about the dynamics of nuclear deterrence and barring a major catastrophe, in a short to medium term future, an increasingly stable security environment is likely to prevail in the region.<sup>20</sup>

### **Categories of CBMs between India and Pakistan:**

CBMs agreed to between India and Pakistan from time to time can be categorized into following:-

- **Communication Measures**
  - Hotline between DGMOs since December 1971.
  - Direct Communication Lines between Sector Commanders across the LOC since 1991.
  - Hotline between Prime Ministers since 1997.
  - Hotlines between Foreign Secretaries since 2005.
  
- **Notification Measures**
  - Agreement for prior Notification of Military Exercises involving ten thousand or more troops is in place since April 1991. It stipulates that at Corps level exercises must be held forty five kilometres from the border while at Division level exercises must be held twenty five kilometres away from the border. No military activity is permitted within five kilometres of the border.
  - Agreement on pre-notification of Ballistic Missiles flight tests is in place since 2005. This agreement is follow up of the understanding reached during the

Lahore Summit in February 1999 and was being followed by the two countries even before its formalization into a bilateral agreement.

➤ **Transparency Measures**

- Invitation to military observers to attend major exercises to confirm non-hostile intent. Indian and other military attaches were invited to attend Zarb-e-Momin Exercise in 1989. India had invited foreign military attaches except the Pakistani military attaché to witness the Brass Tacks Exercise in 1986-87.
- To defuse tensions resulting from its spring 1990 exercises, India invited US observers to monitor the exercises and to confirm their non-hostile intent.

➤ **Border Security Measures**

- Karachi Agreement of 1949 which established an 800 mile CFL (cease fire line) which obligated the troops to keep a distance of 500 yards from the line and froze the force levels along the CFL. The CFL in Kashmir was re-designated as the LOC (Line of Control) following the 1971 war and the Simla Agreement.
- The 1960 Indo-Pak Agreement on Border Disputes established 'Ground Rules' to regulate the activities along the West Pakistan-India border.
- The Rann of Kutch Tribunal Award of 1966. It however, left the demarcation of boundary in Sir Creek area which is still disputed.
- Air Space Violations Agreement signed in April 1991 and ratified in August 1992, which stipulates that no combat aircraft shall fly within ten kilometres of each others airspace.

➤ **Consultation Measures**

- Indo-Pak Joint Commission established in 1982 to facilitate discussions at ministerial level.

- Since 1990, the Joint Commission has been superseded by a series of Foreign Secretary level talks.
  - The Lahore MOU of February 1999 called upon both sides to discuss their respective nuclear doctrines and security concepts.
  - In June 2004, round of expert level talks both sides agreed to consult each other with view to harmonize their positions on arms control and disarmament related issues at the international forums.
  - In September 2006, India and Pakistan agreed to set up a Joint Anti-Terrorism Institutional Mechanism.
- **Water Rights.** The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty brokered by the World Bank helped resolve problems regarding distribution of water resources.
- **Declaratory Measures**
- The Tashkent Declaration of 1966.
  - The Simla Accord of 1972.
  - Agreement on ‘Non-Attack’ on each others nuclear facilities signed in 1988 and ratified in 1991.
  - Joint Declaration on the prohibition of Chemical Weapons concluded in 1992 in which both countries agreed not to develop, produce, acquire or use Chemical Weapons. India however, declared having stocks as well as production and storage facilities as a consequence of its ratification of the CWC in 1997.<sup>21</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The history of CBMs in South Asia is long and so is the list of various types of CBMs agreed to from time to time between India and Pakistan. However, the existing CBMs have not been followed by the two sides in letter and spirit and it appears that CBMs as a concept have somehow failed to find much traction. They have also been generally viewed with skepticism and as an alien concept by many in South Asia. It may, however, be unfair to completely discount their contribution in alleviating tensions and avoiding

conflicts between the two arch rivals. They may not have made much headway beyond the preliminary stage of CAMs but in some cases such as the Indus Waters Treaty they have stood the test of time. The reason for the uncertain and less than satisfactory performance of many CBMs between India and Pakistan has been due to the absence of a 'mechanism for monitoring and review' of their performance. CBMs may not be a panacea for all the ills afflicting the Indo-Pak relations but they can contribute even in small measure to prevent the recurrence of hostilities in a crisis prone and tension-ridden region.

Both countries recognize the significance and value of at least some CBMs between them and are fully aware of their importance in alleviating tensions and removing misperceptions during crises periods. This is amply demonstrated by their conduct during some of the recent crises. As per the terms of the 1988 agreement on non-attack of each other's nuclear facilities, India and Pakistan share lists of their respective nuclear installations with each other on the First of January every year. During the 2001-02 Crisis while the armed forces of the two countries were mobilizing they did not fail to exchange those lists. Similarly, during the same crisis when India conducted the test of a variant of its Agni missile in January 2002, it pre-notified it to the Pakistani side. Similarly, when in May and October of 2002 Pakistan conducted a series of missile tests, it notified these to the Indian side. Interestingly, the understanding about Ballistic Missile pre-notification reached at Lahore in February 1999 had not been formalized into an agreement between India and Pakistan. The agreement was formalized much later in 2005. This is proof enough that the two countries are fully cognizant of the importance of CBMs and do follow at least those measures which they consider to be absolutely critical. Some may argue that absence of war between India and Pakistan since 1971 can be attributed to the gradual emergence of a nuclear deterrent equation. This may well be the case but it does not in any way detract from the importance of the role of CBMs. Moreover, absence of war is not an end in itself as long as the underlying reasons for tensions remain unresolved and that is where CBMs can make a contribution by way of creating propitious environments for the process of resolution of problems to move forward.

APPENDIX-1  
**THE LIAQUAT – NEHRU PACT - 1950**



The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met to discuss means to elevate communal peace

At the time of independence, many communal riots broke out in different areas of India and Pakistan. These riots had a great impact on the status of minorities in the two nations. Due to brutal killings by the majority community, a huge number of Muslims migrated from India, and Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan. Yet, the mass migration failed to solve the minority problem. Even after the migration, almost half of the Muslims living in the Sub-continent were left in India and a sizable number of Hindus in Pakistan. Those who were left behind were unable to become an integral part of the societies they were living in. The people and government of their countries looked upon them as suspects. They were unable to assure their countrymen of their loyalty.

This problem escalated during the late 40's and early 50's. It seemed as if India and Pakistan were about to fight their second war

in the first three years of their independence. At this critical juncture in the history of South Asia, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan issued a statement emphasizing the need to reach a solution to the problem. He also proposed a meeting with his Indian counterpart to determine how to put an end to the communal riots and the fear of war.

The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi on April 2, 1950, and discussed the matter in detail. The meeting lasted for six long days. On April 8, the two leaders signed an agreement, which was later entitled as Liaquat-Nehru Pact. This pact provided a 'bill of rights' for the minorities of India and Pakistan. Its aim was to address the following three issues:

- To alleviate the fears of the religious minorities on both sides.
- To elevate communal peace.
- To create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their other differences.

According to the agreement, the governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agreed that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion; a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honor.

It also guaranteed fundamental human rights of the minorities, such as freedom of movement, speech, occupation and worship. The pact also provided for the minorities to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other offices and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces.

The Liaquat-Nehru Pact provided for the mechanism to deal with oppressive elements with an iron hand. Both the governments decided to set up minority commissions in their countries with the aim of observing and reporting on the implementation of the pact, to ensure that no one breaches the pact and to make recommendations to guarantee its enforcement. Both Minority Commissions were to be headed by a provincial minister and were to have Hindu and

Muslim members among its ranks. India and Pakistan also agreed to include representatives of the minority community in the cabinet of the two Bengals, and decided to depute two central ministers, one from each government, to remain in the affected areas for such period as might be necessary. Both the leaders emphasized that the loyalty of the minorities should be reserved for the state in which they were living and for the solution of their problems they should look forward to the government of the country they were living in. This pact was broadly acknowledged as an optimistic beginning to improve relations between India and Pakistan.

## THE INDUS WATERS TREATY – 1960

### Historical Context

The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the waters of the Indus basin. In 1951, David Lilienthal wrote an influential article in *Colliers* magazine suggesting that the World Bank use its good offices to bring India and Pakistan to an agreement over how to share and manage the river system. The President of the World Bank, Eugene R. Black, agreed to act as a conduit of agreement between the two states. Finally, in 1960, after several years of arduous negotiations did an agreement take shape. Even today, the Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, several high profile commentators in India suggested that the treaty should be scrapped, though the Indian government made no intimations that it was considering such a move. [[For further information...](#)]

**Abridged Text of Indus Waters Treaty (Signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960).** The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and recognizing the need, therefore, of fixing and delineating, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning the use of these waters and of making provision for the settlement, in a cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise in regard to the interpretation or application of the provisions agreed upon herein, have resolved to conclude a Treaty in furtherance of these objectives, and for this purpose have named as their plenipotentiaries:

The Government of India: Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and The Government of Pakistan: Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, H.P., H.J., President of Pakistan, who,

having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers and having found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles and An

## **Article II**

**Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers.** All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article. Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the reaches where these rivers flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan. The points of final crossing are the following: (a) near the new Hasta Bund upstream of Suleimanke in the case of the Sutlej Main, and (b) about one and a half miles upstream of the siphon for the B-D Link in the case of the Ravi Main.

Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural Use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters (while flowing in Pakistan) of any Tributary which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main before these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan.

All the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural course, joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main after these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan shall be available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan: Provided however that this provision shall not be construed as giving Pakistan any claim or right to any releases by India in any such Tributary.

There shall be a Transition Period during which India shall (i) limit its withdrawals for Agricultural Use, (ii) limit abstractions for storages, and (iii) make deliveries to Pakistan from the Eastern Rivers.

The Transition Period shall begin on 1st April 1960 and it shall end on 31st March 1970, or, if extended under the provisions of Part 8 of Annexure H, on the date up to which it has been

extended. In any event, the Transition Period shall end not later than 31st March 1973.

During the Transition Period, Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use the waters of the Eastern Rivers which are to be released by India in accordance with the provisions of Annexure H. After the end of the Transition Period, Pakistan shall have no claim or right to releases by India of any of the waters of the Eastern Rivers. In case there are any releases, Pakistan shall enjoy the unrestricted use of the waters so released after they have finally crossed into Pakistan: Provided that in the event that Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not acquire any right whatsoever, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such releases or such use.

### **Article III**

**Provision Regarding Western Rivers.** Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions of Paragraph (2). India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not permit any interference with these waters, except for the following uses, restricted in the case of each of the rivers, The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab, to the drainage basin thereof: (a) Domestic Use; (b) Non-Consumptive Use; (c) Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and (d) Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.

Pakistan shall have the unrestricted use of all waters originating from sources other than the Eastern Rivers which are delivered by Pakistan into The Ravi or The Sutlej, and India shall not make use of these waters. Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.

### **Article IV**

**Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers.** Pakistan shall use its best endeavors to construct and bring

into operation with due regard to expedition and economy, that part of a system of work which will accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers.

Each Party agrees that any Non-Consumptive Use made by it shall be made as not to materially change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the uses on that channel by the other Party under the provisions of this Treaty.

Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as having the effect of preventing either Party from undertaking schemes of drainage, river training, conservation of soil against erosion and dredging, or from removal of stones, gravel or sand from the beds of the Rivers: Provided that in executing any of the schemes mentioned above, each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party.

Pakistan shall maintain in good order its portions of the drainages mentioned below with capacities not less than the capacities as on the Effective Date: (i) Hudiarra Drain, (ii) Kasur Nala, (iii) Salimshah Drain, (iv) Fazilka Drain.

If India finds it necessary that any of the drainages mentioned in Paragraph (4) should be deepened or widened in Pakistan, Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so as a work of public interest, provided India agrees to pay the cost of the deepening or widening. Each Party will use its best endeavors to maintain the natural channels of the Rivers, as on the Effective Date, in such condition as will avoid, as far as practicable, any obstruction to the flow in these channels likely to cause material damage to the other Party.

Neither Party will take any action which would have the effect of diverting the Ravi Main between Madhopur and Lahore, or the Sutlej Main between Harike and Suleimanke, from its natural channel between high banks. The use of the natural channels of the Rivers for the discharge of flood or other excess waters shall be free and not subject to limitation by either Party, and neither Party shall

have any claim against the other in respect of any damage caused by such use. Each Party agrees to communicate to the other Party, as far in advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such extraordinary discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows as may affect the other Party.

Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such manner, consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage to the other Party. Each Party declares its intention to prevent, as far as practicable, undue pollution of the waters of the Rivers which might affect adversely uses similar in nature to those to which the waters were put on the Effective Date, and agrees to take all reasonable measures to ensure that, before any sewage or industrial waste is allowed to flow into the Rivers, it will be treated, where necessary, in such manner as not materially to affect those uses: Provided that the criterion of reasonableness shall be the customary practice in similar situations on the Rivers.

The Parties agree to adopt, as far as feasible, appropriate measures for recovery, and restoration to owners, of timber and other property floated or floating down the Rivers, subject to appropriate charges being paid by the owners. Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty, nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as affecting existing territorial rights over the waters of any of the Rivers or the beds or banks thereof, or as affecting existing property rights under municipal law over such waters or beds or banks.

## **Article V**

**Financial Provisions.** In consideration of the fact that the purpose of part of the system of works referred to in Article IV (1) is the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which on 15th August 1947 were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers, India agrees to make a fixed contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 towards the costs of these works.

The sum of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 shall be paid in ten equal installments on the 1st of November of each year. Each of the installments shall be paid to the Bank for the credit of the Indus Basin Development Fund to be established and administered by the Bank. These financial provisions shall not be construed as conferring upon India any right to participate in the decisions as to the system of works which Pakistan constructs or as constituting an assumption of any responsibility by India or as an agreement by India in regard to such works. Except for such payments as are specifically provided for in this Treaty, neither Party shall be entitled to claim any payment for observance of the provisions of this Treaty or to make any charge for water received from it by the other Party.

#### **Article VI**

**Exchange of Data.** The following data with respect to the flow in and utilization of the waters of, the Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the Parties: (a) Daily gauge and discharge data relating to flow of the Rivers at all observation sites. (b) Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs. (c) Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a government agency, including link canals. (d) Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals. (e) Daily deliveries from link canals.

#### **Article VII**

**Future Co-operation.** The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent.

#### **Article VIII**

**Permanent Indus Commission.** India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters, and shall appoint to this post, as often as a vacancy occurs, a person who should ordinarily be a high-ranking engineer competent in the

field of hydrology and water-use. Unless either Government should decide to take up any particular question directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty, and, in particular, with respect to (a) the furnishing or exchange of information or data provided for in the Treaty; and (b) the giving of any notice or response to any notice provided for in the Treaty.

The status of each Commissioner and his duties and responsibilities towards his Government will be determined by that Government. The two Commissioners shall together form the Permanent Indus Commission. The purpose and functions of the Commission shall be to establish and maintain co-operative arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty and to promote co-operation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Rivers. The Commission shall determine its own procedures.

#### **Article IX**

**Settlement of Differences and Disputes.** Any question which arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavor to resolve the question by agreement.

If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions mentioned in the Paragraph (1), then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be dealt with by a Neutral Expert. If the Neutral Expert has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed to have arisen.

As soon as a dispute to be settled has arisen, the Commission shall, at the request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission is in agreement and the issues in

dispute, the views of each Commissioner on these issues and his reasons therefore. Either Government may, following receipt of the report, or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite the other Government to resolve the dispute by agreement. A court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute.

## **Article X**

**Emergency Provisions.** If, at any time prior to 31st March 1965, Pakistan should represent to the Bank that, because of the outbreak of large-scale international hostilities arising out of causes beyond the control of Pakistan, it is unable to obtain from abroad the materials and equipment necessary for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of that part of the system of works referred to in Article IV (1) which related to the replacement referred to therein, (hereinafter referred to as the replacement element) and if, after consideration of this representation in consultation with India, the Bank is of the opinion that (a) these hostilities are on a scale of which the consequence is that Pakistan is unable to obtain in time such materials and equipment as must be procured from abroad for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of the replacement element, and (b) since the Effective Date, Pakistan has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the said materials and equipment and has carried forward the construction of the replacement element with due diligence and all reasonable expedition, the Bank shall immediately notify each of the Parties accordingly. The Parties undertake that in being so notified, they will forthwith consult together and enlist the good offices of the Bank in their consultation, with a view to reaching mutual agreement as to whether or not, in light of all circumstances prevailing, any modifications of the provisions of this Treaty are appropriate and advisable and, if so, the nature and the extent of the modifications.

## **Article XII**

**Final Provisions.** This Treaty consists of the Preamble, the Articles hereof and Annexures A to H hereto, and may be cited as "The Indus Waters Treaty 1960." This Treaty shall be ratified and

the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged in New Delhi. It shall enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications, and will then take effect retrospectively from the first of April 1960. The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments. The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of this Treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in triplicate in English at Karachi on this Nineteenth day of September 1960.

[Signed:]

For the Government of India:

Jawaharlal Nehru

For the Government of Pakistan:

Mohammad Ayub Khan

Field Marshal, H.P., H.J.

For the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development:

W. A. B. Iliff

APPENDIX-3

**TASHKENT DECLARATION – 1966**

**Historical Context.** The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was formally brought to an end by signing this declaration at Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed it on behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them.

**Text of the Tashkent Declaration (signed on January 10, 1966).** The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the interests of the people so India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.
- The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their

Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this declaration.

APPENDIX-4

**SIMLA AGREEMENT, 2 JULY 1972**

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples. In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

- That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the countries;
- That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation, and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.
- That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good-neighborliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
- That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries of the last twenty-five years shall be resolved by peaceful means;

- That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;
- That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other;
- Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other.
- Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them;
- In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that;
- Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including over flights;
- Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country;
- Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible;
- Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.
- In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both Governments agree that:
- Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border;
- In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat of the use of force in violation of this line;

- The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days thereof.
- This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.
- Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of a durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

**Sd/-  
Indira Gandhi  
Prime Minister  
Republic of India**

**Sd/-  
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto  
President  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan**

Source: [Government of India, 2 July 1972](#)

**THE LAHORE MOU – 1999**

**The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on February 21, 1999**

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter; Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit; Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries; Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

- The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
- The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
- The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that

could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

- The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
- The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
- The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
- The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
- The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. (K. Raghunath) Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India (Shamshad Ahmad) Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

## Author

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Khurshid Khoja, "Confidence-Building between India and Pakistan: Lessons, Opportunities and Imperatives", in Michael Krepon eds. "A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security", 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp.135.

<sup>2</sup> Agha Shahi, "Confidence Building in South Asia", The News, Islamabad, 29 November, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Krepon, "Conflict Avoidance, Confidence-Building and Peacemaking", in "A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security", 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp.2.

<sup>4</sup> Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence Building Measures : A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, Vol. 25, No. 1, January/February, 1983, pp.2&4.

<sup>5</sup> Michael Krepon, op. Cit., pp.4-12.

<sup>6</sup> Dr Maleeha Lodhi, "Nuclear Risk Reduction and Conflict-Resolution in South Asia", The News, Islamabad, 28 November, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Khoja, op.cit., pp.133.

<sup>9</sup> 'Can't Stop the Madness', *Time*, August 23-30, 1999.

<sup>10</sup> Dr Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, "Confidence Building Measures in South Asia : Pros and Cons of the Debate", The Nation, Islamabad, 22 December, 1995.

<sup>11</sup> Agha Shahi, op. Cit.

<sup>12</sup> [www.indianembassy.org/South.../mou\(lahore01211999\).html](http://www.indianembassy.org/South.../mou(lahore01211999).html)

<sup>13</sup> Qudssia Akhlaque, 'Musharraf, Vajpayee hold historic meeting: India for continuation of parleys, hints at more CBMs. Joint statement being prepared', The Dawn, Karachi, 06 January 2004.

<sup>14</sup> Stimson, 1997 Indo-Pak Foreign Secretary level Talks, [www.stimson.org](http://www.stimson.org).

<sup>15</sup> Jawed Naqvi, 'Nuclear hotline to be set up: Pakistan, India to continue test ban'; Also see, 'Work for strategic stability assured', The Dawn, Karachi, 21 June 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Qudssia Akhlaque, 'Islamabad calls for reciprocal flexibility: Dispute resolution', The Dawn, Karachi, 24 December 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Jawed Naqvi, 'Accord on nuke hotline, missile tests with India', The Dawn, Karachi, 07 August 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Jawed Naqvi, 'India opposes joint train blast probe: Pact signed to avert N-accident risks', The Dawn, Karachi, February 22, 2007.

<sup>19</sup> Qudssia Akhlaque, 'Pakistan proposes 20 CBMs: Secretary-level talks begin', *The Dawn*, Karachi, 28 December 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Author's personal experience of the dialogue process.

<sup>21</sup> *A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security*; 3<sup>rd</sup> edition; The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. and author's personal experience of participation in India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue in 2004-05.

## NUCLEAR TERRORISM – ARE WE PREPARED FOR IT?

*Brigadier (Retired) Tughral Yamin*

### **Abstract**

Nuclear terrorism is being touted as the latest on the list of emerging threats. Theoretically speaking, acts of nuclear terrorism can take place outside heavily guarded civil and military facilities, particularly during the transportation of radioactive materials. A number of government agencies in Pakistan are working towards ensuring that such a scenario does not take place. This paper aims at examining the international perceptions about nuclear terrorism and proposing a joint strategy to counter nuclear terrorism by taking all official and non-official stakeholders on board.

### **Introduction**

Going through the nuclear literature, one comes across a number of combinations and permutations with prefixes like: nuclear arms, nuclear arms race, nuclear alert, nuclear alert levels, nuclear bomb, nuclear bomber, nuclear battlefield, nuclear core, nuclear delivery systems, nuclear device, nuclear energy, nuclear fallout, nuclear fission, nuclear forces, nuclear fuel, nuclear ground zero, nuclear incident, nuclear inspections and safeguards, nuclear missile, nuclear power, nuclear proliferation, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear reactor, nuclear radiation, nuclear reprocessing plant, nuclear submarine, nuclear suppliers group (NSG), nuclear target, nuclear technology, nuclear trade, nuclear scientist, nuclear signals, nuclear warhead, nuclear warning, nuclear weapon state (NWS), non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), nuclear watchdog body, nuclear winter etc. The latest edition to this list is ‘nuclear terrorism.’ Currently, it is being touted as the most serious threat to humanity. Nuclear terrorism, as per 2005 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, denotes the use, or threat of the use, of nuclear weapons or radiological weapons in acts of terrorism, including attacks against facilities where radioactive materials are present. In legal terms, it is an offense committed, if a person unlawfully and

intentionally “uses in any way radioactive material ... with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.”<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this paper is to examine the international perceptions about nuclear terrorism and Pakistan’s ability to deal with the challenge.

Ever since the nuclear genie was let loose on the world, powerful nations have used all means at their disposal to contain the spread of nuclear weapons among other nation states. After September 11, 2001, the nuclear non-proliferation dragnet has been extended to include non-state actors as well. Pakistan, a late entrant into the nuclear field has for most part found itself up against the non-proliferation tide. In 1968, under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the nuclear shutters were slammed shut, denying Pakistan the legitimate right to nuclear recognition. Laying down the nuclear boundary has been in the works, since 1946, when USA, as the sole NWS made a bold pitch to stop the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons by offering to share basic scientific information for peaceful purposes. The Baruch Plan proposed that atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be eliminated from national armaments; and stressed the need for establishing effective safeguards, by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union, only two years shy off testing its first nuclear weapon, quite naturally refused to accept the Plan. The first attempt at nuclear control withered on the vine. The next initiative to engage the world in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was President Eisenhower’s Atom for Peace Program in 1956.<sup>3</sup> This allowed countries to have research reactors for peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In case of India, the spent nuclear fuel from the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) research reactor was illicitly diverted to fabricate nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> During the Cold War, the superpowers offered their close allies various kinds of security guarantees including the nuclear umbrella to keep them from developing nuclear weapons. The safety net of

military and economic alliances did not prevent France, China and Britain from going nuclear.

After having created a nuclear deterrence of sizeable proportions, the two superpowers engaged in bilateral arms control talks to set a bar on the total number of warheads and delivery means held by them. On the sidelines of this nuclear engagement, they constructed an international non-proliferation regime to limit nuclear arms globally through a raft of international treaties. Since 1968, the NPT has expanded to include 189 signatories. Three states namely India, Pakistan and Israel never joined the NPT. In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test under the garb of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). While time and again India was allowed to get away with its nuclear indiscretions, the only non-NPT country to have had the dubious honour of being penalised for nuclear misdemeanour is Pakistan. The infamous Pressler Amendment was invoked in 1990,<sup>5</sup> when the US president refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device, as a precondition for resuming economic and military aid.<sup>6</sup> In 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests to prove its weapon capability. This was predictably followed by Pakistani nuclear tests. The tests, among other consequences, resulted in a host of sanctions. Israel hasn't conducted an overt test so far. Many observers speculate that a suspected nuclear explosion in the south Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli test.<sup>7</sup> This is quite possible, since recent press reports indicate that South Africa, internationally shunned at that time for its racist policy, had a close nuclear cooperation with Israel.<sup>8</sup> Major changes have occurred on the nuclear landscape since then. South Africa gave up its nuclear program and dismantled its nuclear weapons, after renouncing the policy of apartheid and signing the NPT in 1991.<sup>9</sup> North Korea, one time signatory to the NPT, withdrew from the Treaty in 2003, citing threats from the US.<sup>10</sup> It has since conducted nuclear tests twice,<sup>11</sup> and may well be preparing for a third test.<sup>12</sup> After the Soviet Union broke up and left its nuclear facilities, scientists, technologies and armament scattered in the newly independent state, the US launched a vigorous campaign to contain the spread of orphan nuclear material under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Under this scheme Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine voluntarily gave up

their nuclear arsenals in return for technical and financial assistance.<sup>13</sup> Another mean adopted to steer countries clear of nuclear weapons was to encourage them to join regional nuclear weapon “free” zones (NWFZ). Five such zones exist today, with four of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements are Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk). The voluntary concept of NWFZ hasn’t materialised in crisis zones like the Middle East and South Asia. In some cases, aggressive muscular means have been used to eliminate irritant nuclear programs. The Iraqi nuclear reactor at Dimona was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in June 1981. Similar contingencies were being planned against the Pakistani nuclear facilities in the 1980s.<sup>14</sup> Fortunately, these remained on the drawing board and were never executed. Iraq wasn’t as fortunate. In 2002, USA and its coalition allies attacked Iraq on the baseless pretext that Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime possessed WMD’s that could be launched against Israel within 45 minutes. In September 2007, Israel again attacked and destroyed an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor located at Al Kibar.<sup>15</sup> Dire warnings have been issued to Iran to stop pursuing its nuclear program, including the use of military means but so far these threats have not been executed. Four sets of UN sanctions have been passed to deter and delay the Iranian program.<sup>16</sup> The US and EU have added their own sanctions against a nuclear Iran.

Despite a significant toning down of aggressive official rhetoric, as compared to the Bush days, the salience attached to the threat of nuclear terrorism by the American officialdom hasn’t decreased. The US Department of Homeland Security lists ‘Strengthen Our Bio and Nuclear Security’ as the second Guiding Principle after ‘Defeat Terrorism Worldwide.’ It recommends the strengthening of nuclear security by enhancing the national nuclear detection architecture and ensuring that its own nuclear materials are secure. It suggests “establishing well-planned, well-rehearsed, plans for coordinated response, we will also ensure a capability that can dramatically diminish the consequences of chemical, biological,

radiological or nuclear incidents.”<sup>17</sup> The issue of nuclear proliferation figured prominently in the last US presidential election agenda. On his campaign trail, candidate Obama had charged the Bush administration for failing to confront the threat of nuclear terrorism and had “vowed that if elected president, he would lead the effort to corral errant nuclear materials and stay one step ahead of biological and cyber threats.” He had called nuclear terrorism ‘the gravest danger’ that the US faced and blamed Bush for “spending nearly 1 trillion dollars on the war in Iraq, which had no active nuclear programme, while 50 tons of highly enriched uranium at civilian nuclear facilities around the world often is ‘poorly secured’.”<sup>18</sup> In his famous Prague speech, after taking over as President, Obama exhorted a receptive and adulatory European audience to “build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.”<sup>19</sup> In the Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, held at The Hague, Netherlands, in June 2009, Obama’s message read out to the assembled national representatives reiterated that there was “no graver danger to global security than the threat of nuclear terrorism, and no more immediate task for the international community than to address that threat.” He called upon the 75 member nations of the Initiative to “stand together as partners to prevent the theft, diversion, and misuse of nuclear materials and technologies; to detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; and to respond to, investigate, and prosecute would-be nuclear terrorists.”<sup>20</sup> Addressing the Corps of Cadets in West Point in 2009, Obama was more candid and direct. He said the, “stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.” He ominously added: “We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that’s why I’ve made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the

goal of a world without them.”<sup>21</sup> The message was repeated before an international audience invited to the US capital in April 2010. A day before the inauguration of the International Summit on Nuclear Security, the US president declared that “The single biggest threat to US security, both short term, medium term and long term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.”<sup>22</sup> At the Summit, he warned the world leaders that it would be a catastrophe if they failed to act decisively to keep nuclear weapons from terrorists. He highlighted the danger of nuclear materials falling in the hands of terrorist groups and warned that “Just the smallest amount of plutonium, about the size of an apple, could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people.”<sup>23</sup> In May, addressing the class of 2010 at the West Point, Obama reminded the cadets that the top two national challenges at the moment were “countering violent extremism and insurgency” and “stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials.”<sup>24</sup>

A number of official statements and media reports have alerted the Pakistani government to all kind of threats to its nuclear assets. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, former President Musharraf had had cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear arms and missiles as one of the reasons for his dramatic policy shift, as a justification for his decision to assist the United States against the Taliban.<sup>25</sup> Security of Pakistani nuclear weapons was openly discussed in the US senate during Condoleeza Rice’s confirmation hearing as the Secretary of State in January 2005. Responding to a question from Senator John Kerry about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if there was a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Rice replied: “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”<sup>26</sup> On April 26, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told *Fox News* that there were concerns over what could happen to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal if the advancing Taliban supported by the al Qaeda toppled the government. Clinton said that such a scenario was unthinkable and that is why the US government was “pushing” the Pakistanis “hard” to adopt a “strategy to take their country back.”<sup>27</sup> On April 30, 2009, at a news conference to mark the 100 days of his presidency, Barack Obama expressed his confidence that “Pakistan Army will not allow its

nuclear arsenal to fall into the hands of Islamic militant groups like the Taliban or al-Qaeda.”<sup>28</sup> Mercifully, Pakistan’s strong counter-insurgency policy has yielded positive results, and Obama statement during the Washington nuclear security summit that “I feel confident about Pakistan’s security around its nuclear weapons programs,”<sup>29</sup> has been widely seen as a reassuring signal in Pakistan.

Over the years, Pakistan has systematically undertaken a number of widely publicised measures to ensure the world at large about the seriousness it attaches to the safety and security of its nuclear assets. As a member of the IAEA, Pakistan abides by the agency’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Code of Conduct on Transport of Radioactive Materials, and the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. Pakistan is party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC), international conventions against terrorism and the Global Nuclear Security Initiative. Pakistan has taken effective legal measures to strengthen control over its nuclear infrastructure, in the light of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in April 2004. The ‘Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004,’ controls any material, equipment and services that could contribute to the design, development, production, stockpiling, maintenance or use of nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems. It also covers re-export, trans-shipment and transit of all sensitive goods and technologies. The Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) at the foreign office processes all nuclear trade transactions.<sup>30</sup> The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) monitors the functioning of all its nuclear facilities.<sup>31</sup> Pakistan joined the US-sponsored Container Security Initiative (CSI) in March 2006, signing the CSI declaration of principles, and was selected as a model state by the US Customs and Border Protection agency for the Pilot Programme of the CSI. Pakistan supports the spirit of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and although it remains wary of the notion of interdicting the cargo of other states, it has attended three PSI exercises as an observer, since 2005.

A robust command and control system is in place to protect Pakistan's nuclear assets from diversion, theft and accidental misuse. Responsibility for nuclear weapons now clearly rests in the hands of the National Command Authority (NCA) and its constituent bodies. The Strategic Plans Division acts as its secretariat. This body is respected nationally and internationally for its professionalism and competence. The Security Division of SPD has requisite oversight over the materiel and men associated with the nuclear establishment. It provides physical security, organises counter intelligence and runs a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the ISI, forms the 'outer ring' of security in conjunction with the Security Division. An elaborate *three*-man rule is in place for employment authorisation. The nuclear weapons are not on hair trigger alerts. These are kept in disassembled state, during peacetime and can be assembled "very quickly" in times of war. The stockpiles are secured in underground facilities, where these can neither be seized nor destroyed. It has an indigenously developed Permissive Action Links (PALs) to block arming systems without proper codes and Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs) to block arming systems unless a prescribed environmental profile is achieved. Pakistan's nuclear sites were equipped with security cameras; biometric access control; bullet-proof vehicles, high security walls; and quick reaction forces. Under new SPD arrangements, specialist vehicles and tamper-proof containers are provided to all laboratories for the transits of materials, while military personnel escort each of the containers.<sup>32</sup> In February 2008, Ashley Tellis, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia that he was convinced about the safety and security of Pakistan's strategic assets, including "its nuclear devices, its delivery systems, and its stockpile of fissile materials." Tellis gave 'singular credit' to the Director General of SPD, retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai for putting in place safeguards to insulate "the strategic reserves against both external and international dangers."<sup>33</sup>

At the nuclear security summit held in Washington D.C. in April, this year, the Pakistani prime minister felt confident enough to offer two key nuclear resources to other countries: its atomic fuel

services under IAEA safeguards and its experience and expertise in nuclear safety. PM Yusuf Raza Gilani declared Pakistan's strong commitment to nuclear security, and added that his country "would continue to refine and modernize its technical and human resources and mechanisms on safety and security of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, facilities and assets." He stressed that "Pakistan has maintained the highest standards for non-proliferation," and added "When problems surfaced we addressed them definitively and kept the international community informed." He pointed out that a robust command and control system was in place, to protect "our strategic assets against theft, diversion, and accidental or unauthorized use."<sup>34</sup> The Pakistani proposals contained two more significant points i.e. the nations need to cooperate with each other in acquiring reliable nuclear security and that India needed to work with Pakistan for protecting South Asia against a nuclear disaster.<sup>35</sup>

For such kind of confidence to continue, Pakistan needs to build up on its credible nuclear credentials and be prepared to face new challenges, like nuclear terrorism. An incident taking place within the country could provide more ammunition to those, who propagate the theme of the vulnerability of Pakistani nuclear weapons. How can such a scenario materialise, despite foolproof measures? Dr Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter posit four approaches that a terrorist can use to exploit nuclear assets under legitimate government control to serve towards destructive ends around the globe:

- The theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon.
- The theft and purchase of fissile material; leading to the fabrication and detonation of fissile material, leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon – an improvised nuclear device (IND).
- Attack against and sabotage of nuclear facilities in particular nuclear power plants (NPPs), causing the release of large amounts of radioactivity.
- The unauthorized acquisition of radioactive material contributing to the fabrication and detonation of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) – a "dirty bomb" – or radiation emission device (RED).<sup>36</sup>

Incidents have happened in many advanced countries, indicating that wilful or inadvertent nuclear and radiological accidents can take place. Radiation leaks from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine,<sup>37</sup> then part of the USSR, and the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in the US,<sup>38</sup> are well known incidents, involving flawed designs and poor safety standards. In March 1995, terrorists belonging to the Aum Shinrikyo sect carried out five coordinated attacks using sarin gas to kill five people and injuring a thousand more in the Tokyo subway.<sup>39</sup> Far more ingenious methods have been used to spread materials harmful to human lives, including letter bombs. Theodore Kaczinski, also known as the Unabomber sent package and letter bombs through the US mail for seventeen years. His packages killed three people and injured twenty nine others. The letter bomb scare heightened after presence of anthrax was reported in suspicious letters after the September 2001 attacks. At least seven letters infected with deadly anthrax spores produced in biological laboratory were posted from Trenton, New Jersey. This deadly anthrax strain infected twenty two people, five of whom died. The anthrax attacks remain a mystery and no one has ever been apprehended. Many pranksters added to the general insecurity prevailing at that time by sending letters containing baby powder or powdered sweetener.<sup>40</sup> The anthrax alarm spread as far as Pakistan. A package suspected of containing anthrax was found in Islamabad in late October 2001. This was followed by reports from other parts of the country. Over a five month period from November 2001 to March 2002, a total of 230 samples from 194 sources were received by the National Institute of Health (NIH) in Islamabad for analysis, from foreign missions, foreign media, corporate sector organisations, banks, multi-nationals, institutions, universities, hospitals, government officials and private individuals. The tests led to the conclusion that all “incidents of suspected anthrax parcel/letter bombs in Pakistan were hoaxes.”<sup>41</sup>

A number of well documented incidents have taken place in India involving exposure from hazardous material. The leak at the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal caused hundreds of deaths and people living in the vicinity of the ill-fated factory continue to suffer

from its after effects even today.<sup>42</sup> The Madras Atomic Power Station located in Kalpakkam near the seafront in the state of Tamil Nadu was hit by the Asian tsunami in December 2004. The operating unit of the Power Station was shut down after tidal waves flooded its pump house. Officials insisted that the reactor was safe.<sup>43</sup> In another incident, 55 workers at the Kaiga nuclear power plant in Uttar Kanada district in the Indian state of Karnatka suffered radiation exposure after drinking contaminated water in November 2009.<sup>44</sup> After preliminary investigation the corporation's chairman and managing director S.K. Jain contended that "It was an act of mischief." Speaking to reporters in Mumbai, Anil Kakodkar, the chief of India's Atomic Energy Commission added that: "Somebody deliberately put tritiated water into drinking water cooler."<sup>45</sup> A nuclear scientist had died under mysterious circumstances at Kaiga in June 2009. Reports of security breaches at Indian nuclear facilities have been reported as late as November 2000, when Indian Police had seized 57 pounds of uranium and arrested two persons for illicit trafficking of radioactive material. Media reports datelined April 11 spoke of the discovery of at least nine powerful Cobalt-60 sources of nuclear radiation, which had fatally infected five people in a West Delhi industrial area, sending shock waves among the local population as well as nuclear establishment in India.<sup>46</sup> More shocks were in store on April 26, 2010, when 35 year old Rajendra Yadav, a worker in a salvage yard in New Delhi died of multiple organ failure. The deceased had been carrying radioactive material in a leather wallet, while scouting for a prospective buyer. The IAEA, called it "the most serious global instance of radiation exposure since 2006."<sup>47</sup> A month earlier, India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) had certified the dump and the surrounding area as safe. The Greenpeace international environmental agency came up with different conclusions. Its experts found radiation 5000 times in excess of the normal background levels at this privately owned salvage facility in New Delhi's congested Mayapuri district and its surrounding areas. Their tests showed six 'hotspots' between 20 and 50 metres from the scrap-yard into the streets.<sup>48</sup> The radioactive scrap was traced back to Delhi University's laboratories, whose operations were suspended for two weeks, pending investigations.<sup>49</sup>

Clearly, the carriage, storage and disposal of nuclear and radiological materials is a delicate operation open to unprovoked and manmade disasters causing immense harm to human life and the environment. Organisations championing the ecological and environmental causes have often protested against the movement of potentially hazardous material through public highways, railways and waterways e.g. in May 2002 Greenpeace reported the movement of The Pacific Pintail, an armed British-flagged nuclear transport ship through the Panama Canal to retrieve faulty plutonium MOX from Japan.<sup>50</sup> In a recent op-ed article published in the daily *Dawn*, a domestic commentator debated the issue of transporting nuclear waste to the dumping sites. She argued that the transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in special container casks from nuclear reactors and power plants was susceptible to accidents, like the collapse of a bridge or a train derailment resulting in the spillage of highly radioactive material causing the death of dozens of people in the vicinity of the accident site. She raised issues like observance of international safety regulations requiring the container casks to be made of 5 inches thick steel and lead alloy and the nuclear fuel being embedded in clay like material penetrable only by fire during movement. She also wanted to know if the people for their own safety were aware of the nuclear waste sites and the routes leading upto them.<sup>51</sup> Some of these answers are available in an elaborate article on preventing nuclear terrorism in Pakistan authored by Abdul Mannan, an official of the PNRA.<sup>52</sup> Mannan posits that given the multilayered security around NPP's and other nuclear facilities, there is little likelihood of nuclear facilities being targeted by terrorists. Instead such attacks could take place only, where security is less stringent like industrial radiography sources in transit.<sup>53</sup> To study Pakistan's vulnerability to nuclear terrorism Mannan constructed two hypothetical case studies of hybrid terrorist attacks, involving rocket attacks and petrol fires on a consignment of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and high activity radiological material, while in transit. Although he discusses both cases in detail giving out computer generated radiological fallouts and immediate and long term human losses, he rules out the possibility of the first case materialising, since SNF in Pakistan is stored at the site is not moved out. The main source of concern is the risks attendant in moving high activity radioactive source within Pakistan.<sup>54</sup> To

prevent a radioactive source from being waylaid, the PNRA applies stringent measures for administrative and engineering controls over all radioactive sources from cradle to grave. To obviate theft or loss of radioactive sources, periodic physical verifications and regulatory inspections are carried out.<sup>55</sup> PNRA has an elaborate database of all sources and Pakistan has so far maintained an impeccable record in safekeeping of all nuclear and radiological material. To test the responses of all concerned “regular tabletop exercises are held with Pakistan Customs, law enforcement agencies, and Rescue 112. Officers from various organisations are being regularly sent abroad to learn nuclear and radiological safety. They are in turn preparing a crop of safety experts at institutions like Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS).<sup>56</sup> PNRA has also published detailed “Regulations on Management of a Nuclear and Radiological Emergency.” The objective of these regulations is to:

Establish the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Their implementation is intended to minimise the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency.<sup>57</sup>

These regulations are applicable to facilities like:

Land based nuclear reactors; facilities for the mining and fuel processing of radioactive ore; facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities; facilities for the management of radioactive waste; the transport of radioactive material; sources of radiation used in industrial, agricultural, medical, research and teaching applications; facilities using radiation and radioactive material; and satellites and radio thermal generators using radiation sources or reactors.<sup>58</sup>

These regulations also cover “emergencies arising from radiation sources of an untraceable origin and any other source or practice” as specified by PNRA.

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), located in the Prime Minister's Secretariat in Islamabad, is responsible for handling all kinds of natural and man-made emergencies. Their technical wing has prepared detailed instructions on managing and combating industrial disasters, disasters at port terminals and disasters emanating from chem bio attacks.<sup>59</sup> The NDMA is currently in the process of developing a Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan (NREP) in consultation with concerned technical departments. In their nuclear disaster management calculus, they include two NBCW platoons of the Pakistan Army and the technical expertise of the Defence Science & Technology Organisation (DESTO) to decontaminate zones rendered toxic, due to nuclear or radiological exposure.<sup>60</sup>

Indubitably, nuclear terrorism is a major threat to the country's security and no stone should be left unturned to prepare for it, utilising all available national resources. A comprehensive policy covering all possible threats should be prepared as part of the National Security Strategy at the level of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). In order to conserve limited resources, judicious allotment of assets should be made to ward off a possible attack of nuclear terrorism. A number of organisations civil and military and intelligence agencies are vested with the responsibility of combating terrorism in its various forms and manifestations. Similarly, a number of organisations have been given the mandate to conduct the rescue, relief and reconstruction operations. In a national emergency, the services of the armed forces and international disaster management agencies are also requisitioned. A high powered central agency should be identified to coordinate the multifarious national and international efforts transcending departmental jurisdictions of the ministries of defence, interior, foreign affairs, information and broadcasting, communication, health, agriculture, water and power, oil & gas, ports & shipping etc. The Civil Defence Department, the National Volunteer Movement, the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC),<sup>61</sup> all law enforcement agencies (LEA's) like the federal and provincial police forces, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), the Frontier Constabulary (FC), and the National Highway and Motorway Police (NHMP), the Railway Police, the

Citizen Police Liaison Committees (CPLC's), the Civil Armed Forces (CAF), the Airport Security Force (ASF), civilian administration, and emergency and health services should be made part of the effort. Command post exercises and physical drills should be carried out involving all agencies earmarked for such contingencies. Nuclear and radiological emergencies should be made part of the curriculum of all military and civil institutions teaching public safety and security. A national nuclear emergency exercise should be conducted once every five years to identify weak areas.

An imaginative public awareness campaign through the print and electronic media would go a long way in mitigating a nuclear or radiological disaster. The public preparedness for such eventualities should be enhanced through civil defence exercises. Last but not least, funds should be allocated for constructing NBC shelters, and for purchasing equipment like Geiger counters, NBC suits for first responders, and medicines required to handle the casualties suffering from nuclear and radiological exposure.

### **Author**

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### **Notes**

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# STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION

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## **Abstract**

Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004, revised in 2009, was aimed at transforming it from a 'brown water' coastal defense force to a formidable 'blue water' navy. Technically, Indian Navy would have the capability to operate 200 nautical miles from its seashore into the deep sea for extended durations, whereas politically, it would be a long-range extension of the state's presence as a power projection. Following the naval strategy of U.S Admiral Mahan, India desires the Indian Ocean to become 'India Ocean' and the way U.S entered the club of global powers in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, India does the same in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Introduction**

*“There is every indication that the need to develop the Indian Navy into a credible maritime force, capable of safeguarding the country's interests is now well recognized. As the Indian Navy sails through the opening decade of the new millennium, it does so as a professional, focused, and committed force, deeply conscious of its ever increasing responsibilities.”<sup>1</sup>*

The first ever-fighting ship arrived Indian coastline near Surat, Gujarat, on September 5, 1612.<sup>2</sup> Sequel to this, there took place an encounter between the Portuguese and the British East India Company<sup>3</sup> on November 28-29, 1612. In the naval history, this encounter is famous with the name of the, “Battle of Swally,”<sup>4</sup> as it was fought in the village of Suvali (Swally). This small encounter brought the Portuguese's hold over trade and business of the India to an end and enabled the British East India Company to enhance its role over the Indian economy. In order to consolidate its gain, East India Company established a small naval base at Surat. This navel setup was named as the “The Honourable East India Company's

Marine.” In the subsequent years, this marine force indeed mapped the coastlines of India, Persia, and even Arabia.

With the shift of British, trade base in Mumbai (Bombay), this force renamed as the “Bombay Marine” in 1689.<sup>5</sup> In 1830, this navel setup became Her Majesty’s Indian Navy and later ‘Her Majesty’s Indian Marine’ and finally in 1892, received the title of “the Royal Indian Marine.” With the sufficient expansion in its vessels and war ships, the ‘the Royal Indian Marine’ became “the Royal Indian Navy” (RIN) in 1934<sup>6</sup>. Although this Royal Marine force had the recruitment of locals in the lower ranks from the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, however, the first ever Indian Sub-Lieutenant D.N Mukherji<sup>7</sup> commissioned in the Royal Indian Marine as an engineer officer in 1928. After the independence and partition of India, the navel setup was split between India and Pakistan, with the later getting only a negligible portion,<sup>8</sup> whereas bulk remained with the former as the successor state of the British India. India renamed its navel force as the Indian Navy, and its naval vessels re-designated as Indian Naval Ships (INS) in 1950.

### **Organizational Structure of Indian Navy**

The current Indian Navel Headquarters is located at New Delhi having three exclusive naval commands; Eastern, Western and Southern, and a joint command (Andaman and Nicobar). The Western Naval Command is considered as, “the sword arm of the Indian Navy and naval operations<sup>9</sup>.” With its Headquarters at Mumbai, this naval command will have a decisive role in any future naval operation. Since its operational role is to provide naval defence in the sensitive area of Arabian Sea, therefore, the command has been sufficiently equipped with the “submarine pens, a carrier dock and main dockyards.” The Eastern Naval Command with its Headquarters at Visakhapatnam (Vizag) is also an operational command. Its primary responsibility is to safeguard against any aggression on the eastern front and provide security to Indian territories, ports, harbours, oil platforms and other maritime assets & resources in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The third naval command; the Southern Naval Command, is responsible for the training of Indian Navy. Its headquarters is in Cochin (Kochi). It

is equipped with; “professional naval establishments, a naval air station, and a ship repair yard.”<sup>9</sup> The testing of the Naval version of surface to air missile; Trishul is carried out under this command.

The fourth command, with its Headquarters at Port Blair, the Andaman, and Nicobar Command is primarily a tri-services unified command, rotated among all three services. The 750-km long Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago are located at about 1200 km from the Indian mainland, merely 90 miles from Indonesia and 22 miles from Myanmar. Its operational role is to “monitor & counter military and terrorist activities in the Bay of Bengal and the adjoining waters.”<sup>10</sup> Besides, the command also acts as a counter-weight to China-Myanmar naval cooperation. Indeed, India envisages a Chinese surveillance posts in the Coco islands of the Myanmar, which is just 22 miles off the northern tip of the Andaman Island. Moreover, “the town of One Pagoda Point, located near the mouth of the Irrawaddy in Myanmar, is rapidly emerging as the main logistic point for the Chinese.”<sup>11</sup> Therefore, India has started taking all essential counter-measures against any future Chinese expansion in its neighbourhood. India is in the process of the massive build-up of its joint military capabilities under this command. Inferring Sino-Myanmar collaboration, India is undertaking surveillance over a vast sea approaches and surrounding land borders with Myanmar.

### **Establishment of the Far Eastern Naval Command**

As planned in 1995, India would be able to establish an exclusive new naval command in this region by 2012, with the name of, “The Far Eastern Naval command.”<sup>12</sup> The command is primarily part of Indian concept of creating the blue water navy. At the strategic level, this command would secure the Indian strategic interests in the Southeast Asian region<sup>13</sup>. Indeed, the decision to establish this command was taken in 1995, in a secret meeting between the defence officials of India and United States, having the consent of their respective heads of the states. Considering the rising economic and military power of China as a joint threat, United States has persuaded India to patrol the Malacca Strait in the pretext of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).<sup>14</sup> This command would

also be mandated to help in the prevention of piracy, smuggling, and drug and gun trafficking and illegal immigration through the Malacca Strait. Upon its completion, the command will have “a chain of small anchor stations and three main bases.”<sup>15</sup> This command indeed is being established, keeping in view the cold war model of former Soviet Union and United States. The former had a naval base in the Black Sea, currently leased out to Russia by Ukraine, through an agreement for a period of twenty-five years.<sup>16</sup> It was established to offset the US naval base in the Hawaii. Since the US would be a major direct and indirect beneficiary of this new naval Indian command, therefore, it has sufficiently funded India for its development. Besides United States, Russia has also assisted India in the establishment of this command. It would act as a vital link between its various stations. The base will have “state of art naval electronic warfare system”<sup>17</sup>, extending up to the ASEAN countries.

### **The Strategic Vision of Indian Navy**

With a coastline of 7516.6 kilometres (km), and over 3 million square km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),<sup>18</sup> India considers itself as a maritime power to be reckoned with. It views the sea power as an essential component for its survival and prosperity. It shares its maritime boundaries with seven Indian Ocean Region’s littoral states. It has island territories on both seaboards. Stretching some 450 miles from north to south, Andaman and Nicobar islands are located 700 miles east of Indian mainland. Indian overseas trade is over 513.5 million tonnes, whereas merchant marine is approximately 9 million tons Gross Register Tonnage (GRT); equal to 700 ships. Indian oil consumption, currently around 3 million barrel per day is likely to reach 5.3 million barrel per day in 2025. Most of its oil imports take place from the Middle Eastern region or Africa through sea route. Besides transportation, most of the weapons and equipments raw material needed for the Indian industrial development and other imports and export of manufactured goods, take place through sea. In order to safeguard these and many other Indian maritime interests, Indian Navy is assigned to protect Indian Sea lanes of communication during peace and war.

## **Formulation of Indian Maritime Doctrine**

After years of consultations, experiments and extensive naval exercises, Indian Maritime Doctrine was announced in April-2004. However, the year-2006 'Navy Day' is considered to be as the day once Indian Navy actually started, "transforming itself from a 'brown water' coastal defense force to a formidable 'blue water' fleet."<sup>19</sup> Blue water navy has indeed two connotations: a technical and a political. Its technical connotation is; a naval force having the capability to operate 200 nautical miles (320 km) from its seashore into the deep sea for extended durations. However, politically it is the long-range extension of the state's presence, as in the wording of the former Indian Naval Chief; Admiral Jayant Nadkarni; legitimate use...of a Blue Water navy is power projection which is necessary for a power like India.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, India started expanding its naval fleet in late 1980s and early 1990s after conceiving the concept of blue water navy. However, "The first Indian attempt at an integrated command system was with the Nilgiri (Leander)-class frigates in the late 1970s. These were fitted with a helicopter anti-submarine system called DS22 that integrated radar, sonar, and target designation. Some parts of this were also installed in the carrier INS Viraat, which was also fitted with the British CAAIS system and included the hard-wire British Versatile Console System (VCS) for ship's data transfer."<sup>21</sup>

In fact, the evolutionary process of Indian naval doctrine has been going on since 1980s. However in 1998, it issued, "The Maritime Dimension-A Naval Vision,"<sup>22</sup> and later in April 2004, a formal Indian Maritime Doctrine of 148 pages. The doctrine clearly lies down the future strategic vision of the Indian Navy with the subtitle as; The Maritime Dimension-A Naval Vision.<sup>23</sup> Through the Vision Statement, Indian Navy gave a Roadmap to Transformation in October 2006. In 2007, with the mission 'Freedom to Use the Seas,'<sup>24</sup> Indian Maritime Military Strategy (IMMS) was issued. Indian political governments have been vigorously pushing the maritime vision for the ultimate status of a global naval power.

## Strategic Concept of Doctrine

Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 is primarily based on strategic concept of Admiral Mahan of US Navy. Admiral Mahan presented a naval doctrine to the United States President Roosevelt for the domination of oceans, especially the Pacific Ocean to gain the status of a major power towards the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century. Admiral Mahan had a vision that domination of Pacific would give US an edge over the other states geopolitically as well as geo-economically. According to Mahan, “the convergence there of so many ships...will constitute a centre of commerce, inter-oceanic encounters between states. It was one whose approaches will be watched jealously, and whose relations to the other centres of the Pacific by the (maritime) lines joining it to them must be examined carefully.”<sup>25</sup> What Admiral Mahan had visualized for U.S Navy in the Pacific towards the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, Indian Navy desires to achieve through the domination of Indian Ocean and surrounding seawaters by first quarter of 21<sup>st</sup> century. India in fact desires the Indian Ocean to become ‘India Ocean’ and the way U.S entered the club of global powers in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; India does the same in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Salient features of the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 include; controlling the choke points, significant islands, and trade routes in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Bengal. The doctrine further lays down limits of the vision for the Indian Navy for the first quarter of 21<sup>st</sup> century as to; “look at the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest.”<sup>26</sup> The doctrine also highlighted the Indian Navy as the “three-dimensional blue water force”<sup>27</sup>, having the potential to undertake significant assignments and roles “on the surface, underwater, and in the air.”<sup>28</sup> Besides establishing powerful forces for deterrence and preserving orders at the sea during the peacetime, Indian navy will have to undertake the naval diplomatic assignments for the promotion of its cause. Operationally, there are three peculiarities of Indian Naval Doctrine; the conduct of joint operations, information warfare and littoral warfare<sup>29</sup>. However, the proactive role of the Indian Navy would be the projection of its power beyond the limits of Indian shores. It has to counter the

“distant emerging threats and protect extended ‘Sea Lines of Communication’ SLOC through and from the Indian Ocean.”<sup>30</sup>

Owing to its strategic significance, the Indian Ocean remained the most dominant aspect of the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 and Indian Navy Vision Statement- 2006. Even Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh said that, “our strategic footprint covers...to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. Awareness of this reality should inform and animate our strategic thinking and defence planning.”<sup>31</sup> The Vision Statement-2006 accentuated on the role of Indian Navy for safeguarding its maritime interests on the high seas while projecting its combat power “across and around the Indian Ocean littoral”<sup>32</sup>. This statement clearly indicates the strong Indian desire of making its navy as the “Oceanic ranging navy.”<sup>33</sup> Securing of extended SLOCs and domination of Indian Ocean and its adjoining high seas, are indeed part of India’s joining the club of major naval powers of the globe.

There are two interconnected motives, which are acting as the catalyst for all this. The first, being the political and states that; by attaining the status of the major naval power through blue water navy, India will have a say in the global politics, as a significant stakeholder. The second objective is the securing of its economic interests by safeguarding the SLOCs. In order to sustain its rapidly developing economy and industrial enhancement, India needs to import energy resources from the Gulf and African countries. Development and expansion of its naval power will enable it to ensure uninterrupted flow of energy resources and other supplies related to economic development. In the wording of Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the former Indian Naval Chief, “we are not only looking at countering threats but to protect the country’s economic and energy interests. This task has extended our area of operations. This might necessitate our operating in distant waters.”<sup>34</sup> In order to reinforce this military vision, the former Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, said in June 2007, that, “within the larger maritime canvas, it is our nation’s military maritime power - as embodied by the Indian Navy...that is the enabling instrument that allows all the other components of maritime power to be exercised. These ‘enabling’ functions provide centrality to the Indian Navy

within the country's overall maritime strategy and allow it to act as a versatile and effective instrument of our foreign policy."<sup>35</sup>

As per the ambitious Indian Maritime Doctrine, its navy has the primary task of controlling and protecting these SLOCs. Moreover, operationally, it has to operate against the navies of Pakistan and China, without having a direct sea border with the later. The doctrine however, "calls for a stronger deterrent capability against foreign intervention by non-littoral navies, not limited to China only."<sup>36</sup> This strategic reach indeed call for procurement of more sophisticated diesel and nuclear capable submarines, establishing aircraft carrier and developing new cruise missiles. The Indian Navy operates on a wide area extending from the Arabian Sea through Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal. A number of sea lines of communication (SLOC) and strategically significant chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and the Malacca Straits are located in these waters. The importance of these waters can be imagined from the fact that over 90 percent foreign Indian trade and over 60 percent global seaborne trade takes place through them. There are even more chances that the global energy trade would increase in the coming years through these trade routes, thus further enhancing the significance of the Indian Navy.

In August 2009, before his retirement, the former Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta made several changes in the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004. The baseline fixed for the future development of Indian Navy in the modified doctrine is, "sustaining the growth of the Navy with the due attention to indigenisation."<sup>37</sup> Through major changes, Indian Navy has incorporated the evolving nature of the modern warfare into its maritime doctrine. Stratagem has been worked-out to tackle with the ongoing global issues like terrorism, piracy, and coastal security.<sup>38</sup> It is visualized that the Mumbai attack of November 26, 2008, has played a major role in this new change. Awareness and consciousness among the people and Government functionaries have been emphasized in the doctrine.

## **Naval Inventory and Future Developmental Plans**

Among the top five global military powers, overall Indian military power is classified number three<sup>39</sup>; following the China and United States. North Korea and Russian Federation in the fourth and fifth position respectively. Within these first five militaries, India maintains world's second largest Army, fourth largest Air force and fourth largest Navy<sup>40</sup>. At the present, the active military strength of India is 1,325,000<sup>41</sup>. This includes; 1,129,900 persons of Indian Army, 58,350 persons of Indian Navy<sup>42</sup> and 127,200 Indian Air Force and 9550 Indian Coast Guard<sup>43</sup> personnel. The reservists<sup>44</sup> are 1,155,000, with Army 960,000 Navy 55,000, Air Force 140,000. Indian Paramilitary Military forces have 1,300,586 personnel with a reserve of 987,821<sup>45</sup>. Indian Navy has four principal commands and two sub commands; the naval aviation and submarine. It has nine naval bases and two fleets<sup>46</sup>.

Presently, Indian Navy has 131 warships.<sup>47</sup> Out of this inventory, forty-nine are the major combatants and sixteen submarines.<sup>48</sup> Indian Navy is in the process of construction of 33 warships and 6 scorpene submarines at the Indian Naval Yard. Its three Talwar-class follow-on frigates and an aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov; renamed as INS Vikramaditya are being constructed /refurbished in Russia.<sup>49</sup> Indian Navy is also planning to procure a new fleet tanker. The current Indian submarines include; two Vela (FSU Foxtrot) each with 10 single 533mm TT (6 forward, 4 aft). Four Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) each with 1 single 533mm TT<sup>50</sup>. There are four Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) each with 6 single 533mm TT (1 undergoing phased refit of SS-N-27). Besides, there are six Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with six single 533mm TT each with SS-N-27 Club-S tactical SSM. Apart from the submarines, currently in practice, Indian Navy has 47 principal surface combatants.<sup>51</sup> These include one carrier; Viraat (UK Hermes) being refitted.<sup>52</sup> There are eight DDG Destroyers, which include: Three Delhi; each with 4 quad (16 eff.) each with SS-N-25 Switchblade tactical SSM, 2 single with 24 SA-N-7 SAM, 5 x1 533mm ASTT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity either 2 Sea King MK42A ASW hel or 2 ALH utl hel). Five Rajput (FSU Kashin) each with 2 twin (4eff.) PJ-10 BrahMos ASCM (one ship fitted; phased upgrades planned for rest of class), 2 Twin (4 eff)

each with SSN-2C Styx tactical SSM, 2 (4 eff) each with 16 SA-N-1 Goa SAM, 5x1 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 (24eff), 1 76mm gun, (capacity either 1 Ka-25 Hormone/KA-28 hel)<sup>53</sup>.

Indian Navy has fourteen Frigates which mainly include eleven FFG and one FF1- Krishna (UK Leander), used as the training frigate. The FFG includes: three Brahmaputra each with 4 quad (16 eff.) each with SSN- 25 Switchblade tactical SSM, 20 SA-N-4 Gecko SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 1 76mm gun, (capacity either 2 HAL Chetak (SA-316B) Alouette III SA-316 utl/ Sea King MK42 ASW hel or 2 Sea King MK42 ASW hel) (2nd of class awaiting full weapons fit).<sup>54</sup> Three Godavari; each with 2 triple 24mm ASTT (6 eff.), 4 single each with SS-N-2D Styx tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 Gecko SAM, (capacity either 2 Sea King MK42 ASW hel or 2 HAL Chetak (SA-316B) Alouette III SA-316 utl/Sea King MK42 ASW hel). There are three FFG called as Talwar I each with SS-N-27 Club tactical SSM, 6 single with SA-N-7 Gadfly SAM, 2 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 (24 eff.), 2 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS (4 eff.), 1 100mm gun, (capacity either 1 KA-31 Helix B AEW hel/KA-28 ASW hel or 1 ALH utl hel). It has two Shivalik each with SS-N-27 Club tactical SSM, 6 single with SA-N-7 Gadfly SAM, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42-B ASW hel) (3rd vessel expected ISD '10). Besides, Indian Navy has twenty-four Corvettes and forty-nine Patrols and Coastal Combatants' including mine countermeasures (MSO 10 Pondicherry-(FSU Natya) and seventeen amphibious flotillas<sup>55</sup>. It has forty-seven vessels to provide logistic support<sup>56</sup>.

**Commission of INS Shivalik.** On April 29, 2010, the commissioning ceremony of INS Shivalik took place.<sup>57</sup> This is the first ever stealth ship launched by Indian Defence Minister AK Antony. Over all 12 vessels of this project, called "Project 17 Shivalik Class Frigate"<sup>58</sup> will be forming part of the Indian Naval fleet with two joining in the near future. The salient feature of the ship is that the information on a target can be transferred to it from other naval vessels and can be incorporated into its own system, "Consequently, sonar and sensors from other vessels can guide Shivalik to its target, a technique that significantly extends the ship's range".<sup>59</sup> The technological aspects of the ship are a mix of US,

Russia, UK and Israel. This multi-role frigate has 6200 tonnes weight with 90 percent reduced radar signature.<sup>60</sup> India has to pay 650 million dollars for each ship.<sup>61</sup> The Indian aircraft carrier *Vickramaditya* will be fully refurbished by 2012 and some additional MiG-29K and MiG-30MKI are being purchased for this carrier.<sup>62</sup>

Out of the three *Talwar*-class frigates being constructed in Russian *Yantar* Naval shipyard, the first one; named as the 'Teg' was floated into the sea in November 2009.<sup>63</sup> Indo-Russia signed this deal of \$1.6 billion in July 2006.<sup>64</sup> By 23 June 2010, the second frigate named; *INS Tarkash* was also launched in a joint ceremony attended by Russian and Indian high-ranking officials at *Yantar* shipyard in *Kaliningrad*. This frigate will be equipped with eight *BrahMos* supersonic cruise missiles, a 100 mm gun, two *Kashtan* air-defense gun/missile systems, two twin 533mm torpedo launchers, and an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter when she enters service in 2011.<sup>65</sup> The third frigate; *Trikand*, will enter into service by 2012. It will be equipped alike.

**An Overview of Indian Naval Aviation.** With over 7,000 Naval Aviation personnel<sup>66</sup>, it has adequate combat naval aviation power to support its marine operations.<sup>67</sup> Aviation strength includes; FGA 1 squadron (sqn) with *Sea Harrier FRS MK51* (*Sea Harrier FRS MKI*); *T-60*. ASW 5 sqn with; *Ka-31 Helix B*; *Ka-25 Hormone*; 18 *Ka-28* (*Ka-27PL*) *Helix A*; *Sea King MK42A/Sea King MK42B*; *HAL Chetak* (*SA-316B*) *Alouette III*. MR 2 sqn with *Il-38 May*; *Tu-142M Bear F*; *Do-228-101*; *BN-2 Islander*. SAR 1 sqn with *Sea King MK42C*; *HAL Chetak* (*SA-316B*) *Alouette III* (several in SAR role). Transport 1 sqn with *HAL-784M* (*HS-748M*); 1 sqn with *UH-3H Sea King* (spt/utl role). Comms 1 sqn with *Do-228*. Trg 2 sqn with *HJT-16 MKI Kiran*; *HJT-16 MKII Kiran II*; *HPT-32 Deepak*<sup>68</sup>. In order to replace the *Chetaks* helicopters from the inventory of Indian Navy and Coast Guard, recently India is approaching world's leading firms like; *Eurocopter* of France, *Augusta Westland* of Italy, *Kamov* of Russia and *Bell Helicopter* of US for the purchase of fifty utility helicopters. Besides undertaking the anti-piracy and anti terrorism role, this new addition of the helicopters would be capable of conducting anti-submarine

operations with the torpedoes and depth charges. These helicopters will have the potential of electronic intelligence gathering and the disaster relief and rescue operation.<sup>69</sup>

## **INDUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE SUBMARINES**

### **Development of Advanced Technology Vessel**

The first indigenously built nuclear submarine “Advanced Technology Vessel” (ATV) named as Indian Naval Ship (INS) Arihant was put through the sea trial in July 2009. Arihant (meaning destroyer of enemies) is 367 feet long. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), private contractor Larsen and Toubro, and the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam are undertaking the construction project jointly. India is planning to add 5-6 nuclear capable ATV submarines in its naval fleet for undertaking strategic nuclear role. These vessels would be equipped with 12 Sagarika Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) with a range of around 700 km.

Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, however, said that, “We do not have any aggressive designs and that we seek an external environment in our region and beyond that is conducive to our peaceful development and the protection of our value systems.” Two more submarines of the same class are being built and will be inducted for trials in 2011 and 2012 respectively. India has started thinking on the strategic level. Its Defense Ministry has “took over the Hindustan Shipyard Limited in the port city of Vishakhapatnam to augment its submarine production program. The traditional Indian partner of the cold war Russian Federation has whole-heartedly helped India in the enlargement of its naval armada, with a global vision.

In March 2010, during the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin’s visit to India, Russia offered India, defence cooperation in all fields including the development of Indian Navy. Russian Premier also gave India a political guidance that would enable it to be realized at the global level. The visit further boosted the Indo-Russia cooperation in the nuclear field. Russian Federation is deeply keen

to boost this relationship for an indefinite period. In the field of naval development, Indian ambitions are indeed global. It intends operating at the international waters like the navies of United States, Russia, China, and United Kingdom. In order to be recognizing, now Indian Navy is capable of operating on the principle of submarine-based minimum nuclear deterrent (MND).

### **Induction of Akula-II Submarines in India Navy**

India has the experience of leasing the Soviet Submarine Project 670 Skat (NATO name Charlie-I) from 1988 to 1991. Since the previous leasing experience has been a success, therefore India has decided to lease another class of Russian nuclear-submarine, the Project 971 Shchuka-B (NATO name AKula-II). Approximately 300 Indian marines have undergone training of the submarine at a special facility in Sosnovy Bor, near St. Petersburg, Russia. During the trial period, the submarine met an accident, causing death of twenty personnel even. However, after necessary repair, it is being handed over to the Indian Navy in a near future.

The Akula series submarines known as the Project 971 Shchuka (meaning pike or -peak) is a “nuclear-powered attack submarine.” The first of its kind was built and deployed by former Soviet Union in 1986. This series has further three sub-classes: original ‘Akula-I’. This sub-class of the submarine remained dominant during 1980s. Former Soviet Union built seven submarines of this class from 1982 to 1986. Five submarines of the second sub-class, the ‘Improved Akula’ were built by former Soviet Union from 1986 to 1990. The two submarines of third sub-class, the ‘Akula-II’ were built from 1993 onwards by Russia. This is much-improved version of the submarine. The Russians, however, call all of the submarines Schuka-B, regardless of modifications.

With the capability to strike against hostile ships and coastal installations, Russia had deployed most of its Akula class submarines in the Pacific region, as an “aggressive breed of fresh water pike.” The average length of the Akula submarines is 110 meters. The salient feature of this submarine is that, it has double-hulled with sufficient distance between its outer and inner hull,

primarily for the protection of the later. As compared to the single hull craft, the double hull submarines increase its reserves buoyancy approximately three times. Technically, this allows more freedom in the design of the exterior hull shape, resulting in a very hydrodynamic submarine compared to western counterparts at the time.

The “Amur Shipbuilding Plant Joint Stock Company at Komsomlsk-on-Amur at the Severodvinsk shipbuilding Yard” has built this class of the submarines. These submarines can launch both anti-submarine and anti-surface torpedoes. While the Snoop Pair or the Snoop Half, acts as the surface search radar for the target acquisition, the MGK 540 sonar system, provides automatic target detection. With the seven bladed fixed pitch propellers, the propulsion system provides “a maximum submerged speed of 33 knots and a surface speed of 10 knots.” Besides, there is a 370 KW reserve propeller system, powered by two motors, which provides it a speed of 3 to 4 knots. Akula submarine can dive up to a depth of 600 meters. It can carry the supplies for itself as well as the people on board that can sustain them for over 100 days. Its operational crews comprises of seventy three members.”

Submarines of this series have been armed with “four 533 mm torpedo tubes which can use Type 53 torpedoes or the SS-N-15 Starfish missile, and four 650 mm torpedo tubes which can use Type-65 torpedoes or the SS-N-16 Stallion missile. These torpedo tubes are arranged in two rows of four tubes each.” Besides, the Akula-II and Improved Akula submarines are fitted with an “additional six 533 mm torpedo tubes mounted externally. The external tubes are mounted outside the pressure hull in one row, above the 'Normal' Torpedo tubes, and can only be reloaded in port or with the assistance of a submarine tender. The 650 mm tubes can be fitted with liners to use the 533 mm weaponry. The submarine is also able to use its torpedo tubes to deploy mines.”

As compared to Akula-I, the Akula II submarine is approximately 230 tons larger in displacement and 2.5m greater in LOA. The space so increased is being used to reduce the active noise. “The MGK-501 Skat sonar system on Akula-I is replaced to a

new MGK-540 Skat-3 sonar system.” By doing so, it attained the equivalence of the same class of American AN/BQQ-5/6. It is worth mentioning that the K-157 Vepr has attained the status of the first Soviet submarine that was quieter than the latest US attack submarines of that time, which was the Improved Los Angeles class (SSN 751 and later). Indeed, the advancements made by Soviet for quieting the sound of submarines to a considerable level had caused uneasiness in NATO and US. This achievement of the quieter and more accurate propellers was attained through the Japanese firm Toshiba, which sold to Soviet Union the sophisticated nine-axis milling equipment along with the computers control system in 1983-84. Soviet Union later acquired the services of Norwegian firm Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik for its further refinement.

Apart from the centralized weapon system, this version of the submarine has better command and control with high degree of automation, which reduces the strength of the crews. The project has the similarity with the Project 705 Alfa SSN. The bulk production of the Akula series submarines got slow down after the disintegration of former Soviet Union in 1991. The first Akula-II submarine; Gepard (Cheetah) was commissioned in November 1995, and launched in 1999. The manufacturing of the second Akula-II; Nepra started in 1993 and put to trial in October 2008. It will be commissioned as Indian Naval Ship (INS) Chakra during the current year (2010). It is “slightly smaller and streamlined towed array dispenser than the other submarines of the class.” As compared to other submarines, this would have longer sail. This class is equipped with 28 nuclear capable cruise missiles, which can engage target up to 3000 kilometres. Therefore, it would cause a major naval imbalance in the region. Already Indian Navy is many times bigger than the Pakistani Navy.

After necessary repair, Akula-II submarine was put through the sea trial again and has successfully completed that in the presence of the Indian submariners, who were on board. Upon commissioning, the submarine may not be carrying the nuclear weapons out rightly, but certainly has the capability to do that, as and when required. It would however carry anti ship and land attack Klub missiles besides torpedoes. Apart from using this submarine

as the training platform for India's indigenous nuclear submarine fleet, it would help in the refinement of the nuclear operational concepts. "Akula-II nuclear attack submarine is recognized as a state-of-the-art and top of the line weapon system amongst contemporary submarines. Its induction into the Indian Navy will significantly enhance India's reach and offensive capability and may be used as the platform for the second strike in the event of a nuclear attack. Besides its own indigenous built nuclear submarine; Arihant, induction of this Russian version Akula-II submarine would significantly tilt the balance of power in India's favour. Akula; the hunter-killer submarine is one of the quietest in the world today.

### **Nuclear Capable Missile**

The Shaurya missile developed by India has the capability to carry the nuclear warhead. Indian submarines can fire it. Primarily, it is a canister-launched, solid-fuelled hypersonic surface-to-surface tactical weapon. Its range is 700-1900 km and can be pre-programmed to make it difficult for the anti-missile system to intercept it. "Using conventional fuel-air explosive warheads, the missile can cause devastation similar to that of a mini-nuke." It has been optimized for the INS Arihant submarine. Besides, Indian Navy is reinforcing its air power through the induction of MiG-29K (also called Black Panther) maritime fighter planes. These twin-engine aircraft are capable of covering, "a tactical radius of around 2,000 kilometres and fitted with beyond-visual-range missiles, will provide potent air cover to the naval fleet in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The aircraft is also capable of air-to-air refuelling, which enhances the time on task." India has significantly improved its maritime strike capabilities of its naval weapons all over the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean, through a combination of modern naval vessels and air power achieved through; MiG-29Ks and Sea Harriers, and the Jaguars and Sukhoi SU-30MKI fighters of the Indian Air Force. Besides, India manages the existing maritime surveillance through aircrafts like; types IL-38, TU-142, and the maritime Dornier-228. India is also launching a naval satellite, which will further improve its existing surveillance and net-centric communications in the Indian Ocean region between the navy's ships, submarines, and aircraft.

Indeed, the Indian naval inventory is a mix of the foreign and the domestic weapons system. The cruise missile systems like; the Klub (SS-N-27) is part of the foreign weapons system. Moreover, it has indigenous cruise missile systems like; Sagarika, Lakshya and Lakshya PTA. Development of the Sagarika (Oceanic) started in 1994, as the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Its range is from 300-1000 km. Yakhont Anti Ship Missile system (BrahMos) is yet another system being completed by NPO and DRDO. “The BrahMos has been tailored to Indian needs and uses a large proportion of Indian designed components and technology, for its fire control systems, Transporter erector launches, to its onboard naval attack system.”<sup>70</sup>

### **Strategic Implications of Indian Naval Expansion**

The Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 and its further up-dating in 2009, has mandated Indian Navy to control all the choke points, significant islands, and trade routes in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Bengal. The vision as set forth for the Indian Navy by 2025 is to; “look at the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest.” The doctrine also highlighted the Indian Navy as the ‘three-dimensional blue water force’, having the potential to operate at the sea surface, under-water and in the air. Indeed, “India is quietly raising a force with significant blue-water capability, including medium-size aircraft carriers, multi-role destroyers, and frigates, conventional and nuclear attack submarines and amphibious ships, which can facilitate over-the-horizon assaults. It even has a host of modern corvettes that could be classified as frigates in many modest-sized navies.”<sup>71</sup> As analysed by Deba Ranjan Mohanty, the strategic analysts of Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation, Indian Navy is enormously expanding its potential. Following the pattern of Cold Start strategy of Indian Army, the Indian Navy is likely to have three to four aircraft carrier battle groups besides a fleet of nuclear submarines. It is planning to have its own dedicated air force, strong enough to support the maritime operations. Besides naval weapons, it would have land-based weapon system to match its Army. Through the Indo-US strategic alliance, U.S is heavily supporting the expansion programme of Indian Navy at the strategic level.

Indian and U.S navies have undertaken extensive joint exercises in this regard.

At the strategic level, India intends operating its naval power in conjunction with the United States. It is taking the advantage of US presence in the region for countering the Chinese naval influence and advancing its own naval ambitions by reaching out to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. It fully dominates the Indian Ocean and connected regional waters. Through a rapprochement between US and Sri Lanka on the one hand and US and Military Junta of the Myanmar on the other hand, India is making its earnest effort to end the Chinese naval influence in the region. Indeed, ending the Chinese naval influence would enable India to boost its own naval expansion without immediate threat. India and U.S perceive that, "The Chinese strategy aimed at strengthening influence in Sri Lanka and Myanmar so as to open a new transportation route towards the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Africa, where it has begun contesting traditional Western economic dominance. China is keen to whittle down its dependence on the Malacca Strait for its commerce with Europe and West Asia. The US, on the contrary, is determined that China remains vulnerable to the choke point between Indonesia and Malaysia."<sup>72</sup>

The series of clashes between the Yemeni Government and the rebels, some of them believed to be the Al-Qaeda elements erupted in 2008, thought to be a manipulated game. U.S and Saudi Arabia also participated in the military operation against these rebels. US bombing even caused deaths of many innocent people during the clashes. Indeed, the port of Aden in Yemen is the gateway to Asia. Historically, the Port of Aden has a strategic location, linking Asia with Europe. It has served as a sea route between India and Europe. Popularly known as the Arabian Eudaemon in the 1st Century BC, it was a shipping point for the red sea point. With the development of its naval power, India is trying to restore its old linkage in the Arab world and through it with the Western world. Reaching out to this area has been a dream of India.

In 2009, Indian Navy made its formal presence in Oman. U.S otherwise has its presence in some of the Middle Eastern countries.

In the entire region, it appears that a “Cosy three-way US-Israel-India alliance provides the underpinning for all the manoeuvring that is going on. It will have significance for the security of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula.”<sup>73</sup> After the despotic Bush era, President Obama was expected to reduce conflicts. However, the influence of neo-cons still appears strong enough to continue committing US in the region. They are not letting US to give up its global dominance without a fight. Occupation of Yemen and dominance of Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Port of Aden are the corollaries to this alliance. In the entire game, Indo-U.S partnership is quite visible.

“India and its island territories sit astride some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, through which most of East Asia’s oil flows. The ability to interdict these supplies gives India a strategic bargaining tool that can be used vis-à-vis its northern neighbour in the event of a conflict over the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh in the Himalayas.”<sup>74</sup> Chinese contributions for assisting and developing the port facilities of some of the regional states and their navies is taken by the Indian strategists as if China is developing the string of pearls to encircle the India. Over the last two decades, China has developed its strategic and economic relationship with Middle Eastern countries. In order to obstruct and undermine the Chinese influence, India has started developing its strategic linkages with these countries. It has signed a number of economic and defence pacts with Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and many other Middle Eastern countries. Some analysts even predict that, “India may have offered a nuclear umbrella to these states in return for naval basing rights.”<sup>75</sup>

Within Asia, China has started securing its interests with respect to sea trade, a significant part of its rising economy. Moreover, China has assisted Sri Lanka in the building of its naval facilities and constructing a port there. Similarly, China has helped Pakistan in the construction of its Gwadar port. It is assisting Myanmar in enhancing its naval facilities and constructing a port there. India along with the United States, has started taking these Chinese developments as a threat. Furthermore, China uses the Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean for its imports and exports to the

Europe and with the countries of Middle East. Through India and by having the control of the port of Aden, US indeed, sends strong signals to Beijing that Chinese influence in the area would neither be acceptable to US nor to India.

### **Regional Implications of Indian Naval Expansion**

With the ultimate aim to develop the ‘blue water navy’, India is fast modernizing its navy through the induction of a number new naval vessels, as mentioned above. It is also flexing its muscles to have complete control of the Indian Ocean while effectively dominating the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Ocean. This out of proportion strength of Indian Navy and domination of the regional waters is being viewed critically by the regional countries. There are three types of littoral states being affected by the Indian Naval build-up. Irrespective of their military strength and size, none of these states accept Indian domination in the region or inclusion of whole of the Indian Ocean as part of the Indian national security system.

### **Implications for the Bay of Bengal Littoral States**

**Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.** Two South Asian and four Southeast Asian countries are considered as the Bay of Bengal littoral states. In South Asia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, forming part of the Bay of Bengal Littorals, have serious reservations against Indian Naval build-up. In fact, during the post-independence period, Indo-Bangladesh relations remained stalled on various accounts; the major being the delimiting of sea boundary and exchange enclaves in both countries. Indo-Bangladesh dispute over New South Talpatty Island in the Bay of Bengal deters the maritime boundary delimitation. In the past, India made two failed attempts with the Bangladesh: one; to have an excess to the Chittagong for the transit and second; bringing the gas pipeline from the Myanmar to India through the Bangladeshi sea boundaries.

Although the incumbent Bangladeshi Government has a soft corner for the India, but Indian Naval build-up is being viewed as a direct threat for smaller Bangladeshi Navy, consisting of a few naval vessels. As regards the Sri Lanka, it is an island country of the

Indian Ocean, mostly surrounded by India. It is situated on the main sea-lanes passing through the Indian Ocean. In spite of being an island country, Sri Lanka maintained a smaller navy, as compared to India. In the past, there have been conflicts and clashes over the maritime boundaries and territorial disputes between India and Sri Lanka. Indian naval expansion has direct impact on Sri Lanka. Indian ambitions of the domination of Indian Ocean too have a very unenthusiastic effect on the Sri Lanka. Otherwise, both countries have a bitter experience of mismatch during the Tamil Tigers insurgency in Sri Lanka, who perceives Indian hands behind the prolonged insurgency in the country which spread over almost three decades. Ungenerously, Indian blue water navy would dominate Sri Lankan Navy in the Indian Ocean, an aspect having critical resentment from Sri Lanka.

**Southeast Asian States.** Myanmar and India have a tense relationship mainly owing to the border disputes. Nevertheless, more than the border disputes, the growing relationship between China and Myanmar is the main concern of the India. India perceives this cooperation an attempt to encircle India. Whereas Myanmar feels that Indian Naval build-up in the Nicobar and Andaman Island is a direct threat to its existence. The limited naval capability by Myanmar is indeed retaliation to the Indian Naval advancement. Myanmar feels that its cooperation with China would be rescuing her in case of any future Indian naval aggression. The economically poor country is pushed to join the arms race, a slayer to the human development, in a region where poverty is the order of the day.

Indian naval build-up and patrolling of its warships in the Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean approaches to the Peninsula Malaysia has raised concern in the domestic politics of Malaysia. Since these areas are strategically very significant for Malaysia, therefore, its navy has started construction of a new naval base and a command centre at Langkawi, a port directly confronting the Indian Ocean. Indian quest for the domination of Indian Ocean and its naval modernization has posed threats to its other friendly countries like; Indonesia and Thailand, besides Malaysia. Thailand, a pro India ASEAN country, is otherwise very thick and thin with India.

Its siding with India is indeed to counter the Chinese influence over the Southeast Asia. The aims and objectives of establishing the Far Eastern Naval Command at Andaman by India is being viewed critically by Thailand and Indonesia. Both have started developing their own monitoring forces against this Indian development. It is worth mentioning that Chinese Navy has not yet undertaken any strategic move in the area. Indian Naval build-up in the area is mostly based on pre-emptive assumptions.

### **Implications for the Arabian Sea Littoral States**

**Pakistan.** States like Pakistan, Iran, Maldives, Persian Gulf countries, and even Israel are forming part of the Arabian Sea littorals. Owing to the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan, both countries have been pursuing the arms race since 1960s. Traditionally, there has been a rough balance of power in the region between the nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours. However, owing to the ongoing restructuring and modernization of Indian Navy to make it a blue water navy, Pakistan Navy would lag much behind its traditional adversary. Unfortunately, ever since the independence, both countries have failed to resolve their dispute over the demarcation of the Sir Creek estuary, a portion of sea boundary, located at the mouth of Rann of Kutch. India along with some other regional countries, has been opposing the construction of the Gwadar Port on the mouth of oil rich Persian Gulf. Since the port has been constructed through the Chinese cooperation, therefore, India along with other regional and global countries has strongly opposed its construction. Visualizing it as the military outpost of China, and economically beneficial for Pakistan, India along with some major powers, even resorted to promote violence through the promotion of sub-nationalism in the province of Balochistan. A number of Chinese engineers and staff, involved in the construction of the port and other projects have been killed or sustained injuries during these sub-nationalistic violence.

There is no direct Sino-Indo sea border; therefore, the Indian stance that its naval development is primarily to balance the Chinese naval power is unfounded. The fact of the matter is that the pattern of Indian naval development is such that it would lead towards an

effective naval blockade of Pakistan during any future hostilities. Indeed, Pakistan had the experience of 1971, once it was cut into half by India after effective naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal. Otherwise, irrespective of their size and wherewithal, no country in the South Asian region presents any resistance to Indian hegemonic designs. Under geographical and economic compulsions, all regional states indeed have to concede to what India does. It is indeed only Pakistan, which always puts a strong resistance to any military build-up in the South Asia. In the backdrop of 1971 blockade, Pakistan apprehends that the current Indian naval expansion in the Arabian Sea would effectively constrain the movement of Pakistani ships, upon development of hostilities.

Otherwise, the ongoing Indian naval developments have altogether changed the military balance in the region. Throughout its independent history, India has used its military force against Pakistan, except in 1962, when India had a brief war with China over the border dispute. Otherwise, at present, no naval fleets of the neighbouring countries match even the traditional Indian Naval power. Pakistan Navy, however has the potential to act as deterrent force to the traditional Indian Naval capabilities. Nevertheless, with the inductions of nuclear capable submarines like Akula-II and indigenously built INS Arihant, and other modernization, Indian Naval power would be matchless.

**Iran and Gulf Countries.** India and Iran have developed strategic partnership in the last two decades. Over the years, the partnership became so deep rooted that India helped Iran in the construction of its strategically significant Chabahar. Port in the Sea of Oman. Indeed, this port has been constructed in the peer competition of and to nullify the effects of the Gwadar port in Pakistan. By helping Iran in the construction of this port, India gained two strategic advantages. Firstly; it has successfully reduced the significance of Gwader and secondly; it got an easy excess route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Nevertheless, in spite of the Iranian cooperation, India did not favour Iran on issue of its nuclear programme. Under the strong US pressure, India has decided not to become part of Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline, as agreed earlier. Indian close cooperation with Israel is also viewed by Iran with

inkling. Currently, India is the second largest partner of the state of Israel in the field of arms trade. There is warmth in the Indo-Saudi relationship. Besides, all the Gulf countries though have cordial relations with India, but Indian naval expansion and visualized outreach to the region is being viewed with distrust by the Gulf countries.

### **Conclusion**

The unprecedented Indian Naval expansion will have serious implications for the Indian Ocean littorals. Except Pakistan, no country in either the Bay of Bengal littorals or the Arabian Sea littorals is posing a serious threat to Indian Naval expansion. Practically, the Indian naval expansion is unparalleled and even Pakistan lags much behind the current developments and modernization programme of the Indian Navy. Domination and monitoring of the sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and patrolling up to Persian Gulf will give India an edge over the other regional countries, especially Pakistan and China, to operate freely.

Furthermore, in the garb of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Indian navy together with PSI member countries, especially the US can block the movement of any ship in the international waters for the security checks. As far as Pakistan is concerned, because of its traditional rivalry, Indian Navy can block the supplies of essential items like petroleum, weapons and equipment and other essential imports and exports, transported through the Indian Ocean at critical stages. Although, India has no direct coastline with China, yet its naval expansion would seriously impede the movement of the PLA (Navy) in the international waters. China has its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and the Africa, which India would like to interdict in all cases, being its peer competitor in the politics of global domination.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, analysts assume that apart from its global ambitions, this Indian naval power would seriously impact it at the regional level as well as at the global level. The rapidly growing Indian naval power is compelling Pakistan to develop its

naval fleet like India. In a way, the region would be pushed into an unending armed race, now for the procurement of sophisticated and heavily cost-effective naval equipments. Indeed, no other regional country has such a huge naval fleet with nuclear capable submarines. Besides Pakistan, this unrealistic Indian act would provoke all other regional countries to develop their navies to acquire the similar capabilities, thus giving way to an unending naval race in a region, which is already marred by poverty and unemployment, mainly because of heavy defense spending.

In this regard, international community has to play a very important role in making India understand that in the end, this race would have disparaging effects on South Asia as well as for India itself. International community, U.S and Russia must be fretful of the fact that why a particular country (India) is being encouraged and financed to expand its naval capabilities out of proportion.

“Former U.S. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan said more than a century ago that the Indian Ocean was an “ocean of destiny,” and whosoever controlled it would dominate Asia. While Mahan has followers in the United States – which is probably why the United States maintains a significant presence at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean 1600 kilometres south of the southern coast of India – he has found new ones in the Indian military.”

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# NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

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## **Abstract**

Today Pakistan is faced with the most serious existential threat since its independence, unfortunately this threat emanates from within and our existing structural and attitudinal failings are exacerbating the problem. Extremism is a state of mind while the terrorism is a tool for violent manifestation of extremism - the reasons for both vary from ideological to socio-economic disparities to quest for rights and justice to plain psychological. The nature, extent and footprint of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, too spans the entire spectrum. Pakistan's existing strategy to counter the two menaces is stated to revolve around the three Ds of Deterrence, Development and Dialogue, however barring the first there is little progress to account for. There are some workable contemporary models which Pakistan can draw pertinent lessons from and appropriately modify to suit our environment. The paper proposes a proactively multidimensional yet a workable strategy of SHAPE i.e. to Seek out the perpetrators of terror, Heal the discontent and the victims, Administer justice and governance, Prevent and protect against extremism and terror attacks and Engage communities, neighbours and the international community against the two evils. Taking a holistic view of the existing challenges and the environment an attempt has been made to suggest viable policy guidelines encompassing socio-economic, political, legal, ideological, military, informational and other related planes.

## **Introduction**

Terrorism threatens both the security and ability of people to live their lives in peace. In recent years, a new form of terrorism has emerged, bringing together domestic and international movements. Internationally, these draw on perceptions of particular nations' foreign policies, unresolved regional conflicts such as Palestine and Kashmir as well as the extremist ideology associated with Al Qaeda, which sees governments in Muslim countries as 'un-Islamic' or

apostate and considers the use of violence against them as religious duty. Domestically, extremism and terrorism emerge from deeper and longer-term factors, including political and socio-economic exclusion. Particular challenges are presented by modern technologies, which allow propaganda, communications and recruitment opportunities to terrorist groups, support radicalisation, and encourage violent extremism. Events or individuals do play a major role in the emergence of contemporary terrorist networks, but in developing strategies it is equally useful to focus on the effects and outcomes.

### **Aim**

To analyse the phenomena of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and propose a National Strategy for countering Extremism and Terrorism.

### **Contemporary Pakistan**

Terrorism and extremism damage the purpose and security of the nation state. This paper is based upon a national purpose that *“Pakistan shall be a sovereign state wherein the principles of democracy, equality, tolerance, and socio – economic justice as enunciated by Islam shall prevail”*<sup>1</sup>. For Pakistan, the rising trajectory of terrorism is clear: from 56 recorded incidents in 2002, resulting in 102 deaths, the figures rose to 1946 incidents and 2380 deaths in 2009.<sup>3</sup> While Pakistan has always been mildly sectarian,<sup>4</sup> today, it is not only confronted with its most serious internal threat but is bound by geography to suffer threats spilling over from Afghanistan as well. Prudent as Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policies and strategy of political engagement, social development, and selective use of force are, these have yet to deliver lasting results. The success of military operations in Swat, Bajaur, and South Waziristan will not deliver lasting outcomes unless reinforced by measures appropriate to address the underlying causes. The alarming indices of Pakistan’s economic and social sectors represent a serious security challenge to the country. The divisions on sectarian, religious, ethnic, and ideological lines combined with socio-economic disparities and weak governance all contribute to the increase and expansion of existing fault lines. Beyond the

casualties, the socio-economic costs of terrorism to Pakistan too are substantial with losses for 2007-08 adjudged at over US\$8 billion<sup>5</sup> while the Pakistan Security Research Unit<sup>6</sup> suggests losses of around US\$ 35-40 billion since 2001-02<sup>7</sup>.

### **An Overview of Terrorism and Extremism**

Although the real motives may be masked by a range of competing agenda, terrorism emerges from grievances borne of political oppression, cultural domination, economic exploitation, ethnic discrimination, and religious persecution. Extremism is a social phenomenon that can be reflected in a state of mind or through attitudes and may be based on perceptions. It is generally described as having political or religious ideas / actions that are extreme and thus not found not normal, reasonable or acceptable to most people, in other words they claim to violate common standards of ethics and reciprocity. It is founded on judgments of inequitable or unfair treatment; deprivation from economic equity, lack of access to opportunities, stereotyping, discrimination, or communal segregation. Cause of extremism may be the extremist himself that may be reflected in his relationship with his family or society including all the contradictions between faith and behaviour, ideals and reality, religion and politics, , aspirations and achievements etc. Corruption of regimes with their disregard for the rights of their people, lack of social justice and the consequent state of helplessness also act as strong contributory factors. Religious alignments too may become vehicles for projecting extremism. The radicalization process links extremism and terrorism and is the adoption of an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change; however, not all extremist attitudes lead to violent behaviour.

Achieving an internationally agreed definition of terrorism has proved difficult<sup>11</sup>. The use of violence for the achievement of political ends is common to both state and non-state actors, but difficulties emerge when the use of violence is perceived as legitimate. There are, however, commonalities among definitions<sup>12</sup> and these include an intention to cause a political or coercive effect

through pressures aimed at a particular target audience. Terrorism is invariably planned and intended to achieve particular goals and is rationally employed against selected targets rather than a random act. A definition may be seen as “*the unlawful use of force and violence against persons and/or property by an individual, group, community or a state for the purpose of intimidating or coercing a government or a people for political, social, ethnic, economic, or religious purposes*”<sup>13</sup>. Terrorists believe they have no alternatives for their political, economic or religious grievances, therefore they resort to violence to gain publicity and force acceptance of their demands. Causes of terrorism may be historical, cultural, religious, economic, social or political. Unresolved international disputes; like Kashmir and Palestine, have also led to adoption of violent means. There is a relatively small range of motivating factors for the terrorist; these are indigence<sup>14</sup>, ideology, injustice, identity or an international agenda; these encompass, revolution aiming to collapse a particular regime, state-sponsored terrorism<sup>15</sup>, criminal terrorism where terror is used for material gains<sup>16</sup>, nationalist terrorism for seeking a separate state, religious terrorism to further what is seen as divinely commanded purposes and ideological terrorism aiming to alter a belief system.

Extremism is closely associated with terrorism but two are not the same. Extremism is a state of mind whereas terrorism is a physical act. Extremists insist on their beliefs and are intolerant of others' views while terrorists resort to violence to achieve their objectives. Some extremists use terrorism as a technique or a tool for manifestation of their ideals. It is prudent to emphasise that all terrorists are extremists but all extremists are not terrorists.

### **Extremism and Terrorism in Pakistan**

There are many reasons for terrorism in Pakistan, ranging from sub-nationalism to ethnic, sectarian, and religious divides. Each group has its own ideology, grievances, sources of funding and politico-religious influence. For most of its existence, Pakistan had been free of terrorism, save sporadic and specific acts of religious and sectarian nature. However, the Afghan Jihad, with underlying polarization and economic disparity, together with General Zia's

Islamization drive, turned Pakistan into an ideological battleground fuelled by drug and Kalashnikov culture. During this period numerous Madaris were established which were later used as seminaries for Afghan Jihad. The total number of Madaris which was barely 137 in 1947<sup>8</sup> reached to thousands by the turn of the century. Jihadi culture thus took its roots in our society and gained patronization of politico-religious parties. Sectarian organizations subsequently emerged on the political scene. Abetted by societal weaknesses, extremism transformed into terrorism. Defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan too emboldened the Jihadi Non State Actors (NSA) that subsequently manifested through a new form of international terrorism. The tragedy of 9/11 added new dimensions to terrorism while in Pakistan it gained impetus as a reaction to Pakistan's support for coalition operations in Afghanistan. The situation further aggravated in 2007 after the Lal Masjid episode which gave fillip to the activities of a new religio-political organizations like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. This, in 2009, challenged the government leading to military operations in Swat and FATA. Extremism and terrorism are no longer specific to the tribal areas, Pakistan's societal, economic, judicial, and governmental weaknesses provide space for extremism and terrorism to thrive. Additionally, there are also close links between organised crime, black money and external elements. The overarching picture includes Al Qaeda and its misplaced ideology of 'Jihad' and its agenda to establish a parallel government in the name of Islam and objectives which include withdrawal of Pakistan Army from FATA, the eviction of US/NATO troops from Afghanistan, and to re-establish a Taliban Government<sup>9</sup>.

It is also worth mentioning that the structural weaknesses present in our society helped these organizations grow into powerful NSAs. Pakistan over the years has shown dismal performance in achieving Human Development Goals. – the existing inflation rate hovers around 11%<sup>10</sup>, unemployment between 5.5% to 15.2%, population growth around 2%, a literacy rate of around 54%<sup>11</sup> and poor health care – We spend only about 2.6% of our GDP on Education and health<sup>12</sup>. Our poverty stands at 33.4% ranking 101 out of 135 countries and literacy at 54.2% which is 134th out of 182 countries assessed in the world<sup>13</sup>. Pakistan's 141<sup>st</sup> position<sup>14</sup> on the

Human Development Index in 2009 is indicative of our challenges. Pakistan also suffers from corruption and bad governance due to many factors some of which are politicization of state institutions and public functionaries, lack of transparency, checks and accountability, weak enforcement of rule of law and rent seeking behavior of decision-makers. Corruption in Pakistan over the last three years increased by 400% and our ranking now is 139 out of 180 countries in the world<sup>15</sup>. Economic prosperity and social development cannot take place in a lawless society. The criminal justice system today has become inefficient and despite the efforts made under National Judicial Policy of 2009, the backlog of cases awaiting adjudication in various courts is still over 1.3 million<sup>16</sup>. There is also a pronounced lack of uniformity in the education system and three different categories of private and government schools and Madaris have created distinct disparities in our society; the resentments created are leading to hatred and polarization. Besides, due to pronounced sectarian cleavages, the Shia-Sunni as well as intra sectarian conflicts are on the rise. Extremists of one sect are now willing to annihilate the other while some Madaris continue to encourage extremism. Some political and religious groups also maintain undeclared militant wings who incite hate, conduct target killings and resort to myriad pressure tactics against governments. Ofcourse all these internal factors and the weaknesses of our society provide opportunities to external elements to have a field day in Pakistan. The Taliban movement in the border areas aims to pursue the Afghan conflict, resist foreign forces and establish Islamic rule, carving out a sphere of influence within FATA and parts of KPK<sup>17</sup>. It is also orientated towards providing safe havens to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and their agenda is woven deeply into the fabric of both local politics and feed on local grievances. The Pakistani Taliban or the TTP, in spite of drawing their inspiration from the movement across the border, are distinct from both Taliban of Afghanistan and the mainstream religious elements in Pakistan, even though there are critical linkages between them<sup>18</sup>. The strategy of TTP revolves around projecting militant activities as struggle against infidels and creating public perception that security situation will improve if government withdraws its support to US.

## **Contemporary Counter Extremism / Counter Terrorism Strategies**

The difficulties associated with terrorism are well known and there are numerous examples of national counter-terrorism strategies. However one size does not fit all and each tends to be designed to meet particular national needs. Nevertheless, some of the tools derived through international experiences are applicable within Pakistan. Since 2001, international work on counter-terrorism has moved away from traditional policing and application of draconian measures to a focus on communities<sup>19</sup>. Analysis shows no evidence that a draconian approach produces any increase in the effectiveness of counter-terrorism<sup>20</sup>. Community alienation, for whatever reason, plays an important part in sustaining extremism and violence.

**UK / US Models.** Examples of contemporary strategies include the UK Model with its Four Ps – Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare<sup>21</sup> and the US Four Ds Model<sup>22</sup>. The latter aims to Defeat terrorist organisations through relentless action; to Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary they need to survive; to win the war of ideas and Diminish the underlying conditions that lead people to embrace, rather than shun terrorism; and, to Defend against terrorist attacks.

**India.** Conversely, India’s official report<sup>23</sup> points up the failures inherent in an event driven or episodic counter-terrorist strategy and where containment is effectively left with law enforcement and security forces. India lacks both a coherent strategy and a long-term vision on counter terrorism. The report also points to the need to improve “intelligence network and policing capacity at both central (union) and state levels to meet the challenges and the fundamental importance of a legislative and administrative framework”<sup>24</sup>.

**Other Countries.** In Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia the emphasis is on development of the ‘Prevent Strategies’ through centralised control, aiming to tackle the longer-term issue of terrorist groups regenerating. Their policies are marked by regional

cooperation, which has some relevance to Pakistan's position with Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia has followed a three-pronged Counter Terrorism strategy of Prevention, Cure, and Care, which is described as a very successful model.<sup>25</sup> In addition to combating terrorism by force through security and law enforcement, the Saudi government put in place an effective legal system to dissuade and punish terrorism, prevent terrorist financing through charitable donations and money laundering. Additionally a host of reforms in education, information and other social sectors have also been undertaken.

Not all historical models of counter-terrorism policing deliver long-term success and may increase a community's alienation from the security forces, perhaps exemplified by unsuccessful techniques applied against Irish terrorism in the UK. Such techniques also generally require a need to review legal machinery and tighten legislation to meet the fresh challenges when dealing with domestic terrorism or extremism.

**Lessons for Pakistan.** There are a number of lessons to draw on:-

- Countering extremism and terrorism require a holistic strategy with strong central control, a greater emphasis on political, educational, and economic initiatives and less on military operations. Regional terrorism requires full engagement with the neighbours.
- Remedial measures should be focused on education, health, welfare and the elimination of poverty.
- Presence of a strong political will, patience, amnesty, and compromise for reconciliation and building social cohesion.
- Need for an effective de-radicalization campaign backed by intellectuals, academics, religious scholars and the media, aimed to eliminate the idea of terrorism and violence and supported by intellectual effort to uproot the extremist ideology.
- The police need to be in the lead with the military in a support role; prolonged military operations tend to alienate the populace.

## **Analysis of Pakistan's Existing Counter Extremism and Terrorism Strategy**

Pakistan does not have any officially declared/notified/ documented Counter Extremism/Terrorism Strategy. The strategy developed during the last regime concentrated around a military response, despite recognition of the need, little importance / resource allocation was accorded to other strands. The present political government has attempted to follow other strands of policy in this regard but with little success. Pakistan's existing response so far could be described as "Three Ds", namely Deterrence, Dialogue and Development.<sup>26</sup> The government's first choice of strategic response is to deter terrorism through the military and civilian organizations. The Pakistani Law enforcing Agencies (LEAs), especially the military, have been the instrument of deterrence. As aptly illustrated by *Operation Rah-e-Rast* in Swat Valley and *Operation Rah-e-Nijat* in South Waziristan, the military approach has been to sanitize the affected areas and hold the area till the rebuilding starts. This was the first time in the history of the country that Pakistan's military was deployed in the region. The Police force was ill-prepared for this and therefore paid dearly by sustaining heavy losses. However, success has been achieved and efforts are now being made for joint efforts for undertaking socio-economic development, failing which the effects of success delivered through Military action would diminish with the passage of time. The government is also engaging locals as part of the strategy and is building consensus for clearing the areas from the terrorists.

While the relevant stakeholders are making efforts to combat terrorism and extremism, the strategy lacks coordination and coherence. Weaknesses include a lack of a comprehensive coherent National Counter Terrorism strategy, a lack of a comprehensive National Action Plan, the absence of a consolidated National Threat Assessment and fragmentation of efforts between different stakeholders sans an effective coordinating structure. In sum, efforts are sporadic, reactive, ad hoc, and predominantly military with little role of complimenting elements of national power.

Improved investigative techniques and international cooperation have increased the capability of the country's law enforcement agencies, but much remains to be done in this regard, especially in the police force. Apart from being seen as corrupt, the police in Pakistan are ill equipped and lack the resources to deal with terrorism. In-service training, especially for the lower ranks, is almost non-existent; the ratio of police personnel to the population that they serve is ill adjusted to the task; and most police staff is kept busy with non-policing tasks like providing security for fixed installations and VVIPs<sup>27</sup>. Pakistan's institutional weaknesses have also resulted in the slow implementation of government decisions at the grass- roots level. A few 'spoilers' in key posts too can gravely damage the state because of the government's inability to control them, even though it wishes to do so. Thus, institutional inadequacy can be seen paralleled with an inexplicable reluctance in certain high quarters to fully grasp and act against terrorism.

While individual departments and organisations have been receiving their usual annual budgets and funds for undertaking their operations against the militants, little funds for socio-economic development of the affected areas have been received from FODP; an action that is critical for determining success. Thus the two prongs of Development and Dialogue largely remain unaddressed.

Even though the government has taken strong policy measures against Jihadi organizations involved in terrorism in Pakistan, and there has been a marked decline in their activities, both domestic and international stakeholders are still not fully bereft of doubt.<sup>28</sup> Part of the problem lies in the approach of the government to tackle this existential challenge. The government has so far acted in a piecemeal fashion of post-crisis reactions induced by external stimuli, rather than adopting a concerted pro-active strategy to avert a dangerous threat to national security. Every time the government responds to an international catastrophic event, it creates resentment among the local population. Moreover, there are also lapses in the way in which the government responds to such situations. For example, in the crackdown on Madaris following the London bombings, the police in Islamabad raided a female seminary, which created a public outcry in the traditional Pakistani

society and resulted in the removal of three high-ranking police officers from their posts.<sup>29</sup> The Lal Masjid crisis of July 2007 erupted when the government's hand was forced due to a sudden increase in the activities of the extremists and the diplomatic pressure arising after the kidnapping of Chinese nationals.

Today Pakistan is faced with the challenge of managing perceptions on War on Terror both internally and externally. Domestically, some leaders of national stature neither own this war nor condemn the terrorist activities, especially the suicide bombings in which thousands of innocent lives have been lost. On external front, Pakistan faces the dilemma of trust-deficit with its coalition partners who think that it is not doing enough against the terror networks. The Indian media is also in a traditional frenzy blaming Pakistan of nurturing the terrorist organizations. Still there is no formal institution at the national level to formulate and execute an information strategy. Despite having a very vibrant media, the government appears to have failed to capitalise on its reach to manage public perceptions, especially international, and countering militants' themes are yet to be tackled.

The porous Pak-Afghan border too provides tremendous flexibility to the terrorists in their cross border activities. As a result, when military action is undertaken, these elements cross the border in to Afghanistan where they enjoy a relative freedom of movement and space to re-group, owing to support of their Afghan sympathizers and limited foot print of Coalition Forces on ground. This in turn, facilitates weapons and narcotic smuggling, which provides a boost to the criminal activities in the country. To prevent the cross border movement of the terrorists, Border Control Mechanism will have to be strengthened and finally the inability of the government to publically own or prevent a spate of drone strikes inside Pakistan and the consequent collateral damages undermine the credentials of a representative government.

### **Relevance of Historical Models**

The historical models of counter-terrorism policing rarely deliver long-term success and may increase a community's

alienation from the security forces, perhaps exemplified by earlier unsuccessful techniques applied against Irish terrorism in the UK or Indian policies in Kashmir. Particular conclusions are:-

- **Need for Legal & Constitutional Measures.** Counter-terrorism generally requires a review of legal machinery and tighter legislation to meet the fresh challenges when dealing with domestic terrorism or extremism.
- **Social Cohesion.** Underpinning contemporary counter-terrorist strategies is the concept of social cohesion<sup>30</sup>, which draws on police engagement with the community as a source for information, followed by broader levels of trust and interaction. There is a need for effectively tackling sectarian issues through a balanced and even-handed approach by the police towards each community, irrespective of ethnicity or religion.
- **Poverty and Extremism / Terrorism.** Karin von Hippel<sup>31</sup> suggests, there are a number of components associated with terrorism which at least provide the space to allow terrorism to take hold. The first of these is poverty; although there is no direct link between poverty and terrorism, terrorists will use the condition of the poor as justification to broaden their appeal. Equally, poverty promotes madrasa enrolment as the poor have no other option but to send their children to these free institutions.
- **Radicalisation.** The radicalised and unregulated madaris may develop radical agendas, predicating a need to accelerate registration and reform. While resourcing of quality education is difficult, the capacity of the education system at local level, constrains rapid reforms. On recruitment and radicalisation, there is a need to properly understand the process. For example, generally, prisons are judged as areas for recruitment of criminals and there is a need to counter radical (to counter for countering) influences in prison.
- **Funding.** The issue of funding stretches beyond simply equipping LEAs, as funds are required to compete with terrorist organisations that are providing employment opportunities to the disaffected. Governments must

effectively meet socio-economic needs, if necessary, through international assistance.

- **International & Domestic Influences.** There must be a forward-looking strategy and some of the factors that currently sustain terrorism, both international and domestic, are likely to persist. Some groups in the Islamic world are likely to continue to support the political agenda associated with Al Qaida – although fewer are likely to support Al Qaida’s operational activities. Internationally, many of the conflicts and disputes, which show no signs of early resolution, may be exploited by contemporary terrorist organisations, while those areas of Pakistan with failing governance are likely to remain a concern for the near future.
- **Globalization and Technology.** The evolution and availability of technology will continue to enable terrorism and in some ways make it easier for terrorist organisations to threaten both international and domestic interests.
- **Use of Military.** The use of the Pakistani armed forces in counter-terrorism will remain an essential component in the medium term. The use of an army within its own country’s borders against one’s own people is fraught with presentational issues, even more so with the use of airpower, and demands constant efforts to retain public support. There is often a perception that the military dominates counter-terrorist operations, which distorts understanding. Clausewitz argues that *‘in less intense conflicts political aim is more complex and more prominent’* and in counter-insurgency the division of effort is judged as 20% military and 80% political action<sup>32</sup>. The ideal is an overtly police - led capability and the building of appropriate paramilitary police capability – a capacity that needs to be built. A secondary point is that continual use of military forces in paramilitary roles, ultimately blunts their military capability and requirements of conventional warfare e.g. Pakistani Army has undertaken 203 major operations since 2002, while in Waziristan the Army has been engaged in 35 major operations and 107 minor operations<sup>33</sup>. At the higher end of counter-terrorism operations, the issues are markedly similar to counter-insurgency<sup>34</sup>, where people are part of the

battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere, with civilians around, against civilians, and in defence of civilians. Civilians are one of the targets and objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.

**Principles of Counter-extremism / Terrorism (even Insurgency Operations)**

There are a number of principles, which underpin counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. First is the appreciation of the primacy of political purpose that any counter-terrorist strategy must always aim at long term objective by focusing on political outcome and not simply be event driven. Second is ensuring unity of effort across government. Third is recognition and adherence to the human dimension and how the nature and culture of the population defines the tools which are most appropriate; human security is often fundamental to wider governance processes and brings in or helps gain and maintain popular support. Fourth is neutralization of the power of the extremist / terrorist, not necessarily by force but encompassing political, socio-economic levers and by encouraging engagement with the political mainstream as well as drying up the resource pool. Fifth is operating in accordance with the law, an aspect that goes to the heart of human rights and sustaining public support for government policies and security force operations. Finally integration of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. This reflects both domestic and international intelligence efforts as well as those between local and central government levels and between different security agencies.

In looking at the resolution of terrorist campaigns, the Rand Corp in 2008 examined some 648 terrorist groups, active over the period 1968 to 2006.<sup>35</sup> While statistics alone do not reflect which of the aforementioned tools were applied and whether in isolation or combination, the findings indicated that 43% ended due to political negotiations, 40% were eliminated by local police/intelligence efforts, 10% ended because they achieved their objectives and 7% ended because of military activity.

## Proposed Counter Extremism and Terrorism Strategy

Despite the range of underlying causes, there are a number of principal components to any strategy. These components or strands are not however mutually exclusive and cannot be applied piecemeal. While it is true that not all such components will be necessarily applicable in every case, one common factor is the application of effective governance to ungoverned spaces. In terms of their application, the various components require persistent and coherent action. The terrorist groups find it difficult to survive in a coherent form under continuing political, socio-economic pressures and the rule of law. The resulting fragmentation constrains the activities of terrorist groups. However, at this point the provision of wider support to the community is essential to address such fragmentation and to preclude emergence of smaller self-generating terrorist groups. For measuring success, purely quantitative measures are inadequate; these must be supported by qualitative measures e.g. surveys of perceived risks, literacy levels, healthcare and not simply the number of attacks.

### Components of Strategy

The principal components of the proposed strategy can be described as SHAPE, an acronym that proposes to seek out the perpetrators, heal the causes and effects, administer the people and institutions, prevent terrorism and extremism and engage the community. The objective of the proposed strategy is to *'make Pakistan safe from extremist and terrorist violence, and eliminate the underlying conditions, which give rise to extremism & terrorism'*.

**Seek-out.** To detect, disrupt and defeat violent extremists and successfully prosecute them by addressing the inadequacies of legal framework. Pursuing terrorists and reducing the threat encompasses proactive intelligence, investigation capability and a high-capacity prosecution process, from evidence collection to post-prison supervision and religious and psychological counselling.

**Heal.** This strand demands a population-centric approach and addresses political alienation of marginalized communities; a process in which some groups believe they have no stake in the country. This requires re-establishment of the government - writ through reorganization of justice, police, and governance mechanisms, underpinned by socio-economic reforms, employment and education opportunities. Winning hearts and minds requires a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism, enhancing community resilience and having an effective rehab and reintegration plan.

**Administer.** This component aims at improvement of governance mechanisms, organizing a methodology of a cross-government, inter departmental coordination machinery, mobilizing community and institutions and establishing a coherent plan for protection of critical national infrastructure.

**Prevent:** Terrorism has a range of effects which include loss of life, weakened social cohesion, retarded socio-economic development, weakened economy, radicalised youth, weaponised society, and damaged resolve to fight back<sup>36</sup>. The strand of Prevention and Preparation encompasses areas like; Finding ways to prevent the dissemination of terrorist related material and knowledge, identifying capabilities needed to tackle various types of terrorism in Pakistan – in essence a National Risk Assessment, action against those who defend terrorism and abet violence. Ensure effective border, drug, finance and weapon control mechanisms, protection against ‘insider’s threats’: and need for institutional checks. With Pakistan’s greater electronic connectivity there is a need to ensure security of critical systems against cyber attacks and to prevent the misuse of commercially available hazardous substances.

**Engage.** There is a need to correct the ideology behind violent extremism, especially by supporting mainstream voices and protecting individuals, vulnerable to recruitment. The appeal of a simplistic ideology is easier to understand than democracy and human dignity and plays more easily among the poorly-educated.<sup>38</sup> This process needs to be underpinned by a comprehensive strategic

communications and media programme, engaging moderate and reconcilable elements through a political dialogue and engaging neighbours and international community in a meaningful support for WOT.

### **Policy Measures**

There is a range of recommendations, however, there are no quick fixes and each measure requires a concerted and continued effort which must be coupled with measurable targets and outcomes as well as appropriate review processes. Although many of these recommendations can be initiated relatively quickly, it must be appreciated that most outcomes are unlikely to emerge until the medium-term. Measures intended to address the underlying factors and grievances will naturally require sustained implementation over several years. The importance of the counter extremism / terrorism strategy requires direct ministerial oversight and accountability for each recommendation. The proposed response has been discussed under the three heads of NACTA, Counter Extremism and Counter Terrorism.

### **NACTA**

Counter extremism & terrorism require a structured policy that encompasses all components of counter-terrorist effort and cross-government support, including that from provinces. It is proposed that NACTA should be established as a government department with a ministerial head, answerable directly to the Prime Minister. The ministry's task may be expanded to encompass all aspects of countering extremism and terrorism. NACTA must immediately publish its strategy, which must encompass all of the components of the counter-terrorist and counter-extremist effort, with cross-government support, including that from the Provinces. NACTA should be responsible for ensuring that funding is targeted on vulnerable communities; it must have the authority to redirect funding by other ministries to particular initiatives. NACTA will also require Provincial nodes answerable to itself and support from local intelligence agencies, operating under the control of law enforcement agencies. In nut shell, it is proposed to Re-design

NACTA and extend its remit, through appropriate legislation at the earliest possible, so as to make it the highest level Focal Body for policy, decision making as well as implementation of strategy.

For the purpose of NACTA reorganization and functioning, it is essential that all the federating units have a voice in the policy level decision-making, affecting them. It is therefore proposed that NACTA should function through an Executive Committee, headed by the Prime Minister with members including ministers for Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Health, Religious Affairs, Law & Parliamentary Affairs, provincial Chief Ministers (including Gilgit Baltistan), Governor KPK, Prime Minister AJK and Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, the Co-opted Members to be other Governors, Chief Secretaries, Services Chiefs and Heads of the intelligence agencies. NACTA Executive Committee should meet on quarterly basis or when needed and its mandate should include policy and direction as well as the allocation of resources once policy decisions are made, the Minister NACTA to assume key role in implementing the decided policies through a Secretariat having representatives of concerned ministries, provinces, armed forces and intelligence agencies with the proposed tasks to formulate policy options for NACTA, translate decisions of Executive Committee, advise / ensure / oversee implementation and provide regular feed back to the Executive Committee. It is also proposed to have, under NACTA, a National Intelligence Data Base that must feed centralized analysis and dissemination – ensuring interagency collaboration between various Intelligence & LEAs, NADRA, Immigration etc and create data base on areas like ~~profiling~~ suicide bombers, likely sources of financing, IED and other explosives types & patterns, record / surveillance of immigrants/ refugees, record of property sale / renting, record of affectees of terrorism and related issues.

## **COUNTER-EXTREMISM**

### **Ideological Response.**

- A flawed but simplistic ideology of hate is easier to understand than the messy construct of democracy and human dignity as it plays more easily among the poorly

educated<sup>39</sup>. To counter it, the recommended is four pronged strategy i.e. ; promote correct and progressive interpretation of Islamic ideology focusing on tolerance, mutual acceptance, moderation, balance and respect for human life. De-radicalization of youth through education, appeal to Pakistani nationalism and Social justice.

- The response must also protect people's civil and human rights and that must manifest through:
  - Nurturing moderate theological leadership through universities so that religious leadership re-transferred back to where it belongs i.e. learned scholars.
  - Across the board condemnation of extremism and terrorism i.e. no distinction between good and bad terrorists.
  - Govt to progressively assume responsibility to regulate places of worship i.e. Mosque registration, permission for new mosques & madaris and oversee activities of suspected individuals etc.
  - It is also proposed that NACTA launch a de-radicalization campaign, in consultation with Council of Islamic Ideology under the slogan of "*The Message of Islam*" through religious scholars. The aim being to:-
    - Identify extremist ideologies/themes in different groups and formulate correct responses in the light of Islam.
    - Send message of tolerance, moderation and balance.
    - Regularly visit /address universities, institutions, madaris.
    - Media campaign with emphasis on areas of convergence between various factions.
    - Work on religious decrees through consensus / *Ijtehad* of respected scholars / leaders of all sects, to nullify the messages of hate, suicide bombing and intolerance etc.
    - Rehabilitation and use of reformed extremists to spread the correct message.

### **Education**

- Literacy and knowledge are important to enable communities to resist both extremism and terrorism and stopping distorted ideologies from taking roots. The present status of efforts is, at best, inconsistent and often poor or non-existent; the provision

of education remains woefully inadequate. Policies currently aim for 86% literacy by 2015 and a minimum 4% of GDP expenditure on education. An increase in education expenditure is essential, with short-term additional needs of affected areas being channelled through NACTA.

- It is also proposed to create of a Provincial Academic Service (PAS), with status and remuneration on par with Central Superior Services. The PAS must be responsible for quality of induction, training, and career progression of teachers; persons holding management positions must receive appropriate training and remunerations.
- Federal curriculum and syllabi guidelines may continue to be made and implemented by provinces but under federal guidelines and federation must retain the right to correct the parts of education syllabi, that are found offensive or promoting extremism.
- Checks are also recommended through establishment of community-based District School Board Systems; the boards, being made up of local respected citizens, to be responsible for school management and correct functioning.
- To change the mindset of youth from jingoistic to more cultured and refined citizenship, there is a need to introduce new chapters on achievers in science, art, literature, medicine etc more than the focus on usual war heroes.

To address parallel systems of education, there is a need to link schools, colleges, universities and technical institutes through an integrated syllabi / standard of examination and recognition system.

**Madrassah Reform.** In Madrassah reform, there is a need to address the fragmentation of effort and responsibility by strengthening of Madrassah Reform Board and continue to implement and build on Madrassah registration and reforms project. The aim is being to ultimately integrate religious education with formal education and strengthen lines of communication between government and Madaris. There is also a need to improve coordination, understanding, and consensus building among the five factions of *Ittehad e Tanzeemat al Madaris*.

**Corruption.** Terrorism funding has links to crime; endemic corruption is conducive to terrorism. The effectiveness of any anti-money-laundering campaign will be limited in an environment that allows free capital transfers across international borders. While it is important to meet wider societal economic needs (as in family remittances) there is a need for a cultural shift to achieve success. Pakistan has all the appropriate legislation but has yet to turn the legal corner. A new impetus is required by way of a strong Financial Intelligence Unit and creation of an effective anti-corruption agency. A transparent and accountable Anti-Corruption Commission remit should operate nationally without any political interference. Its chairman to be a person of good repute, appointed for a fixed period under a constitutional cover, and he/she should be aided in this job by professional representatives of civil society, on required bases. Such a measure also requires support through a wider cultural change, better check of financial regulations and legislation to introduce stiff punishments at the highest / strategic level. The key to success of such an exercise lies in transparency, accountability and impartiality.

### **Counter Terrorism Related Issues**

Having enumerated measures specific to counter extremism, few measures related to counter-terrorism are discussed hereunder. However, it needs to be understood that most counter-terrorism related measures inherently address counter extremism as well.

**Socio-economic Development.** Socio-economic policies take time to deliver and longer still for any trickledown effect to emerge. Besides governance, the two key areas hampering development are the lack and wastage of funds and capacity issues. Following is suggested in this regard :-

- To address funding inadequacies and their correct utilization. Pakistan first has to look inward and it is proposed to have a complete freeze on defence expenditure and rationalization of non-development budget at present levels for next three to five years.
- It is also important that the government prepares coherent development plans to seek international assistance.

Simultaneously, a funding process needs to be established for socio-economic development at the heels of counter-terrorist operations. This should include micro-finance schemes and assigning priorities to achieve of MDGs<sup>40</sup>, all of which are related to human development, in communities most affected by terrorism.

- All processes must be accountable and transparent and supported by appropriate data collection and target setting and a system of external audit / inspections must be encouraged and instituted.
- Appropriate policies are in place to tackle missing factors of production, such as human capital and infrastructure, as is the package to attract Foreign Direct Investment. Measures must be enforced to constrain domestic capital flight.
- In capacity building, the key issue is to improve management so as to ensure correct and timely utilization of funds, policy consistency, data collection and target setting for projects under political leadership, for development activities, aided by local community and the bureaucracy, avoiding frequent transfer of civil service decision-makers.
- Finally, there is a need to engage international community, NGOs, Pakistani diaspora and private sector and it must be impressed upon the west / partners that investment in developmental works in affected areas, is directly proportional to the long-term safety of their homelands.
- Few measures specific to FATA & other disturbed areas; to address the governance vacuum, formation of Dist / Agency Reconstruction Teams (DRTs) dedicated for each area is proposed. Such teams should comprise a pool of selected officers / staff of Dist Management, Police, line departments, NGOs and community members and may even be given performance-based incentives or conversely face accountability for failing to deliver. Such an arrangement ought to be a 'transitional arrangement' wherein the Army gradually hands over responsibilities to DRTs, which will eventually re-transform into regular district administration. The proposed tasks for such an organization are to manage IDPs, relieve Army after operations, improve governance and development indices, and manage rehabilitation and reintegration.

**Legal Aspects.** There are also a number of wider legal aspects that need to underpin any new strategy; for instance, all training must include an understanding of human rights. Counter-terrorism provides a particular challenge in establishing the right balance between the individual and the community as a whole. There are 13 universal legal instruments and three amendments which aim at preventing terrorist acts that cover a wide range of issues including the safety of NBC materials and protection of maritime navigation and fixed platforms on the continental shelf. Negotiations on a comprehensive convention on international terrorism with a focus on criminalizing terrorist offences are ongoing. Pakistan will need to remain fully engaged in this process. It is recommended to implement judicial reforms and increase the effectiveness of the criminal prosecution process, from evidence collection to post-prison supervision and reform special anti-terrorist courts. A process supported by a re-energized Joint Investigation Teams comprising ISI, FIA, IB, Police Special Branch, MI and others should be initiated. Similarly a mechanism for protection of judges, witnesses and employees is also needed. As for the measures specific to affected areas only, it is proposed that the government must keep its word and implement appropriately modified *Nizam-e-Adl*, in Malakand Division for a trial period of five years. Finally for the affected areas of FATA/PATA, the Frontier Crime Regulations should be abolished and basic constitutional rights be granted, in consultation with tribes, through a phased programme.

**Political Initiative.** Dialogue is a key to solutions confronting Pakistan, there is a need to drive the Balochistan package forward and engage in dialogue, from a position of strength, with all reconcilable terrorist elements, including the TTP and all dissident elements of Balochistan with focus on general public/commoners; traditionally the element of patriotism and loyalty towards Pakistan is still relatively more among the simple village folks as compared to some Sardars. Besides, there is also a need to initiate a domestic process of interfaith / sectarian dialogue and afford protection to such initiatives.

**Information Campaign.** There is a need to initiate a comprehensive Strategic Communications programme which is coherent and highlights government and military's achievements and hollowness of extremist ideology – to retain popular support and win war of ideas; the aim being to sensitize and energize masses through engagement of all stakeholders and provide advice/ focal point to local authorities and general populace on the protection of public places. Engage communities as a vital part of counter-terrorism, with particular emphasis on communities suffering most from terrorism or inadequacies of government policies. Also provide an advice focal point for local authorities, commercial facilities and the population on protection of public places, including protection against toxic materials.

**Policing.** Pakistan has seen at least five identifiable studies during the 1990s and there is a consensus that the institution suffers from corruption, inefficiency, and limited capabilities. This requires a number of measures ranging from amending outdated legal and institutional mechanisms through creation of neutral and unified command structures and addressing capacity issues. Police failures arguably compound the threat of religious extremism and terrorism. A lot is required in this field including; establishment of community policing and a partnership model drawing together the police, local authorities, and the community, amendment of current police legislation to reflect current challenges and create institutional structures that ensure neutrality and democratic control, need for national standards for police recruitment and training, capacity-building programme encompassing a 'train and equip' process including development of police and FIA forensic capabilities – some practical components of capacity building may be orchestrated by the Armed forces, reviewing the remuneration of police officers and all the aforementioned need effective protection, at the highest level, to enable total de-politicisation of the department.

**Military Aspects.** It is time the government gradually begins to reduce its reliance on military tool and use it as a short term shock therapy alone. For conduct of operations it is proposed to alter the focus from large scale, resource and casualty intensive operations to intelligence driven sub-tactical strikes, with focus on

targeting leadership, support and resourcing networks. Operations are also recommended in remaining FATA, however, they must precede intelligence led operations to create and exploit existing cleavages & internal dissension among various Taliban factions. There ought to be a condition based but clear 'Exit Strategy' for military wherein it is able to ensure smooth / functional transition to civilian setups and re-assume the role of a deterrent as opposed to the applied force. On the issue of UAV (drone) strikes inside Pakistani territory, the government must take people in to confidence, failing which it should re-negotiate the provision of logistic support and Pakistan's air space. Finally, there is a need to formalize joint training and exercises between police, CAFs and the Armed Forces.

**Risk Assessment.** Initiate a centralized risk assessment and a register of critical national infrastructure drawings by way of capitalizing on expertise and knowledge held by communities, industry, and the government sector. Establish a coherent national recovery and management plan for the swift recovery of critical national infrastructure following terrorist incidents. The National Risk Assessment should also drive training and capacity for law enforcement agencies, and include specifications with regard to standards of protection in both military and critical civilian systems against cyber attacks and the security of hazardous materials as well as application of passive measures. Second, is taking action against those who defend terrorism and violent extremism and undermine community cohesion. Third is border security, not only physical barriers but also tackling issues of false documentation and multiple-identities. Fourth is protecting against threats from insiders and guarding against the illegal transfer (theft and sale) of identity and security information<sup>41</sup>.

**Target Terrorist Resource Networks.** Institute strict joint border control mechanism with Afghanistan and Iran, undertake selective terrain friction measures through fencing, mining, and surveillance mechanisms, with or without Afghan consent as well as review easement rights and undertake assessment of relocation of villages straddling border regions. Simultaneously develop a maritime counter-terrorism strategy supported by intelligence-led

boarding operations to inspect documentation / cargo. Most importantly target sources of supply and, in this regard, there is need to re-negotiate the terms of Afghan Transit Trade to include an on site inspection / taxation at port of entry along with random spot inspections enroute. This will likely lessen the possibility of arms, logistic support of terrorist organisations. For constraining financial sources, launch a concerted counter-narcotics campaign, with inter-agency and community support. Fully prosecute the requirements of money-laundering legislation and institute mechanisms to dry up financial sources of *Havala /Hundi*, through extension of formal sector to affected areas, and the charitable funding should only to be permitted for government registered Madaris and institutions and be subject to audit.

**Community Engagement.** There is a range of community related recommendations including; establishment of a National Advisory System under NACTA, to provide advice to community on tackling extremism and terrorism and providing a medium to report suspicious activities, initiate youth programmes, sports & extracurricular activities, transform mindsets and promote inter-faith and inter-sectarian harmony by nurturing moderate theological leadership through universities and youth programmes and finally, the government must engage civil society and business community to play a role in development of affected areas through exchange programmes, financial assistance and possible sisterhood of areas, especially between cities of Punjab and Sind with affected areas of KPK and Balochistan.

**International Components.** There are two principle international components, which must be coherent with Pakistan's counter-terrorist strategy. Pakistan's international standing is directly affected by its success in tackling groups which perpetrate not only domestic extremism but also those which pursue an international agenda; legitimacy issues apart, whenever terrorist groups with real or perceived links to Pakistan carry out attacks in other countries, there is inevitably a judgement on Pakistan's ability and sincerity. Secondly regional cooperation is essential to tackling cross-border terrorism especially the terrorism in FATA which cannot be disconnected with the trajectory of Afghani and ISAF

counter-insurgency operations and represents a risk to Pakistan's counter-terrorist strategy.

### **Periodic Review.**

Delivery of the Strategy requires close cooperation between a wide range of organisations and stakeholders: local authorities, government departments, devolved administrations, the police, security agencies and intelligence agencies, emergency services, the Armed Forces international partners and multilateral organisations. Neither intelligence nor implementation mechanisms can be perfect. Due to environmental dynamics, there is a need for constant and comprehensive reviews of the strategies. It is therefore recommended that strategy and adjustments should be reviewed at periodic basis at each level, wherein all the stakeholders, departments and agencies, must give a detailed resume of the progress and identify shortfalls, if any.

### **Timelines**

If history is an example, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Malaysia all took over 25 years, before any semblance of stability began to emerge. Though Pakistan is in the spiral of violence since 2002, there is still some time to go, before the effects of terrorism will began to wane away. As for timelines for success of strategy, there are no quick fixes and each measure requires sincerity and persistence. Unfortunately, considering the impoverished state of economy and internal dissension, time is not on Pakistan's side. Therefore all the proposed measures are required to be initiated on urgent basis i.e. within one year; it is believed that the emergence of any discernible positive effects is likely to vary from medium to long term i.e. 3 to 10 years.

### **Conclusion**

Extremism and terrorism are contemporary challenges to many nations. Such problems do not go away without concerted and well-articulated strategies at national, regional, and global levels. Pakistan has been experiencing more than its fair share of

extremism and terrorism and this paper has attempted to identify gaps in the nation's strategy to counter the problems and proffer a response strategy. However, strategies and policies, no matter how well thought out, are always as good as the ability of the individuals to implement them. There is however optimism that this time around, Pakistan would conscientiously implement an effective counter-extremism/terrorism strategy so that, sooner rather than later, the twin monsters of extremism and terrorism are brought under control in Pakistan.

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*National Security Paper is a joint effort of a seven member panel headed by Brigadier Mirza Kamran Zia, including Commodore Muhammad Hisham (Navy), Air commodore Akmal (Airforce), Mrs Azra Mujtaba(Civil Services), Mr Abu Ahmed Akif(Civil Services), Group Captain David Hayward(UK) and Group Captain OA Akinyele(Nigeria). The group leader Brigadier Kamran Zia is currently working as Director - Center of Excellence for Peacekeeping Studies (CEPS) at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) in National Defence University, Islamabad.*

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> Coined by the panel, in consultation with NDC 09-10.

<sup>3</sup> Crises Management Cell, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, 04 June 2010.

<sup>4</sup> Abou Zahab Mariam ,Sectarian Violence in Pakistan , Local Roots and Global Connection Institute of Regional Studies, Global Terrorism Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures, Pan Graphics Printers Private Limited, P-383.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Hafiz Pasha, heading a panel of Planning Commission economists. source - Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13024>

<sup>6</sup> University of Bradford

<sup>7</sup>Socio-Economic Cost of Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan. Available from: <http://www.pakistanconflictmonitor.org/2010/04/socioeconomic-cost-of-terrorism-a-case-study-of-pakistan.html>

- <sup>8</sup> Nazar Ahmed, “Dissolution of Traditional Institution in Pakistan”, 1996 and interview with Chairman Pakistan Madrassa Board by Panel, May 2010
- <sup>9</sup> Mr. Habib Ullah, Secretary FATA, Presentation on Power point to participants of NDU 2009/10
- <sup>10</sup> Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010
- <sup>11</sup> CIA – The world Fact Book 2010 Pakistan
- <sup>12</sup> Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010
- <sup>13</sup> United Nations Human Development Index 2010
- <sup>14</sup> United Nations Human development Index Report 2010
- <sup>15</sup> Transparency International corruption ratings of countries 2009.
- <sup>16</sup> Source: Review of Judicial Policy, 2009
- <sup>17</sup> Joshua T White, “Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier” CFIA, USA 2008 p3
- <sup>18</sup> Antonio Giustozzi “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop”. The neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan; New York; Columbia Univ Press, 2008.
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- <sup>23</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission (India). Constituted by Presidential Order 2005. Available at [www.arc.gov.in](http://www.arc.gov.in)
- <sup>24</sup> Op cit, Kamala Kanta Dash
- <sup>25</sup> Ali S Awadh Asseri, “Combating Terrorism- Saudi Arabia’s Role in the War on Terror”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009, p 87.
- <sup>26</sup> Stated by President Zardari at the 4<sup>th</sup> Trilateral Summit in Istanbul, January 2010. [http://www.thenews.com.pk/top\\_story\\_detail.asp?Id=26880](http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=26880)
- <sup>27</sup> The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 11  
Aarish Ullah Khan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2005.
- <sup>28</sup> The state’s deliberate distancing from a policy to use Muslim extremist and militant elements for its proxy campaigns began when President Musharraf, in the post 9-11 scenario, jettisoned the Afghan Taliban, and by association all their co-conspirators inside Pakistan, when US demanded a reversal of Pakistan’s politico-military strategy towards Afghanistan and Kashmir. Although some of the sectarian terrorist organizations were proscribed prior to 9/11, the President’s speech of January 12, 2002 was a watershed: “We must check abuse of mosques and Madaris and they must not be used for spreading political and sectarian prejudices.... Our mosques are sacred places where we seek the blessings of God Almighty. Let them remain sacred. We will not allow the misuse of mosques... If

there is any political activity, inciting of sectarian hatred or propagation of extremism in any mosque, the management would be held responsible and proceeded against according to law. We want to ensure that mosques enjoy freedom and we are here to maintain it. At the same time we expect a display of responsibility along with freedom.” (source: [www.millat.com/president/1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf](http://www.millat.com/president/1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf))

<sup>29</sup> ‘Crackdown on Seminaries leads to shake-up in Police: 15 booked under 3 MPO’, *The Dawn* (Karachi), 21 July 2005.

<sup>30</sup> Pickering, S McCulloch, J and Wright Neville D. Counter-terrorist Policing: Community, Cohesion and Security. New York, Springer. 2008.

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<sup>32</sup> Galula, David. Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport Ct. Praeger 1964. Reprinted 2006. p63.

<sup>33</sup> HQ 11 Corps briefing to NDC09/10.

<sup>34</sup> The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (2005) General Sir Rupert Smith KCB, DSO & Bar, OBE, QGM.

<sup>35</sup> Rand Corporation 2008.

<sup>36</sup> NACTA spokesperson 16 February 2010.

<sup>38</sup> A resilient community is defined as a group that takes intentional action to enhance the capacity of its citizens and institutions to both respond to and influence change. Source; Community Relations Manual (2000) The Centre for Community Enterprise Canada Section 1 p5. Available at [www.globalfacilitators.org](http://www.globalfacilitators.org).

<sup>39</sup> A resilient community is defined as a group that takes intentional action to enhance the capacity of its citizens and institutions to both respond to and influence change. Source; Community Relations Manual (2000) The Centre for Community Enterprise Canada Section 1 p5. Available at [www.globalfacilitators.org](http://www.globalfacilitators.org).

<sup>40</sup> The Millennium Development Goals are 8 goals to be achieved by 2015 and drawn from the Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 nations in September 2000. The goals are: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Achieve universal primary education; Promote gender equality and empower women; Reduce child mortality; Improve maternal health; Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Ensure environmental sustainability; and Develop a global Partnership for Development.

<sup>41</sup> Daily Times, Pakistan. 12 April 2010