


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SUMMARIES

Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic Environment

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Dr Jaspal in this paper dwells on an extremely vital theme, which brings out various dimensions of Indian nuclear doctrine and the implications of Indian jingoistic / grandiose ridden mindset for peace and stability of South Asia. The concept of 'Ballistic Missile Defense', aims at Indian psychological and military superiority against its adversaries, particularly Pakistan. It is likely to upset existing nuclear balance of deterrence and is fraught with serious implications, as discussed by the author with convincing arguments.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Emerging Trends & Options for Pakistan

Brigadier Muhammad Khurshid Khan

The concept of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) attained maturity in 1996, after a lapse of four decades. The treaty restricted development of high-tech nuclear warheads by the states, possessing highly developed nuclear weapons programs. The author has enlisted the countries that have ratified the treaty and the states those have not even signed it as yet. There is a lukewarm response from US, China and India on the issue. Though Pakistan supported CTBT, nonetheless, declined to sign it, owing to its own security concerns. The author suggests that international community has to perform a serious role for bringing stability in this region, prior to expecting Pakistan and India to sign the treaty.

The Evolving Nature of Pak-US Relationship

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

Dr Khan in this article touches upon the sensitivities of Pak-US relations, particularly highlighting the irritants and differences over military action in North Waziristan Agency and the so-called safe havens of Haqqani Network. While evaluating the cost benefit analysis, hardly any worthwhile dividend is noticed on part of Pakistan, despite last six decades of bilateral relationship. This asymmetrical alliance has often led to a paradoxical situation for Pakistan. It is imperative for both the countries to reconcile and engage in a positive negotiation process, for evolving better and sincere bonds of relationship, which is essential not only for peace in Afghanistan but also entire South Asia.

Indian Air Force: A Regional Power By 2020

Air Commodore Zia ul Haque Shamsi

Air Commodore Shamsi in this article ponders upon the impact of modern technology, along with air power, as a prevailing factor in changing the nature of warfare. In pursuance of playing a more dominant role in world affairs, Indian leadership in year 2000, unveiled an ambitious plan envisaging India to be recognized in the comity of developed world by 2020. To materialize the ambitious agenda, IAF would also need the support of a modern aerospace industry coupled with research and development organization to sustain it.

Possibility and Implications of an Israeli Strike on Iranian Nuclear Installations

Major Shams uz Zaman

In the contemporary era, Iranian nuclear program has become highly debatable in diplomatic circles as well as among the nations possessing nuclear capability. A spread

wide scepticism exists over Iranian nuclear programme, however, Iran denies various allegations and asserts for its nuclear rights for peaceful purposes. While handling the Iranian nuclear issue, a clear divide is visible among the US and the EU, as the US is willing to use military option, contrary to Europeans quest for a diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, Israeli strike against Iranian nukes can not be ruled out, which will have distressing implications for the region and Pakistan.

Role of Media in Modern Warfare

Air Commodore Asadullah Khan

In this paper, Air Commodore Khan has highlighted the role of media and its impact on the modern warfare. Technology has made the media an active and influential element in armed conflict. The author opines that the media support is crucial to military operations and the Armed Forces must put a deliberate effort to evaluate comprehensive framework for media-military relationship. This article examines potentials, using media as a weapon along with examining some historical trends, addressing current and future issues, and surveying media considerations in current doctrine.

Prospects of Pakistan-Cuba Relations

Ambassador Najm us Saqib

Ever since the Castro's revolution of 1959, Cuba has been an important country from the view point of geopolitical studies. Ambassador Saqib in this article has carried out an analysis of multiple contours of Pak-Cuba relations. The author during his ambassadorial services at Cuba has identified the ways and means to enhance bilateral relations between the two countries. This article also investigates the reasons for non-exploitation of real potential of bilateral relations between Pakistan and Cuba.

Conceptual Framework of Homeland Security: A Case Study of Pakistan

Ms. Afifa Kiran

Ms. Kiran, in this paper, picks up an interesting topic for analysis delved in to bring forth pertinent policy. The concept of 'Homeland Security' is gained significant attention of the intellectuals and scholars all around the globe. The writer undertakes this study in the context of Pakistan and investigates the roles of various law enforcing agencies, weaknesses in their operating mechanisms and measures to bring harmony in existing homeland security apparatus.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Abstract

The construct of nuclear balance of deterrence between India and Pakistan has limited the former's options to coerce the latter in the prevailing conventional-military asymmetry between them. This strategic compromising position of New Delhi has forced it to chalk out a strategy, which could reinstate its militarily advantageous position in the region and also demonstrate its military primacy in the strategic theater of India and Pakistan. New Delhi, therefore, has been endeavoring to develop or acquire new generation of weapon—Ballistic Missile Defense systems. The missile shield is yet to be proven in the battle field. The advancement in technology, however, generates an impression that system would be viable in the near future or at least provide psychological military superiority to its holder. The psychological military superiority and sense of immunity from the ballistic missile strikes of an adversary could create a 'Fortress India' mindset. This mindset would not be conducive or at least problematic for the Strategic Stability, Escalation Control, Nuclear CBMs and Peace Process between India and Pakistan.

Introduction

The nuclear weapons capabilities immensely contributed in India-Pakistan strategic doctrines and military postures. Instead of revolutionizing warfare between belligerent neighbors, the nuclear weapons have necessitated strategic restraint between them without thwarting sub-conventional conflicts. Indeed, nuclear weapons have profound impact on the strategic stability, escalation control, nuclear confidence building measures and peace process between India and Pakistan. The rudimentary nuclear confidence building

measures (NCBMs) have germinated optimism for sustainable peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad. Conversely, arms race, modernization of offensive/defensive missile inventories,¹ Indian Cold Start Doctrine and cross-border infiltration or asymmetric warfare breed strategic anxieties in both India and Pakistan.

The limited border war and sub-conventional conflicts did not escalate into total war between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of their nuclearization in May 1998. The technical level (or weapon buildup and procurement plans) of India and Pakistan strategies, however, indicate that the sustainability and durability of prevailing strategic stability is bound to change or at least would be under continuous destabilizing pressure. This pessimistic conclusion is due to the absence of an arms control agreement/treaty between the strategic competitors. Islamabad's Restraint Regime Proposal has failed to attract New Delhi. The latter seems convinced to destabilize the prevailing balance of terror, a guarantor for strategic stability and escalation control between India and Pakistan by introducing new category of weapon, i.e. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in its arsenals. The BMD being a new weapon could shift a balance of power in its holder's advantage. The review of historical literature reveals that imbalance in power has always been detrimental for strategic stability, escalation control, confidence building measures and peace process between belligerent neighbors.

The balance of power or action-reaction theory predicts that the introduction of BMD in India's arsenal may perhaps oblige Pakistan either to acquire BMD or structure and deploy operational nuclear weapons to solidify its defensive fence. While making its nuclear posture credible, Pakistan would confront an alarming deterrence/management trade-off, what Scott D. Sagan terms the 'vulnerability/invulnerability paradox'.² In theory, the deployment and operationalization of nuclear weapons capability generates a new conflict dynamic that constructs new strategic environment having ingredients of heightened instability.³

The theoretical contribution or primary objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that the introduction of a new category of weapon in South Asia and beyond transforms nuclear postures, which systematically produce differential deterrence and stability effects. This paper is structured into five sections. First section highlights strategic puzzle of India, which compels it to acquire BMD. Second section deals with India's progress in the BMD realm. The third section briefly explains Pakistan's strategic posture and its missile potential. It is followed by the discussion on Pakistan's strategic, economic, technological, safety and security complexities due to the Indian BMD. The final section contains discussion on the likely transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture and its intrinsic impact on the Strategic Stability, Escalation Control, Nuclear CBMs and Peace Process between India and Pakistan.

India's Strategic Puzzle

The use of missiles has altered the offence-defense balance in favor of offense. Pakistan's development of dual-use missiles has exposed India's vulnerability to both preemptive and retaliatory strikes of Pakistan. Therefore, the nuclear weapons coupled with ballistic and cruise missiles have intensified Pakistan's deterrence capability and credibility, and have also forced its militarily superior adversary India to acknowledge and take into account seriously the existing balance of terror between belligerent neighbors in its making of strategy. Consequently, the strategic equilibrium constituted by Pakistan's nuclear weapons had refrained India from military adventurism during the intermittent deadlocks, despite its superiority in the conventional weapons, gigantic defence budget and numerical strength of armed forces personals.

The following table assists us in understanding the asymmetry in war-fighting capabilities of India and Pakistan.

States	Defence Budget in US \$ 2009	Active Troops	Paramilitary forces	Population
India	35.88 billions	1,325,000	1,300,586	1,156,897,766
Pakistan	4.11 billions	617,000	304,000	174,578,558

Source: *The Military Balance 2010: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, February 2010). pp. 359, 367.

The construct of the balance of terror between India and Pakistan limits former's options to influence the latter in the prevailing strategic environment of South Asia. This strategic compromising position of New Delhi has forced it to chalk out a strategy, which will reinstate its militarily advantageous position in the region and also demonstrate its military superiority in the strategic theater of India and Pakistan. New Delhi, therefore, has been endeavoring to develop or acquire new category of weapons, including BMD. The Indian strategic pundits believe that the BMD will effectively protect it against retaliatory or last resort Pakistan's nuclear capable ballistic missile strikes. In simple term, India's BMD advancement could be described as an effort to acquire the ability to attack Pakistan without a risk of retaliatory ballistic missile strikes annihilation.

Admittedly, the BMD is yet to be proven in the battle field. The advancement in technology, however, generates an impression that system would be viable in the near future or at least provide psychological military superiority to its holder. Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then the President of India stated on February 24, 2007, that: "In the next two decades, anti-ballistic missile defense systems are going to be a major force, after which space systems and strategic military satellites will come in a big way, to guard against nuclear weapons attack."⁴ President Kalam's strategic prediction, the United States investment in the research and development of the BMD, and Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi veto against the

Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament in 2005 prove that missile defensive shield are a new mantra in the present strategic discourse and will immensely influence militarily insecure nation-state's chalking out of nuclear deterrence strategy.⁵

India's BMD Program

The shift in the global strategic environment in the aftermath of the Cold War and emergence of new actors on the Washington strategic chess-board (termed as rogue states or axis of evils by Bush Administration) transformed the United States threat perception and encouraged the debate on the subject of BMD in the American strategic enclave. This constituted a powerful bi-partisan American strategists lobby in favor of controversial missile defense shield. The proponents of the BMD systems argued that credible deterrence could no longer be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation.⁶ They claimed that states like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya posed serious threats to United States security because of their modest ballistic missile capabilities, coupled with their antagonism towards the United States and its allies.⁷ The Americans interest in the BMD instigated a few other states, including India to acquire missile-shield to solidify their respective security fences.

Presently, the New Delhi rejects regional arms control agreement, such as nuclear restraint regime and is investing colossal amount of money to build and acquire sophisticated weapons, including BMD. The Indian policy-makers seem convinced that a militarily weak nation will not be able to protect its economic strength. Wg Cdr Anand Sharma pointed out: "For India to achieve and maintain a continental status in the future, it needs to match or outdo adversary's capabilities."⁸ This strategic mindset germinated New Delhi's consistency in institutionalizing sophisticated BMD system to reverse the prevailing strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. Indeed, the Indian BMD program faces formidable technical challenges despite the Israel and United States

assistance, and thereby would be unlikely to be militarily effective anytime in the near future. Despite the technological challenges, New Delhi has been steadily investing in this sector since mid-1980s. A. Vinod Kumar pointed out that “there is greater acceptance in the country [India] on the need to invest in affordable interception capabilities, be it through the indigenous route or through other sources of technology assimilation.”⁹ Hence, New Delhi’s pursuit for BMD would continue.

The review of literature confirms that prototype BMD program was a part of India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program initiated in 1983.¹⁰ New Delhi termed its BMD system as an indigenous system catering to India specific security needs. The close scrutiny, however, contradict this assertion. In the beginning New Delhi was relying on the Russian ABM technology, i.e. the Russian Antey 2500/ S-300VM and Russian Almaz S-300 PMU-1/2.¹¹ In 1990s it instituted defense cooperation with Tel Aviv and acquired a few components of Israeli Arrow-2 Missile Defense System.¹² Israel transferred to India, its Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon-Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.¹³ The Arrow system was designed to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.¹⁴ Christer Ahistrom pointed out: “Finally, in 2001 it became known that India sought to purchase the interceptor of the AWS- the Arrow 11 — to be used in connection with its indigenously developed Akash theatre defense missile.”¹⁵ India also purchased from Israel Elta Green-pine radar. The Elta Green-pine radar is phased array L-band radar, having dual mode operation — early warning and fire control and long range acquisition capability — several hundred kilometers. It simultaneously tracks dozens of Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM) and also discriminates between TBMs, aircraft and other missiles. It also possesses ECCM and transportability capabilities. These features makes Green-pine radar capable to detect missile launches up to 500 kilometers away and is able to track targets at speeds over 3,000 km/s.¹⁶ It was reported that in addition to the Russian and Israeli missiles, India had also made requests for the American Patriot PAC-3.

President Bush announced that United States would assist its allies in the development of their BMD programs on May 1, 2001.¹⁷ This announcement had a constructive impact on the Indian BMD program. Instead of opposing new category of weapon entailing arms race internationally, New Delhi right away endorsed President Bush's Strategic Framework in the second week of May 2001. The affirmative response of the New Delhi on the BMD had laid the foundation for future Indo-US military equipment cooperation including American Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile defense system.¹⁸ In February 2003, Mr. Kanwal Sibal, the then Indian Foreign Secretary of India pointed out that "Nowhere has this engagement grown more than in the area of defense and, given the near absence of any defense cooperation in the past, the change has been nothing short of dramatic."¹⁹ In the following years, Washington and New Delhi military cooperation increased. For instance, BMD was one of the four items in the 'US-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership' (NSSP) in January 2004.²⁰ Subsequently, in June 2005, the New Delhi and Washington had signed a 10-year "US - India Defense Relationship - The Defense Framework", paving a way for joint weapons production, cooperation on the missile defense and possible lifting of the US export controls for sensitive military technologies.²¹ The clause H of the agreement seeks to expand collaboration relating to BMD.²²

The Obama Administration continued previous Administration's policies towards India. Since November 2010, the Obama administration has been supporting India's full membership in four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). India's full membership in these regimes would facilitate India in transferring dual use technology for both military and peaceful uses, uninterruptedly. In the beginning of 2011, after more than a decade of sanctions, Washington has ended export restrictions on India's defense and space industries. The blacklisted Indian organizations, including the Defense

Research and Development Organization, which develops weapons, have been cleared.²³

The preceding developments certainly positively contribute in India's BMD program. Presently, the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is perfecting two tiered missile defense system consisting of two different interceptor missiles namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD)/ Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor for high altitude interception or upper-tier exo-atmospheric defenses; and the Advanced Air Defense (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception or lower-tier theatre for dedicated Ballistic Missile Defense applications.²⁴ In November 2006, an interception of an incoming missile was conducted in exothermic mode. It indicated that India acquired capability to engage and intercept incoming missile in space, such that the debris would burn up before reaching in the earth's surface.

India did the AAD interceptor test from Wheeler Island to destroy a Prithvi target missile launched earlier from the Interim Test Range at Chandipur 72 km to its North on December 6, 2007.²⁵ In this test the interception of an incoming missile was conducted in endothermic mode. It demonstrated that if the attempt of engagement in space fails, the AAD missile or the endo-atmospheric variant would engage the target at about 20 km height. Significantly, after the third successful anti-ballistic missile test on March 06, 2009, the DRDO announced that it had achieved its objective of developing a two-layered defensive system.²⁶ The third BMD test also involved testing of the indigenously developed "Swordfish" long-range tracking radar. Wg Cdr Anand Sharma pointed out: "This radar is an acknowledged derivative of the Israeli Green Pine long range radar and has been developed by DRDO in collaboration with Israel and France."²⁷ The Indian scientists pointed out that this two-tiered shield would be able to intercept any incoming missile launched 5,000 kilometers away. The Indian officials claimed that initial tests were exceptionally successful. In reality, claims of BMD

effectiveness are questionable at this early stage of development.²⁸

India's BMD deployment plausible options were discussed by Nathan Cohn. He pointed out that one plausible deployment is a defense of India's leadership and the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) around New Delhi. The mission would be to protect the Indian leadership from the threat of a decapitating nuclear attack. Second, option is a thin and perhaps symbolic defense of India's two most iconic cities, New Delhi, the seat of the government, and Mumbai, the commercial capital and the location of significant nuclear infrastructure. Third, option is for BMD to accompany Indian troops in carrying out Cold Start Doctrine announced in April 2004. If one critically examines the utility of the Indian BMD in the near future, it seems that out of these three options of deployments, the most appropriate as well destabilizing could be the BMD utility in the Cold Start Doctrine. The BMD deployment would provide shield to the offensive integrated battle groups against the Pakistani tactical missiles. Though the operational affectability of the BMD in the battlefield is debatable, yet their deployment would give confidence to the Indians field commanders.

Pakistan's Strategic Posture

Pakistan jealously guards its regional strategic autonomy and nuclear weapons capability. It had rejected UN Resolution of 1172—which recommended that Islamabad in conjunction with other states that have not yet done so, to become party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.²⁹ In addition, Islamabad has been sticking with its stance on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament. On July 28, 2011, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly, acting Pakistani Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar struck a note of caution against taking negotiations for the FMCT outside the 65-member Conference, saying, "Pakistan will not join any such process nor would it consider accession to the outcome of any

such process.”³⁰ Islamabad has been convinced that its’ nuclear and missiles programs are instrument for maintaining minimum nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India. The primary purpose of these weapons development has been to achieve a strategic equilibrium entailing strategic stability by building a capacity to bear a pre-emptive or surprise aggressive nuclear strikes and still be able to respond with a force that could cause unacceptable damage to the adversary. In reality, through nuclear posture, Islamabad has aspired to accomplish various objectives, i.e. dissuade the adversary from contemplating aggression; deter potential enemies; increase bargaining leverage; reduce dependence on allies; and acquire military independence by reducing dependence on external sources of military hardware.³¹

The conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan increases the latter’s reliance on its nuclear weapons. That is why; Islamabad has adopted a first-use nuclear posture. Vipin Narang pointed out that: “A state with this posture [first-use] must therefore have sufficient tactical and potentially survivable second-strike strategic weapons to absorb potential retaliation.”³² The significance of tactical nuclear weapons is debatable, but retaliatory capability is of course is essential. Nevertheless, the credibility requirements of first-use posture generate severe command and control pressures that increase the risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

Islamabad has been employing both diplomatic and arms-buildup approaches to preserve the credibility of its minimum nuclear deterrence since the May 1998. In the diplomatic realm, Islamabad repeatedly propagated its ‘Nuclear Restraint Regime Proposal’ to India. The proposal was based on credible nuclear deterrence at the minimum possible level, including non-induction of anti-ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the region.³³ Nuclear restraint regime proposal qualified to be labeled as ‘Arms Control’ proposal. It reflects that through arms control proposal Islamabad desires to reduce the probability of war between India and Pakistan; the costs of preparations for war with its eastern adversary, and the death and destruction if control

fails and war becomes inevitable.³⁴ The Nuclear Restraint Proposal also manifests that Islamabad has been in pursuit of three objectives: recognition of strategic parity between India and Pakistan by the former; upholding strategic stability in the subcontinent with recessed-deterrence capabilities; and minimizing war-fighting preparations expenses. New Delhi rejected this proposal citing threat emanating from Chinese military muscle. In reality, the proposal was rejected because the Indians were not willing to concede parity to Pakistan and the missiles buildup was meant to engage Islamabad in the spiral of a costly and self-destructive arms race.

Islamabad's failure to entangle New Delhi in the bilateral arms control apparatus necessitated the former to advance its nuclear weapons delivery vehicles to sustain balance of terror with its adversary for the sake of deterrence stability. The deterrence stability depends on the ability of belligerent states, especially the strategically defensive one, to keep credible its war-fighting ability, by demonstrating both military capacity and political resolve, the threat to go to war. This arrangement is essential for strategic stability between India and Pakistan. Ciro Elliott Zoppo argued: "The military capacity built and maintained over time, must be capable of inflicting such pain and destruction on the enemy as to deprive him of incentives for surprise or pre-emptive attack (either out of confidence or in desperation)."³⁵ This defensive philosophy which is only the prospect of retaliation in kind — an eye for an eye — could act as any sort of restraint,³⁶ encourages and justifies modernization of missile program, which resulted in the invention of dynamic indigenous nuclear-tipped cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles to be fired from land, air and sea. Islamabad successfully tested nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles and has also given short and medium range ballistic missiles to its armed forces.

Pakistan successfully conducted the 1st flight test of its newly developed Short Range Surface to Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX (NASR) on April 19, 2011. According to the ISPR press release, "the NASR missile, with a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with

high accuracy and shoot & scoot attributes. This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats.”³⁷ The Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai announced that “the test was a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.”³⁸ He added “that in the hierarchy of military operations, the NASR Weapon System now provides Pakistan with short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.”³⁹ The statement of General Kidwai and the range and payload of the NASR missile indicate that it is a ‘tactical nuclear weapon’. In simple terms, it is a low yield battlefield nuclear weapon, which is capable of deterring and inflicting punishment on mechanized forces like armed brigades and divisions envisaged in India’s Cold Start Doctrine.⁴⁰ The following table contains brief information about Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles.

Pakistan’s Missiles

Name	Fuel	Alternate Names	Range (km)	Pay Load (kg)	Test Firings	Developer	Status
Hatf-1	Solid		70-100	500	April 1989	KRL	In service since 1996
Hatf-1A	Solid		100	500	February 2000	KRL	In service?
Hatf-2	Solid	Abdali	260-300	500	April 1989	KRL	In service?
Hatf-3	Solid		800	?	July 1997?	KRL?	Not deploy
Hatf-4	Solid	Shaheen-1	750	1000	April 1999	NDC	In service
Hatf-5	Liquid	Ghauri-1	1100-1500	700	April 1998	KRL	In service
Hatf-6	Solid	Shaheen-2	2400-	1000	March	NDC	?

			2500		2004		
M-9	Solid	CSS-6/DF-15	600-650	500	?	China	Supplied?
M-11	Solid	CSS-/DF-11	300	500-800	?	China	30-80 supplied
Hatf-7	Cruise	Babar	500-700	?	August 2005		?
Hatf-8	Cruise	Ra'ad	300	?			Not deploy
Hatf-9	Solid	NASR	60	?	April 2011	NDC	Not deploy

Pakistan's Strategic Complexities

The New Delhi's determination to engineer and deploy BMD systems would not only solidify its defensive fence and increase its military options vis-à-vis its strategic rivals in the Southern Asia, but also multiply Islamabad's strategic complexities. The Indian scientific elite confidently articulated country's BMD's scientific sanguinity and strategic significance. In December 2007, Dr. V K Saraswat, a leading scientist of the India DRDO, announced that: "within three years major cities such as Delhi and Mumbai would be under a protective shield. A county, which has a small arsenal, will think twice before it ventures."⁴¹ It was an indirect reference to Pakistan's limited nuclear capability and a clear warning to Islamabad that once the Indian major cities would be under the missile-shield, it would not be able to uphold credible deterrence against India. A. Vinod Kumar pointed out: "Pakistan's mounted missile capability and fledging nuclear arsenal could be the main stimulants for India's missile defense planning. There is a feeling that Pakistan might have gained a narrow edge in missile capability, neutralizing India's conventional superiority, which emboldens Pakistan to pursue a proxy war in Kashmir."⁴² This understanding about Pakistan's missile potential and determination to negate

Pakistan's strategic autonomy logically justifies the Indian BMD buildup. Simultaneously undermines Pakistan's deterring capability or at least its deterrence credibility.

The current Indian BMD inventory — Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile — indicate that it would target and destroy Pakistan's offensive ballistic missiles at the two different stages, i.e. exo-atmospheric interception or mid-course; and endo-atmospheric interception. The PAD is designed for exo-atmospheric interception. The exo-atmospheric interception means attacking the adversary's missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it, when the attacking missile is traveling outside the atmosphere. Nevertheless, it requires that India acquire complete inventories of Israel's Arrow missile and American PAC-3 to target Pakistan's striking ballistic missiles in the mid-course. The Arrow-2 uses a mobile two-stage interceptor missile carrying a blast-fragmentation warhead. Notably, Patriot PAC-3 is designed to defend limited areas from short and medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.⁴³ It seems that both Arrow-2 and Patriot PAC-3 would be the effective weapon against the short and medium range missiles or they could be employed for defending counter force targets.

The AAD is designed for endo-atmospheric interception. The endo-atmospheric interception means attacking the missiles or their warheads during the re-entry phase in the lower denser atmosphere, i.e. when the offensive ballistic missile is approaching its target within the atmosphere. Technically speaking, as the warhead descends back towards the earth, the atmospheric gases heat it while it is approaching the target. Once a warhead begins atmospheric re-entry, it is less than two minutes away from detonation at the target.⁴⁴ According to the tactical calculations, intercepting during the re-entry phase or within the atmosphere is easier for the BMD because warhead is highly visible to radar and to optical sensors due to very hot 'wake' produced by the Mach-23 RV as it enters the atmosphere, balloons and light chaff are no longer effective against sensors; they are retarded or

destroyed on re-entry. Conversely, the worrying factor in this case is that little time is left to respond and destroy approaching missile at this point. Secondly, it is recommended that the warhead must be destroyed twenty miles above the earth; otherwise there is fall-out damage.⁴⁵

Pakistan's tactical and short-medium range missiles could be intercepted by the inventories such as Arrow, PAC-3, S-300 coupled in conjunction with the Greenpine or Protivnik-GE radars. The BMD would also intensify capabilities of the Indian air-defense system. In the words of A. Vinod Kumar "anti-aircraft roles of the air defense systems have a significant operational role; it could ideally be assimilated into a comprehensive architecture of air and missile defense system so as to garner optimal utilization of resources."⁴⁶ The Indians current effort to create BMD systems for lower and upper tiers application would upgrade the Indian air defense system. The upgrading or improvement in the air defence system undermines Pakistan's air force striking capability.

The technological estimate reveals that the BMD are defensive weapon systems but these components could be employed to augment the offensive ballistic missile potential. Scientifically, it is too difficult to make a distinction between an offensive ballistic missiles and BMD systems, except the latter is designed only for counter-force targets. During the crisis nothing would prevent BMD that could strike a ballistic missile in its boost phase from hitting it in its silo or at pre-launch position. Moreover, BMD systems equipped nation attain the confidence to go on the offensive against its adversary with impunity. These assessments underline that the mobile BMD certainly increase New Delhi's confidence in operationalization of its Cold Start Doctrine, announced in April 2004. The Doctrine envisaged the creation of up to eight battle groups—comprising armour, mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery, backed by close air support—capable of mobilizing rapidly and carrying out fast, surgical operations against targets in Pakistan, without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold.

Pakistan's Countermeasures

The strategic analysts have divergent opinion regarding the Indian BMD ramifications for the Pakistani deterrence credibility. Despite this discrepancy in perceptions, the strategic pundits have a consensus that Indian BMD would compel Islamabad to take countermeasures for solidifying its defensive fence or restoring the confidence of its people on its nuclear deterrent capability. It is because, irrespective of the Indian BMD effectiveness, uncertainty would prevail in the minds of the Pakistani decision-makers when a missile shield is in place. Hypothetically speaking, India would apply pre-emption military methodology to confront Shaheen-2 and Ghauri-1 ballistic missiles of Pakistan. It would launch precision pre-emptive missile strikes to destroy Pakistan's missile launch-sites after detecting by powerful Greenpine or Protivnik-GE radars or satellites, while ensuring India's own territorial defense through its comprehensive missile defense shield. This kind of strategic environment obviously necessitate Islamabad to revise its nuclear deterrence strategy, which is based on force-in-being and non-deployment to maintain its nuclear forces on a destabilizing launch-on-warning posture. Such a strategic compulsion would also increase financial investment in the missile sector, which would be an added devastating burden on its fragile economy. Despite the budgetary constraints, Islamabad has been compelled to revise its technical level of strategy and nuclear posture. In this context, it could take the following steps.

First, Pakistan would see India's BMD together with New Delhi's decision to reject the nuclear restraint proposal, as signaling an emergent India bias toward reliance on missile defensive shield and moving away from its declaratory minimum nuclear deterrence posture. Islamabad is obliged to respond to the Indian BMD by accelerating its nuclear modernization program and expands its strategic deterrent capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively. The simplest way would be to overwhelm the Indian BMD with a large number of delivery vehicles and warheads. In arithmetic term, it is much easier to send one more vehicle and warhead to the

target than what is required to defend against it. Hence, the Indian BMD would bolster Islamabad's investment in a more robust nuclear triad. Within the triad, as Pakistan's nuclear offensive program come to fruition, it becomes indispensable to replace single warhead missiles with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), with up to 10 reentry vehicles (RVs) per missile. The RVs reenter the earth's atmosphere at very high velocities to dodge the Indian missile defense systems.

Second, Pakistan presently neither constitutes an operational nuclear arsenal nor maintaining nuclear force on a hair-trigger alert. Nuclear warheads are stored physically separate from missile launchers. With the transformation and buildup of adversary's offensive and defensive military muscle, Islamabad could mate its nuclear warheads with the delivery systems to match the eventuality. It is more likely to deploy its offensive nuclear forces in the hair-trigger alert mode. Pakistan's hair-trigger alert deployed nuclear weapons would sacrifice a substantial degree of assertive and centralized control over its nuclear assets, especially in crisis situation that increases the possibility of the nuclear weapons being used by accident or inadvertence. The National Command Authority would be under stress, mainly because of nuclear weapons deployed on silo-based missile launchers and on submarine launched systems would be kept on hair-trigger alert and thereby the time available to decision-makers for reacting to an ambiguous event would be correspondingly short. In this case the National Command Authority would be obliged to delegate launching decision-making power to the local commanders. Though, Islamabad's nuclear posture having operational component adds destabilizing variables in the regional strategic environment that alarms the international community, yet it is very much an outcome of the Indian BMD.

Third, the Indian BMD would transform the relaxed minimum deterrence posture i.e. de-alerted nuclear force, which discourages further nuclear tests into a maximalist nuclear war-fighting capability on a higher state of alert —

quick-launch posture. Pakistan's solid-fuelled propellant ballistic missiles have inbuilt capability to be deployed or operationalized for a longer period, and thereby could be launched within a minute of receiving the launch command orders during the crisis. A modernized Pakistani nuclear force and more quick-launch posture will have a negative cascading effect in the South Asian strategic environment. The quick-launch posture of Pakistan would intensify India's threat perception. Consequently, both India and Pakistan would supplement their nuclear forces with modernization and postures advancement. The process of modernization and up gradation of nuclear forces would result in the resumption of nuclear testing to develop lighter plutonium, thermonuclear and enhanced radiation warheads for a potential MIRVed ballistic missile force. Hence, Islamabad ought to remain outside the framework on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Implications for Strategic Environment

The preceding discussion proves that India has been seriously engaged in developing and acquiring BMD. The introduction of BMD in India-Pakistan strategic environment necessitates Islamabad to improve qualitatively and quantitatively its missile inventories. This action-reaction syndrome intensify security dilemma puzzle of both India and Pakistan. The security dilemma not only keeps going on arms race between the belligerent neighbors, but also germinates destabilizing miscalculation and misperceptions. The miscalculations and misperceptions are always prone to war.

Second, Pakistan's nuclear posture remains at a pre-deployed stage. The Indian BMD would compel Pakistan to transform its nuclear posture from pre-deployed stage to deploy or hair-trigger stage. This step-forward movement would have inbuilt destabilizing variable. As the warheads are mated to the delivery systems and these systems get deployed, issues of unauthorized launch stemming from pre-delegation of authority would begin to surface. Pre-delegation of authority to its local commanders to use nuclear weapons

would be unavoidable for Pakistan, as its primary command post remains vulnerable to decapitation strikes by Indian missiles due to geographical contiguity and non-availability of the BMD to Islamabad to protect the Pakistani leadership from the threat of a decapitating nuclear attack.

Third, in theoretical term, a defensive buildup creates pressures for offensive countermeasures. Therefore, the deployment of BMD and nuclear capable missiles would intensify or expand conflict. At the same time tension between India and Pakistan would be further exacerbated leading to the destabilization of the region.

Fourth, the calculus of real-politic holds that India behind the safe missile shield might be more likely to adopt military adventurous policies against Pakistan. Therefore, the acquisition of BMD would encourages New Delhi to carry out its Cold Start Doctrine, or impose the limited war on Pakistan, without the fear of latter's nuclear retaliation or repercussion of the escalation of conventional war into nuclear war.

Fifth, Islamabad views the Indian BMD program intensely threatening to its security, because it is primarily intended to allow India to attack the Pakistan without the fear of retaliation. For instance, by neutralizing Pakistan's retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of its missile defense system, India could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. More precisely, the Pakistani retaliatory strike that follows Indian surprise attack would be significantly degraded. In the words of Michael Quinlan: "sudden strike and the use thereafter of systems such as Arrow to ward off surviving retaliatory capability might give India a pre-emptive option."⁴⁷ Similarly, the United States Congressional Research Service study pointed out that Indian BMD capability could destabilize the current state of deterrence between India and Pakistan.⁴⁸

Sixth, India's BMD would shift the strategic balance between India and Pakistan to the advantage of the former, and thereby India could assume a more aggressive posture in

its dealing with Pakistan. Such an environment would oblige Pakistan to develop a more robust deterrence, which would be the likely response, leading to an increase in the number of nuclear delivery systems and fissile material. A strong Islamabad nuclear response to changes in its strategic balance with New Delhi would inevitably raise the strategic temperature between India and Pakistan, something that would have an adverse impact on the nuclear deterrence stability in the region. Accordingly, a more aggressive and unstable nuclear relationship may emerge in South Asia. The implications are summarized in the following two tables.

Scenario System Cause effect Outcome

Scenario 1	BMD	Power transition	Generate misperceptions/ Miscalculation	Anti-NCBMs & peace process
Scenario 2	BMD	Destabilize Balance of Power	Advantageous state become aggressor	Instability/War
Scenario 3	BMD	New category/ Generation of Weapon	Arms Race	Security dilemma/strategic instability
Scenario 4	MBD	Countermeasures	deployments	Escalation

Weapon Situations Influence

BMD	Strategic Stability	Negative impact
BMD	Escalation Control	Negative impact
BMD	Nuclear CBMs	Shrink the zone of cooperation: Negative
BMD	Peace Process	Coercive behaviour/negative

Conclusion

The ballistic missiles coupled with nuclear weapons have provided Pakistan the capability to bypass the battlefield and hit New Delhi or strategic targets in the Indian heartland and also far-away into the South-India with relative impunity. This striking capability brought a profound change in both the Indian and Pakistani strategic thinking. Though the geographical contiguity questioned the operational operability of Indian BMD against Pakistani ballistic missiles or the BMD have dismal operational limitations against Pakistan's ballistic missiles, yet the missile shield possesses the potential to destabilize a decade long strategic stability between the belligerent neighbors. It contains the ingredients that create a 'Fortress India' mindset due to which New Delhi could prefer military adventurism against nuclear capable Pakistan.

The strategic calculations signify that the introduction of BMD in the Indian arsenal could undermine Pakistan's nuclear deterrence credibility. Islamabad, therefore, has been adamantly opposing BMD introduction in the South Asia strategic theatre by proposing Nuclear Restraint Regime at various occasions to New Delhi. It is hardly surprising given the limited number of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that Islamabad has developed as part of its deterrence posture. Pakistan has pursued a minimum deterrence strategy, and thereby having comparatively small nuclear force. This underscores that Islamabad's deterring capability could be compromised by the rudimentary BMD. Conversely, if Islamabad constitutes countermeasures to the adversary's BMD, it will create additional unbearable technological and financial burden on the country's exchequer.

The Indian BMD would undermine the credibility of Pakistan's strategic nuclear deterrent based on a handful of ballistic missiles, and thereby increase Islamabad's vulnerability to Indian's military coercion. If its strategic deterrent is rendered ineffective, Islamabad would lose the means to attempt to deter New Delhi military coercion in the event of a future deterioration in India-Pakistan relations.

This threat assessment made it clear that BMD would compel Islamabad to expand its nuclear and missile arsenal — both quantitatively and qualitatively — to ensure a capability to overwhelm any BMD deployed by India. To sum up, the Indian BMD would create an enormous spiral in offensive nuclear arms — a situation in which there would be far less stability, and limited security for both India and Pakistan.

Author

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Notes

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COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: EMERGING TRENDS & OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Brigadier Muhammad Khurshid Khan

Abstract

Starting from 1954 when India first proposed the concept of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the debate took over four decades before it was finalized. Formal negotiations between the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and the former Soviet Union started in 1958 which continued through 1970s/80s with occasional breakdowns and finally, the treaty was concluded in September 1996. The treaty focuses on two fold objectives: One, it makes it difficult for states with advanced nuclear weapons programs to develop new types of nuclear warheads and it makes it far more complex for nations aspiring to develop these weapons to test-proof their capabilities. Out of 180 signatories, 148 have ratified the treaty. Three states namely, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not even signed the treaty. The outcome of Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicates that like Bush, Obama administration is also less enthusiastic about the issue. China has taken backseat on the issue while India though non committal is also likely to resist. With regards to Pakistan, history proves that it has always joined its voice in building a global consensus in favour of nuclear restraints and voted in favour of the CTBT however, later it did not sign due to serious security concerns.

Introduction

The CTBT is the “longest sought and hardest fought for arms control treaty in history,” which obligates countries that sign and ratify “not to carry out any nuclear weapon(s) test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.”¹ While signing of the treaty took over fifty years since 1945 but negative applications of this technology were realized when it was used

by the US against Japan, necessitating a serious positive response to control/ manage this deadly technology. To resolve the problem of two interconnected concepts i.e. assurance of non proliferation of nuclear weapons and supply and services to manage the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the US advanced Acheson-Lilienthal concept during 1946 by proposing an Atomic Development Authority to regulate nuclear activities which met with resistance from the former Soviet Union.²

The concept of the CTBT was first proposed by India during 1954 which did not materialize during the Cold War era. The high moral ground that India achieved during 1950s could not be maintained later as it blocked consensus in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on ground that the treaty should include a specific commitment by the nuclear weapon state(s) (NWS) to eliminate their weapons in a negotiated finite span of time, and made its support of the draft treaty contingent on such a commitment and also rejected the treaty entry into force (EIF) formula.³ The formal negotiations between the US, the UK, and the former Soviet Union first started in 1958 which continued through 1970s/80s *with occasional breakdowns* and finally, the treaty was concluded in September 1996. During this intervening period, Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed which prohibited the nuclear weapon test explosion other than those conducted underground.⁴

Unlike the last US administration, President Obama created optimism and gave impetus to make this world free of nuclear weapons in his speech at Prague on April 05, 2009 in which he outlined his vision for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system. He said that "after more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned".⁵ His speech raised the expectations of concrete steps by the US towards the elimination of nuclear arsenal that may in fact, not be met certainly not, as he himself said, 'in his lifetime'.⁶ Ratification of the treaty by the Congress would be the first indicator to prove that the US is in fact, sincere towards the underlined objective of ultimately

creating a nuclear free world that might bring tremendous pressure on other countries including possibly China.

Pakistan has always pursued the idea of nuclear non-proliferation aggressively at the international and regional levels. It is among one of the leading countries that has contributed massively towards this end by initiating fresh approaches in the regional context and also supporting international community in their efforts. However, since the last over one decade, strategic security environment in this region have changed from bad to worse therefore, it is unlikely that Pakistan would risk its national security interests by signing the CTBT without obtaining plausible assurances from international community.⁷

In this backdrop, this paper aims at highlighting following key aspects of the CTBT: one, salient contours of the treaty including its brief history, two, renewed debate in the US on the CTBT, three, the emerging scenarios in the aftermath of the US renewed non-proliferation approach and the international response, four, signing of the treaty by Pakistan and its implications and finally policy options. This paper does not focus on technical aspects of the issue rather primarily takes into account security and political fallout of the treaty especially on Pakistan.

Salient Features of the CTBT

The CTBT preamble states, the treaty is “a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.”⁸ It bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,” that focuses on two fold objectives: one, it makes it far more difficult for states with advanced nuclear weapons programs to develop new types of nuclear warheads and it makes it more difficult for nations aspiring to develop these weapons to proof test their capabilities and develop more advanced types of nuclear warheads that could be placed and delivered by ballistic missiles. But the treaty does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, nor does it prohibit non-nuclear explosions that may

be relevant to maintaining them such as hydrodynamic tests, hydro-nuclear experiments, or computer simulations.

State seeking to develop nuclear weapons may not need to conduct a test to build a simple fission bomb however, such tests would be necessary to develop more complex and powerful thermonuclear weapons. Testing would also be necessary for a new nuclear state to develop small warheads for ballistic or cruise missiles, thus CTBT puts limits on such developments. EIF of the treaty would consolidate political and practical progress in treaty implementation and would also bring permanency to the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization (CTBTO), located at Vienna which comprises of three entities, the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.

The treaty has been signed by 180 states and ratified by 148.⁹ The salient of the treaty includes: one, it contains 17 Articles, Annex Part I and II including list of states and protocol consists of Part I and II which elaborates about detailed procedures involved in CTBTO and steps required for conducting on site inspections. Two, the treaty shall EIF after 180 days of the deposit of instruments of ratification by 44 designated states (the list of 44 includes the member countries of the CD that had an advanced civilian nuclear capability at the time of the treaty negotiations—that is, they possessed nuclear research or power reactors, require for EIF of the treaty).¹⁰ Of the 44 states, following six states - China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the US - have signed but yet to ratify while India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not even signed the treaty. Three, the treaty provides for an extensive verification regime, the CTBTO including an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions, a global infrastructure for satellite communications from IMS stations to an International Data Centre (IDC) that processes and distributes data to state parties.

Four, the CTBT groups the states into six geographical regions to ensure equitable geographic representation on the

Executive Council of the CTBTO. One region comprises nations in the Middle East and South Asia including three de facto NWS: India, Israel and Pakistan. Five, the treaty will have a total of 321 seismological, hydro-acoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring stations capable of detecting possible nuclear explosions underground, in water, and in the atmosphere, are to be located in 90 countries. Of this, one seismological and one infrasound station will be located in Pakistan. 250 stations are in place which means the system is 75 percent ready. Six, the provisions of on-site inspection contained in Article 4 and the Protocol are comprehensive and detailed but politically most sensitive which involves physical presence on the sovereign territory of a state. Every member state has a right to request for an onsite inspection however, 30 of the 51 member of Executive Council must vote to authorize the action. Seven, a Preparatory Commission consisting of the signatory states, supported by a provisional technical secretariat, and having the standing of an independent, international, intergovernmental organization, serves to ensure that the necessary steps are in place before the treaty EIF and finally, the treaty is of unlimited duration however, consistent with most arms control treaties; it also provides right to withdraw on six months' notice if a state decides that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests".

CTBT: A Brief History

As earlier indicated, it is the "longest sought and hardest fought for arms control treaty in history". During 1954, the idea was floated by India and called for a 'standstill agreement' on nuclear testing, the first initiative of its kind. Nevertheless, a formal debate between the US, UK and Russia started in 1958, as a first step toward a test-ban treaty, during which both the US and Russia temporarily suspended nuclear testing. During May 1960, negotiation broke on U-2 incident but later in the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crises of 1962; enough political pressure was built for negotiations of a test-ban treaty. Consequently, the LTBT was signed on August 05, 1963 and EIF on October 10, 1963 which is a trilateral

agreement that halted atmospheric, underwater and outer space nuclear tests.¹¹

The LTBT was supplement during 1974 and 1976, respectively as parties to LTBT also signed threshold test ban treaty (TTBT), and a treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNET), limiting threshold level up to 150 kilotons in both cases. On June 01, 1990, the US and Russia signed the verification protocols to the un-ratified TTBT and PNET, and on September 25/ October 09, 1990, TTBT and PNET were ratified by them which EIF on December 11, 1990. During October, 1977, Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) talks began in Geneva between the US, UK, and Russia that continued for three years. The parties agreed that the treaty would ban all nuclear weapons tests, suspend Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) until they can be distinguished from weapons tests, establish an extensive verification regime (including national technical means and seismic monitoring stations), and permit onsite inspections to ensure confidence in the treaty though differences remained on related issues including treaty's status after its three-year term but by 1979, the negotiations were overshadowed by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and, later, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹²

Negotiations on the CTBT had direct linkage with 1968 NPT as the CTBT has been specifically stated in the preamble and Article VII of the NPT as an objective to be achieved in the process of moving toward nuclear disarmament. Completing and implementing a universally applicable, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable CTBT not later than 1996 was also one of the objectives specified in the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely during 1995 NPT Review Conference[s] (RevCon).¹³ Resultantly, on August 10, 1993, CTB Mandated-The CD in Geneva to give its Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin negotiations in January, 1994. On December 16, 1993, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) first time passed a consensus resolution (48/70) for supporting the multilateral negotiation for a CTBT. On January 25, 1994, the CD reconvened in

Geneva and directed the AHC to negotiate intensively on a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable treaty. Negotiation process continued through 1995 and on September 10, 1996, the UNGA adopted the CTBT by 158 to 3 votes while 5 abstained, despite the fact that the consensus could not be achieved in the CD due to India's objection.¹⁴ Pakistan participated in preparation of the text but did not sign due to its security concerns linked to its neighbour India.¹⁵ The treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996 and President Clinton was the first world leader to sign but when the treaty was submitted to the US Senate in September 1997, it was vigorously opposed and later during October 1999, the US Senate failed to ratify it by a vote of 5-48.¹⁶

Since 1999, no progress on the CTBT has been achieved because two tenures of the US administration led by Republicans were less enthusiastic. With the change of administration in the US, it was expected that a serious effort may be undertaken to address the two key issues to include the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as envisioned in the speech delivered by Obama at Prague on April 05, 2009 however, the ground realities do not support as Obama administration also seems less enthusiastic on the issue of the CTBT.

Fresh Approach to the CTBT Debate: The US Case

Like Clinton, Obama also marked CTBT as a key foreign policy priority. In his famous speech at Prague, he announced that the US would "immediately and aggressively" pursue ratification of the comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In an interview with the New York Times, he said, it was 'naïve' to think that the US and its allies and Russia could continue to grow nuclear stockpiles "and in that environment we're going to be able to pressure countries like Iran and North Korea not to pursue nuclear weapons themselves".¹⁷ Though, indicators reflected in Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of February 2010 were in line with Obama's broad policy on nuclear issue but the approach adopted by Obama administration in its long awaited Nuclear Posture Review

(NPR), is almost in line with the stance earlier taken by the Bush administration. Both President Obama and Secretary Hillary Clinton had earlier made clear that they would keep pushing for its Senate ratification and also launch a major diplomatic offensive to get other non-signatories on board like India and Pakistan.¹⁸

In her Senate testimony, Hillary Clinton claimed that arms control and non-proliferation are "passionate concerns" of President Obama. Senator John Kerry, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee also extends his support for the US ratification of the CTBT.¹⁹ Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association explains that there is a talk of the day that how close is the US ratification of this treaty? John Kerry replied that "We are very close however; he said that the vote by the full Senate is unlikely before next year (2010).²⁰ Political environments within the US has been favourable during 2009 and securing the necessary two thirds, 67 votes, in the Senate was probably clearly within reach nevertheless, the outcome of NPR indicates that the administration is probably not keen to achieve the milestone. Since 1999, the US had 11 more years of a very well-supported, multifaceted Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) created by the Department of Energy (DoE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).²¹ A detailed study by Dr Sidney Drell of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Lab indicates that the US does not require nuclear testing to validate efficacy of its nuclear weapons.²²

During 1999, the test ban discussion in the Senate remained focused on technical issues. The underlined question was, whether the US would be able to maintain a safe, effective, reliable and secure stockpile without testing? As authenticated by the heads of the weapons programs at the two laboratories, Bruce Goodwin at Livermore and Glenn Mara at Los Alamos - and this is their quote - "To date, the SSP has achieved remarkable successes and enabled us to assure the nation that we do not need to conduct a nuclear test to certify the deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable". The SSP is a dynamic program which does not call on testing, which has both the talent and the tools necessary to be able to respond to changes and surprises that may come up in the future

strategically or technically. *Dr Sidney Drell said, "The need for testing, I believe, has been put to sleep".*²³

Ambassador Tibor Toth while elaborating on detection system explained that we are in the build-up process. The build-up of the stations brought us to 250 seismic stations compared to 180 in 2006. The number of the noble gas systems doubled in the last more than two years from 10 noble gas stations to 22 by now. The detection of North Korea's nuclear explosion twice is a reality not a concept, with only 50 percent readiness of the system back in 2006, the 0.1 kiloton level was achieved in the northern hemisphere for defining areas US, Russia, China and by now (2009), we are moving to this 0.0, still with a system which is 75 percent ready that excludes the auxiliary stations which can bring an additional improvement of 0.25, 0.5 magnitudes. It also excludes internationally and regionally functioning systems working outside CTBTO, thus one can safely say that 100% monitoring of a nuclear test is possible.²⁴

While indicating deteriorating state of non-proliferation regime, Ambassador Jim Goodby agrees with George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn who believe that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective". He also supports a report prepared by General Shalikashvili that was presented to President Clinton in January 2001. The essence of that report was that the treaty is a key element in a network of barriers against proliferation - not a panacea in itself, but an element critical to the success of the whole project. It would prevent the advanced NWS from making significant improvements in their weapon stockpiles and it would also prevent NNWS from entering into a nuclear weapons status, except perhaps through a primitive gun-type atom bomb. The treaty would help responding vigorously if any nation conducts a nuclear test".²⁵ However, the argument contradicts what Dr Drell has proved in his study.

While addressing the CD, Rose E. Gottemoeller under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International

Security, remarked that there is no greater security challenge in the world today than turning the tide on nuclear proliferation, and pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free world. She said that together with an FMCT, the US will also seek to bring into force the last accomplishment of this forum, the CTBT, by pursuing ratification by the US Senate.²⁶ Another important statement coordinated by the Arms Control Association duly endorsed by the individual scholars and a number of non governmental organizations (NGOs) on the CTBT to the Preparatory Meeting for the 2010 NPT RevConf views that the US is poised to be a leader on the CTBT that would enjoy full support of a wide array of NGOs in the US and around the globe. Kimball views that Obama's speech does not just pledges to 'pursue' nuclear disarmament as it has been done in past rather he has made a commitment to make it as a strategic goal of the US policy to eliminate all the world's nuclear weapons. He believes that securing the necessary 67 Senate votes for ratification of the treaty is possible. He proposes that the US ratification of the treaty is especially important if it wishes to continue playing its leadership role in future as well. A non-participant is poorly placed to argue that others should do what it has itself not done.²⁷

Ratification of the treaty by the US would reflect movement towards eventual nuclear disarmament, as called for by the NPT, the former defence secretary said. Such action could be useful in demonstrating the US intent to make good on its NPT obligations, even if other nations withhold CTBT ratification and the test ban never EIF, he said. Perry persuaded that the US ratification would put substantial pressure on India and Pakistan and China to ratify the treaty.²⁸ In the same context, Kimball says, one should ask "what the US would do differently in the future if it ratify the CTBT vs what it would do ... without having ratified." "And the basic answer is 'nothing,' there is no difference," he said. "Therefore, why not ratify the treaty and accrue the benefits...".²⁹

Contrary, there are strong views within the US circle, opposing ratification of the treaty. The opposing side believes that after all, debate on ratification since 1996 remained inconclusive on rationales which are still valid despite scientific advancements carried out by the US. Critics have argued that the treaty verification regime is not sufficient to detect low-yield tests of less than one kiloton.³⁰ James Schlesinger (former Defence Secretary), Vice Chairman of the 12-member bipartisan panel, cast doubt on the advantages that Washington's treaty ratification might offer; he thinks that roughly half of the members of the commission did not endorse ratification. With a probability of "near zero" that all those nations would sign on, the US ratification would mean Washington "would be bound by restrictions that other key countries could ignore".³¹

A bipartisan congressional commission of the US, headed by some of its most experienced national security practitioners, recently concluded that a nuclear deterrent is essential to its defence for the foreseeable future while Obama's agenda that runs counter to the commission's recommendations. They are of the view that there are good reasons why the CTBT has not been ratified. The commission opines that in fact, blocking crucial modernization means unilateral disarmament by unilateral obsolescence. This unilateral disarmament will only encourage nuclear proliferation, since our allies will see the danger and our adversaries the opportunity. The commission opines that there is a fashionable notion that if only the US and the Russia reduced their nuclear forces, other nations i.e. China, Iran, North Korea or Pakistan would follow the suit. This is dangerous, wishful thinking thus, a robust American nuclear force is an essential discouragement to nuclear proliferators; a weak or uncertain force just the opposite. Mr Robert Gates warned in a speech during October 2008 that in the absence of a nuclear modernization program, "at a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium".³²

Evolving Scenarios & International Response

With the ushering in of Mr Obama as President of the US, the mood of the international community has drastically changed which has raised hopes that significant progress can now be made in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The US is also morally bound to honour its commitment made during the 1995 and 2000 NPT RevConf that suggest making efforts towards advancing many of the “13 practical steps” toward nuclear disarmament, such as deeper cuts in the US and Russian arsenal, and even progress towards the EIF of the CTBT, thus the administration is likely to come under pressure to move beyond rhetoric on nuclear non-proliferation issues including the CTBT. Though in practical term, EIF of the CTBT would serve as a tool for arms control rather than a means for general and complete disarmament as envisioned in article VI of the NPT.

By joining the CTBT, countries (not in possession of nuclear weapons) enter a legally-binding commitment that severely constrains their ability to develop workable nuclear warheads. It is presumed that such assurances can support regional efforts at conflict resolution and confidence building, which are needed in many regions today where nuclear proliferation is a problem. By ratifying the treaty, Iran could demonstrate that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons and ratification by Israel would be an important symbol of nuclear constraint.

President Obama has earlier indicated that he would encourage India and Pakistan to ratify the treaty and resolve the Kashmir problem to reduce nuclear dangers in South Asia, thus the US is likely to prioritize its diplomatic efforts with India and Pakistan to encourage them to move beyond their moratorium on nuclear testing. Whether or not Pakistan signs the treaty; India's accession though unlikely would certainly increase pressure on Islamabad because it is generally believed that the treaty EIF would improve security in South Asia. This argument is debatable and questionable because

India is technically well advanced to rely on simulation testing for developing more weapons without violating the treaty.

There are strong apprehensions that the US will pursue a new design of warheads in the name of ratifying the CTBT, thus put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenal of other countries. The countries with nuclear weapons are not going to believe anything that the US administration says about "no new military capabilities." The feeling is that while the US would continue to further improve and maintain quality weapons, it will discourage others from doing the same. The emerging security scenarios at the international level would allow the US to continue maintaining hegemony at the global level, an early EIF of the CTBT would help the US in furthering its military capabilities vis-a-vis others. The opposition to the CTBT by the establishments of some NWS is an indication that without tests, the development of nuclear weapons is more difficult and in many cases likely to be impossible. Iran, Israel and Chinese position on the CTBT is crucial. None of them has come up with clear position on Obama's latest statement. Beijing's official excuse that ratification is being held up in the National People's Congress has been implausible for a long time. China may like to keep the option open for renewed testing as it would like to develop multiple independently targeted warheads for its nuclear forces if it wants to emulate the policies of other NWS.³³

Since 1995, India maintained that the CTBT was not explicitly linked to the goal of nuclear disarmament. For India, this was crucial since it was not acceptable to legitimize, in any way, a permanent division between NWS and NNWS. In view of the development which took place in the recent past, it appears that India's concerns have mostly been addressed and it has become a leading player in the nuclear club, thus it would like to maintain friendly environments by extending greater cooperation in the coming debate on the CTBT. Shyam Saran, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Special Envoy for Nuclear Issues and Climate Change, while delivering a keynote address in a conference organized by The Brookings

Institution titled, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Expectations and Consequences*, expressed that since the Pokhran tests in May 1998, "India has observed a unilateral and voluntary moratorium and is committed to its continuance".³⁴

In author's considered opinion, the whole debate whether or not the US is going to ratify the treaty in an earlier timeframe presents a pessimistic view. Obama's sincerity notwithstanding, my understanding is that the nuclear factor would remain central to maintain global strategic stability and there is no possibility that the US, Russia and China and possibly all other NWS would change the stance in foreseeable future. A strong scientific and political lobby in the US will continue to resist ratification of the CTBT on two grounds: one, foreclosing the option of nuclear testing and total reliance on laboratory tests may increase the risk attached to its nuclear weapons program as the time passes and secondly, there is no possibility of achieving 100 percent verification. Therefore, unlike many scholars/academia, in author's candid view, the CTBT debate in the US will take longer than expectation and the earliest timeframe during which the US administration may try to develop consensus is early 2012, provided they still hold the majority in the Senate to create goodwill within the US community to secure second tenure for Obama.

CTBT Status: Pakistan's Position

History proves that Pakistan has always joined its voice in building a global consensus in favour of nuclear restraints. Now, as a declared NWS, it remains conscious of its obligations to the world community and it has therefore, reaffirmed its commitment to restraint and responsibility. It considers the NPT, CTBT and the proposed FMCT as three pillars which provides basis for arms control leading to complete disarmament, though none of the above treaty individually or collectively addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation in a wholesome manner.

Nuclear non-proliferation has always been Pakistan's priority agenda that continues to support global and regional levels initiatives. In 1957, it supported Ireland's proposal for the NPT. Following the creation of the IAEA in 1957, Pakistan voluntarily submitted its civilian nuclear facilities for international inspections in 1959. Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was presented in the UNGA in 1974, resulted in Resolution 3265, which endorsed the creation of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia.³⁵

During September 1996, Pakistan voted in favour of the treaty however, later it did not sign it due to its security concerns links to its eastern border. While Pakistan will continue to act with responsibility avoiding an arms race however, it will not remain oblivious to the imperative of maintaining "credible minimum nuclear deterrence". With respect to the CTBT, *Pakistan's position has been that it did not take lead in nuclear testing in South Asia, nor shall it be the one to resume nuclear testing. Pakistan will not come in the way of EIF of the CTBT, when it is ready for implementation. Since 1998, Pakistan has been maintaining unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.*³⁶ India out-rightly rejected Pakistan's proposals for Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia presented in the aftermath of 1998 nuclear tests. With regards to Pakistan's current policy on the CTBT, Foreign Office Spokesman during a weekly briefing said that Pakistan supports non-proliferation but rules out signing of the treaty in current political/security environment.³⁷

Signing the CTBT: Implications for Pakistan

The debate generated in the aftermath of May, 1998 nuclear tests, to whether or not sign the treaty is still valid and holds good. "Yes" or "No" to the CTBT is not the establishment's issue alone, rather it is the most debated question at various levels of Pakistani society especially after 1998. One school of thought in Pakistani community opposing the idea of signing the treaty believes that it is the nuclear capability which has effectively countered the possible aggression from India. This group views that Pakistan can sign

the treaty provided the P-5 are agreed to destroy the piles of nuclear warheads. However, a former federal minister S. M. Masood said that there was no harm in signing the treaty as the option for cold test would still be available.³⁸

Mr Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's former Foreign Minister also supports the idea of signing of the treaty by Pakistan. He views that the apprehension that the CTBT is only a first link and that once Pakistan signs this treaty, it would be bound in a chain of restraints and prohibitions that would strangle its nuclear program is self-created story which needs to be buried. The conjecture ignores the elementary fact that joining one treaty does not and cannot obligate a state to join another. The fear that signing the CTBT would require a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear program is yet another manifestation of failure to understand the treaty. He suggests that not signing the treaty has identifiable costs but no benefits, while signing the CTBT has no identifiable costs even though the benefits, too, are more intangible than concrete.³⁹ In my sincere view, many well read scholars in Pakistan do not subscribe to Mr Sattar's rationales.

In author's considered view, it has become more difficult to go along with the CTBT in the current regional and extra regional security/stability environment as Pakistan is confronted with three pronged challenges: One, while its relations with India are once again at the cross road, its western front has become more volatile causing a direct existential threat because of numerous external factors. India's consulate mission in Iran and Afghanistan causes added security problems for Pakistan. Indian involvement in Balochistan unrest has amicably been highlighted by Christine Fair of the Rand Corporation as well.⁴⁰ Two, Pakistan's participation in WOT and the subsequent fallout on its domestic front, it has been forced to fight on two fronts with limitations (external and internal), to secure its national integrity and solidarity. Three, added to the overall geopolitical dread, is the surreptitious design to undermine its nuclear capability and limit it to a point where it ceases to

fulfil its deterrent value; Pakistan has to deal with this serious interconnected challenge as well.

The pressure to ink the CTBT in the coming days is but a natural course of action likely to be pursued by those who matter. Bruce Riedel, Obama's key adviser on South Asia in his absurd published article in *The Wall Street Journal New York* suggests that Pakistan does not require India like civil nuclear deal while seeking certain assurances from Islamabad to protect India which include besides other guarantees, no first use of nuclear weapons and the signing of the CTBT first without demanding the Indian adherence. He said, "Pakistan's arsenal works and it does not need to test again".⁴¹ He is not the first one to behave irrationally; Pakistan's nuclear program is under attack since long. The US/western encouragement to India which is also busy in perfecting its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system to maintain its hegemony (both in terms of nuclear and conventional forces) over Pakistan would also impinge on its policy on issue of the CTBT.⁴²

Out of declared NWS (P-5 plus 3), Pakistan may emerge as the only country that has serious stakes in signing the treaty in its current form. Contrary, as pointed out by Shivanand Kanavi, a business writer from Mumbai, even if the US wishes to pressurize India, it will make no difference as India has already got most of what it wanted in terms of global sanctions on nuclear trade having been lifted. Kanavi does not expect too much pressure on India on this front either.⁴³

In Pakistan, the CTBT debate has always been a sensitive subject. While the government would like to accommodate international concerns alongside protecting its national interest, the opposing side has always been more hawkish even at time without convincing rationales. There is also a feeling among some circles that, even if the CTBT is harmless in itself, it might be the first step on an irreversible path. On the other hand, the supporters of the CTBT range from the pure moralists, who support non-proliferation at all costs, to those who view this treaty as harmless, in the wake of our

nuclear tests conducted earlier. They reason that by signing the treaty after having tested, Pakistan may have something to gain, and nothing to lose.⁴⁴ In opposition, former ISI Chief Lt Gen (retired) Hameed Gul opined that the government and all those who contend that signing the CTBT would not bind Pakistan to conduct any further nuclear test are 'sadly mistaken'. "Signing the CTBT, he said, not only binds the signatories to adhere to its provisions but is also requires them to sign the FMCT, the NPT and to destroy their entire existing nuclear arsenal. He goes on to say that the treaty has Islamic, moral, legal, strategic, psychological and technical dimensions".⁴⁵ In view of the unpredictable security /stability situation in South Asia, one can safely argue that the position taken against the signing of the CTBT by a number of think tanks/scholars in Pakistan earlier still holds valid.

The primary motivating factor that the promoters of the CTBT in Pakistan are pursuing has been economic/financial support that pressurized Pakistan's successive establishments' to consider signing of the treaty. Political observers say the government is keen to sign the CTBT before India does, to win the approval of the West, particularly the US and to secure financial relief for its cash-strapped economy. Both the main political parties leaders, Nawaz Sharif' and Benazir Bhutto (late)' expressed support for the CTBT.⁴⁶ While speaking at the UNGA on September 23, 1998, Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made it clear that Pakistan would adhere to the treaty well ahead of the September 1999 deadline however, "it will take place only in conditions free from coercion or pressure".⁴⁷ International sanctions which pushed Pakistan close to an economic collapse were the motivating factor that made Mr Sharif to make this statement. Later former President Musharraf also launched a campaign through his Foreign Minister Mr Abdul Sattar to soften the ground for signing the treaty without actually linking Pakistan's old stance with India.⁴⁸ Primarily, it has been the establishment that seemed in hurry but independent opinion makers are still reluctant to support this initiative without negotiating for a meaningful trade-off from international community.

Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy, who has been passionately arguing for the CTBT in Pakistan for years, now said the signing is "an insignificant thing" since Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. "Pakistan has already tested its nuclear weapons and demonstrated that these are powerful enough to destroy a city." By refraining from future tests, "Pakistan loses nothing in terms of the military and political significance of its nuclear capability". Signing the treaty by Pakistan does not prevent it from possessing nuclear arsenal or increasing its numbers, instead "Pakistan can hope for a modest economic and political dividend. Dr A H Nayyar, a leading pro-disarmament activist while supporting Hoodbhoy said, "The main pressure on Pakistan is the state of the economic mess.⁴⁹

As indicated earlier, Pakistan is likely to undergo immense pressure when the next debate on the subject opens. This time, Pakistan has more constraints. In addition to serious economic problems, it has obvious security compulsions, which are home grown as well as foreign sponsored. Pakistan will be entering in the CTBT debate from a position of weakness. In author's candid views, development of consensus for signing of the treaty within Pakistan was much easier during late 1990s after its nuclear explosion and early 2000 but the current situation in Pakistan is quite different. It would be a daunting task for the establishment to convince the public that signing of the treaty is in our national interest. It deprives us of nothing and may have something to offer however, international community will have to help Pakistani establishment in a massive way by creating goodwill and friendly environment.

The promoters of the CTBT in Pakistan opine that the treaty structure is free from discrimination and gives no veto power. 'It must be noted that the obligation of signatory to the CTBT is confined to testing, and rollback of the program is not involved. Basically the treaty does not intend to weaken the defence line of a NWS including Pakistan. They see lot of opportunities to achieve economic prosperity. In addition, unlike the UN Security Council, no member in Executive Council of the treaty has the dominant power. The supporters

argue that since each state party has a right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests thus, Pakistan would be free to take any decision to protect its supreme national interests.⁵⁰

As indicated by Lawrence Scheinman, like India, Pakistan being technically less advanced, it is unlikely that it would be able to successfully carry out undetected low-level tests techniques such as detonating nuclear devices in large underground cavities (de-coupling). However, the author sincerely believes that India is extremely advance in computer technology and since it is no more under nuclear sanctions, as a consequence, intangible transfer of the technology would enable India to bridge that technical gap required for conducting cold tests and undetected low-level tests techniques such as de-coupling. This argument is substantiated by Einhorn, the new advisor to Hillary Clinton who views that in seeking to make India an exception to longstanding non-proliferation rules, the Bush administration has given India virtually all that it wanted.⁵¹

As reflected elsewhere, Pakistan has recently embarked upon plutonium route to achieve more flexibility in terms of depth and verity to its nuclear weapons technology, though a report reveals what Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) seems to have recently discovered at Khushab is nothing new or exotic, Pakistan has had plutonium producing plants since 1985 and two under construction sites for additional reactors at Khushab are only a natural progression of the technological up grade process using plutonium based nuclear process for electricity generation.⁵² However, the report neither confirmed nor denied that Pakistan has ever conducted plutonium bases nuclear test therefore, the author still believes that Pakistan would need some more time to ensure that the program gets matured thus it might need testing as well. Scientific community has to decide whether or not it is ready to take a chance to sign and ratify the treaty without compromising on Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability.

The author supports the argument made in the News Editorial that nuclear weapons of any kind are dangerous; but untested and unreliable ones are more dangerous than the rest.⁵³ In order to enhance reliability/credibility of these weapons, NWS have already conducted 2052 tests including North Korea's latest test.⁵⁴ If five to ten nuclear tests were sufficient, the P-5 would have exercised restraint, thus, India and Pakistan might still require additional nuclear testing to validate their nuclear arsenal. Signing of the treaty especially by Pakistan in highly cloudy environment, prevailing in South Asia will be more dangerous and the consequent results of achieving peace and stability would be unpredictable.

Suggested Way Forward

International Approach: Kimbal suggests that just as President John F. Kennedy did in 1963 with the LTBT, Obama should tap into the deep reservoir of public support for a complete end to testing and enlist the support of the growing bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, including George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and dozens more, who have signalled their support for the treaty.⁵⁵ Since, there is a strong well of support from the public for these kinds of initiatives and actions at the moment therefore, Mr Obama may like to cash the opportunity and make history.

Since 1999, the US had 11 more years of a very well-supported, multifaceted SSP created by DoE and NNSA, thus technical advances in nuclear field over the past decade should make the case for the CTBT stronger than ever. In addition, 64 of the required number of 67 senators already poised towards ratification of the treaty. CTBTO though, still not fully in place, has proved its effectiveness thus, current conducive political environment within the US, which presents a very strong case, may be pursued with vigour by the administration before it gets too late.

Undoubtedly, signing of the NPT has been an instrumental mechanism in containing emergence of 15 to 25 NWS however, El-Baradei has also warned, the number of states with the know-how to make nuclear weapons within a few

years could include "another 10 or 20 virtual weapons states". Therefore, he suggested that the only way forward is for all NWS to commit themselves urgently and convincingly to a global regime in which all fissile materials and nuclear weapon systems are put under international supervision and control.⁵⁶ Though, an idealistic approach but it is urgently required if a vision of 'zero nuclear weapon' is to be realized in medium to long terms.

International community also calls on the world's other nuclear-armed states in joining President Obama to pledge not to develop new types of nuclear arsenal. Kimball added that two decades after the end of the cold war, there is no plausible reason for the US and Russian leaders to maintain thousands of strategic nuclear weapons, many of which are on high alert. Besides the US and Russia, no state possesses more than 300 nuclear warheads. Thus, the US and Russian nuclear arsenal can and must be reduced to 1,000 or below within the next five years and the other nuclear-armed states must join President Obama's push for verifiable nuclear weapons reduction and elimination".⁵⁷

As highlighted by Kimball, history proves that punitive sanctions and stern lectures will not by themselves halt North Korea's nuclear activities. The US must outline, again and in detail, the security assurances, trade benefits, and energy support that the US and other regional allies would be ready to offer if North Korea once again halts its nuclear and missile programs, ends its proliferation behaviour, and dismantle its nuclear complex, Chinese role in this regard will be very important.⁵⁸

As highlighted in the debate, the US technological advancements have already provided sufficient guarantee that an up gradation of its nuclear weapons can be ensured without testing, it is therefore important for the US to take lead and ratify the treaty without further delay. Whether or not other countries needed to ratify the treaty follow the suit, it will however, place the US at higher moral ground to persuade

them and maintain a constant pressure to achieve the desired results.

The author fully agrees with El-Baradei who believes that any checks to ensure that nuclear weapons are not secretly under development or that recognized stocks are being dismantled can only take place under the IAEA's legal authority. A major tool in this regards is the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which allows the IAEA the crucial freedom of action to check and stop states' from manipulation with their undeclared nuclear material. And yet we still have over 100 countries without Additional Protocols, which means "we do not have the authority." He clearly indicated that transparency in the use of nuclear technology can only be ensured once users have signed the IAEA Additional Protocol.⁵⁹

International community must also extend its full cooperation to Pakistan and provide plausible assurance that its nuclear capability is recognized and it is also taken on board with regards to its role as part of nuclear fuel supplier group in view of the emerging trends of international nuclear fuel bank. This kind of approach at the international level would encourage Pakistan to offer greater cooperation.

Possibility of achieving any significant progress on the CTBT in South Asia under the prevailing security environment seems highly unlikely therefore, if the international community wishes that India and Pakistan sign the treaty in an earlier timeframe, it will have to initiative steps to create conducive environments for stability in South Asia by carrying out sincere hard work and objective analysis of the situation and accordingly address Pakistan's concerns vis-à-vis India before they could actually demand something from Pakistan. International community's active positive role will reduce domestic pressure and encourages leadership of the two countries to take bold initiatives.

Policy Options for Pakistan

While the US will maintain a strong, dynamic, science-based SSP with all sophisticated technical gadgetries including super computers and new machines like the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro-Test Facility operating in Los Alamos which allows its scientific community to make three-dimensional pictures with X-ray radiography with extremely high precision, that does not call on testing, which has both the talent and the tools necessary to be able to respond to changes and surprises that may come up in the future strategically or technically. Such a technological gap for a country like Pakistan which has a modest nuclear program with all limitations imposed on it by the international community due to discriminatory treatment needs threadbare studies.

As pointed out earlier, the primary motivating factor that the promoters of the CTBT in Pakistan are pursuing has been economic/financial support linked with the signing of the CTBT. In my considered view, Pakistan should not be in hurry to make a decision let alone signing the treaty. As and when the debate opens, the final position should only be taken after a consensus decision of scientific, political and military leadership, protecting Pakistan's supreme national interests in the medium to long term.

Contrary to the opinion that we must not shut our mind to the imperatives of safeguarding Pakistan's good name and standing in the world, the author propose that consensus on technical and strategic security aspects linked with its nuclear program must get preference over political debate on the issue likely to be organized at the formal and informal levels. Signing of the CTBT in vacuum in an earlier timeframe might accrue political mileage which may also help in attaining some short-sighted objectives however, *economic factor as a single point agenda must not, I repeat must not be allowed to dominate the debate*, if allowed, it would defeat the whole purpose of our nuclear program for which the nation has sustained intensive international pressure since early 1980s.

The author supports a Pakistani writer who views that today Pakistan's financial borrowing though on very tough terms is linked with our performance on WOT; tomorrow Pakistan's stance on the CTBT will provide a cause to the international donors to twist its tail if it goes against their wishes. By signing the treaty in its current form without bargaining for strategic gains will of course be a temporary boom to the powers that be, but our sovereignty will be at stake. The US policies around the globe have never been stable and uniform based on principals, it differs from country to country and time to time. It is not necessary to enter into a match of wits with the US but we should keep our heads cool and maintain our struggle to meet our objectives first. *The CTBT is a part of global diplomacy issue rather than a nuclear issue, to which Pakistan should play its diplomatic cards well* without losing sight of its long term national goals/objectives.⁶⁰

The writer sincerely proposes that Pakistan may address following queries before taking a final decision whether or not to sign the CTBT: One, does Pakistan's scientific community possess technical means and confidence that on balance, it would enhance its national security and also meet contribute in achieving non-proliferation objectives. Two, if we believe that deterrence of aggression in foreseeable future depends on a reliable and credible nuclear capability; can that objective be achieved without testing? Three, after signing the treaty, will Pakistan ever be in a position to exercise its right to withdraw from the treaty using Article IX so as to protect its supreme national interest, and finally, is there a choice to be made between protecting national security interests and preserving the non-proliferation regime or are these objectives inseparable?

To sign the CTBT, the author goes along with majority of the opinion makers in Pakistan who view that in changed security and political environment, signing should remain linked to: One, outstanding issue with India i.e. Kashmir be resolved amicably involving three affected parties, India, Kashmiri and Pakistan. Two, coercive and discriminatory

attitude of the West/US/G-8 towards Pakistan especially on nuclear issue must change, three, acceptance of Pakistan as a NWS and accord it a status at least as that of India. Fourth, easing and rescheduling loans and finally extending generous economic support to rebuild infrastructure in Swat and Federally Administrated Tribal Area and areas hit by recent devastating flood and fill up the economic losses of over \$40 billion that Pakistan has suffered due to its participation in WOT.

Concessions once made at the cost of national security interest, would lead to more concessions, thus Pakistan's nuclear hierarchy and political leadership need to show resolve and commitment, while still contributing towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on merit. The CTBT is indeed not an easy matter to be resolved as it has far reaching consequences for every individual of the country. Prudence, sagacity and caution are the pre-dispositional prerequisites before exercising the painful choice.⁶¹

Conclusion

With the change in political setup in the US and in the aftermath of the US President's speech indicating a wishful vision of the nuclear free world, the international mood with regards to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament seem favorable. Nevertheless, the issue in hand being extremely complicated in nature can not be addressed easily however; the stance expressed by the US administration would definitely bring extraordinary pressure on states like Pakistan, North Korea and possibly China.

We must remember one simple truth, as articulated by the founder of the Global Security Institute, Senator Alan Cranston: nuclear weapons are immoral and unworthy of civilization. The goal must not be to stop the production of nuclear arsenal or forswear their modernization. The goal must not be to achieve parity through some arbitrary "floor" or "ceiling" number of warheads. The goal must be to prevent the unimaginable apocalypse that their use would wreak upon a people, or, in the event of a mutual nuclear war, upon

civilization itself. The goal therefore, must be to eliminate nuclear weapons. Achieving this goal in foreseeable future is not possible nevertheless; a beginning has to be made that warrant a sincere and constructive approach by the international community.

While Pakistan is extremely sincere to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation however, as proposed by General Aslam Beg, "One must not take down the fence, unless one took into consideration why was it raised", said a wise man. This we must adhere to with respect to the nuclear fence, as well.⁶² We must ponder the question of the CTBT on the basis of its objective merits. Cold logic should guide us, unfounded doubts and emotions should not be allowed to cloud judgment. Pakistan does not intend conducting any further tests nevertheless, if another country conducts tests, its option to do the same remains open. The treaty has identifiable costs and benefits, Pakistan will have to weigh the cost benefit equilibrium and short term gains at the cost of national integrity and solidarity in the long term must be refused. But a sound policy should keep Pakistan in the mainstream rather than pushing it to the fringe, liable to international isolation.

There is no denying fact that signing of the CTBT is in collective interest of the international community however, for the smooth EIF of the treaty, the world will have to address Pakistan's regional and extra regional security and economic concerns. International community needs to realize that Pakistan has an advanced nuclear technology infrastructure which also contains a well established nuclear fuel cycle mechanism therefore; it may also be integrated in nuclear club for a greater role in nuclear energy field. I would once again re-emphasize that if world wishes to see a positive outcome of the CTBT debate which is likely to gain momentum, it must show magnanimity and immediately take all stakeholders on board without discrimination. Such gestures would definitely usher better and quick results.

Author

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THE EVOLVING NATURE OF PAK-US RELATIONSHIP

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

Abstract

Under the prevalent security environment in South West Asia, the interest driven Pak-US relationship is passing through a very crucial stage in its entire bilateral history. The criticality of this relationship can be well imagined from the fact that, for the first time, the US has threatened with a military action in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) against the so-called safe havens of Haqqani Network, if Pakistan does not launch a military operation there. Contrary to Pakistani logics, U.S believes that, the network is combating ISAF in Afghanistan from NWA. Owing to its geopolitical location, Pakistan has served US objectives throughout its history without any worthwhile gain for itself. In fact, the unequal alliance has often embarrassed Pakistan, causing the worst internal destabilization of its history, economic collapse and the violation of its sovereignty by its senior partner. The countless accusations and the lack of recognition of Pakistan's role in and contribution to the fight against terrorism, which have been levelled by the US, has generated a sense of betrayal within Pakistan. For the U.S, there is a need to understand the Pakistani viewpoint, appreciate its domestic and external compulsions, respect its sovereignty, and take into consideration its national interests.

Introduction

Prevalent geopolitical reality is testament to the fact that, "Pakistan occupies, strategically, one of the most important areas on the world and its position in South Asian region is remarkable for the security of the free world and Japan"¹. During World War-II, the United States developed strategic interest in the Subcontinent, after Japanese troops had

captured Burma (Myanmar) and the US naval base in Pearl Harbour was attacked by Japan in 1941. Owing to its strategic significance, President Roosevelt's special representative and former assistant secretary of war, Mr. Louis Johnson, was appointed as the head of mission in New Delhi in 1942.² Later, prior to the partition process of the Subcontinent in early 1947, this interest was renewed; as the global struggle between the United States and the former Soviet Union evolved and naturalized "hardening into the cold war."³ The US even attempted to block the partition of India, for a united response to counter the spread of Communism. In regards to:⁴ Pak-US diplomatic relations were established in 1948, with Paul Alling, being the first US ambassador to Pakistan.

Soon after partition of Sub-continent, US invited Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for a state visit, which transpired in October 1949. Contrary to American expectations, Nehru did not pledge any support to US efforts against the spread of Communism (against USSR).⁵ Following this, US invited the Pakistani Premier Liaquat Ali Khan, who visited the States in May 1950. Taking the visit as an opportune moment to show Pakistan's willingness to provide what India had demurred from offering, Liaquat Ali Khan expressed his country's desire to support the US cause in the region. For Pakistan, the basic impetus for its support of the US was its security needs against Indian aggression.⁶ As was subsequently proven, ignoring a similar invitation from the Soviet Union and giving preference to the US over the former was the first slip-up of Pakistani policy makers.⁷

For the US, Pakistan's geo-political location was the most significant factor in accepting its leadership's overtures; as Stephen P. Cohen put it, "while history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit. It has resource rich area in the north-west and people rich in the north-east"⁸. Indeed, Pakistan's geo-political landscape has always been considered vital by major players in the arena of world politics. In the early 20th century, the region played part in the Great Game⁹ between British India and Tsarist Russia, and in later years its significance increased many fold

as it remained a hub of the Cold War until the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1990. In the contemporary world, Pakistan has maintained its relevance primarily for two reasons; firstly, it is playing a key role by helping the international community in combating the menace of terrorism since September 11, 2001, and secondly, its location has made it a potential future energy corridor between energy rich Central Asian states and the energy deficient Asian countries¹⁰.

Lamentably, instead of exploiting its geographical location and God gifted potential for its own benefit, Pakistan embarked upon an era on a wrong footing giving rise to external dependency in the wake of formalizing its relationship with the US from a position of weakness. Consequently, in the subsequent history, its relations with the US “careened between intimate partnership and enormous friction-reflecting the ups and downs of global and regional geopolitics and disparate national interests”¹¹. Surprisingly, despite Indian reluctance to join the US camp and building bridges with Moscow, US fostered an exceptional relationship with India much to the awe of Pakistani counter parts. So much so, that in the period from 1949 to 1971, the United States gave India over \$10 billion¹² for its economic development and wrote off two-thirds of Indian loans¹³ in 1974, the year India exploded its first nuclear device. On the other hand, Pak-US relations have been “intense and extraordinary volatile.”¹⁴

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s alliance with the US displeased the former Soviet Union to the extent that it considered Pakistan as its horrid enemy, and conveyed its ire in the strongest of the diplomatic language, even to the extent of threatening Pakistan with dire consequence for aiding American interests in the region. In May 1960, after shooting down an American U-2 spy plane, which took off from Peshawar base, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev intimidated Pakistan with explicit words: “We warn those countries, that make their territory available for launching planes with anti Soviet intentions: Do not play with fire,

gentlemen! The governments of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway must be clearly aware that they are accomplices in this flight”¹⁵. His question, “Where is this place Peshawar? We have circled it in red on our maps,¹⁶” was intended as a further warning to the Pakistani leadership. Later, it was categorically stated by the Soviet leadership that “if any American plane is allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operation against the Soviet Union, we will retaliate immediately.”¹⁷ In the wake of all the hard-talk originating from a neighbouring super power, and the physical assault from Eastern border leading to dismemberment of Pakistan in two halves in 1971, US did not provided the appropriate support to Pakistan.

Nevertheless, in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan provided its full assistance to the West and to the US in particular, in their covert guerrilla war against the USSR from 1979 to 1989¹⁸, which resulted in the disintegration of the superpower in early 1990s. This strategy of aiding and promoting global Jihad against the former USSR with the consent and blessings of the Western world, left a deep-rooted impact on the Pakistani society as manifested in the form of extremism, weapon and drug culture and countless other social ills from which Pakistan now suffers. Following the incident of 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion in Afghanistan, Pakistan once again acted as a frontline state and provided unfettered support to US and world community, at the cost of its own domestic stability.

Today, after a decade of the global campaign against terrorism, an overwhelming majority of the population of Pakistan is convinced that the ongoing instability and extremism in Pakistani society is because of its ill-conceived alliance with the US, particularly in the decades of 1980s and the 2000s. Pakistan’s alignment with the US has indeed entailed risks and dangers to a level that has put its sovereignty as well as its integrity at stake. Pakistan was never the panorama of senseless violence and ruthless massacres even as recently as 2003¹⁹. The incident of 9/11 has been a page-turner in the history of Pakistan. As of today, the US accuses Pakistan for any militant act which occurs in

Afghanistan or its surrounding areas, simply to try and coerce Pakistan into giving in to US demands, even at the cost of compromising its own sovereignty and national interests.

Compelling Factors in Pak-U.S Relations

In its entire history, Pakistan has been the “most allied ally” of the United States of America. Being a small country with borders that were vulnerable to potential Indian aggression, it became party to the US sponsored defence pacts, SEATO and CENTO, which were meant to contain rising Communist and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and the oil-rich Middle Eastern region. Apart from these, Pakistan was also part of Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) and a party to U.S Military alliance of 1959²⁰. Although Pakistan felt its concerns somewhat alleviated by joining regional organizations at the time, in essence they never extended any practical assistance to Pakistan (nor were they envisioned as such), even when it was attacked by India in 1965 and 1971.

A measure of the reliability of the US when it came to Pakistan can be gauged from the fact that after Pakistan had barely managed to defend itself against Indian aggression in 1965, the US admonished it for using the weapons supplied to it, against India, arguing that they were meant to be used for the containment of Communism only²¹. On the other hand, the American leadership was at pains to provide complete military, political and diplomatic support to India in the event of a short war with China in 1962, over the Sino-Indian border dispute. Despite this, it was during the same administration, of President Nixon, that Pakistan facilitated the US in its rapprochement with China through quiet diplomacy, without demanding anything in retribution.

Major Divergences in Pak-US Relations

The Sovereignty Dilemma – US Drone Attacks: There have been over 300 CIA driven drone attacks in the Tribal areas of Pakistan to date.²² Report released by Bureau of Investigative Journalism compiles that since first drone

strike on June 17, 2004, 248 missiles were fired during President Obama's first three years, ²³ coming to a tally of well over 80% hell-fire rounds between 2008 and 2011. Although these attacks are aimed at targeting terrorists and foreign elements, they have killed more than 2900 innocent citizens of Pakistan. The foreigners and wanted criminals killed during these attacks total less than a hundred in number. Sustaining these attacks over the years has caused the alienation of the affected communities and, consequently, has led to a further deteriorating security situation by furthering the grievances of even larger segments of society. It is not only the Pakistani government, but also the civil society and human rights activists that have been strongly condemning these attacks and demand their halt. Admiral (retired) Dennis C. Blair of the US Navy is one of those who have declared the drone attacks as being counterproductive and undermining support for the US in its campaign against terror. However, Defence Secretary Leon Panetta asserts that the "campaign of drone strikes had seriously-----weakened the Al Qaeda leadership,"²⁴ and has rejected the unanimous call to abandon these.

From the US perspective, a legal impetus was provided for the first time on 25th March, 2010, by State Department legal Advisor, Harold Koh, who said that the United States was "... in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence under international law."²⁵ And he further emphasized in his speech that the US complied in all its drone strikes with principles of the laws of war, notably the principle of distinction and proportionality.

What Mr. Harold Koh failed to address in his speech were arguments made by a UN special reporter Richard Alston. UN Special Reporters Richard Alston in his report argued that if targeting of individuals was considered *prima facie* valid simply under the basis of self-defence then the war in Gaza, and hostilities against civilians, Congo etc would need not to be discussed by relevant UN bodies.²⁶ In other words, as Zakaria commented, if all extra-judicial targeted killings were

so easily justified based on the premise of self-defence then any nation could be allowed under the flimsiest of pretexts to encroach on another's territory to kill individuals they believed were involved in hostile acts against it.

Moreover, legality of these airstrikes are complicated by the fact that till date Government of Pakistan has not officially acknowledged that it has granted Americans the permission to launch drone strikes inside her territory. If Pakistan has not provided any consent to these strikes, then drones hovering over Pakistani territory amount to infringement of Pakistan's sovereignty. And infringement of sovereignty, under the provisions of UN Charter, is considered as an act of aggression. Even if it is established that Islamabad's consent is there, still the US and its allies stand guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the light of Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,²⁷ Geneva Convention and the Charter of United Nations.


Strategic significance of drone attacks from American perspective has been highlighted by the Wall Street Journal which stated that "the Central Intelligence Agency's drone programme is important to Washington because areas of Pakistan remain a haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants operating in Afghanistan"²⁸. However, analyzing the effectiveness of these attacks from a viewpoint of security & threat perception, US military commanders and even the CIA confirm the successful elimination of not more than a handful high value Al-Qaeda operatives during last seven years.²⁹

From the perspective of the people of Pakistan, these drone attacks are a serious violation of its sovereignty. Political repercussions have been even more devastating as these strikes have fuelled the process of radicalization and have resulted in bringing further instability inside Pakistan. Indeed, these attacks have serious implications for Pakistan. Firstly, drone attacks by foreign forces are a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty in the light of the UN charter. Secondly, these attacks are causing massive collateral damage in the form of the deaths of innocent civilians, including a vast

majority of women and children. These killings fuel anti-American sentiment which in turn increases the likelihood of adding to the terrorists' numbers. Thirdly, drone attacks have displaced a huge number of affected people to other areas, where they face multiple problems, including difficulty in acquiring shelter and food. Fourthly, the failure of the Government in stopping these attacks incurs anti-government sentiment among the people, gravely damaging the national integration and internal stability in the country.


As per a report of the London based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a neutral forum, it has been found that, under the Obama administration, there has been, on average, one drone attack after every four days (80%).³⁰ The last seven years of drone attacks have killed over 168 children. The forum found that only four percent of the 2900 people³¹ killed so far in drone attacks were militants. The Brookings Institution, however, calculates that for every militant taken down, 10 innocent civilians are killed.³² "As a marker of what may come to be, May 11, 2011, witnessed one of the heaviest drone bombardments Pakistan has ever seen, with four separate strikes killing over 50 people."³³ These attacks are a serious violation of international law. Mr. Philip Alston, the UN Special Envoy on Extrajudicial Killings, believes that drones attacks in Pakistan are "undermining the rules designed to protect the right of life."³⁴

A graphical representation of the number of drone strikes and the casualties incurred are given below³⁵:



Source:<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/resources-and-graphs>.

Number of Strikes, Total Casualties and Civilian Casualties Since-2004



Fallouts of AfPak Policy

President Barack Obama's AfPak policy mainly cantered on the shared dealing of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the focal goal being to dislocate, dismantle, and overpower the terrorists groups of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and to prevent their resurgence.³⁶ The policy was discriminatory, as it tagged Pakistan, a nuclear power, with war-ravaged Afghanistan. The core of the policy, as articulated by President Obama, is that the soil of Afghanistan and Pakistan must not be used as a base to launch attacks against the US Homeland.³⁷ However, following a surge in US troops and the announcement of the "US Exist Strategy" from Afghanistan, the actual motives of the AfPak policy have raised fears about the future intentions of the US towards the region.³⁸ It would not be amiss to say that if the AfPak Policy has achieved anything so far, it has been the uniting of militants on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border.³⁹

As the policy now unfolds, some Afghan Provinces, like Kunar and Nuristan, have become "Safe Havens for Terrorists", who, as a matter of routine, attack and target Pakistani security forces, installations and innocent civilians. As per the DG ISPR, these hideouts are housing some very

“high level terrorists,”⁴⁰ including the likes of Fazlullah, Faqeer Muhammad, Abdul Wali, Hakimullah, etc. He categorically stated that, “the recent terror attacks from Afghanistan have testified our words; we have already voiced our concern over the pull out of NATO and Afghan forces from these areas.”⁴¹ Destabilizing Pakistan was and continues to be the sole objective of all these terrorists and the spying agencies abetting them.

After pull-out of ISAF, these terrorists have been given a free hand. Moreover, there is hardly any deployment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) or even its paramilitary forces. On the other hand, there are over 1100 security check-posts established all along the border by the Pakistan Army, with over 150,000 trained military personals. The fact is that the “low number of Afghan security check post and inaction by the Afghan security forces and ISAF is one of the main reasons behind the increasing terrorist infiltration.”⁴² However, the question that arises is whether this lack of check-posts on the Afghan side of the border is a deliberate state of affairs or out of a compulsion. After all, it must be remembered that there have been no attacks by Afghan militants from any of its bordering provinces into Pakistan, even during periods of extreme tension between the two countries.

To some analysts, the hasty withdrawal of the ISAF from these bordering Afghan provinces has enabled and encouraged attacks, either by terrorists of the TTP hiding in Afghanistan or by Afghan militants on the bordering areas of Pakistan, such as Dir and Chitral. Analysts feel that attacks by militants from the Afghan soil appears to be the real unfolding of the AfPak policy, as this act would concurrently destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan, thereby providing the US with an excuse to operate anywhere, the essence of AfPak. Furthermore, U.S indeed, desires a state of confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan for a better manipulation, to further its own and Indian interests in Afghanistan and to reduce Pakistani influence.

As was recently revealed, the new CIA Chief General David Petraeus is launching a covert US campaign against Pakistan to implement US quasi-military operations. With its foot prints already in Pakistan, CIA only needs to evolve again and intensify its actions. General Petraeus as CIA Director “will be a battlefield commander, in charge of a robotic air force and a small army of US and Afghan paramilitaries, many of whom are former special operations soldiers.”⁴³ Furthermore, “under US law, Petraeus's campaign in Pakistan will be a civilian-led covert action, authorized under Title 50 of the United States Code. To Pakistan, it will look a lot like war.”⁴⁴

The Raymond Davis Case: A Major Twist in Pak-US Relations

The distrust between Pakistan and the United States was added to, after the arrest of Raymond Davis, a covert CIA operative in Pakistan. He was arrested on charges of committing the murder of two Pakistani nationals in Lahore on January 27, 2011. In addition, he was involved in several anti-Pakistan and espionage activities, including maintaining linkages with terrorist groups operating against Pakistan. Though he was eventually released, his arrest left in its wake a wide gulf of mistrust in the already ailing Pak-US relationship. It is a measure of his value that, in addition to other voices within the US, President Barrack Obama himself pressed Pakistan for his immediate release. Pakistan was relentlessly called on to accord him diplomatic immunity as per the Vienna Convention, despite the fact that in Davis's case, such immunity did not apply.

Although, Raymond was released after paying the blood money owed to the murdered men's families, the US did not hide the fact that it was deeply displeased. The succeeding intensification of drone attacks and intensifying the pressure on Pakistan with reference to Afghanistan appeared to be a retaliation of sorts for the Raymons Davis affair. Nevertheless, his interrogation revealed that there are a large numbers of CIA operatives involved in similar activities, spread all over the country, whose whereabouts may be known to very few in

Pakistan. It should, perhaps, not be a surprising revelation, given the fact that Xe and Blackwater employees have been found, openly demonstrating their weapons, in various cities of Pakistan since 2009.

The Killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL)

After the killing of OBL by US Navy SEALs without Pakistani authorities being taken into confidence, many questions arose about the mutual distrust between these two unequal allies. Until then, the possibility of such an operation being undertaken on Pakistani soil without having sought the prior permission of, or at least having informed, the Pakistani leadership, was considered unthinkable. However, the repeated denial by the Pakistani defence authorities and the Government of Pakistan has convinced the Pakistani public that this was indeed what had transpired. Furthermore, the CIA Director Leon Panetta made it clear that the CIA did not share the operational details with Pakistan over fears that it could have compromised the target. As per Pakistani military officials, “it was the ISI which had initially provided a lead on Osama in the shape of cell phone details of his most trusted courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, which the CIA pursued and developed.”⁴⁵

Leon Panetta, while indicating his dismay at the Pakistani intelligence setup, perhaps forgot that it was Pakistani intelligence which for the want of American government tracked down, captured and handed over to US authorities some of the top leaders of Al-Qaeda. Although upon the killing of OBL, US President Barack Obama said that this is “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda.”⁴⁶ But what comes to the fore is the question of whether this death would end Al-Qaeda’s global agenda and whether, consequently, the United States’ so-called War on Terror would come to an end as well. The US may at least have achieved the tactical benefit of satisfying its domestic audience, which had started questioning their leadership’s rationale behind the indefinite engagement of US troops in Afghanistan. The fact must not be ignored that US authorities

have failed so far in giving the world solid and logical proof of OBL's killing. The authorities have yet not released any video or photographs of the operation, thereby creating room for suspicion.

Analysts believe that, the incident may kick-start Obama's election campaign, but the more mature minds within US domestic circles ask for verifiable evidence of OBL's killing, a failure to provide which may become a point of embarrassment for the Obama Administration in the days to come. The people of Pakistan have a lot of questions from the Government, safeguarding the sovereignty being the top most. Furthermore, there has been more mistrust in the Pak-US bilateral relations after these two incidents.

Countering US Unilateralism

In its first formal response after OBL's killing, the Pakistani legislatures called for a "review of the country's relationship with the US,"⁴⁷ in a joint session of the Pakistani Parliament. A review of the policy is considered essential because of the unilateral US military operation on Pakistani soil, which violated the Pakistani sovereignty. The resolution unanimously "condemned the unilateral action... which constitutes a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty"⁴⁸. The resolution also urged that were the US to continue drone attacks in the coming days, the NATO transit conveyors would be banned from using Pakistani soil. The security establishment briefed the law-makers about the US unilateral operation in Abbottabad during the session. All participants felt, during the course of the discussion, that the actions of the US and the official statements it had issued, either preceding the event or following it, had malicious intent, that it in fact constituted a "campaign to malign Pakistan."⁴⁹ Unfortunately, the resolution could not be implemented despite the fact that CIA drones are still continuing.

Consequently, in the milieu of US pressure and threats, there held an All-Parties Conference (APC) on September 29, 2011, at Islamabad. APC adopted a joint declaration calling US to give peace a chance. It was emphatically emphasized that,

“Pakistan cannot be pressured to do more, but the doors are still open from our side for talks and discussion.”⁵⁰ This gathering of politicians and military commanders rejected the US allegations and said that, “God willing, we can face these challenges with unity. We are committed to defend our independence and sovereignty.” Prime Minister Gillani said on the occasion that, “I am confident that our nation is determined to defend its geographical frontiers, independence and sovereignty. Our armed forces are united as always. They have never disappointed their people.”⁵¹ A united Pakistani response has compelled US to lower its tone towards Pakistan and there also took place two successive visits of Secretary of State, besides other high officials as confidence building measures. According to US media analysis, “This shift in the US stance could give Washington and Islamabad new room to cooperate on ending the Afghan war.”⁵²

US Exploitation of the Haqqani Network

United States has been continuously accusing Pakistan of having linkages with the Haqqani network in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). Besides, US have been emphasizing Pakistan to take action against the network. It believes that this network is actively involved against ISAF in Afghanistan. Owing to the possibility of severe repercussions, Pakistan has been disinclined to undertake such a military operation. However, it ought to be understood that Pakistan never supported the network's presence on its territory; rather it has always tried to pull out all foreigners from its soil. Contrary to US claims, the leader of the network, Sirajud Din Haqqani, disclosed in September 2011, that they have shifted to Afghan territory. In an interview with Reuters, the young Haqqani has said, “Gone are the days when we were hiding in the mountains along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Now we consider ourselves more secure in Afghanistan besides the Afghan people. Senior military and police officials are with us.”⁵³ He further emphasized that the Afghans are desirous of getting rid of the US occupation of their motherland and they believe that this group would provide them such a platform. He also asserted that his network has linkages with

individuals in the Karzai Government. “There are sincere people in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces.”⁵⁴ He mentioned that in the past, the US had attempted to strike a deal with the Haqqani network and had even offered them lucrative positions in the Afghan Government, but they had rejected the overtures.

Rumors of the relocation of the Haqqanis from NWA had been circulating much before the killing of OBL. However, there was no confirmation or rejection from the network itself, from the Afghan Government or from Pakistan, until Sirajud Din himself broke the silence in the interview cited above. As revealed by locals’ sources, in the wake of US pressure on Pakistan for a military operation in NWA, even prior to the killing of OBL, the Haqqanis had started shifting from the area. This movement was accelerated following the May 2 Abbotabad raid as indications from the Pakistani side seemed to signal an impending military operation in NWA.

According to Brigadier (ret'd) Mehmood Shah, former Secretary of FATA, “Haqqani has no more fighting elements left in Waziristan Agency. Air strikes ... forced them to shift ... across the border ... and stopped them from visiting relatives.”⁵⁵ Another defence analyst, General (ret'd) Jamshid Ayaz, stated, “I know they (Haqqani and Taliban) have relocated themselves ... but operations are necessary to prevent their return.”⁵⁶ To add to it, a senior journalist from Peshawar asserted, “I am of the firm opinion the Haqqani network is no longer operating from North Waziristan. ... They are now based in the Afghanistan border region and enjoy the full support of Afghan mountain tribes living along the border.”⁵⁷ According to a local tribal elder Malik Mumtaz, “Local tribes and Hafiz Gul Bahadur will not support any foreigner or allow anybody to use the soil against any foreign country.”⁵⁸ Some reports say Hafiz Gul Bahadur and elders of the tribal peace committee have convinced the Haqqani members and Arab fighters to move out or stay peaceful to forestall a military operation in North Waziristan.

Brigadier (retd) Mehmood Shah feels that the time has arrived when “The Haqqani network is safer in Afghanistan than in North Waziristan.”⁵⁹ Therefore, there is no need to launch a military operation in NWA, as there is “nothing to fight now.” In fact, publicity about likely military operations and frequent aerial attacks in the form of drones has impeded the movement of the Haqqanis in NWA, who thus preferred to vacate the area. Some people say that Hafiz Gul Bahadur has played a very significant role in driving the Haqqanis out of NWA. However, it is certain that Pakistan firmly believes that neither foreign elements are acceptable on its soil nor terrorist acts of locals can be tolerated any more.

The Haqqanis hail from the Jadran tribe of Paktia in Afghanistan and have roots in North Waziristan. Jalaluddin Haqqani, played a very significant role in defeating the former Soviet forces in Afghanistan under the patronage of the CIA and later defeated Communist forces of Dr. Najibullah in Khost Province in 1991. It would be accurate to say that during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Haqqanis had a major contribution in the fulfilment of US aims and objectives to disintegrate the USSR. After the US invasion in Afghanistan, Haqqani turned against by becoming part of the Taliban. Washington has declared him as “one of the most dangerous Taliban commanders in the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan.”⁶⁰ Though they maintain a soft corner for Pakistan, the Haqqanis are not its friend. Indeed, neither Haqqanis nor Taliban are obliged to follow the Pakistani directives.

On its part, the United States has long laboured under the misperception that the Haqqanis are a strategic asset for Pakistan’s security establishment, either for garnering influence in Afghanistan or against India. This assumption is fallacious, as Pakistan is a nuclear power and with over half a million regular armed forces it does not need to depend on such foreign elements or non-state actors. Indeed, no nation can depend on foreign elements or non-state actors for its defence. Together with US, Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan during the decade of the 1980s, necessitated the

formulation of linkages with various Afghan groups and factions, Haqqanis being one of them. Now, the US is exploiting the same very linkage for a different purpose, a behaviour which is reminiscent of the way it declared the Mujahedeen it had formerly supported, as terrorists.

The US even blamed Haqqani network and ISI for the attack on US Embassy and ISAF Headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011. Though the attack was of minor scale, involving only a few militants, yet the penetration of Taliban in such a high security area, right inside the capital city, raised questions about the effectiveness of ISAF and the Kabul administration. The attack also exposed the ineffectiveness/susceptibility to attack of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan police and the occupying power. Pakistan strongly condemned this attack and subsequent assassination of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former President of Afghanistan, at the hands of terrorists on September 20, 2011. Afghan President and his intelligence chief however, once again pointed fingers at Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan had fully supported Rabbani's efforts for bringing together various Afghan groups and factions for stability in Afghanistan. His death has raised many questions about the enemies of peace in Afghanistan and has given rise to speculation regarding their vested interests.

In the aftermath of the Kabul attacks, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta threatened Pakistan in the wordings; "Time and again we've urged the Pakistanis to exercise their influence over these kinds of attacks from the Haqqanis. And we have made very little progress in that area. I think the message they need to know is: we're going to do everything we can to defend our forces."⁶¹ The tone and texture of this highly provocative statement indicates a firm belief in Pakistan's complicity. The rational recourse for the US would have been to assess the grey areas in its security arrangements in Afghanistan instead of tagging Pakistan as the scapegoat.

The Pakistani response, while quick in coming, was reflective of a level-headed reaction. The spokesperson of the

Pakistani Foreign Office stated: "We believe these remarks are not in line with the cooperation that exists between the two countries." ⁶² The US was, however, reminded to respect Pakistani sovereignty. Pakistan also questioned the US about the safe havens of militants on the Afghan side of the Pak-Afghan border, who had repeatedly attacked Pakistani security posts, killing hundreds of security personnel as well as innocent civilians. Pakistan feels that "There is a need to clearly address the issue in a cooperative mode and work for de-escalation in violence as violence is no solution to any problem."⁶³ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her two days visit of Pakistan rejected these accusations⁶⁴ and desired for restoration of confidence between Pakistan and US.

Not only the US ambassador in Kabul and the ISAF commander in Afghanistan, but also the US Ambassador in Pakistan, Cameron Munter, accused Pakistan of fostering linkages with the Haqqani network. The Americans accused the network of launching attacks in Afghanistan from their safe havens in NWA. Analysts contest these accusations by questioning the role played by the 150,000 ISAF troops in Afghanistan, besides the unsatisfactory role of ANA and ANP. How is it that these militants managed to crossover into Afghan territory, orchestrate their attacks and then slipped right back into NWA, with out having aircraft, missiles and modern equipment like US and NATO forces? How is it that US drone attacks have failed to trace and engage them?

Furthermore, the US has an effective surveillance system to monitor any activity in these troubled areas; what defies explanation is why the militants cannot be tracked down and targeted before they launch their next attack or escape from the scene of one. US should realize today's world is more aware and visionary, thus cannot be befooled easily. Earlier, the Pentagon had accused the Haqqanis for being responsible for a truck bombing that wounded 77 US marines besides killing four Afghan civilians, on the occasion of a gathering to mark the 10th anniversary of 9/11 attacks in Wardak province. The Pentagon released a statement declaring, "This was of course a deplorable attack against a combat outpost in

Wardak and we condemn it in the strongest possible terms. We believe that the perpetrators were from the Haqqani network. ... This is totally unacceptable behaviour and we call on these kinds of attacks to cease."⁶⁵

In the same backdrop, during the meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Defence in Seville, Spain, the Pakistani Army Chief General Kayani ruled out any possibility of undertaking a military operation in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). As per ISPR, the General "reiterated the resolve and commitment of Pakistan in the struggle against terrorism while underlining Pakistan's sovereign right to formulate policy in accordance with its national interests and the wishes of the Pakistani people."⁶⁶ This statement was issued to dismiss the rapid accumulation of pressure by the US on Pakistan to launch a military operation in NWA. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar's meeting with the US Secretary of State on the sidelines of the annual session of the UN, and the ISI Chief General Pasha's meeting with the Director CIA General Petraeus,⁶⁷ all cantered on the US demand that Pakistan take action against the Haqqanis. It would be premature to say anything about the future course of action. However, Pakistan cannot afford a military operation in NWA, especially not one in haste, given that the presence of the Haqqanis there is an uncertain fact at best.

For the US, General Kayani's statement after his meeting with Admiral Mike Mullen should have been enough. It was a true reflection of the national sentiments of an enraged Pakistani nation—in the wake of the incident of May 2, 2011. After all, why should Pakistan be made a scapegoat for all the ills whether committed by the Afghan Government, militants and the United States or NATO? It is a considered view of the nation that, under the current security situation, a military campaign cannot be launched in NWA, simply in order to appease the US. After all, we are a sovereign nation and have the right to make decisions in our best national interest.

Such a military operations will have many implications. Firstly, the massive territory of NWA is composed of rugged

mountains and populated areas which are generally inhospitable terrain for launching an attack, and would need heavy combat power and finances. This is something which is not feasible in the current constrained situation given that Pakistani forces are already engaged in military operations in all agencies of FATA, including NWA. Secondly, the people of the area harbour hostile sentiment, and another major attack would further provoke them against the armed forces and the Government, potentially causing further destabilization within the country. Thirdly, such a military operation would, like Swat, call for a major internal displacement of the locals; this again would need financial resources and a detailed segregation, both of which are difficult to assure in this agency. Linked with this is the added complication of it being very difficult to differentiate between a terrorist and innocent locals, as both are from similar races and hail from similar areas. Thus shifting the IDPs to settled areas would be amounting to destabilizing those areas too.

Fourthly, the Haqqanis have reportedly left the Agency and a military operation in NWA would result in heavy collateral damage, which would provoke the locals against the state. There is yet another angle to this. Any action in NWA would disturb the prevalent peace in the agency, and would facilitate the TTP and other militants in making inroads into the Agency.⁶⁸ Subsequently, the Afghan Taliban, who until now have not posed a threat to Pakistan, could conceivably join forces with them, thus putting Pakistani in an extraordinary situation. Besides, what appears at the Afghan end game that, US desires to relegate any future Pakistani role in Afghanistan, for which it would like that Pakistan should have no linkages with any Afghan group. Perhaps, such an option would suit U.S and its new potential strategic partner; India, for the purpose of serving overlapping multiple regional and global gains. Molding Haqqanis focus from Afghanistan to Pakistan and encouraging armed engagement with Pakistan might be a desirable equation for Delhi. Such a strategic manoeuvre is unacceptable for Pakistan, given the stakes it has in Afghanistan; for that matter, the Afghans, too, have stakes in Pakistan. Pakistan feels that its future and that of

Afghanistan is interconnected and interdependent, while neither the US nor India can lay claim to any such linkage or resultant obligation.

These implications need to be weighed against the likely gains. A realistic assessment would reveal that there would be no real term gain from a military operation in NWA, other than the fulfilment of US demands. The US needs to realize that, going after the Haqqani network (whose presence in NWA is now uncertain) at this stage will have huge repercussions for Pakistan, Afghanistan and even for the US itself. It would only serve to further destabilize the region. It could provoke a very severe local backlash. US and NATO should use the channel of Pakistan and its armed forces to facilitate a negotiation between the Kabul Administration and all factions including the Haqqanis.

With continued allegations, many security analysts' question US; whether Haqqani is the only group operating in Afghanistan against ISAF. What of the other undefeated militant groups in the form of the Taliban and warlords in Afghanistan? If it is conceivable, and it would indeed appear to be implied, that the Haqqanis, with a few thousand men are able to take on the combined might of the ISAF, ANA and ANP, than perhaps the group deserves to have a say in this lawless state.

Well Orchestrated US Defamation Campaign

Besides Haqqanis, American media and officials have launched a well-orchestrated defamation campaign against Pakistani armed forces and the ISI. Though the campaign gained impetus after the arrest of Raymond Davis, it is still continuing with series of accusations aimed at the ISI by top US military officials, such as Admiral Mike Mullen. Unfortunately, as proved by various events, Admiral Mullen, widely considered as one of the few friends Pakistan has in US, who acted as more of whippier than a bearer of sweets. The stance he adopts in meeting Pakistani military officials appears remarkably at odds with the anti-Pakistan posture he demonstrates in press conferences and in gatherings of US

officials. He has frequently accused the ISI of maintaining a relationship with the Haqqani network. Even on September 20, 2011, following a seemingly successful meeting with the Pakistani Army Chief General Kiyani, in which both sides expressed satisfaction over the progress in Afghanistan and the renewed level of cooperation, Admiral Mullen issued a statement in front of the US Senate Committee in which he yet again asserted his belief in the ISI having links with the Haqqanis. Mullen even declared the network as the “veritable arm”⁶⁹ of the ISI. Earlier on September 21, 2011, Admiral Mullen had stated that “It was the heart of the discussion that the proxy connection to the ISI (of) the Haqqanis, working across border, killing our people, killing Afghans, has to stop. That’s not a new message. But it’s one that he clearly understands. And I think it’s one we have to keep reiterating.”⁷⁰ Pakistan has out rightly rejected these accusations and decries this “negative propaganda of Pakistan not doing enough”.⁷¹ Admiral Mullen, while briefing a panel of US Senators, said, “With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted a truck bomb attack [on 11 September], as well as the assault on our embassy,”⁷² a fact now negated by Secretary of State herself.

Another reason of the US pressure and allegations which surfaced after the Raymond David affair and the OBL episode is that Pakistan has demanded that the US provide information on CIA operatives in Pakistan and reduce their strength. Pakistan also warned the US to end its CIA driven covert activities inside Pakistani territory, and demanded a cessation of the drone attacks in the tribal areas. To add to this, the ISI took a strong stance and objected the issuance of bulk visas to US nationals under the garb of diplomatic corps by Pakistani authorities without its clearance. The US has taken issue with this surveillance. In short, the factor driving this defamation campaign is Pakistan’s blunt refusal to accept US demands, deeming that they are contrary to its national interest.

In his brief statement, General Kiyani rejected the statement of Admiral Mullen and said that; Mullen’s

statement is “not based on facts,”⁷³ since Pakistan does not maintain any such connection. He rather questioned that, Mullen and US are well aware which countries have connections with the Haqqanis. Earlier also, Pakistani security establishment declared that, US allegations are baseless in response to a 22 pages, Matt Waldman’s research paper. The paper says that, ISI guides Afghan militants including Haqqanis in their strategic planning, decision making and even in the implementation phases of the insurgency.⁷⁴

US Concern over Rising Anti-Americanism in Pakistan

Though U.S has never been a favourite country for the people of Pakistan, yet, there developed anti-Americanism among the Pakistani masses, following its mysterious activities either within Pakistani territory or within the region after 9/11. The recent strong wave of the anti-Americanism, which is reflective of collective voice of all Pakistanis, gained momentum with the arrest and thereafter release of CIA agent Raymond Davis. The incident of May 2, 2011, and attack on PNS Mehran, destroying the surveillance aircrafts (P-3C Orion) have further fuelled this hatred. Indeed, this public revulsion for US in Pakistan is a natural outcome, from the years of exploitation by the former, which have evolved to an unbearable limit.

Over these sentiments, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, even showed US annoyance, during her brief visit to Pakistan, following the OBL episode. She even repeated this during her October 20, 2011 visit to Pakistan, once she questioned that US provides Pakistan with \$2billions annually, yet its people are anti-America. The frustrated Secretary of State even advised Pakistani people in the words that, “anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories will not make their problems disappear.”⁷⁵ Rather, she suggested that, the recipe of the Pakistani problems is in toeing the American line, rather giving rise to anti-Americanism. However, she gave a clear message that, “America cannot and should not solve Pakistan’s problems,”⁷⁶ rather Pakistanis should solve

their problems themselves. Perhaps this is what most of the Pakistanis want.

Even after describing Pak-US relationship at a “turning point”,⁷⁷ Secretary Clinton tried to exploit the U.S financial assistance to Pakistan, whose effects has never reached to people of Pakistan. Yet the promised \$1.5 billion per year financial assistance under KLL by US has yet not reached Pakistan. Furthermore, on the defence cooperation, Pakistan realizes that dependency on supply of military hardware from US does not guarantee security, as they could not prevent its disintegration in 1971, rather further aggravates the fragility of Pakistan.

There seems harmony among the masses in Pakistan that, if at all U.S is serious to be respected by Pakistani masses, than; it should start respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty at the very first instance. It should rebuild the infrastructures lost during the militancy of last one decade. It should help FATA people in the provision of employment through Reconstruction opportunity Zones (ROZ) as earlier promised. Over and above, it should stop supporting anti-Pakistan forces locally as well as globally. It should re-establish relationship with Pakistan based on mutual trust and respect.

Acceptance in Denial

During a debate focusing on the situation in the Pak-Afghan region, at National Defence University (NDU), Washington, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton declared the relationship with Pakistan as of “Paramount importance.” Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, while seconding Clinton, said, “There is no choice but to maintain a relationship with Pakistan. Because we are fighting a war there. Because we are fighting Al Qaeda there, and they (Pakistanis) do give us----some cooperation in that effort.”⁷⁸ A very significant feature of this recognition of Pakistani role by these hawks is limited to Pakistan’s serving the US interests only. Beyond that, both were very critical to Pakistan’s role,

even to the level of accusing it for having linkages with Afghan militants.

Indeed, here lies the fault-line in the Pak-US relationships. U.S accredits Pakistan's efforts only where its own interest are served. Nevertheless, once Pakistan tries to secure its own interest, the US gets annoyed and allege it with multiple charges. For example during the same very debate, Panetta charged Pakistan with its alleged relationship with Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and said that, "There's a relationship with LeT. And, you know, this is a group that goes into India and threatens attacks there. It has conducted attacks there."⁷⁹ This difference of narrative also fuels mistrust between Pakistan and United States. Like all other Americans, Defence Secretary Panetta was not able to digest the presence of only deterrent; Pakistan has in the form of nuclear weapons. While recognizing the Pakistani position, he showed US concern with its nuclear weapons. He said that, Pakistan "happens to be a nuclear power that has nuclear weapons and we have to be concerned about what happens with those nuclear weapons."⁸⁰ This again reflects malevolence mindset of US about Pakistani nuclear programme. This creates suspicion in Pakistan, as to what plan US has for Pakistani nukes. Pakistan has demonstrated that its nukes are safest in the world with a very effective command and control system.

US feels that, "They (Pakistani) are partners, but they do not always see the world the way we see the world. They do not always cooperate with us on what we think, and I will be very blunt about this—is in their interest."⁸¹ Surely, American interests in the region do not overlap with Pakistani interests. We are two different nations with different priorities, cultures, values, religions and different histories. American sees the world through the prism of hegemony and imperialism, whereas, we believe in the sovereignty of nation states, their independence and right to live as per their own desire, as determined by UN Charter. Secretary Clinton accepts this reality once she said, "There are certain attitudes or beliefs that the Pakistanis have which are rooted in their own

experience, just like we have our own set of such convictions.”⁸²

Still Determine to Fight Militancy without US

Following the US decision of stopping the military assistance (\$800 million) to Pakistan, the Military establishment vowed to fight the “menace of terrorism using Pakistan’s own resources,”⁸³ as decided in the Corps Commander’s conference in July 2011. The participants of the Conference have also unanimously decided that, “Like in the past, operations against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates would continue.”⁸⁴ Indeed, it has reiterated the resolve to fight the menace of terrorism in our own national interest using our own resources. Whereas, seeing the history of Pak-US relationship, which essentially has been a marriage of convenience (mostly to the US convenience only), Pakistani armed forces haven’t been strategically dependent on any other country for its defence and security. Therefore, for fighting the war on terror too, Pakistan’s reliance on United States has been marginal. This is not to state that Pakistan has not purchased weapons and equipments from the technologically advanced countries of the world including United States. But the interest-stringed arrangement with US is also evident from the fact that we were provided with the wheat for the billion of USD we paid for F-16 aircrafts, once we were not serving its direct purpose. Over 80 percent Pakistanis have a feeling that, it would be blessing in disguise if US leaves us alone so that we can resolve our problems in our own ways, rather succumb to the US dictates. This is again a reality that, financial assistance US has provided to Pakistan in lieu of various services, in most of the cases has made its way back to U.S in the shape of high cost of consultancy and cost of expertise provided by US on various accounts.

The Way Forward

Pakistan has always emphasized US to negotiate with the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and opt for a political solution to bring stability in Afghanistan. The military operations, night raids and drone attacks have not yielded

results of bringing stability in this war-ravaged country. These operations would further fuel the anti-Americanism and militants would keep multiplying in numbers. Political solution indeed, is the only way forward in Afghanistan. Such an option would enable U.S and its NATO allies to have an honourable exit from Afghan war zone. Politically negotiated solution will also enable Afghan groups to have a consensus Government at Kabul, having representation from its diverse factions and ethnic groups. In this way, Afghanistan would not plunge into a civil war, a curse it experienced during the decade 1990s.

Unfortunately, U.S has not paid heed to this idea of political settlement so far, except failed talks with some less significant militants. The dominion of power politics steering the course of super power, and its presumption that superior war munitions and well-trained armed forces would bring a victory on a military front. According to 'Carnegie Endowment', US needs to understand that it is not winning the Afghan war; rather, the insurgents have an upper hand there. The think tank says, "The current strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily is unrealistic. The coalition is on the defensive across much of Afghanistan and, with current troop levels, can at most only contain the insurgency. On present course, the coalition is swiftly heading toward an impasse."⁸⁵ This is a considered view of the Think Tank that, US military commanders in Afghanistan have been misperceiving the on ground situation. These military commanders portray to the Obama administration as if they are gaining ground against the Taliban by pursuing objectives largely categorized as being unrealistic. Contrarily, the fact is that, these coalition forces, "cannot defeat the Taliban militarily."⁸⁶ The think tank even advised Obama administration to go for a political solution; ceasefire and better negotiate with the Taliban insurgents "rather than be boxed into dead-end military logic."⁸⁷ These constitute the exact contents of roadmap suggested by Pakistan, and instead of hurling threat and accusations, US should have positively listened to Islamabad.

After having analyzed, the failed US strategy, President Hamid Karzai, decided to launch reconciliatory efforts to integrate Taliban and other groups into the main stream of Afghan society and the Government. Pakistan indeed, encouraged and helped the Afghan Government to negotiate with all factions including Taliban. In this connection, the statement of Pakistani Army Chief, General Ashfaq Pervaz is on record that; “Pakistan cannot wish anything for Afghanistan which it cannot wish for itself”.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, after the assassination of the Prof Burhanudin Rabbani, the former President and the head of the Afghan Peace Council has created many doubts about the future of these efforts.

Some recommended steps for improvement of Pak-US relationship are covered in succeeding paragraphs.

- **Bridging the Trust Deficit:** Lack of trust has been a cornerstone of the Pak-US bilateral relationship. Over the last few months, this trust deficit is touching new highs. US, being the real beneficiary of Pakistan’s contributions, need to acknowledge Islamabad’s commitment and sacrifices rendered in counter-terrorism, rather than resorting to levelling allegations. US policies should neither be governed through impulsive decisions made from time to time as a patch work nor should be driven by anti-Pakistan lobbies sponsored by traditional adversaries of Pakistan⁸⁹. There should be a realistic appraisal of the bilateral relationship, marked with transparency, without any malicious intent. Likewise, sporadic and individual events should not dictate the relationship between the allies having long-term interest-driven relationship. As Prime Minister, Gillani told visiting US delegate on February 19, 2011, that, the strategic nature of Pak-US relationship should be above the Raymond Davis or for that matter, the military operation in the North Waziristan Agency.
- **Respecting the Sovereignty:** Some of US actions like Abbottabad raid and drone attacks without consent

of Pakistani authorities are contrary to international norms. Sovereignty and geographical boundaries of nation states are to be respected at all cost. Threatening with military action by US over the Haqqani allegations constitutes a gross violation of diplomatic norms and further underpins the lack of concern for Pakistan's territorial sovereignty. There is a need for U.S to adopt a clear and balanced policy towards Pakistan, which is based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. Pakistan cannot afford any more drone attacks in its territory, nor can the US be given a free hand to run unchecked operations inside Pakistan and keep raising the tally of collateral damages in the garb of targeting terrorists. US should rather share any relevant intelligence with security forces of Pakistan for taking any action. Drone attacks by U.S have only fuelled the militancy, consequently enhancing the strength of militants. Besides, while being in Afghanistan, it is the US responsibility to stop ANA, Afghan militants and TTP militants taking refuge in Afghan territory from attacking Pakistani border localities, its innocent people and security forces. ISAF should also make efforts to cease supply of sophisticated arms and equipment and uninterrupted flow of finances to the militants, operating in Pakistani territory.

Consideration for Pakistan's Regional Interests

It is deemed not prudent to calculate that Pakistan will continue serving U.S regional interests at the expense of its national interest. Under the prevailing environment, where US is accusing Pakistan for its own failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan has to secure its national interests. Being in physical control of Afghanistan, U.S must thwart anti-Pakistani forces actively operating from Afghanistan and engaged in promoting sub-nationalism in Balochistan and importing terrorism in FATA and other settled areas. US should aid Pakistan in securing its own national and regional interests.⁹⁰ Also, US should seriously reconcile its efforts of accommodating India in Afghanistan. Indian involvement in

Balochistan together with other international forces to promote sub-nationalism should not be entertained with US blessings. Indian substantial involvement in Afghanistan security calculus raises concern among Pakistan, as suspicion about Indian motivation to actively engage on Pakistan's Western border state grows, logically to be dubbed as a strategic encirclement.

Ending Misperceptions about Pakistan

In the comity of nations, Pakistan has behaved as the most responsible, civilized and cooperative nation in its entire history. It is a highly responsible nuclear power, with a firm command and control system. Despite being prey to terrorism and domestic instability, the Pakistani nation stands united against conspiracies being transpired from across the borders and challenges to its integrity and sovereignty. It is responsibility of international community and US to stop encouraging propaganda and misperceptions about the security establishment of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. US should not encourage its institutions and think tanks from drawing new maps for the future of Pakistan and issue certificates for the likely collapse of Pakistani state or project Pakistan as a failed state. Since most of these misperceptions are being spread in US, therefore, as a responsible super power and ally, it should take note of all such pseudo scholars and caustic think tanks from publishing such ill-motivated grossly biased reports, giving way to unending conspiracies.

Diplomacy, rather making public rebukes and threatening language, should be the hallmark of foreign policy of any country. US officials, both military and State Department, have been making inappropriate, or at times even provocative, statements which contradict the essence of diplomatic norms. These are counterproductive acts and would only further the mistrust between the two. As a moral obligation, both countries should resolve their differences and discuss the issue on the negotiating table.

Conclusion

It is worth mentioning that, in the process of combating terrorism, Pakistan and United States have worked as partners for a decade now. Surely, no overt or covert participation of any Pakistani has been suspected in the incident of September 11. They were all Arabs and so was OBL or Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, arrested and handed over to US along with over 600 other wanted militants by Pakistan. Despite evolving nature of Pak-US relationship, Pakistan played a pivotal role in supporting US cause for the disintegration of USSR in the decade of 1980s. Following the incident of 9/11, Pakistan once again played the role of front line state against terrorism and served the US cause.

Regretfully, instead of acknowledging and appreciating the Pakistani contributions, the U.S has shown a deep mistrust over the sacrifices made by Pakistani nation. By subscribing to the rhetoric of “do more”, by infringing Pakistan’s sovereignty through the conduct of drone attacks and other covert activities, US has severely undermined the validated interests of Pakistan. US media, its defense establishment and State Department has launched a well-orchestrated and well-coordinated defaming campaign against ISI and the armed forces of Pakistan for their alleged support for the Afghan militants groups, especially the Haqqani network.

Mindful of the emerging challenges facing the country, today the Pakistani nation stand united to thwart any misadventure by any one. This was amply demonstrated after the Abbottabad incident, following the accusations of former US Military Commander Mike Mullen and during the visit of Hillary Clinton on October 21, 2011. Pakistan has said in unequivocal terms that it is not supporting any Afghan insurgent group nor believes in allowing its soil to be used against any other state. Pakistan has more than a few options at hand to uphold its national pride and national integrity, however, it wishes to respect other’s sovereignty and demand reciprocity from others.

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INDIAN AIR FORCE: A REGIONAL POWER BY 2020

Air Commodore Zia ul Haque Shamsi

Abstract

Given the sweeping impact of today's technology, air power has unquestionably taken a position of dominance in changing the very nature of warfare. Hence, any nation that aspires to enhance its influence beyond its frontiers; ought to have a strong and a viable Air Force. Desirous to play a more dominant role in global affairs, Indian leadership in year 2000, drew an ambitious plan envisaging India to be recognized in the community of developed nations by 2020. Consequently, the Indian Air Force (IAF) defined its vision for 2020 and under the proposed plan, IAF plans to raise its inventory of fighter combat squadrons. The proposed plan includes acquisition of more advanced fighters, sophisticated defence systems and smart long-range weapons, for which IAF would require huge funding over the next decade. However, besides exorbitant spending, IAF would also need the support of a modern aerospace industry and research and development establishment to sustain it. Given the regional aspirations, India is expected to invest heavily in IAF to pursue its objectives of projecting power beyond its borders.

Introduction

India is the second most populous country with the world's second largest army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest naval force. "The country has a land frontier of 15,200km, a coastline of 7,516.6 km and an exclusive economic zone of 2.2 million sq km, as well as island territories, vital offshore installations and airspace to defend. The armed forces, therefore, have to be kept prepared and well equipped to repel any external threat."¹ Already accepted as a regional military power, India can move into the great power league but only if it treads carefully². However, India has boundary disputes with both, China and Pakistan and has fought wars over them.

According to Shirivastau, “China wishes to keep India strictly confined to its periphery in South Asia, whereas Pakistan has kept India militarily embroiled and economically burdened”.³ Hence, India perceives that both of them, individually or jointly, continue to pose a military threat to her territorial integrity thereby causing restraint on her desire to become a truly global player.

Indian Air Force (IAF), which since its inception, had been tailored to play a purely supportive tactical role to the army, decided to suitably augment and develop itself to make the maximum impact on the military posturing in future. IAF has managed to convince the leadership of the country that the current scenario necessitated a strategic reach to safeguard its national interests and play a strategic role to dominate the skies over the Indian Ocean.⁴ Consequently, a number of Committees were set up to work out the modalities, timelines and requirements to meet this daunting task. Like other services and departments, IAF also defined its vision for 2020, in the wake of the ‘Arun Singh Task Force on Management of Defence’.⁵ Under the proposed plan, IAF plans to raise its inventory of fighter combat squadrons to 50-55 from the existing figures of 39.5. IAF plans to acquire more advanced fighters, sophisticated defence systems and smart long-range weapons to cater for its strategic needs. In order to project itself beyond its borders, IAF rightly laid emphasis on the acquisition of force multipliers and improvements in C4I structures, concurrently modernizing its air defence and communication networks.

IAF’s ambitions to become a truly regional force need to be verified through its intentions and planning for the future. Therefore, the study is aimed at analyzing the IAF’s preparations and efforts to become a dominant regional force.

Problem Statement

India aspires to play a more dominant role in the global affairs. Indian Air Force (IAF), which had been tailored to play a supportive tactical role to the army, has decided to change its posture and assume the responsibility of projecting its

power beyond its frontiers. In order to enhance its strategic reach by becoming a truly dominant force in the region, IAF has embarked upon an ambitious plan of its modernization and up gradation of its inventory. The proposed plan includes acquisition of more advanced fighters, sophisticated defence systems and smart long-range weapons. IAF plans to achieve this daunting task i.e. task of becoming a regional airpower by 2020.

IAF: A Historical Review

Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) was established on 8 October 1932 with the prime responsibility of conducting air-based warfare and securing Indian airspace. The first Flight of No 1 Squadron was formed with Wapiti aircraft at Drigh Road Karachi on 1 April, 1933.⁶ During the inter-war period, RIAF went through a phase of steady expansion and number of combat squadrons increased to nine, with a primary role of 'Army Cooperation'.⁷ At the time of partition, IAF played a crucial role in moving Indian troops into Srinagar when Indian government decided to support the Maharaja of Kashmir. This was the first IAF operation in the regional context and the airlift in October 1948 saved not just Srinagar but two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir for India.⁸

During Sino-India war of 1962, IAF only took part to counter-attack the Chinese raids and to supply troops fighting near the border. General Kaul, the Army Commander in NEFA later confessed, "lastly, we made great mistake in not employing our Air Force in a close support role during these operations".⁹ Whereas, during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, in spite of an overwhelming superiority in numbers and airfield infrastructure, IAF remained reactive and was outclassed by the PAF within the first few days of the war. As Dixit put it, "during the course of the conflict, the PAF enjoyed qualitative superiority over the IAF as most of the jets in IAF's fleet were of post World War II vintage. Despite this, the IAF was able to prevent the PAF from gaining air superiority over conflict zones."¹⁰ However, after the War, IAF went through an intense phase of modernization and consolidation by

inducting Mach 2 capable Soviet MiG-21 and Sukhoi Su-7 fighters which proved effective during the 1971 War against Pakistan.¹¹

Since the mid-1990s, IAF has changed gears and emerged as a very potent strike force with high-tech aircraft and weapons which aim to project its power beyond the Indian borders. As Air Chief Marshal Tyagi stated that, “The redrawn strategic boundaries of resurgent India could extend from Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and from Central Asian Republics to the Indian Ocean. The enlarged strategic dimension necessitates not only a radical change in our strategic thinking but also accentuates the role of Aerospace Power in the new security arena”.¹² During the Kargil conflict, IAF played a pivotal role in India’s counter-offensive against Mujahedeen positions. Although, IAF lost two fighters and an attack helicopter to the air defence weapons but it quickly changed its posture and resorted to the use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) from standoff ranges which allowed them to stay well outside the envelope of Pakistan Army’s air defence weapon systems.¹³ Kargil marks the watershed in the mindset of IAF leadership; from being a purely tactical support element to a more dominant and decisive force in the changed nature of warfare.¹⁴

IAF Today

IAF today is the fourth largest air force in the world. It is among the world’s top ten countries in terms of defence expenditure and third-largest importer of defence hardware. IAF is focusing on the procurement of long range, lethal and precision guided munitions, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition system. India’s military spending amount to roughly over 2% of GDP and its military budget is expected to grow by 7% annually over the next five years with military hardware and software’ bills are expected to be over £15bn by 2012.¹⁵ In the process of its modernization effort since the late 1990s, size of the IAF has decreased during this period because of the retirement of older aircraft and IAF’s current strength has dropped to an all-time low of some 29 combat squadrons against the authorized level of 39.5¹⁶. However, IAF still has over 800 combat aircraft with a balanced mix of

offensive and defensive capability, having the potential for undertaking entire spectrum of air operations. The Sukhoi Su-30MKI is the mainstay of IAF with multiple role capability. The IAF has ordered for a total of 272 Su-30MKIs¹⁷ of which 159 are in service as of June 2011.¹⁸ Whereas IAF's dedicated air superiority fighters are the MiG 29s, some 69 are currently being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG standard.¹⁹ The Dassault Mirage 2000, is the IAF's primary multirole fighter of which 51 are in service.²⁰ The older Fleet of MiG 21 nearly 200 in numbers of which 121 have been upgraded to Bison standard are likely to remain in-service till 2017, whereas older version is planned to be phased out by 2013.²¹ The Ground Attack and Close Support Fleet is mainly comprised of Jaguar and the MiG-27 aircraft. The IAF currently operates 139 Jaguars²² and over 100 MiG-27s.²³

The IAF currently operates different types of transport aircraft for different roles. The IL 76 acquired in mid eighties is mainly used for military transport roles such as strategic or heavy lift.²⁴ However, these are to be replaced by C-17 Globemaster IIIs, the first of which has test landed on Gaggal Airport, North India on June, 2010.²⁵

The AN 32 is mainly used as medium transport aircraft as well as in bombing roles and para-dropping operations. The IAF currently operates 105 An-32s, all of which are being upgraded.²⁶ IAF also operates a variety of helicopters for medium utility and attack roles. The Mi-8 is being replaced by Mi-17 and IAF has ordered 80 Mi-17V-5s with some 59 additional helicopters to follow soon.²⁷ The Mi-26 serves as a heavy lift helicopter whereas Mi-35 is mainly used as an attack helicopter. The IAF currently operates 4 and 15 of these two types for multiple tasks.²⁸

Since India aspired to play a more dominant role in the region, the induction of force-multipliers became a priority of the IAF. It has successfully inducted six IL-78s as Air-to-Air refuellers and modified some of its Jaguars, SU-30s, Mirages and Sea Harrier for the purpose. Induction of force multipliers like Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) has

given IAF much needed ability to monitor entire flying activity over the skies of Indian Ocean while aerial refuelling capability helps enhance the radius of action of the combat fleet.²⁹ IAF has also diversified its surveillance and reconnaissance (recce) methods and it has acquired a large number of Searcher-1, 2 and Heron UAVs from Israel to enhance its near real time recce / surveillance capability.³⁰ The IAI Harpy serves as an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) which is designed to attack radar systems whereas more advanced Harop have also been ordered.³¹

IAF's Modernization Plan for 2020

IAF's drive to modernize itself gained momentum and support from the outcome of Kargil conflict. IAF leadership was able to prove the efficacy of air power during the conflict in which the air operations kept on developing with the passage of time.³² Hence, the recommendations by Kargil review committee laid the foundations for the IAF to get the largest chunk from the 15-year Defence spending plan i.e. around \$ 30 billion for the desired inductions and upgrades.³³ Consistent economic growth and the political will to dominate the region, IAF's march to achieve its ambitions is continuing with full support from the government and this massive upgrade and modernization plan would involve investments to tune of over \$ 100 billion in the region over the next three decades.³⁴ This must be maintained by a new generation of combat aircraft, incorporating critical technologies including Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, advanced mission computers and displays, helmet-mounted cueing systems, integrated defence electronics counter-measures and multifunctional information distribution systems. This shift in the mindset; tactical support element to a more proactive and a dominant strike force is what the IAF leadership would be vying to achieve by 2020.

In order to sustain and further develop the huge armed forces with ambitions to play a regional role, India's defence industry is fast growing with enhanced international support. Nearly all the international defence organizations are making

huge investments in the Indian defence and space industry. India's R&D under the umbrella of Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has 50 laboratories/establishments, whereas as many as 39 Ordnance Factories are supporting with all types of arms, explosives and weapons.³⁵

Aircraft and Weapon Systems

IAF has planned to increase the total number of its "air dominance combat jets" SU 30MKI order to a sizeable 272; the biggest aircraft deal with Russia since the MiG 21 deal with Soviet Union in 1968.³⁶ IAF is already pursuing the upgrade of its fleet of Soviet-vintage Mig 29 fighters and IL 76 airlifters with the Russians, while the Indian Navy has asked for 45 naval versions MiG 29K.³⁷

The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) being built indigenously in India is primarily intended to replace the aging fleet of IAF's Mig-21s. IAF has a projected requirement of 220 LCA which would be a small, lightweight, supersonic, multi-role, single-seat fighter designed to function as a frontline, multi-mission tactical aircraft. Delay in the induction of LCA and phasing out schedule of Mig-21s has forced IAF to induct 126-200 fighter aircraft to cater for the depleting inventory. IAF has put up the qualifying requirements of its future Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) to manufacturers of Gripen, Rafale, Mig-35, Euro fighter and F-16/18. IAF leadership has been evaluating these options for a decade now but the evaluation and decision process has been extremely slow. India is also a partner in the development of Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA) and Russia's Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which it is committed to support financially and then buy as and when they are developed and operational.

Prospective IAF Force Structure: 2020

Role	Air Craft	Number	Sqns
Air Superiority	Su-30MKI	280	15
	MiG-29	50	3
Air Combat	Mirage 2000	50	3
	MMRCA Selectee	126/200	7/11
Air Combat	LCA Tejas	125	7
Strike	Jaguar	110	6
Total		741/815	41/45

Source: Ashley J. Tellis, 'Dogfight', Carnegie Endowment Report 2011, p. 121.

Alternative IAF Force Structures: 2020

Role	Air Craft	No/Sqns	No/Sqns	No/ Sqns
		Option-I	Option-II	Option-III
Air Superiority	Su-30MKI	280/~15	330/~18	280/~15
Air Combat	MMRCA Selectee	250-325/~14-18	375/~21	425/~24
Strike	Jaguar	110/~6	110/~6	110/~6
Total		640-715/~35-40	815/~45	815/~45

Source: Ashley J. Tellis, 'Dogfight', Carnegie Endowment Report 2011, p. 124.

Force Multipliers

Until the early 1990s, the IAF remained a largely tactical force in its outlook. The prevailing view was that in case of a war with Pakistan, all major targets could be reached without the need for in-flight refuelling whereas any conflict with China would also remain largely localized, again putting all targets within easy range of its aircraft. However, nuclearisation and an expansion in the size of the IAF forced a reconsideration of this view and the induction of force multipliers became a priority of the IAF. It has, since 1996, successfully inducted IL-78s as Air-to-Air refuellers and modified some of its Jaguars, SU-30s, Mirages and Sea Harrier for the purpose. All IAF aircraft, including medium lift helicopters will have in-flight refuelling capability and the strategic aircraft assets would be augmented. The IL-78 tanker-transport force has endowed the IAF with incredible force multiplier capability even as the IL-76-mounted Phalcon AEW &C system will provide unprecedented long range target acquisition and identification, allowing operations to simultaneously perform a wide range of air land battle management functions.³⁸

IAF' quest for force multipliers has made significant inroads into EW and Reconnaissance as well. IAF has rather extensive Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) gathering and reconnaissance assets available on its inventory. The bulk of the ELINT aircraft (B-707, An-32, and B-737) are operated under the auspices of the Aviation Research Center (ARC) and photographic reconnaissance assets are operated directly by the IAF. The recent introduction of high altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) gave the IAF its first significant experience with near real time reconnaissance capability. It is expected that in the next 5-7 years the defence forces will deploy dedicated satellites to enhance their intelligence gathering capabilities.

As regards to Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability, IAF had been desperately trying to induct an AEW and Control aircraft into its fleet since early 1990s.³⁹ The Russian

A-50 AEW & C can pick up to 100 targets simultaneously and has a detection range of 230 km against a fighter size target. The Israeli Phalcon AEW System has coverage of 333 km and can deal with 500 targets in track while scan mode. IAF plans to induct three Phalcon based AWACS from Israel by 2007-09⁴⁰ whereas indigenous AEW programme has been revived and maiden flight of the first aircraft is planned in 2011.

Strategic and Tactical Airlift Capability is an essential element for an emerging airpower with regional ambitions. IAF needs to acquire and enhance this capability on fast track basis so as to make India capable of intervening in the region to preserve peace and stability. "Action of this nature was witnessed in the late eighties on a small scale in Sri Lanka and Maldives. Operation of this nature may have to be conducted on a larger scale in the future."⁴¹ IAF has decided to invest heavily in this capability which is extremely crucial to ensure its future tasks. It is acquiring ten Boeing C-17 Globemaster III heavy airlift aircraft for \$ 4.1 billion and may even consider increasing the number at later stage. These C-17s would give IAF the much needed rapid strategic airlift of troops and cargo throughout the region of its interests.⁴²

Training

IAF' modernization plan poses a great challenge to its leadership to suitably deploy, adapt and sustain force levels, required to operate the sophisticated systems being inducted within such a short span of time and over such a vast area. The state of the art aircraft, smart weapon systems, complex sensors, space-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems, a network centric environment; all needs to be supported by an equally advanced and sophisticated training environment.⁴³ The computer-based training systems, elaborate simulation devices for all disciplines, automated distance learning and evaluation systems, need to be placed in the loop now and not only for the officer cadre but at all levels of operators and leaders.⁴⁴

As regards to aircrew training, IAF offers a very rigorous schedule for its pilots. However, this is one issue that IAF

leadership has not been able to resolve despite numerous studies and the proposals. Indian Defence Minister in July 2006 had accepted in the Parliament that IAF is short of 683 pilots which are nearly 24%.⁴⁵ The problem is particularly acute at the advanced fighter training level because the MiG Operational Flying Training Unit's (MOFTU) aircraft are now over 30 years old and in very poor state of repair.⁴⁶ The IAF has been trying for years to purchase suitable Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) to ease the transition to high performance aircraft. IAF has now acquired 66 Hawk Advance Jet Trainers which is considered inadequate.⁴⁷ The current fleet of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) built HPT-32 type trainers have already been grounded since 2009 following a series of crashes.⁴⁸

Space Programmes

Another dimension that the IAF is aspiring for is the 'space'. As Bhal writes that, "space is not only a natural extension of the third dimension but a continuum of the air medium".⁴⁹ It has already formed an Aerospace Group which would lay the foundation for the Aerospace Command.⁵⁰ According to Pandey, "While the concept of using space-based lethal weapon systems may yet lie in the realms of imagination, considerable progress has been made in the regime of communication and surveillance by space-based platforms using optical, radar and IR sensors".⁵¹ However, Indians do have an ambitious plan send a man on moon by 2020.⁵²

IAF is presently faced with a challenging task of transforming itself into a 'Space Power', because there are a number of organizations in the country which are dealing with matters related to space. Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) controls Indian Satellite-based image acquisition and operationalises only with the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) function. Whereas the other space applications such as Navigation, Communication, Search & Rescue, Early Warning, Space Control and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) need to be

integrated with airpower to significantly enhance its potency.⁵³ Newly formed Aerospace Group is tasked to interact with other departments and organizations dealing with space to enhance IAF's overall combat potential and now it would be the responsibility of this large network of organizations to help IAF in its endeavour to become a truly an Aerospace Power.⁵⁴

The Doctrinal Shift

Indian leadership has aptly outlined its national objectives that India should emerge as an eminent power in Asia by 2020. In fact, India has everything that any great nation has had at any point in time in the history; manpower, knowledge, natural resources and above all its secular ideology which is acceptable to the western world. According to Bharat Verma also, "India is suitably placed and conveniently located, geographically, culturally and otherwise to play this role effectively."⁵⁵

In pursuance of its national objectives, "IAF is presently undergoing historical changes. From being sub continental force, it is transforming itself to have continental reach and effect."⁵⁶ IAF formulated its first ever Air Power Doctrine (APD) in 1995, which caters for the changing nature of air warfare and the challenges of operating under nuclear environment. The former IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal S K Kaul, who was the architect of the airpower doctrine and purchase of Su-30 aircraft, had visualized "a total of up to 34 combat squadrons by the year 2005 of which one-third should be multirole in performance."⁵⁷

The details of India's Airpower Doctrine have been published in *Jane's International Defence Review 1997*. According to the *IDR*, APD lays emphasis on the following fundamental issues: -

- Offensive operations priority has been upgraded and the need to achieve maximum performance from limited sources has been emphasized.

- The concept of air defence has been replaced by strategic or deterrent air defence. In fact, deterrent air defence implies that, after absorbing the enemy's initial air effort, the IAF should be able to maintain a higher relative strength as conflict progresses.⁵⁸
- Emphasis on the acquisition of force multipliers such as AWACS, mid-air refuelling, and electronic warfare, to maximize impact of the existing force.
- Space will be treated on an equal footing with air, land and sea in India's future defence strategy; core competencies of "space power" would include intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, battle management and weapon guidance.⁵⁹

Analysis of Air Power Doctrine (APD)

APD is reflective of the changed mindset of the IAF leadership. It manifests IAF' transition from tactical to the strategic realm. A critical analysis of some of its fundamentals indicates: -

- **Priority of Offensive Operations over Defensive Operations:** This is the most fundamental change in IAF's strategy. The offensive punch that the IAF had been acquiring in the form of SU-30 MKI, Mir-2000, Jaguar and Mig-27, complemented with AWACS and Air to Air refuellers has given it the requisite wherewithal to swiftly change gears from being a tactical support force to a more dynamic strategic strike force. However, the depleted force level does pose a challenge for IAF at the moment.
- **Shift towards Space:** IAF' claim to be an Aerospace Power is to be viewed with its intent to use the space for military gains. Its increasing collaboration with other space research organizations to acquire knowledge about space-based applications must acknowledge. Air Chief Marshall Shashi Tyagi, the former IAF Chief also stated that, "we are an aerospace power having trans-

oceanic reach and we have started training a core group of people for the aerospace command.”⁶⁰ This transition from airpower to aerospace power would provide IAF the much needed potency and accuracy and the outcome could be a strong strategic deterrence.⁶¹ Tyagi claims that, “Aerospace Power will be the primary tool for projecting power beyond the shores of the country. So far the Navy has been showing the flag and will continue to do so, however, the IAF is now in a position to share this role.”⁶² IAF ambitions of using space for military means aside, its leadership is well aware that China is on its way to becoming a genuine aerospace power, rather than being merely an air force with high performance aircraft. The race for the optimum use of space is going to cost heavily to both, China and India. US interest and support for India in this regard can have serious consequences for the region.

- **Greater Emphasis on Force Multipliers:** IAF leadership has been extremely careful in selecting its inventory. It now stands as a balanced force comprising medium to long range strike aircraft (SU-30 MKI, Mir-2000, Jaguars and Mig-27), potent air combat aircraft (SU-30 MKI, Mig-29), augmented by state of the art AWACS and air to air refuellers. Since, IAF is aspiring to achieve strategic reach to influence events in the region⁶³ it would have to make serious effort to enhance the capability of its force multipliers by adding their numbers and potential. At present, “IAF transport fleet is inadequate to meet strategic airlift requirements.....and IAF needs more Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and airborne early warning systems to cover all contingencies.”⁶⁴

Analysis of IAF as a Regional Airpower

The critical analysis of APD reveals the IAF’ intention of changing from being a tactical air force to a strategic air force. It also indicates the vision and the resolve of the leadership to

swiftly but smoothly transform its force to meet the future challenges. According to Lord Trenchard, “strategic capability of a military force revolves around the aspects of ‘Mass’, ‘Reach’ and ‘Vision’.⁶⁵ Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the future capability of the IAF according to the above stated attributes so as to determine its implications for the region.

- **Mass:** For an air force to be rated as a strategic air force, it is necessary that it is able to create strategic effects on its own on its adversary. IAF’s intended inventory reflects its effort for both; quantity and quality. IAF is not only planning the requisite high tech combat aircraft, weapons and missiles for the purpose but also has adequate support elements such as Phalcon AEW, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) etc. However, the study of the force structures of other regional players reflects that IAF’s projected strength has been overrated. Considering the claimed areas of interest for India, “its strategic neighbourhood extends from the Malacca Strait to the Persian Gulf”,⁶⁶ IAF numbers could only impress the PAF. Inordinate delays in the development of LCA and indecision on the selection of MMRCA has led to the sharp reduction in IAF’s numbers and it is not expected that the authorized level of 39 Combat squadron would be reached before 2017 that too if the MMRCA deal is concluded now. VK Bhatia has shown his reservations about the timeline of MMRCA, “while assurances from various quarters that the MMRCA would be in service by 2014 might appear somewhat unrealistic, it is imperative that the deal is finalized expeditiously.”⁶⁷ This ground reality was accepted by the Indian Defence Minister who stated that, “the IAF’s fighter fleet would not reach a combat strength of 42 squadrons any time before the end of India’s 13th Plan in 2022.”⁶⁸ So the much needed strength of 45 Squadron Air Force to play a dominant role in the region, if that was correctly envisaged by successive IAF leaderships, is not in sight by 2020.

- **Reach:** To defend and intervene around the expanded frontiers; Straits of Malacca to Central Asia and the Gulf covering the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), IAF needs to be prepared for rapid strategic intervention and power projection to “safeguard and promote national interest”.⁶⁹ However, China being the dominant economic and military power would certainly challenge India’s influence in the IOR⁷⁰ and therefore, IAF may have to directly confront a much larger PLAAF in the process. Whereas most analysts are still busy in defining India’s dominant role in the region, some believe that, ‘the elephant and dragon may still dance together.’⁷¹ As Tyagi insists that, “we now have the capability by way of hardware.....the transition from the tactical to strategic and progressively graduate from ‘continental strategy’ to ‘regional strategy’ and then on to ‘global strategy’. We need to look beyond our boundaries beyond J&K and China.”⁷² Although the nuclear neighbours are not expected to engage themselves militarily, thanks mainly to economic necessity, as Indian Prime Minister stated, “There is enough space in the world to accommodate the growth of both India and China”.⁷³ Despite efforts to avoid military conflict with China, IAF continues to prepare itself for a limited; due to nuclear factor, two-front war scenario. However, IAF aims and objectives for 2020 are not Sino-Pak centric and it remains committed to project and intervene in the region as defined by Tyagi above.
- **Vision:** IAF has acquired the capability to look beyond its borders through AEW, UAVs and space based satellite systems. The modified EMB-145 for the AEW role is expected to be in operations by 2012 and at least 20 platforms are needed to meet the operational requirements of IAF and IN.⁷⁴ IAF has also received two A-50EL AWACS, jointly build by Russia and Israel whereas the third platform would join the Fleet soon. However, in order to keep the entire region under positive surveillance and reconnaissance for 24/7 with

strategic capability, at least 12 such platforms are needed.⁷⁵ This is also one capability which IAF may would not be able to operationalize by 2020.

Conclusion

The impact of RMA technologies on the nature of warfare poses challenging demands on the future air power to be innovative and ubiquitous. The future wars would see an increasingly decisive and frequent employment of air power due to its coercive and deterrent capability through selective use of long range precision strike, strategic surveillance and other RMA technologies. Air Superiority or air dominance will remain the main mission of air power, although UAVs, UCAVs, satellites, and Cruise Missiles may be increasingly employed to reinforce the manned aircraft and the missile. IAF is therefore preparing itself to meet not only the challenges of the future but to become a dominant force in the region by 2020. But to transform this dream into a reality, it requires a concerted effort in R&D and indigenous design and development and more importantly the capacity to produce modern aircraft and equipment in the country. Indian Defence establishments are working hard to overcome the difficulties faced in projects like LCA, however they are determined to support as well as sustain the effort.

IAF's preparation to become a regional power by 2020 seems inadequate. The delays in operationalisation of LCA and decision on MMRCA are expected to have caused serious dent on its desire. Although, IAF would have the requisite strategic airlift capability and aerial refuellers to adequately support its long range multirole strike aircraft, yet it would not be able to meet the desired numbers needed to project power in the area of its interest; primarily because IAF continues to prepare for a less likely two-front scenario. By 2020, IAF would still lack the desired numbers in nearly all the essential categories i.e. multirole combat aircraft, AWACS and strategic airlift aircraft and above all the requisite number of well trained aircrew.

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POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Major Shams-uz-Zaman

Abstract

Iran is at the centre of the international diplomatic storm over its nuclear programme. Lot of scepticism exists over Iranian nuclear programme which is accused of in violation to NPT by the western countries. Iran, on the other hand, denies these allegations and asserts for its nuclear rights for peaceful purposes. There is a difference of opinion in dealing with Iran between the US and the Europeans, as the US is willing to use military option, whereas Europeans seek for a diplomatic solution. But with the passage of time, the US problems are compounding due to destabilizing situation in Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan beside the economy which is in doldrums. Under these circumstances, a US strike on Iran is less likely however, regardless of the US problems, Israel which considers Iran as an existential threat, may not hesitate in taking such an action if it gets convinced that Iran is about to cross nuclear threshold. Such a strike will have devastating implications for the region and Pakistan which warrants a critical analysis.

Introduction

Since last decade or so, the global politics have seen dramatic changes which had a profound impact on the global security paradigm. The invasion of Iraq and rise of militant groups in Muslim world has terrified the western world, and all those countries posing a challenge to the western domination and hegemony, are perceived as a potential threat by the West. Since the Iranian revolution, Iran has been generally viewed by the West, as a country completely out of step with the modern liberal and secular values, which remains as hallmark of western universal model of “Liberal Democracy”, and thus in this backdrop, possession of nuclear

weapons by Iran is considered as a threat to global peace and security. Iran has never kept its intentions hidden towards Israel, resultantly, Israel has also publically announced that it will not accept a nuclear Iran and thus may launch a pre-emptive strike before Iran actually acquires a nuclear weapon capability as has been witnessed in case of Iraq and Syria.¹

The debate in the United States (US) on dealing with Iran, amid Iraq and Afghanistan experience, has been a cause of division amongst neo-cons and democrats. Democrats seem more inclined towards finding a solution to Iranian problem through diplomacy or sanctions, while neo-cons have been advocating a military solution to the problem in case diplomacy fails.² Israel on the other hand is not ready to accept any nuclear armed Arab state in the Middle East including Iran, even if means a major military confrontation or a unilateral strike over Iran. Therefore, the probability of Israel launching a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear sites some time in the future, either with or without American support, appears to be high and thus warrants an in depth analysis.

Aim

The aim of this research is to evaluate the possibilities of an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear installations and its probable implications on Pakistan and the region.

Iranian Nuclear Programme – A Brief Overview

The Iranian nuclear programme dates back to 1959 once it purchased a Nuclear Research Reactor from the US to be installed in Tehran. The Shah's ambitious plan to built 23 nuclear reactors over a span of 30 years was never considered either a threat or an attempt to develop nuclear weapons by the West firstly, because Iran didn't possess the expertise and desire in the requisite field³ and secondly, it was a close ally of the West. The purpose of these reactors was to possess an alternative source of energy.⁴ To assure the world community of its peaceful pursuit, Iran signed Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970⁵ which

encouraged not only the US, but also Germany, France, Sweden and other European countries to assist Iran in developing its Uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel production capabilities.⁶ However, in 1979, the political/security situation changed and Iranian nuclear program came to a halt due to Islamic Revolution and Iran-Iraq war.⁷ In 1982, Iranian regime decided to re-institutionalize its nuclear program fissile material production having dual usage.⁸ Iran formally resumed its nuclear program in 1991 with the Chinese and Russian assistance⁹ but by mid 90's, the US and other Europeans countries started alleging that Iran is not meeting its obligations under the NPT. Iran however denied these assertions.¹⁰

Iran continued to expand and disperse its nuclear program till August 2002, when a dissident Iranian group, National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), revealed information regarding its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, which were kept hidden from IAEA.¹¹ As a result, under international pressure, Iran had to sign an additional protocol in September 2003 which obliged Iran of granting further access to IAEA to its nuclear sites, suspending Uranium enrichment and Plutonium separation experiments. However, with Ahmadinejad becoming President, Iran announced resumption of its enrichment activities as permitted under the NPT in February 2006.¹² Since then, Iranian nuclear program is at the centre stage of the world politics and controversies despite the US National Intelligence Estimates of 2007 and 2010 asserting that Iranian weapons related program has been halted since 2003 and the earliest possible date by which Iran would have technical capability to produce enough Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for a nuclear device, is by 2015.¹³ After Iran announced that it has started development works in order to enrich Uranium at 20 percent, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions against Iran in June 2010 for the fourth time since 2003.¹⁴

It is estimated that Iran has constructed over 22 known nuclear facilities all across the country. However, facilities which are considered critical nodes in Iran's nuclear

infrastructure includes, Nuclear Research Centre and Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan, Uranium Enrichment Facilities at Natanz and Qom and Heavy Water and Future Plutonium production Centre at Arak.¹⁵ Some other nuclear facilities include Nuclear Research Centre at Tehran (apparently dismantled in 2003), Light Water Reactor at Bushehr, Uranium milling plant at Yazd and Uranium extracting mines at Saghand, Narigan and Zarigan.¹⁶

Threat Perceptions of West and its Allies Regarding Iran

Since the last five years or so, Iranian nuclear program is at the centre of the world politics. Not only Israel has been issuing threats from time to time but the Europeans and Americans have also been showing their concerns on the issue. Some Europeans sources assert that their apprehensions regarding nuclear weapons technology are not Iran specific and rather are against all new acquisition efforts.¹⁷ Although, there is a difference regarding the European and the American approach to tackle the Iranian issue, as the former prefer diplomacy while the later stress on coercive measures including a military option, in case diplomacy and sanctions fail to deter Iran¹⁸, despite realizing that the situation in Middle East after such a strike would be extremely difficult to handle. Still, it is widely believed that in case of an American or Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iran, there would be hardly any opposition from the European governments.

Other regional states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, UAE, Jordan and Oman are equally apprehensive of a nuclear armed Iran as of the West¹⁹, not only due to Shiite-Sunni rift, but also in the larger context of changing power balances which may lead to nuclear arms race in the region. However, they are also fearful of the consequences of a military strike on Iran.²⁰ There were also rumours that Saudis have given a silent approval to Israel for using its airspace to attack Iranian nuclear installations.²¹ It can be best concluded that there exist a silent conformity

amongst the Europeans, Arabs and the Americans, that Iran must be prevented from becoming a nuclear state and if diplomacy fails, other options like sanctions or even a military strike should be used to bar Iran from achieving nuclear weapon capability. However, Europeans in real sense don't perceive a direct threat from a nuclear Iran and rather are more concerned of the prospects of an Israeli-Iran or US-Iran confrontation which may destabilize the region and disrupt the oil supplies.²² In addition, they also believe that if Iran becomes nuclear, not only militant organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas would become more aggressive, influential and strong, thus posing greater risks for Israel's security, but any conventional conflict between Israel and either of the Groups might acquire a nuclear dimension.²³

The Israeli Equation

Israel adds a very different dimension to the conflict. Since the election of Ahmadinejad to the seat of President, Iran and Israel are in direct confrontational mode. Rhetorical and historical statements given by President Ahmadinejad like "Israel will be wiped off the world map" and "Holocaust Myth" have been taken at the face value by Israel, terming these to be an existential threat.²⁴ Due to its size and demography, Israel is a "one bomb state," meaning that even if one nuclear bomb drops on Israel, it would cease to exist.²⁵ Israel affirms the policy of "Never Again" on holocaust which provides the basis for any pre-emption strike on perceived threat to Israel's security.²⁶ Some western analysts believe that diplomatic pressures, covert intelligence operations, sanctions and computer malware attacks like Stuxnet, can't restrain Iranian nuclear ambitions except for causing a temporary slowdown.²⁷ Therefore, for most Israeli politicians, the question is not that Israel should launch pre-emptive strikes against Iranian nuclear installations, when and how it should be done.²⁸ Rather Israeli leaders argue that they can't afford to remain quiet and take measures only when Iran has already hit Tel Aviv with nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran armed with ballistic missiles, is such a dangerous phenomenon which Israel can't afford to ignore.²⁹ They are convinced, if Saddam

Hussain had the access to WMDs during the first Gulf war, he definitely would have used them against Israel, and thus Israel can't let Iranians to have this capability with their long range missiles capable of hitting Israel. However, Israel has assured Americans that they will never attack alone until and unless they feel that they have been abandoned and left at their own. Moreover, Israel also believes that the time to act might be approaching sooner rather than later. The Israeli military commanders are also confident that despite this being a difficult task, air strikes can still be executed with deliberated planning and rehearsals.³⁰ The largest ever civil defence exercise conducted in June 2009 was aimed to rehearse the worst case scenario against simultaneous attacks from Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and Iran.³¹

Options on the Table and Possibility of a Strike

The policy makers in Washington and EU capitals, are working on a timeline to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons³² as follow:

- **Diplomacy and Dialogue:** The main focus of world is on finding a diplomatic solution to the issue, and for this purpose, mainly EU-3 (Germany, France and Britain), IAEA and few other regional countries like Turkey, China, Brazil and Russia are trying hard to convince Iran that it doesn't face sufficient threat to pursue its nuclear program and thus it must follow the IAEA safeguards.³³ However, Iran has categorically made it clear that it has no intent to pursue for a weapon grade nuclear program, and Tehran has a peaceful purpose which the West is not ready to believe. Therefore, this perceptive difference is not likely to lead to any breakthrough in the deadlock sooner or later.
- **Incentives and Trade:** Offering security assurances, incentives and increasing trade is yet another policy being pursued by the west, however, Iran does not believe in vague security assurances and incentives of the West primarily due to the reason that the West has

double standards, and second, they can always turn back on their promises without any threat of punitive measures as was witnessed while making the case for invasion of Iraq. Moreover, Iran also considers that any major change in international scenario can force the West to turn away from its commitments as was the case after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which left Iran at its own, and thus had to pursue a clandestine nuclear program.³⁴ The Israel lobby and the neo-conservatives at the Capitol Hill, strongly oppose diplomatic and trade relations with Iran.³⁵ Therefore, any diplomatic breakthrough between the US and Iran, in near future is inconceivable. However, despite this opposition, according to the US Census Bureau, American exports to Iran reached 683 million dollars in 2008 and 280 million dollars in 2009³⁶. but it is highly unlikely that any increase in trade or incentives would convince Iran to dump its nationalistic sovereign aspirations on nuclear issue, in order to comply with the Western demands on its nuclear program.

- **Regime Change:** Most agree that toppling of Iran's nationalistic Prime minister, Muhammad Mossadeq, by the CIA³⁷ was an unwise thing to do which ultimately paved the way for the religious theocracy in Iran. The regime change aspirations of the US in Iran are still considered as to be the major policy options prior to resorting to military strike, but the debate still goes on how it can be done and will it be possible in the near future, especially after the Iranian regime successfully put an end to the uprisings after the election controversy in 2009.³⁸

Sanctions, Containment and Isolation

Majority of the US policy makers agree that a mix of sanctions and diplomacy is the way forward, which would pressurize the Iranian regime to come to negotiation table or may even facilitate the conditions for regime change due to internal pressures.³⁹ However, the Iranian regime has shown

its commitment and will that no amount of foreign pressure would force Iran to abandon its right over peaceful pursuit of nuclear program. It is unlikely that in the near future, Iran would abandon its nuclear activities due to fear of sanctions or international isolation, especially in view of the Chinese and Russians reluctance to support an all out containment or sanctions on Iran.⁴⁰

Deterrence

In a worst case scenario for Israel and the US, if Iran ultimately seeks a nuclear capability, the US would like to adopt a policy of deterrence either by employing a missile defence shield in Europe and countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which it is in process of deploying, or by taking Israel under its nuclear protective shield,⁴¹ a shield which the US has publicly proclaimed but has not yet become a formal policy matter due to Israeli reluctance.⁴² Although, there are visible indications that the US would continue to lead a coalition to disarm Iran of its nuclear status, through wide range of diplomatic and coercive measures however, things may not go as per American plans. According to some analysts, the present Iranian regime has some different aspirations as President Ahmedinejad has a messianic mission to destroy Israel and facilitate to bring an apocalypse upon the world, which even Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken of while giving interviews to some news reporters.⁴³ According to these writers and analysts, President Ahmedinejad believes in the promised awaited leader Mahdi, who would appear in the times of great turbulence and injustices. Thus in his perception, the calls for nuclear rights and wiping Israel off the map would ultimately create the desired level of turmoil and conditions which would facilitate the return of the Mahdi who would spread justice and raise the Iranian stature in the world politics.⁴⁴

Pre-emptive Strike

The ultimate and final option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is a pre-emptive strike by Israel, possibly assisted by the US. With the help of ongoing media

blitz, such an attack is becoming more plausible by each passing day as more consensus is developing in domestic and political circles of the West that Iranian regime must be prevented from acquiring nuclear status. A similar smearing campaign was also witnessed before the invasion of Iraq while most of the European countries wanted to give more chance to the weapons inspectors. The US however, due to economic worries and fear of overstressing its military, might not opt for a military strike in the near future.⁴⁵ Most American analysts, after the Afghan and Iraqi experience, are wary of the fact that such a strike would be costly, counterproductive and full of risks, as it would not only fail to completely destroy Iran's nuclear capability but would also unleash a reign of terror against American interests around the globe beside providing Iran with a moral superiority to pursue its program.⁴⁶ Israelis on the other hand are however convinced that even if the US restrains, Israel will have to act, even unilaterally, before Iran actually possesses a nuclear device. After the recent uprising in various Arab countries, Israeli strategic planners see Iran in a much stronger position. However, they are now looking at worst case scenarios in which either Israel attacks Iranian nuclear installations or Iran succeeds in forming a coalition of revolutionary Arab countries in a war against Israel.⁴⁷ Under the prevailing circumstances, majority of Israelis believe that Israel might have to act alone against Iran without physical help of the US. Therefore, Israel besides realigning its strategic position, is waiting for an appropriate opportunity once the international environment becomes conducive, so as to avoid international condemnation and to minimize the repercussions of an attack against Iran.⁴⁸

Capabilities Required for the Strike

Israel and the US disagree on the timings of attack. While the US is willing to give diplomacy more chance, time for a pre-emptive strike is running out for Israel. If the US and Israel decide to strike Iran, it will be more effective with combined capabilities which may enable them to strike 6-7 major nuclear facilities using a mix of cruise missiles, ballistic

missiles and aircraft squadrons based on its naval fleet deployed in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Precision guided deep penetration bombs like GBU-27 and BLU-113 can be delivered through the strategic bombers placed at Diego Garcia. However, if Israel decides to attack unilaterally, the US would most likely help in refuelling over Iraq and in providing strategic intelligence only. In that case, only 3-4 critical nuclear sites would be selected, which includes Nuclear Research Centre and Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan, Uranium Enrichment Facility at Natanz, Heavy Water Plant and future plutonium production centre at Arak⁴⁹ and Uranium Enrichment Facility at Qom. To undertake such a mission, Israel would need more than 90 aircrafts or approx over 20 ballistic missiles.⁵⁰ Israel also has the option to use a mix of both the capabilities. Thus in an overall context, Israel does possess the capability to strike the Iranian nuclear facilities. However, such a strike would not put Iran completely out of nuclear business but rather retard the capability for acquisition of nuclear weapon by few years.

Global and Regional Implications

A strike by Israel or the US/Israel on Iran could have wide ranging global and regional implications. Some of them are explained in succeeding paragraphs:

- **Worst Case Scenario – A Nuclear War:** In a worst case scenario, there can be a breakout of a major war in the region should Israel and Iran involve in the retaliatory strikes invoking other regional countries to take sides in the conflict due to domestic or external pressures. Some analysts have even pointed towards an outbreak of a Third World War in a chain of uncontrollable events ultimately resulting in nuclear exchange between several countries.⁵¹ This scenario is developed on the hypothesis that due to domestic pressures, the regimes in most of Islamic countries including Pakistan would fall apart to be ultimately taken over by radical Islamists posing a serious threat to Israel. Resultantly, this would incite Israel to attack

Pakistani nuclear installations thus resulting in a nuclear exchange. The spill over effects would later compel other regional and global powers to either go for pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes. After the recent turmoil in Arab countries, this scenario although possible, still seems to be quite unlikely and improbable.

- **Massive Retaliation by Iran and Regional Non-State Actors:** Iranian conventional capabilities against Israel or the US are quite limited. Iran, along with Hezbollah and Hamas, at the most can fire a barrage of missiles towards Israel or send a suicidal aerial mission aimed at destroying the Israeli nuclear facilities.⁵² Enrolling suicide bombers from within Hezbollah and Hamas is also a possibility, but the success of such a mission is questionable due to well guarded and effective Israeli counter defence mechanism. However, such retaliation would result in high rate of civilian casualties. Moreover, Iran may also launch missile and rocket attacks against US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan thus raising high prospects of escalating the conflict and spilling it over to other countries like Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Countries like Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, Libya and Jordan may also see an unprecedented situation of American embassies or consulates takeover in massive protests which could escalate the situation.
- **Blocking Strait of Hormez:** Iran has displayed its capability to block the narrow strait of Hormez, thus disrupting the oil supplies and creating a global oil crisis, which could have profound implications for the global economy which already lies in an imbroglio. The ongoing global economic recession and a volatile situation in Middle East could result in collapse of stock markets and world financial institutions, thus bringing down the whole capitalist system.

- **Rise in Terrorist Activities:** Such an attack would unite the Shiite and Sunni militants in Jihad against Zionists and Americans. Thus the Shiite elements which so far have not become part of the global Jihad would also join in and terrorist incidents across the globe would become more frequent and devastating. This would result in crack down by the Western governments against Muslims, thus turning more Muslims towards radicalism and terrorism, thereby making it extremely difficult to control the situation. In longer run such a situation would result in serious political and economic instability in the Western and Muslim states.

Implications on Pakistan

Pakistan would also be profoundly affected by the pre-emptive strike on Iran. Possible scenarios emerging from such an eventuality could be:

- Severe domestic backlash thus forcing government to reverse its pro-American policies.
- Hype in anti-American sentiments causing serious threat to lives and interests of Americans in the country.
- A dramatic change in domestic situation due to anti-American and anti-government protests running out of control thus bringing down the elected government.
- A cessation of NATO and ISAF supplies to Afghanistan due to domestic fallout which could bring Pakistan into direct confrontation with the US and NATO.
- Dramatic rise in the domestic violence and terrorist activities.
- Sharp rise in the pro-Taliban and pro-militants sentiments, as more individuals would be willing to join the ranks considering it to be war between Islam and

the West, thus sending ripples in the US and Israel regarding safety of our nuclear program.

- Possibility of militant groups organizing a major terrorist event in India to escalate situation with India thus easing the pressure from tribal areas.
- A joint effort by the US, India and Israel to secure or “take out” Pakistani nuclear arsenal in case they feel any threat to these.

Conclusion

It is evident that the US doesn't have a direct and existential threat from a nuclear Iran. The US preference for a diplomatic course towards Iranian nuclear program would still not change Israeli perceptions towards Iran. Israel perceives that the US support for Israel is not everlasting, and due to domestic or other economic considerations, this support may diminish in the future and confronting Iran, without direct or moral support from the US, would be an unmanageable scenario for Israel. Israel knows, that the window of opportunity which exists in shape of the US and European support against Iran, must be utilized before it closes down. The fear that Iran may possess a nuclear device within next few years also compels Israel to take necessary action before Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. On numerous occasions in history, Israel has withstood American pressures on its policy decisions even once the whole world was opposed to it. The strong Israeli Lobby ultimately compels the US policy and decision makers to tow the Israeli line, despite the fact that these positions at times seriously damaged the US national interests.⁵³ This situation may change in future.

Therefore, availing this window of opportunity, Israel may launch a pre-emptive strike on Iran within the next few years, or until and unless some dramatic breakthrough takes place on the Iranian nuclear issue. Such a change, amidst strong Iranian position in the region after recent uprising, seems highly unlikely. A strike on Iran would have serious implications for the region and Pakistan, and therefore, it is

imperative for Pakistan to take into account the severity of situation and take necessary appropriate measures beforehand for such an eventuality.

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ROLE OF MEDIA IN MODERN WARFARE

Air Commodore Asadullah Khan

Abstract

Technological breakthroughs have impacted all walks of life, media being no exception has also been impacted profoundly. The outreach of the media has been enhanced exponentially, hence, coupled with bold and objective oriented war policy, the inherent capability of the media that of "Perception Management and Public Opinion" can be utilized to accrue meaningful benefits. Wars and Warfare being associated with mankind since time immemorial has also been influenced by the media over the years. After the realization of its true potential, its exploitation and utility as a force multiplier by the military is being witnessed all around the world by employing various new techniques and methods.

Introduction

"I know the secret of making the average American believe anything I want him to. Just let me control television.... You put something on the television and it becomes reality. If the world outside the TV set contradicts the images, people start trying to change the world to make it like the TV set images...."

--Hal Becker, media expert and management consultant, the Futures Group, in an interview in 1981

Human race's quest to attain power has resulted into conflicts since time immemorial. Nations have gone to wars to acquire the same, media being an integral part of our societal setup has had a profound impact on wars and warfare. Since technological advancement in the field of communication is synonymous with the west, we did see the role of media in the World War II as a means of propaganda, followed by the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War. Technological advancement put to use for live coverage, gave media an

additional boost and the real impact was witnessed during the Gulf War, where, the US president came to know of the commencement of operations through CNN's live coverage.

Evolution of media over the years from slow means of communication such as print media, early telephone, telegraphs to today's fast track mediums such as fibre optics which have led to a host of facilities such as radio, cable TV, internet, satellites, being made available, has impacted virtually every walk of life in the human society. With the recent advents in the field of communication, it has given media another dimension, whereby, not only has it made the world a global village, it has also had a profound effect of influencing public perception and hence the public opinion. The media of today has the ability, through its live coverage capability, to bring the entire world into our sitting rooms, covering events as they unfold.

Media today has virtually attained the status of fourth pillar of the state, and has profound effect on the war waging capability of a nation and at the same time the outcome of war. Conversely, on the hind side, its ability to affect public opinion owing to technological advancements and easy access by the adversary needs to be mitigated, especially in an Asymmetric war scenario and the use of internet/dish TV.

The Military Commanders of today also realized the real potential of media's role in warfare and therefore stand to gain more than ever before by controlling the media and shaping their output¹ and endeavour to capitalize on this potent tool and use it as an integral instrument of war to its advantage and at the same time, counter the adversaries onslaught, as the technological advancement have facilitated acquisition of media facilities to propagate its point of view, which is virtually accessible by the populous.

As a consequence, states witness an increased interaction between the media and the military, whereby, there is a concerted effort by the military to employ media in projection of its version of events, countering propaganda promulgated by the adversary; hence achieving the national objective.

Therefore, in the modern armies we see mechanisms being put in place to exploit this vital tool. The aim of the article is to determine the role of the media in modern warfare especially due the advancements in technology and it's impact on the emerging Asymmetric Warfare.

Media and Warfare relationship

Man's quest to gain power has been on-going since ages; wars have been fought and have been employed as an instrument for the attainment of this objective. The transformation of techniques of waging wars has evolved over the years, and in the contemporary world of Modern Warfare, we see the evolution of Asymmetric Warfare to be more prevalent rather than the earlier concepts of All-out wars.

The era of industrialization as witnessed in the 20th century influenced all walks of human living; the advent of technology facilitated every aspect of human life. Telecommunication being an integral part of technology also advanced exponentially in the later part of the 20th century and the early part of 21st century. The technological advancements especially in the field of telecommunications have very usefully been employed by the media as a source of information dissemination. From the earlier medium of print media to today's live coverage and internet, there is a noticeable influence of media in a walks of human society, war being no exception, the media has had a huge impact on the ability of a nation to go to war and the warfare, through influencing public perception; hence the public opinion and providing support to the policy makers and the military. It also possesses a huge potential in conflict management and conflict resolution, if employed in with the intent.

Modern Warfare

Although present in every historical period of military history, "Modern Warfare is generally used to refer to the concepts, methods and technologies that have come into use during and after the Second World War and the Korean War"².The concepts and methods have assumed more

complex forms of the 19th and early-20th century antecedents largely due to the widespread use of highly advanced Information Technology.

As a fall-out of WW II the nations of the world put in place global mechanisms for conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution such as the UN. The demise of Soviet Union, the end of Bi-polarity, the ever growing devastating ability of the modern weapons of war, the trends of “All out Wars” is on the decline (although we still witness sporadic deviations). The absence of all out war led to localized conflicts in the form of “Limited Wars”. However, the current decade has witnessed the emergence of “Terrorism” which has led to pronounced activity in the form of “Asymmetric Warfare”.

Media

“It is the medium by virtue of which the thoughts, feelings, ideas, concepts and information are conveyed to the masses. Every medium has a formidable force, as they disseminate information; they mould and shape public opinion”.³ Newspapers, radio, television, internet, mobile phones etcetera together are termed as Media. Media and Mass Media are synonymous. As per Chambers 21st Century Dictionary,⁴ Media is defined as, “the means by which news and information, etc is communicated to the public, usually considered to be TV, radio and the press collectively.”

The media has over the years acquired the status of one of the determinants which can influence warfare and the outcome, hence it has virtually acquired the status of one of the instruments of war. The same fact has been realized by the military commanders and as result has realized the necessity of controlling and utilizing its important tool to their advantage and uses it as a force multiplier to assist and enhance the effectiveness of the military’s objective and to mitigate the negative propaganda by the adversary. Hence in future conflicts a comparatively enhanced role of this potent tool’s employment is visible.

Media has an important role to play both, in “Conflict Management” as well as “Conflict Resolution” and peace building, and at the same time, media as an instrument of war influences the overall outcome of the war, by influencing the pre-war scenario as well as operations through “Perception Management” at the highest tiers of decision makers and at the same time affecting the public opinion. One of the major components being “Psy Ops”, which affects not only the enemy’s will and ability to wage war but also the conduct of operations. Hence, it is applicable both during pre-war and during war itself. The attainment of this objective is orchestrated thru “Psyops”, in which media has a fundamental role to play⁵.

Media – Warfare Relationship

Apart from other facets of warfare influenced by media, one which is predominant is its ability to influence perceptions through propaganda and “psychological warfare” or “psywar”. In yesteryears, when only print media was available as a source of information dissemination, it had a profound effect on influencing and shaping public opinion. Manifestation of this medium was witnessed in the 19th century during the American civil war, followed by the 20th century during the 1ST WW, wherein massive psychological warfare launched in WW I and thereafter, by the establishment mass psywar apparatus led by John Rawlings Rees for the British intelligence. This was later supplemented by the advent of the radio and its utilization as a propaganda tool during the 2nd WW, to sustain the morale of the British populous.⁶

Finally the advent of TV, which brought the war to the US as US citizens could be shown the way the war progressed and its negativities also. The Korean War is a valid example, however, the impact of media during the Vietnam War was more pronounced as this profoundly changed the public opinion in the US against the war in Vietnam.

Ever since the rapid growth of electronic media, the

pace of life has enhanced tremendously, supplemented by the advent of satellites and fiber optics, live coverage has had a tremendous effect on influencing public perception, hence the public opinion. Utilizing these facilities, extensive media coverage was given to the conflicts in The Gulf war (Desert storm) War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq⁷, which did influence the public perception on these conflicts .

True representation of war scenarios, while enhancing the morale of the nation, it can also shape public opinion against it, like it happened in Vietnam war, the WMD scenario built up which had public support initially and the whole process of public support was reversed thereafter once the issue was further investigated. GWOT, as has been covered by the media, has generated tremendous support in the fight against terror, a valid example is here in Pakistan, where initially the public opinion was against the war on terror in Pakistan as it was perceived not to be our war. Media played an important role in reversing the public opinion⁸.

Hence, it is evident that media has a very important role to play in forging perceptions and therefore public opinion. This does not necessarily mean that the public opinion would be in line with the government policies (as is evident in case of Vietnam War and WMDs in Iraq). Similarly, the use of voice media, FM radio channel, was utilized to the hilt to gain public support by Maulana Fazalullah in Swat⁹ and thereafter, an aggressive media campaign was launched by Pakistani media to reverse the public opinion followed by successful counterinsurgency operations by Pakistan Armed Forces. The role of media in contemporary conflicts is evident and is certainly going to grow in future ones, to gather public support which is very vital for national morale¹⁰.

Capitalizing on the potential of media efforts are being undertaken to utilize this as a force multiplier for attainment of the objectives. Hence in future conflicts¹¹, a more enhanced

role of this potent tool's employment is envisaged. The fundamentals of the role of media in warfare are discussed in following paragraphs:

Perception Management

It is defined as "Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations"¹². This is applicable and aimed at, not only the general populous but at the same time the policy and decision makers to distort their ability to take viable decision at the right time. It entails the following aspects:-

- **Psychological Operations:** "Capture their minds and their hearts and souls will follow". The basic aspects of modern psychological operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including Psy Ops, Political Warfare, "Winning Hearts and Minds," (WHAM Operations). Various techniques are used, to influence a target audience's value systems, belief systems, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior. It is used to induce confessions or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The U.S. Department of Defense¹³ defines psychological warfare as "The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives." It entails Strategic, Operational and Tactical psychological ops.

- **Propaganda:** "Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist"¹⁴. It is a form of communication that is aimed at influencing the attitude of a community toward some cause or position. As opposed to impartially providing information, propaganda in its most basic sense presents information primarily to influence an audience.
- **Molding Public Opinion:** Media, if utilized intelligently through perception management (psy ops, propaganda) can alter public opinion dramatically (Operation Rah-e-Raast in Swat). Media has the ability to project any issue in any manner and can thus achieve any objective set forth by moulding public opinion. It has the ability to build national cohesion, nation's confidence, be instrumental in building national morale a very important ingredient to nations to wage wars and pursue their objectives. In future war the electronic media will be the most effective and powerful means of mass motivation.

Conflict Management

The world beyond our direct observation reaches us through the media, hence, having an immense outreach, media has the capability to influence and manage conflicts; it can either aggravate the situation or pacify it, hence has a tremendous role to play with regards to "Managing Conflicts". The media is a double-edged sword. It can be a frightful weapon of violence when it propagates messages of intolerance or disinformation that manipulates public sentiment or it can pacify emotions and ease prevailing tensions. A proper and saner management of media can definitely prevent deadly conflicts¹⁵.

Conflict Resolution / Peace Building

Yet again, media has immense potential in conflict resolution, in case one does come about¹⁶. Contribute to societal reconciliation, change misperceptions and broaden understanding of the causes and more so, the consequences of conflict. Peace building means intensifying efforts to establish lasting peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully. The media can play educative role and build peace among the warring factions. Media can either dramatize conflicts by focusing on irreconcilable differences between the parties, extreme positions and inflammatory statements, violent or threatening acts and win-or-lose outcomes, or it can portray the realities and consequences of war, the human sufferings and the ultimate cost of war.

As is evident that Media not only has a role to play in warfare, but also can contribute to avert wars. In the context of contemporary conflicts which has a bias towards Asymmetric Warfare, the role of media gets even more pronounced as would be dilated in subsequent chapters. In the research paper, however, the focus would be towards the influence the media has had on warfare, with a bias towards psy war, propaganda, “Winning Hearts and Minds” etc.

Role of Media in Warfare: The Evolution

Any on-going event is put forward to the public through media, hence, it tends to form public perception and opinion regarding the issue. Wars being no exception, media does have immense effect on its outcome through public perception/opinion. In the Vietnam war the photographs published by the US media of the atrocities and the state of affairs of the people in Vietnam had a backlash in the US and the public opinion regarding the on-going war changed. Similarly, in Pakistan itself, one clip of a woman being lashed by the Taliban in Swat valley changed the entire public opinion with regard to the Taliban; what happened there after is a part of history.¹⁷

One of the dividends accrued through exploitation of media is the “propaganda / psyops ”which does effect the warfare and the outcome. Since what media achieves is dissemination of information, the same was achieved through “verbal techniques” in ancient era, as media in classical form as we see it today was not available then. It will hence be prudent to have an overview of the relationship between propaganda (one of the major dividends of media in subsequent years) and warfare. The methodologies in earlier times were different, yet the benefits were the same as of the media of today.¹⁸

Aural Dissemination

In the ancient era, one of the aspect that media does is psy ops. One of the great victors in human history, Alexander the Great¹⁹ has been known to have employed psy ops in his times, although the techniques have changed due times, what media does today in terms of psy ops was achieved by Alexander the great then by infiltrating the enemy camps and spreading demoralizing rumours, forge good relations with people of similar school of thought to take advantage of favourable opinions. Similarly Genghis Khan would employ psychological warfare by dispatching agents in the enemy camps to spread rumours and propaganda regarding the size of his army and other such aspects and thus demoralizing the enemy. The Mongols created an image of total barbaric domination; target groups never believed they were the victims of astute psychological warfare.

Employment of Print Media

Unlike pre- American civil war era, the civil²⁰ war saw the printing press go through revolutionary technological advancements and so did media which benefitted from the technology in communication networks. Correspondents at the front could now observe a battle and have their story received within hours. The newspapers had become affordable hence, the public thirst for the latest developments was quenched by the media. However, in its infancy, the media reporting lacked professionalism and what ever they could

muster for public consumption would be transmitted, the accuracy of the information was seldom verified. By the end of the war though, the realization on factual reporting despite military objectives gained strength, hence gave birth to media-military conflict. However, the military fully realized the impact media can and does have on the public opinion as well as the moral of the troops. Hence, later on, the thaw in relations between the two resulted and realizing the potential, efforts were undertaken to forge better relations with the media to achieve the objective.

Employment of Print/Audio/Visual Techniques

During the first WW the influence of media in shaping public opinion was being established and was utilized by the warring countries to mould public opinion, President Wilson of USA used this instrument to forge public opinion for the US to enter the War, although the US was not directly threatened by the war, but it was the inherent capability of the print media the ‘Propaganda’²¹ that was put to use to accrue the desired objectives. The desired results were achieved through the establishment of “Committee for Public Information” which employed various techniques such as renowned writers of the time towing official stance, showing movies against the German aggression etc. The media campaign of propaganda launched moulded public opinion in favour of American involvement in war.

Criticism of the intense Governmental control of the media during WWI led to easier restrictions during the coverage of WWII²², however, classified information with regards to the troop’s movement and locations were still in place. During this time, the “visual media” was on the rise and the adversaries were projected as the aggressors, hence forging public support for the war.

During the Korean War, the propaganda mechanism continued during this conflict also, with the media still influenced by the governmental dictates to project the official stance and journalists were allowed to cover the war, however, lowered governmental restrictions were put in place, the

emphasis was to protect dissemination of vital military information.²³

Vietnam War is termed as “the first war fought on television”. It is said that “Television brought the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America—not on the battlefields of Vietnam”. It was this war which was given wide media coverage due to technological advancements and it was the first time that the US public was shown the atrocities of war and of the US. Two such images from the Vietnam conflict²⁴; a summary execution of a Vietcong officer by a Saigon police chief, and a naked Vietnamese child, burned and fleeing in terror from a napalm strike brought war to USA and made it personal. By this time, since the media influence was increasing, the aspect of Objective reporting rather than towing the official line was also gaining ground. Here was witnessed a classical example of “influence of media on public opinion”, whereby immense public pressure was mounted on the US government for termination of war²⁵ as a consequence of pictorial as well as video footage shown on the TV. Vietnam is held to be a notable example of the role of a free press in changing the faulty national policy. However, certain quarters still have reservations regarding the “Objectivity” of the media and media was finally accused in many circles, of being the major reason of US failure in Vietnam. According to the study conducted by Mr Eric Larson²⁶, through RAND corporation, it was the lack of leadership and unclear objectives that led the media to project the same which ultimately transformed the US public opinion.

Probably the height of propaganda was witnessed during the “Cold War” era between the Western block and the Eastern blocks²⁷, whereby almost all facets of print, audio, visual media were utilized by both. It was a war to influence the “Hearts and Minds”, whereby the Americans were projected as Capitalists, not catering for the needs of the masses, and the Soviets were projected as “Dictatorial regimes” and efforts were undertaken by both sides to

influence the masses across the divide by state sponsored propaganda mechanisms.

The Falklands War has been described as "the worst reported war since the Crimean". The implication being, that in 1982, war reporting reverted back to an era before mass communications. There was a dearth of news from the front line and what made it back was tightly controlled by the Government²⁸. Here again, the lack of professional journalism did come to the fore with regard to British media, and information considered critical from the military point of view was released and in quest for competitive journalism, speculative reporting rather than factual reporting was resorted to, this led to a divide between the military and the press.

Employment of Media in Contemporary Wars

Media had an influence in the outcome of the Vietnam War, the manifestation of its potential had not been witnessed in practical terms prior to the Vietnam War. Hence, thereafter, the military hierarchy realized the true potential of this potent toll for utilization in preparing grounds to go to war as well as during war itself and was seen in the contemporary wars, which would be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Learning the lessons from Vietnam War, the potential of media was utilized to its fullest during the Gulf War I, the military fully supported the media²⁹ by providing requisite support for undertaking propaganda campaign against the Iraqi regime to gain public support for the operation. During the troops build up, tried to convince the Iraqi public of the consequences of war, thereby, affecting the moral of the Iraqi masses. Subsequently, during the war itself the Pentagon arranged live transmissions of the news briefing on the conduct and consequences of war, attaining the objectives of mustering own public support and at the same time, affecting the morale of the adversary. Here again, the reporters failed to analyze the briefings and aspect of "Objective reporting" was brushed aside and resulted in "effectively eliminating the

press's traditional role of analyzing and commenting upon the military briefings"³⁰. Efforts undertaken were as follows:-

- Live coverage of the troops movements and deployments were undertaken along with live coverage of the battle zone so that the public back home could feel the anxiety of war and sympathize with the troops and support them.
- Select group of reporters were facilitated by the Pentagon who were provided transportation and such like facilities, were assigned to various units and their movement were orchestrated by the unit commanders which ensured:
 - The reporters were supervised all the time.
 - They were allowed to record what ever was intended.
 - Information dissemination was controlled.

The events of 9/11 led to massive retaliation by the US in the form of Operation Enduring Freedom, the first instrument of onslaught was the "Media". Al-Qaeda and its associates the "Taliban" were highlighted as the perpetrators of the attack on US, and public opinion was moulded for military action against them, by showing the brutalities committed by them in Afghanistan and else where. The campaign was so overwhelming that virtually the international opinion was moulded for action against the regime in Afghanistan³¹.

Here again, the US capitalized on the potential of media by offering them material support so that the aspect of "Objectivity" was taken out of the equation and only the official version were projected, control of media was ensured and the collateral damage to the civilians was not aired or even brought to the fore, since the military had acquired the control of the reporting mechanisms.

Objectivity was introduced by Al-Jazeera network³², which showed the other side of the picture also i.e. the atrocities

committed against the civilians; however, diplomatic as well as physical pressure was exerted by the US to block the transmissions. Hence, the US propaganda was so overwhelming that the champions of “Human Rights” the West, totally ignored the loss of civilian lives. The true potential of media came to the fore yet again, where the media campaign was so overwhelming that even the core values of human rights etc, of the Western society were disregarded and was accepted. It impacted warfare with disregard to civilian casualties and support facilities and the targeting methodologies, the ultimate aim was the over throw of Taliban’s regime, at what ever cost.

During the Gulf War II, the concept of “Embedded journalists” was pursued with the intent of covering the battles live and influencing the “Public Perception” and public opinion around the world in general and US in particular. The International media was fully involved in projecting Iraq as Rouge state in possession of WMD without undertaking its own investigation and following the official version of the governments³³. So overwhelming was the propaganda that the entire world was turned against Iraq, hence the true potential of Media was witnessed. However, it was later on revealed that the media got carried away and under the influence of the governmental design and did not investigate the facts, which later on revealed the claim to be incorrect.

Both, “Operation Enduring freedom” in Afghanistan and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” which began as a Limited Wars initially, but ultimately after the overthrow of the regimes in those countries transcended in “Asymmetric Warfare”³⁴ and the media had a active role and new trends such as embedded journalists, strategic corporal etc emanated form there and would be discussed in the next chapter.

Emerging Trends

The changing global scenario ever since the Gulf War II (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and especially the 9/11 incident (Operation Enduring Freedom), the world has witnessed a paradigm shift in the war fighting and associated mechanisms,

tilted towards “Asymmetric Warfare”³⁵ duly assisted and supported by the media, with special emphasis to “winning hearts and minds” operations. In Pakistan the manifestation has been in the form of Operation Rah-e-Raast. All out wars are on the decline and what has come to the fore is the “Asymmetric Warfare” or the 4th Generation warfare biased towards the urban warfare with “Ideological” disparities. Apart from changing the war fighting methodologies, it has had an immense impact on the involvement of the media in the entire spectrum.

To conform to the changing face of the wars and warfare, the role of media has also undergone a change, so as to remain in-step with the changed environment. The fast paced, dynamic tempo of the current warfare required constant track of the emerging scenarios and is duly supported by advancement in technology to keep the audience up to date. Some of the media trends used in modern battle fields were as under:-

- **Embedded Journalists:** To keep the audience up to date with the latest developments, the concept of “embedding journalists³⁶” with the troops in the battle area is gaining pace and is supported by the technology, which ensures “live coverage” of the battle field as the events unfold. In October 2002, Clarke and Whitman developed a plan to assign or “embed”³⁷ reporters with the troops. Limited embedding was tried in limited usage with around 40 reporters in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in response to media objections that they had no access to the battlefield. Clarke’s embed vision would be “dramatically different in scope and numbers than anything tried before” However, in the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 2003, the concept was taken one step ahead,, more than 600 reporters at a ratio of 80 percent U.S. reporters to 20 percent non-U.S. reporters, to include Arabic outlets such as Al-Jazeera. Ten percent of the U.S. reporters were to be selected from “local media that were from the towns where (the) troops were coming from³⁸.”

whereby journalists would accompany the troops during operations. These journalists would live, travel and work with the troops and give live coverage to the masses back home. The concept essentially is to mould “public opinion” by “managing perceptions” and “propaganda”. Here again the aspect of Objectivity was lacking³⁹, as the effort was to control the media by supporting them and as a consequence, they would support the official governmental stance, also to ensure that no operational related information was transmitted which would jeopardize the operation. In the same context, independent journalists were not supported.

- **Strategic Corporal:** Introduced by US Marines,⁴⁰ as a consequence of the Urban Warfare confronted by the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan, also known as the "Three Block War" and was used to describe combat in cities. The modern combat is very dynamic and changes across a small front rapidly. The *strategic corporal* is the notion that leadership in complex, rapidly evolving mission environments devolves lower and lower down the chain of command to better exploit time-critical information into the decision making process, ultimately landing on the corporal, the lowest ranking non-commissioned officer, the he is faced with wide variance of combat operations: 1st Block they are doing humanitarian missions handing out food and everybody is happy with them, a few minutes and the next block over they are negotiating disputes between rival factions and people are throwing rocks at them, by the third block and a few minutes later, the same Marine is in a fire fight with a determined enemy. The Strategic Corporal is that guy who makes the decisions to not shoot during crowd control of humanitarian ops, not shoot during angry rock throwing, and shoot the right people during the appropriate kinetic engagement, and then going back to not shooting the right people very quickly⁴¹. The point is that the modern warrior has to be an effective decision maker

across the entire spectrum and make decisions with enormous consequences and that relatively junior guys are frequently those guys who make those decisions with national implications. A single tactical operator can have strategic impacts based on what he does or does not do⁴². The nature of modern combat, and the media prevalence, makes the decisions that a 21-year old makes of national importance and perhaps of world scrutiny. It was the prevalence of the media on the battlefield, or more specifically the media's ability to speed information from the battlefield, that led to his explanation of Strategic Corporal and media makes it possible for the global audience to witness a small unit leader in action; capturing the effects of his decision in real time⁴³.

- **Live Coverage Facility:** Technology has facilitated live transmissions of the war front to the public at home. It has had a profound impact in “perception Management” and moulding “Public Opinion”, where the masses at home can relate to the feelings of the soldiers in the battle area arousing the feelings of “patriotism” as a dividend. A contemporary example in the India-Pakistan context is that of the “Kargil Conflict”, whereby, the live coverage of the events in the conflict by the Indian media aroused feeling of patriotism amongst the junta.⁴⁴
- **Usage of Media as a Force Multiplier:** Cognizant of the ability of Media as a force Multiplier, the Commanders are utilizing the media to their advantage by “Selective Coverage” and “Control of the Media”, thus accruing benefits in the overall scheme of things and moulding public opinion in their favour and enhancing the morale of the troops⁴⁵.
- **Media’s Requirement:** US military machine fulfilled the media’s requirements by holding “daily press briefs”⁴⁶ and giving their own version of the

events on a platter and indirectly influencing them not to look else where and project their version.

- **Objectivity – Casualty of War:** Ever since the military has acknowledged the potential the media possesses in terms of serving their interest, it has employed various techniques to control the media and accrue benefits to their advantage. However, in the entire process the “Objectivity” in reporting has been the “Causality of War”.⁴⁷ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq was one of the prime factors which resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom; a stance pursued by the US government and vehemently projected by the world media, whereas in actuality, it turned out to be nothing but a hoax, and media was utilized for “Perception Management” and moulding “Public Opinion”.
- **Influencing other Networks:** Another “Causality of war” was the tendency to influence other independent networks such as “Al-jazeera”⁴⁸ from undertaking objective reporting, restricting the freedom of speech, which was counter-productive and was undertaken by the US military during operation in Afghanistan. This is a new trend that has developed.
- **Terrorism and Internet:** Due to technological advancements, the Internet access has become increasing available. Due to lack of objectivity and influenced media by the West, the Terrorist groups have resorted to use of “Internet”⁴⁹ to project their point of view, communicate amongst themselves, undertake psychological warfare by spreading disinformation, to deliver threats intended to instil fear and helplessness, and to disseminate horrific images of brutal murder, undertake publicity and propaganda, arranging fundraising through sympathizers, recruiting and coordinating. Terrorist organizations can now affordably duplicate many capabilities needed by modern militaries, governmental organizations, and

businesses. Hence have changed the complexion of warfare, whereby, they are nullifying the efforts of the governments and not only that, they are pursuing their motives, thus stressing out the efforts through a simplistic and cheap means⁵⁰.

- **Wikileaks:** The recent episode of “Wikileaks” on internet (segment of media) and subsequently on the print media and TV has introduced yet another dimension, whereby, has put a lot of governments involved in anti-terrorist activities under stress and dented the alliance forged for fight against terrorism⁵¹. It did strain relationship between Pakistan and the US⁵² and was likely to affect the efforts by Pakistan in the War-on-Terror and has taken a lot effort by the US government to pacify the situation. The entire impact of the “Wikileaks” is yet to be felt as things unfold.
- **Mobile Phone Network:** Yet another marvel of technology, the accessibility and ready availability of mobile phones has exponentially enhanced the outreach of the media and is termed as the 7th Mass Media⁵³. The built-in features such as video recording, SMS, MMS etc has provided media the availability to be virtually Omni-present and be able to report from remotest and cramped locations especially in LIC environment, where the paraphernalia of live coverage may not be possible. In the context of LIC the same advantages are utilized by the terrorist to project their point of view and to undertake propaganda, without the requisite wherewithal, at very cheap and cost effective manner.
- **Effects on War Policy and War Tempo:** Rand Corporation conducted a study in 1996 by Mr Eric V Larson⁵⁴ to determine the causal relationship between political policy under circumstances of armed conflict, these included examination of the possible impact of the news media with reference to the Vietnam war. One of the most important findings of this study is the

central role of leadership—and divisions among leaders—in support for military operations and preferences regarding strategy and the level of commitment. Many public opinion analyses tend to ignore leadership or to treat it simplistically as presidential manipulation of public opinion or a search to find justifications that will resonate with the public. Substantial evidence supports the proposition that leadership consensus or dissensus is an essential element in the character of public support for US military interventions. As can be noted, Larson asserted that analysis of the existing empirical evidence pointed to two dominant factors evoking support as expressed in public opinion polling; the strength and character of political leadership, and the outcome of actual “objective” events resulting from political decisions. One is led to conclude that the best “information operations” campaign aimed at engendering domestic psychological support as well as demoralizing and defeating adversaries is an aggressive policy reflected in bold battlefield operations and commensurate administrative supporting actions to achieve clear and specific political and military objectives.

Here the role of detractor’s media is pronounced, especially in the global media age—who wilfully misreport with the intent of undermining war policy and sowing doubt in the domestic populace. Intuitively one recognizes in such media reports a corrosive effect on national morale and public support for a war that is difficult to measure or counter. However, this analysis offers a theoretical perspective to suggest that between the two competing factors of press and policy, by far policy—as manifest by bold leadership and action—has the greater influence on public opinion. This conclusion suggests that modern communications technology has not made adversarial media more influential in dampening the prehistoric instinctive animus resident in human nature, but it has made such voices—which are now more numerous and louder—more potentially distracting for

the public, policymakers, and those who execute policy through action.

As Larson additionally observed, although the media may not have the impact on the substantive policy preferences of the public that some attribute to it, technological and other advances could have a profound effect on democratic governance. Perhaps the most important effects would be a *perception* among policy makers that the electronic media are shortening their decision cycles and the increasing availability of “flash” polling that often reflects little more than short-lived and transitory opinion. The collective national challenge is for wartime policymakers to understand that the nature of perception generated by the closeness of the media is “short-lived and transitory,” and that the most important long-term factor shaping public support is a focus on formulating and resourcing clear, bold policy that the military can translate into decisive action without getting distracted.

Moreover, when boldness, clarity of objectives, and effectiveness of policy are reflected in deeds, the nature of the ruthlessly competitive modern media system ensures that the press will report that clarity and resolve to the public as the factual content of its news coverage. The news media remain the principal messengers of bold policy to the public, and they will report it purely as a consequence of relentless marketplace competition irrespective of whatever baggage of bias some quarters of the media establishment may attach to it. As a consequence, assuming the correctness of the policy in its articulation and the boldness of its execution, domestic public support will take care of itself. The effect of media on war policy makers is immense, hence rendering the wars to be more swift, high tempo and aggressive rather than protracted and lingering.

- **Wars more Legal/Transparent:** The technological advancements has enhanced the out reach of the media and at the same time afforded it the ability to reach remotest of locations for coverage. Earlier, media lacked ability to reach and report, the world at large

was not made aware of the brutalities of war and the usage on the types of weapons⁵⁵. This phenomenon of showing the casualties and “collateral damage” to the civilians has enabled to ensure that the wars become more legal and in conformance to the “Geneva Convention” has been brought to the fore. The Vietnam War was the first such example⁵⁶ where the world was made aware of the brutalities of war⁵⁷. Then is the example of Gulf War¹, the media brought to the fore, the civilian casualties⁵⁸. The inhuman treatment of POW in Abu Ghareb prison⁵⁹ camp in Iraq shocked the entire world⁶⁰. The exposure of Guantanamo Detention camp again brought to the fore the human right issue and ultimately led to the decision of the closure of the facility⁶¹.

- **Winning Hearts and Minds:** As indicated earlier, “Asymmetric Warfare”⁶² is what is expected to be as a potent threat in the foreseeable future, with terrorism being one form of manifestation having Ideological disharmony as the driving force. The media has a vital role in this domain i.e winning hearts and minds of the population and influencing public opinion⁶³. It can either project the cause of the terrorists by building sympathy for their cause amongst the populous by showing them as being victim of unjustified war and showing the collateral damage as a consequence of hostilities, OR forge public opinion against them by showing their brutalities and the victims of their heinous acts and endeavor to expose the terror networks and facilitate the fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

Conflicts have been on-going and would continue to occur, what is evident is the role of Leadership as to how it steers the nation state through war. The importance of bold decisions, effective policy, which are objective oriented and practical action aimed at achieving the set objectives, is of vital importance with regard to generating public support for

governmental policies. The media plays a vital role in projecting governmental stance undertaking its classical role of “perception management” which translates in public opinion. This would manifest it self in short and aggressive wars with clear aims.

In the same context, in the current trend of 4th generation warfare which has a bias towards Ideological plane, while the role of leadership and media in perception management/public opinion formulation of the governmental policies would remain pronounced, the media’s role in “Winning Hearts and minds” would be of vital importance which would facilitate the government to take bold decisions followed by concrete actions.

The role of media in the context of the phase Pakistan is under going at present needs all the support to forge national unity and cohesion. We have seen the role media can and does play in the modern warfare, especially in the Asymmetric warfare scenario with terrorism still a major national concern, which would require national consensus if further military actions are to be undertaken. What better tool, other than media can be utilized for attainment of these objectives. Although, the realization of the potential of this potent tool amongst the Military hierarchy is evident, however, there is room for further improvement to fully capitalize on the inherent capabilities of media.

Author

Air Commodore Asad Khan graduated from College of Aeronautical Engineering in September, 1982 and was commissioned in the Engineering Branch of Pakistan Air Force. He served in various appointments including Engineering Officer of F-16 Squadron, Officer Commanding of the Engineering Wing, Director at the Air Headquarters and finally, Managing Director of Mirage Re-build Factory at Kamra.

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PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN-CUBA RELATIONS

Ambassador Najm us Saqib

Abstract

Fidel Castro's revolution of 1959 has survived against all odds. In modern day socialist Cuba, the spirit of the revolution is still alive. Pakistan and Cuba enjoy cordial and friendly relations. In recent years, Pakistan and Cuba have been engaged in efforts to broaden the base of bilateral relations and expand cooperation in diverse fields. However, bilateral economic and trade relations between the two countries lack substance. This paper investigates the reasons for not materializing the potential both countries have in the economic and trade fields even after having enjoyed cordial relations for the last over five decades. In addition, an effort has been made to find answers to these questions: Why Cuba is important for Pakistan and does the Caribbean island hold any potential for a far off South Asian Pakistan?

Introduction

Cuba is one of the most politically influential countries in Latin America. In the April 2009 OAS Summit in Trinidad and Tobago, US President Barrack Obama could not avoid the subject of Cuba as most of the member states demanded improvement of US-Cuba relations. The island has close relations with South American and Caribbean countries in the fields of economics, trade, health, culture, sports, education and scientific-technical cooperation, on the basis of numerous cooperation agreements, inter-governmental joint commissions and drug enforcement treaties. The only country with a history of military intervention in Cuba since 1898 is the US which still maintains its Naval Base in the Cuban province of Guantanamo.

Cuba has a unicameral parliamentary system and every five years elections are held with former Prime Minister, former President, Commander-in-Chief, and *maximo lider*,

Fidel Castro and his companions winning the elections for the last 50 years, unopposed. About one-fifth of the total Cuba population of 11.35 million lives in the capital city of Havana. Cuba has a rich and ever-evolving culture that existed long before the Cuban revolution of 1959. The Cuban people are resilient, egalitarian, invigorating, sociable, friendly and at times opinionated. Although life seems hard yet no one starves in modern day Cuba today.

Cuba and Pakistan enjoy cordial and friendly relations. Although diplomatic relations were established in 1955, Pakistan actually opened its Embassy in Havana in 2007. Both countries share common views on a number of international and regional issues. Extending support to each other at the multilateral forums like the UN and NAM on almost all issues is a strong indicator of thought cohesion. However, bilateral economic and trade relations between the two countries lack substance. Initial contacts between the pharmaceutical sector, Cuba's hosting of over 900 Pakistani students on scholarship and its earthquake relief efforts in the 2005 disaster in Pakistan are not enough examples to justify the real potential both countries possess in the economic field. This is where the topic of this research paper takes its relevance and significance from.

Cuba has one of the best health systems in the world. It is a leading country in cancer research. Can Pakistan learn from Cuba's experiment? What is Cuba's potential in the economic field and how best can Pakistan utilize Cuba's expertise and vice versa? There is a need to evaluate the present nature and extent of bilateral political and economic relations to analyse the present and future prospects for Pakistan.

Considering the complex nature of a typical socialist country like Cuba and looking at its existing weak economic relations with Pakistan, the hypothesis is: can Pakistan benefit from Cuba's potential and strengthen bilateral relations especially in the economic field? Secondly, keeping the age-old Cuba-US hostility in view, it would be interesting to find out whether the strong Pak-US relations could pose any

significant hindrance in the future Pak-Cuba relations especially in the economic and trade fields? Cuba's sovereignty in the last five decades, its strained relations with the US and its potential in various sectors for Pakistan have been taken as independent variables while present and future developments in Latin American region remain as dependent variables.

Cuban Revolution

Rebel and independence movements have a long tradition in Cuba. After an unsuccessful war against the Spanish (1868-1878), Cuban rebels mounted a more successful campaign in 1895, led by the revolutionary hero, José Martí, a political leader, a statesman and a poet, who devoted his life to the Cuban independence movement and to the Latin American integration efforts. In modern day Cuba, José Martí is still considered the most important revolutionary hero of the period and his political thoughts still shapes revolutionary thinking in today's Cuba. An important quality inspired Martí's deeply revolutionary thinking: a cultured man, with a fine sensibility and extraordinary scientific knowledge, Martí rejected the vulgar materialism, at base idealistic, of positivism that many of his contemporaries supported.

Modern day Cuba has its roots in the Cuban Socialist Revolution of 1st January 1959 when Fidel Castro and his rebel army forced US-backed General Fulgencio Batista to flee the country. Because Cuba's guiding ideology is a form of Marxism-Leninism, Cuban nationalism has a distinctly international tone. In December 1956, Fidel Castro and a dozen youths landed on the eastern end of the island and from the mountains of Sierra Maestra began a dogged and ever increasing armed rebellion, eventually attracting enough support to bring Batista down. It is important to note that Cuba is one of the few countries in the world to have seen off three imperial powers: Spain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Exceptionality and resilience have been two prominent attributes of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership over the

years. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, many thought that surviving without the blessings of the US would not be possible as clashing with the latter's interests was unthinkable. It was estimated that without a sugar quota and provision of oil and other supplies from the US would lead to economic collapse. However, Fidel Castro's revolution survived against all odds. Only a handful of political observers would have envisaged the survival of the revolution when in early 1990s, the Soviet Union, Cuba's ally, began to disintegrate. Here again, the world seen that Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution survived. None of the US administrations in the last five decades was succeeded in bringing down either Fidel Castro or the socialist regime in the island. Meanwhile, the five-decade old US economic and trade embargo against Cuba continues.

Modern Day Cuba

Even after five decades of struggling and the exit of Fidel Castro from active politics in 2008, the spirit of the Cuban revolution still seems to have a strong grip over the island and is still respected. Fidel Castro's influence continues to change or make President Raul Castro's decisions. As the Head of Cuba's Communist Party, Fidel Castro still exerts a kind of veto power behind the scenes. He has overruled Raul Castro by repeatedly expressing intransigent positions on prospects for improving relations with the US. Fidel Castro continues to make his views known by writing occasional essays known as "Reflections," which are carried prominently in the Cuban media. Meanwhile, his younger brother, President Raul Castro, is all praise for Fidel Castro, a leader who "led us yesterday, leads us today and always would from victory to victory". In recent months, Fidel Castro has surprised everyone by making unannounced public appearances.

Fidel Castro nationalized all small businesses in 1968 and only after the collapse of long-time benefactor the Soviet Union in 1991, allowed their return under tight regulation. Since assuming office of the President in February 2008, Raul Castro has mainly focused his attention to maintaining Cuba's

socialistic system and introducing modest reforms. His austerity measures announced during 2009, suggested that the country must learn to live within its means. The reform blueprint calls for the government to cede much of agriculture, retail services and small-scale production to family farms and businesses, cooperatives and leasing arrangements over the next few years. A new Cuban "revolution in farming", is, thus, in the offing. In a bid to boost food production and reduce costly imports, Cuba is leasing state-owned farmland to individual farmers and co-ops. The country has been forced to import over \$2 billion a year in food and agricultural products, much of these could be grown locally.

In April 2010, Cuba started turning over hundreds of State-run barber shops and beauty salons to employees across the country as a long-expected revamping of state retail services. These are small steps with possible big implications. The recent easing of red tape for private enterprise is improving services for tourists in provincial towns with hundreds of new restaurants and lodgings opening up. "Mom-and-Pop" small businesses have begun to boom in Cuban cities and towns following reforms by President Raul Castro to boost private enterprise and lay off state workers to improve efficiency in one of the world's last Soviet-style economies.

Cuba has a centralized system of governance. The Government owns and controls almost all businesses. Barring the 300 joint ventures initiated by the Government in early 1990s, all economic and trade related activities including real estate, hotels, hospitals and other facilities are run by various Government agencies. Similarly, the Government has control over both electronic and print media. All areas of the media are state-owned, state-controlled, and censored. The Government has hardly made any secret of its view that the mass media are powerful tools for ideological formation and the development of social consciousness.

The use of internet is getting popular but the access is limited. Even diplomatic Missions stationed at Havana find

difficulties in getting connected with their respective capitals. As such, Cuba is the least connected country in the hemisphere. However, there are prospects of a fiber optic cable linking Cuba to the rest of the world. Although officials say the link-up may not provide internet-starved Cubans with greater access to the World Wide Web, the Venezuela-sponsored link is expected to be operational soon. In a country that currently relies on satellite transmission, the cable will increase data capacity 3,000 times and carry up to 10 million international calls simultaneously.

Tourism remains the country's major foreign exchange earning industry, with over 2 million tourists visiting Cuba, from around the world, only in 2009. Cuba is one of the world's largest nickel producers and supplies 10 percent of the world's cobalt. Sugar is Cuba's most prevalent crop. Other important exports include medical products, fish and shellfish, citrus fruits, cigars and coffee. Large-scale fishing operations have been encouraged in recent decades, and that industry is now one of the largest in Latin America. Cuba meets 50% of its energy requirement (oil and gas) indigenously.¹A leading country in cancer research and biotechnology, Cuba has 100% literacy rate and maintains one of the best health systems in the world.

Presently, Cuba is reeling from an economic crisis and a string of hurricanes that caused more than \$10 billion in damage only in 2008. Cuba racked up a \$3.9 billion trade surplus in 2010 as President Raul Castro's efforts to cut imports and earn more abroad bore fruit for a second consecutive year. Exports increased 12.9 percent to \$13.6 billion in 2010, led by the selling of services at \$9.4 billion. Imports fell 3.3 percent to \$9 billion².

Cuba's Foreign Policy

Modern day Cuba's views are increasingly in tune with today's anti-capitalism and anti-globalization movements. Cuba's stated foreign policy claims to have adhered to the principles of International Law, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states, self-

determination of the peoples, equality of states and peoples, rejection of interference in the internal affairs of other states, right to international cooperation to mutual and equitable benefit and interest, peaceful relations among the states and other precepts enshrined in the UN Charter.

The backbone of Cuba's foreign policy is composed of internationalism, anti-imperialism, solidarity and unity among third world countries. As a policy, Cuba condemns all hegemonic, intrusive and discriminatory practices in international relations, as well as the threat or the use of force, the adoption of unilateral coercive measures, aggression and any form of terrorism, including State terrorism. The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba condemns any form of discrimination based on race, creed or opinion.

Cuba's relationship with the US is the most crucial dimension of the island's foreign policy. Since the early 1960s, the US considers Cuba as a perennial threat to hemispheric stability after it had acquired the military and financial means in the 1970's to mount a sustained offensive in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba supports all anti-US postures while strengthening bonds with its Latin American and Caribbean friends. European countries and the European Union are valuable counterweights to US policy on Cuba, although human rights issues cause sporadic breaks in diplomatic relations and aid programmes.

Russia is seeking to expand economic ties with Cuba and possibly forge stronger military relations echoing their Cold War era friendship. China and India enjoy cordial relations with Cuba. Venezuela has been facilitating the country for the steady supply of oil shipments. Since 2000, subsidized Soviet oil has been replaced by subsidized Venezuelan oil. Cuba has openly supported Iran's struggle against the pressures from the West and the US while officially maintaining that it defends Iran's right to the peaceful production and use of nuclear energy.

Cuba's position on Afghanistan and Iraq invasions has been of open rejection and condemnation of the US 'War on

Terror' following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington. Cuba has always defended the right of Palestine to sovereignty, being its most firm ally in Latin America and in all international forums. Cuba does not have any diplomatic relations with Israel, as besides being "the US ally in the region", it considers Israel as an aggressor and condemns Israel's repressive measures against Palestine. Cuba unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Cuba feels that it is a victim of International terrorism especially at the hands of the US. The host of 2000 first-ever South Summit of the G77, Cuba had the Chair of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) from 2006 to 2009.

Pakistan-Cuba: Bilateral Political Dimension

Available record has revealed that diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Cuba were established in 1955 and Cuba kept an operational diplomatic Mission in Pakistan from 1963 to 1991. At the beginning of the "Special Period", when the island faced extreme hardships after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the long time benefactor, Cuba closed down its Mission in Islamabad 1991. Following Cuba's unprecedented earthquake relief gesture in 2005-6, the Cuban Mission in Islamabad was reopened in April 2006. Next year, the Embassy of Pakistan was established in Havana on 30 November 2007 with the arrival of the first resident Ambassador³.

In January 2009, the Cuban Foreign Minister observed that bilateral relations between Pakistan and Cuba were "developing cordially". In a letter addressed to the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister expressed confidence that the presence of Embassy of Pakistan in Havana "will contribute to strengthen" relations between the two friendly countries. That is true. The presence of diplomatic Missions in Islamabad and Havana has provided impetus to various initiatives of bilateral cooperation that were in the pipeline while opening up new vistas of cooperation.

In recent years, Pakistan and Cuba have been engaged in efforts to broaden the base of bilateral relations and expand cooperation in diverse fields. In addition, certain high level visits especially since 2000 to and from Cuba have given momentum to the efforts for boosting bilateral relations. The President of Pakistan visited Havana in April 2000 to attend the South Summit; he again visited Havana in September 2006 to attend the 14th NAM Summit. In May 2005, a six member Parliamentary Kashmir Committee delegation visited Havana in July- August 2007 and put forward Pakistan's principled stand on Kashmir. The visit by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to Havana in April-May 2009 proved useful in reviewing the existing bilateral relations.

From Cuba, former Foreign Minister Felipe Roque visited Pakistan following the 8 October 2005 earthquake to supervise the Cuban relief assistance. He again visited Pakistan in February 2006. First Deputy Foreign Minister (present Foreign Minister) Bruno Rodriguez visited Pakistan in October 2005 and May 2007. During his visit of October 2005, he stayed back for over six months to supervise the earthquake relief efforts. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcos Rodriguez Costa visited Islamabad on 6-7 November 2009 to hold the first round of bilateral political consultations.

Pakistan appreciates Cuba's generous and unprecedented relief assistance during and after the October 2005 earthquake⁴. Cuba is presently hosting more than 900 Pakistani students as part of its 1000 Scholarship Programme. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, who led the Cuban contingent comprising more than 2500 doctors and paramedics during the earthquake relief efforts and stayed in Pakistan for more than six months, considers Pakistan as his second home. The Cuban 1000 Scholarship Programme together with Cuban generous relief assistance rendered in the wake of October 2005 earthquake, forms an important aspect of existing cordial bilateral relations.

The two countries remained in close coordination for years on their positions in the United Nations. Extending support to

each other's candidatures at international organizations has also been an important element of bilateral relations.⁵ Cuba appreciates Pakistan's support at the United Nations on its resolution which calls for an end to the US economic and trade embargo. Cuba also appreciates the US\$ 1 million donation received from Pakistan in March 2009, for the hurricanes' affected people.

Economic and Trade Dimension

Traditionally, before commencing formal economic and trade relations with other countries, Cuba desires to sign a bilateral Cooperation Agreement, under which, a Joint (Economic) Commission is usually formed to decide the extent, scope and modalities of trade and economic relations between two countries. The Cooperation Agreement was signed in November 2009. This agreement would facilitate in undertaking feasibility studies to identify investment project, in cooperation of International Economic Associations, exchange of experts in various fields and cooperation modality, mutually beneficial to both the countries. The establishment of a Joint Commission is presently under process.

The Cuban Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi signed The Joint Cooperation Agreement during 2007. Both sides agreed to carry out dissemination of business information in order to promote mutual interests. Promotion of "most favourable conditions for the development of economic relationship between Pakistan and Cuba" has also been agreed upon.

Presently, exports from Pakistan to Cuba are carried out through intermediary companies. Main exports include fabrics, garments, sesame seed, sports and surgical goods. Main import commodities include vaccines, medicines, metal scrape and medical equipments. Mostly, the Cuban Government contacts third parties for import of Pakistani goods. The Cooperation Agreement has also provided the requisite platform for utilizing each other's expertise in the

economic field while opening up doors for formal bilateral trade. Exact bilateral trade figures are not available as almost all commodities are imported and exported through intermediary companies. However, according to rough estimates provided by the Cuban Chamber of Commerce, the total volume of trade stands at US\$ 4-5 million. The trade figures available with the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) in 000\$ value, are as follows:

Year	Exports	Imports	Total Trade	Balance
2006-07	876	1,723	2599	(847)
2007-08	765	2067	2832	(1302)
2008-09	877	1980	2857	(1103)
2009-10	795	2119	2914	(1324)

Source: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan

The Cuban side has agreed to import directly from Pakistan “any or all” exportable goods. They would like to have a 360 days credit line facility as is practiced with Governments and businessmen of other trading partners. In particular, the Cubans have evinced interest in sports and surgical goods, garments, fabrics and food products.

Humanitarian Dimension

In the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake, Cuba was in the forefront in extending relief assistance to the earthquake affected people. Immediately after the earthquake, then President Fidel Castro offered medical assistance to Pakistan and dispatched teams of doctors and paramedical staff to the earthquake affected areas. Former Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque said, “Cuba responded to Pakistan’s call for help immediately after the October 8 earthquake and the first medical team arrived in Islamabad on

Oct 14”.⁶ He observed, “Pakistan and Cuba had friendly relations and Cuban medical help to Pakistan was part of the efforts to strengthen these relations”.⁷

“The Cuban Mission had set up 32 field hospitals and two relief camps in the NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, staffed by more than 2,400 doctors, paramedics and physiotherapists. Tons of medicines and medical equipment were also dispatched by Cuba over the past seven months. About 30 amputee patients received treatment in Cuba”.⁸ “Seventy three percent of all the patients in earthquake-hit areas had been assisted by the Cuban medical teams. The Cuban government has also donated 241 tons of medicines, surgical instruments and material, and more than 275.3 tons of medical and hospital equipment. During the crisis, the Cuban medical brigade was present in 45 locations with back-up staff – more than 40 percent of them women – who remained to work in remote mountain villages, living in tents in freezing weather and in an alien culture after Western aid teams had been withdrawn”.

The work of the Cuban team was personally supervised by then President Fidel Castro who had tasked the First Deputy Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez (present Foreign Minister) to lead the Cuban contingent. Bruno Rodriguez remained in Islamabad and the affected areas for over six months. “The Cuban medical contribution has been remarkable and second to none in the critical phase of rescue and relief. Cuban doctors and paramedics have a large presence in the worst affected areas such as Balakot and Muzaffarabad, and in the coldest temperatures at Banna Alai, Maira, Thakot, Beshan, Garhi Habibullah, Hattian, Danna, Battal, Jared, Abbas Pur, and Oghi”.⁹

While departing for his country, Bruno Rodriguez observed, “Cuba had extended the assistance with a sense of duty. The Cuban medical team was returning home with immense gratification and would leave behind all the field hospitals it had established here”.¹⁰ “Cuban doctors provided treatment to 80,000 patients, conducted 7,000 operations

and admitted 4,000 patients in earthquake-hit areas of Kashmir and NWFP. The Cuban medical team, comprising 2,465 doctors and paramedical staff is the largest ever mission deployed in a foreign country in any disaster-stricken area”.¹¹ “The Cuban doctors attended 1.04 million patients in the earthquake- devastated areas”.¹² “The Social Welfare Ministry has sent 14 earthquake amputated persons to Cuba for their prosthetic treatment”.¹³ The dedication and commitment of the Cuban contingent contributed to a momentum for strengthening bilateral relations.

The humanitarian dimension was not one sided. Cuba was hit by “Gustav” and “Ike”, two devastating hurricanes, in September-October 2008. The Government of Pakistan announced on 15 November 2008, emergency relief assistance for the affected people of Cuba and subsequently, a cheque of US\$ 1 million was presented by the Ambassador of Pakistan¹⁴ to Federal Minister of Cuba for Foreign Trade and Investment Malmierca Diaz on 17 March 2009. Terming the receipt of one million dollars as a “manifestation of solidarity” by Pakistan, the Minister expressed confidence that bilateral relations would be strengthened in the years to come.

Scholarship Programme

In the wake of October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, the Cuban Government had offered 1000 scholarships in the medical field to the students of the affected areas for low-income Pakistanis and this gesture opened a potential gateway to success for these families. The scholarship offer revolved around the idea that these students, after graduating in medicine, would go back to their villages and serve the poor communities in their respective areas. The Embassy of Pakistan in Havana informed me in March 2011 that at present, there are 910 students benefiting from the fully funded Scholarship Programme.

According to Cuban officials, many of the students did not meet the Cuban criteria of belonging to “the poor or very poor category”. They feel this is one of the reasons why there were incidents of campus disturbances and expulsion of 17 students

from the Programme. Considering the scope of the Programme, the Pakistan Government might have set up an office in Havana, consisting of at least 3-4 officials, to manage the Scholarship Programme since its inception.

There was no apparent mechanism available to Higher Education Commission to foresee with exactitude, the innumerable day-to-day administrative problems facing the students and the Cuban Administrative staff deputed at the campuses. Hence, the question of putting in place an effective mechanism to address day-to-day problems facing the students did not arise in early stages of the Programme. The Embassy of Pakistan was established in Havana in December 2007, a year after the first batch of students reached Cuba. Fortunately, now the situation at the campus is calm and the Programme is being looked after by both sides with a view to securing the future of these Pakistani boys and girls, who would become qualified doctors in the next few years.

Strategic Dimension

In recent years, the world has witnessed significant strategic, political and economic changes in the international arena. The world security structure is undergoing dramatic transformations. Varying trade and investment patterns keep influencing a number of decisions in international relations. In this backdrop, if one examines the past and present nature and extent of Pakistan and Cuba relations, one would see a virtual void. One reason of the absence of any strategic relation could be Cuba's Latin America centric policies which do not allow the island to form any kind of strategic alliances outside the region. The other reason, this research reveals, is the absence of any serious thought given to this specific area by the Governments of both countries. The in between distance and the language barrier could be other reasons. However, in the ever dependent international environment, there is a need for both countries to start negotiations on these lines. Pakistan has opportunities for Cuba in the defence and defence production fields as well.

Education and Health

52. In the face of so many hardships, Cuba's experience in the fields of education, public health, biotechnology research and cooperation with other third world nations, continue to receive international praise. Cuba has 100% literacy rate; it provides medical assistance by exporting doctors and paramedics to various countries of the world, earning around US\$ 5 billion annually; it has successfully addressed the energy crisis of 2004 by adopting innovative measures and has effectively dealt with malnutrition and hunger in the country since 1990's. Cuba ranks 51st out of 177 states listed by the UNDP in its Human Development Report, which is quite a remarkable achievement for a Third World country.

"The Cuban government operates a national health system and according to World Health Organization statistics, Cuba is in the top quintile in worldwide comparisons of major health indicators such as doctors per capita, life expectancy and infant mortality".¹⁵ "Cuba is one of the most developed countries in the health sector".¹⁶ Because the education of physicians came to exceed the country's internal requirements, Cuba has been able to export primary care practitioners and specialists for periods of service in other Third World nations. Cuba's missions in 68 countries are manned by 25,000 Cuban doctors, and medical teams have assisted victims of both the South Asian Tsunami and the October 8 earthquake.

"Since its establishment in the mid-1980s, the Cuban biotech sector exports the world's most effective hepatitis B vaccine to more than 30 countries. It also developed the first synthetic vaccine for the prevention of pneumonia and meningitis, which is much cheaper than what is offered by Western pharmaceutical companies. Poised to provide anti-cancer therapies to the European market by 2008, Cuba is also eagerly looking to enter the Western market".¹⁷ "Cuban medical research and practice has been highly productive in curing patients of diseases generally regarded elsewhere as incurable. The Cuban doctors have carried 1.4 million free eye

operations in more than 33 countries across Latin America and Africa. Successful clinical trials in several countries have already established Cuba as a world leader in cancer research and treatment. It might sound surprising that despite these advances, Cuban medicine has not become popular in the world. Havana is hamstrung by Washington's stringent sanctions, which are seriously restricting its options".¹⁸

Here, arises a question. Can Pakistan benefit from Cuba's expertise in the field of education, health and in particular biotechnology? Looking at Pakistan's performance in these sectors, one could safely say that opportunities exist for Pakistan to benefit from Cuba's experience in these important fields.

Social and Cultural Dimension

Due to strict local laws regarding naturalisation and obtaining longer stays, Pakistani expatriates prefer to reside in Dominican Republic, Jamaica and other neighbouring countries. Therefore, with the exception of Pakistani students, Cuba is devoid of any Pakistani community, making the island a rare place where there are no Pakistani expatriates. However, more than 900 Pakistani students are living in Cuba since 2006 as part of the Cuban Scholarship Programme in medical field. These students are not only fluent in Spanish language but also have understood the Cuban culture and social life. The presence of these Pakistani students in Cuba is the second time when people of both countries closely interacted with each other. The first time was when the Cuban contingent for earthquake relief intermingled with Pakistanis for over six months in 2005-6. The Cuban doctors, paramedics and officials, who stayed in the earthquake affected areas, fondly remember the "nice, hospitable and friendly" people of Pakistan. A question arises here: Why and how two people from two totally different cultures would become comfortable with each other and that too in the absence of any common dialect?

Cubans are known to be frank, honest, friendly, helpful, talkative, emotional and bold. Barring clothes, cuisine and

language, one would find Cuban more like Pakistanis. Owing to government rules and restrictions on free travelling outside the country, the Cubans generally are not exposed to the outside world”.¹⁹ Similarly, in Pakistan, millions never get a chance to go abroad and travelling outside the country remains a dream. Is there a possibility of having people-to-people contact in the near or distant future?

Future Prospects for Bilateral Cooperation

It is a general perception that any country disliked by the US that offers anything truly meaningful to the people of Pakistan, sees direct and indirect, covert and overt impediments - all of which have a US imprint. The questions that arose before the research on the subject started were: Why Pakistan and Cuba have not been able to provide real substance to bilateral relations even after enjoying cordial relations for the last around six decades? Was it because of Cuba's not-so-good relations with the US, a close ally of Pakistan?

During the research, the second question got its reply first. The answer was in negative. Neither the US nor Cuba seems averse to the idea of having independent bilateral relations with other countries. There are more than 112 diplomatic Missions in Havana²⁰. More are opening up. The US and Cuba have Interest Sections in each other's capital, which, for all practical purposes, work primarily as Embassies. There has not been any official response on the establishment of Pakistan Embassy in Havana.²¹ Then what was the reason for Pakistan and Cuba to not come closer in diverse fields for the betterment of people of both the countries?

Now the reply to the first question. This research suggests that progress in Pak-Cuba bilateral relations since 1955 was somewhat slow paced owing mainly to the absence of formal bilateral frameworks and non-establishment of Pakistan Embassy in Havana. In the last four years, the following significant initiatives seem to have filled this vacuum:

- Establishment of Pakistan Embassy in Havana in November 2007;
- In March 2008, Cuba lifted the three decade old ban on export of Pakistani rice while offering to purchase 100,000 tons of rice from Pakistan;
- Signing of an MOU in April 2009 on holding periodic consultations. The first round of bilateral political consultations was held in Islamabad in November 2009;
- Pakistan and Cuba signed the Cooperation Agreement in November 2009 to commence economic and trade relations on a formal platform. Besides other things, the Agreement requires the establishment of a Joint (Economic) Commission to discuss all related matters including possible arrangements of joint ventures;
- To streamline the all important 1000 Cuban medical Scholarship Programme, in March 2010, the Cuban side proposed two draft Agreements on Mutual Recognition of Higher Education Studies, Degrees and Diplomas and for Training of Medical Doctors in Cuba.

The author's tenure in Cuba as Pakistan's Ambassador for three years and present research further suggest that the stage is now set for providing real substance to Pak-Cuba relations while pointing towards possible areas of cooperation. That brings to the real question of the research: What are the prospects of Pakistan-Cuba relations? The details already given amply indicate the existence of present and future prospects of Pakistan-Cuba relations in multiple dimensions. Pakistan and Cuba have a vast scope of improving their bilateral, trade, economic and cultural relations and could proceed in that direction.

Economic Dimension

The desire of increasing trade and investment is mutual. The signing of a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries during 2009 to initiate economic and trade relations on a formal basis is a welcome sign. The most important aspect seems to be the establishment of a "Joint (Economic)

Commission”, which will facilitate businessmen of both countries to commence formal trade and work for economic activity. Once the Commission is established, a delegation from Islamabad could undertake a visit to Havana for the initial contacts with the Cuban Government/Economic Ministries besides holding the first round of formal talks under the Cooperation Agreement. This may well also be the beginning of a long awaited people-to-people contact.

Possibility of initiating joint ventures in both countries exists. The Cuban side is presently exploring the possibilities of initiating joint ventures in Pakistan, in biotechnology, as they are doing with India for years. On the other hand, over 300 economic associations (joint ventures) have been created in numerous sectors in Cuba. Areas of common interest can be worked out by our Board of Investment with its Cuban counterpart, beginning with cooperation in biotechnology.

Scholarships Dimension

There are 910 Pakistani students presently benefitting from the Cuban Scholarship Programme. These students, after becoming qualified doctors, are likely to return to Pakistan and contribute towards the economic development of the country. In order to streamline the Scholarship Programme, the roles of Higher Education Commission and Pakistan Dental and Medical Council will remain vital. Both these departments have so far coordinated various initiatives with the Cuban side to ensure that the future of more than 900 Pakistani youth is secured.

Trade Prospects

Cuba holds Havana International Trade Fair (FIHAV) every year in the month of November. It is a bit surprising that Pakistan has never participated in this important trade fair. The Ministry of Commerce and TDAP may plan to participate in FIHAV to showcase Pakistani products for the first time in Cuba, where more than 80 countries including India, Iran, Korea, Japan, China etc regularly participate. The participating delegation from Pakistan may also (a) assess the

market situation for: future business; and, (b) explore the possibility of selling food items, sports goods and garments etc. directly to the Cuban foreign currency markets. The Cubans have evinced interest in sports and surgical goods, garments, fabrics and food products. The interaction between the business communities of both the countries will create the required business environment while aiming at mutually befitting from each other's experience.

Around 33 years ago, the Mexican authorities banned the import of rice from Pakistan on the grounds of harbouring "Beetle Khapra". Cuba and some other Caribbean states followed suit and stopped importing Pakistani rice as it was "plagued" with *trogoderma granarium*, *tribolium masdens*, *tenebrio molitor*, *tenebrio obscures* etc. which cause "damage to stored products". According to Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP), besides Mexico and Cuba, no other country had imposed such a ban on the import of Pakistani rice on account of "Beetle Khapra" or any other so called "plagues". Cuba lifted this ban in 2008. Pakistani rice exporters have a new market now and an opportunity with immense prospects. Cuba's offer of purchasing 100,000 tons of rice from Pakistan, after having lifted the ban on the export of Pakistani rice is being considered by Pakistan. Future initiatives can be explored as well.

Political Dimension

The MOU signed in 2009 has provided a formal platform for both the countries to periodically review their bilateral relations and also to exchange views on regional and international issues of mutual interest. Follow up actions need to be taken besides proposing the dates to the Cuban side of holding the second round of consultations.

Cuba continues to advocate the establishment of internationally acceptable standards for establishing a clear distinction between terrorism, which must be condemned and combated, and the legitimate right of peoples to fight, including through armed struggle, against aggression, occupation and foreign domination, colonialism or foreign

hegemony, in order to achieve their liberation and self-determination.²² This approach puts the Island close to extending support to the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

Education and Health

The study reveals that enormous opportunities exist for Pakistan in bilateral cooperation in the fields of education and health. Pakistan can learn from Cuba's experience in these fields. The mere fact that education in Cuba is free till PhDs and according to World Health Organization, Cuba is in the top quintile in worldwide comparisons of major health indicators such as doctors per capita, life expectancy and infant mortality, are enough indicators to understand the depth of cooperation that both countries can benefit from. The Cuban Health Ministry officials maintain that Cuba's \$1.8bn and growing tourism industry will soon be overtaken as the number one foreign exchange earner by biotechnology joint ventures, vaccine exports and the provision of health services to other countries. Successful clinical trials in several countries have already established Cuba as a world leader in cancer research and treatment.²³ During the 1990s, Cuba became the first country to develop and market a vaccine for meningitis B, and this sent export earnings soaring. Then there was a surge in exports of its hepatitis B vaccine, which is currently being shipped to around 30 countries of the world.²⁴

Strategic Dimension

In the absence of any strategic dialogue or relations between Pakistan and Cuba, there seems an apparent lack of interest on part of both sides to proceed in this direction. In the recent past, the Cubans were offered seats in Pakistan military institutes like the Command and Staff College, Quetta, for their army officers.²⁵ The Cuban Government may consider initiating such linkages to bring officers of both armed forces together at least to getting to know each other's potential in the related fields. A defence and defence production related delegation could visit Cuba to ascertain the island's military needs for any future business. To begin with,

the National Defence University, Islamabad, could offer National Security and War Course to two or three Cuban officers, to participate as allied officers.

Cultural Dimension

People-to-people contact has yet to be established between the two countries. One way to achieve this is through cultural exchanges. In Havana, the Embassies like that of Iran and India hold cultural functions, exhibitions and show documentaries and feature films in collaboration with the Cuban Ministry of Culture. These activities, keenly attended by the Cubans, help create a softer image of these countries. The Ministries of Culture and Information may start projecting and promoting Pakistan's rich cultural heritage in Cuba. This may include paintings exhibitions, fabric and garments shows, food fares, Qawwali performances and playing Pakistani documentaries and other feature films in local cinema halls.

Sports and Tourism

Pakistan and Cuba are presently working on signing an agreement for bilateral cooperation between the Ministry of Sports and the Cuban National Institute for Sports, Physical Education and Recreation (INDER). A Cuban boxing coach, present in Pakistan, is contributing to improving the performance of the Pakistani boxing team. Similarly, cooperation between the two countries is being broadened through signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in tourism. Signing of these agreements will strengthen ties between the two countries and offer new opportunities in these important fields.

Conclusion

The bilateral diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Cuba, established in 1955, have seen both countries coming close to each other diplomatically and politically. Both enjoy each other's cooperation and support at international forums on regional and global matters. In particular, cordial and

friendly relations have brought both countries together at important forums like those of the United Nations and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The unprecedented earthquake faced by Pakistan in 2005 saw Cuba at the forefront of relief efforts. As a follow up, Cuban Government offered 1000 scholarships to Pakistani students in the medical field. At present, 910 Pakistani students are benefitting from the Cuban Scholarship Programme.

This study has revealed that the progress in bilateral economic relations was not hindered because of Cuba's hostile relations with the US viz-a-viz Pak-US partnership. It was because of the absence of formal bilateral platforms and a willingness to proceed in strengthening economic and trade relations, from both sides, that both countries could not utilize each other's expertise and potential in related fields.

Author

Ambassador Najm us Saqib joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1985 as a career diplomat. Holder of a Master's degree in National Security and Military Strategy from the National Defence University, he is also a Law graduate. On his diplomatic assignments abroad, besides representing Pakistan in numerous International Conferences and Meetings, Ambassador Saqib has served in various countries of the world including Bangladesh, Spain, Azerbaijan, Kenya and Canada. His most recent posting abroad was in Havana where he served as the first ever resident Ambassador of Pakistan to Cuba from 2007 to 2010. He is presently serving as Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. He has also authored five books of poetry and fiction.

Notes

¹ "Record" of the Embassy of Pakistan, Havana.

² Marc Frank, Reuters, Havana, 7 January 2011.

³ The author of this Research Paper

⁴ "Record" of the Embassy of Pakistan, Havana.

⁵ Ibid

- ⁶ “Cuban doctors to stay till needed, says Minister”. *Daily Dawn*, 17 November 2005.
- ⁷ Ibid
- ⁸ Qudssia Akhlaque, “Pakistan and Cuba agree to boost ties”. *Daily Dawn*, 25 May 2006.
- ⁹ “Cuba deplores quantum and pace of relief”. *Daily Dawn*, 20 November 2005.
- ¹⁰ Qudssia Akhlaque, “Pakistan and Cuba agree to boost ties”. *Daily Dawn*, 25 May 2006.
- ¹¹ “Cuban doctors operated upon 7,000 patients, treated 80,000”. *Daily Dawn*, 12 February 2006.
- ¹² Ibid
- ¹³ “14 quake survivors flown to Cuba”. *The News*, 15 February 2006.
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- ¹⁵ “Ties with Cuba”, *The Post*, 19 July 2006.
- ¹⁶ Ibid
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- ¹⁹ “Record” of the Embassy of Pakistan, Havana.
- ²⁰ www.cubaminrex.cu
- ²¹ “Record” of the Embassy of Pakistan, Havana.
- ²² www.cubaminrex.cu
- ²³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4583668.stm>
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF HOMELAND SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

Ms. Afifa Kiran

Abstract

The word “Homeland Security” (HS) came in the wake of 9/11 anthrax attacks which is new and ever evolving concept. The threats to the homeland are diverse and difficult to predict with potential adversaries increasingly adopting variety of methods, capabilities, and challenges to security of the homeland. The new Department of Homeland Security of the US represents the most extensive restructuring of the US government since 1947. In Pakistani context, there are continuous relentless threats to its internal security. Its law enforcing agencies are expected to maintain internal security by confronting multifaceted security threats. The analysis of Pakistan’s internal security concept demonstrates that its central concern is the threat of terrorism. In Pakistan, homeland security tasks are usually performed by several security agencies working under provincial domain, the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defense. Primarily, the Civil Armed Forces are responsible to handle all kinds of domestic security threats in Pakistan but none of them including police is neither fully prepared nor equipped to undertake its primary role independently. There is a lot to be done to improve their professional competency.

Preface

This is a game of wits and will. You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, 2004¹

It is historical verity that most of the countries in past and present have been beset by insurrections. It is a reality of today’s world and in all probabilities it is there to stay in future as well. These militants and radical elements, in fact,

are organized opposition to authority where they try to wrest control from another, disturb the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state. This all can't be achieved unless a vacuum is created in the existing social order thus providing environment conducive for exploitation by the militants and the radical elements to cause law and order problem with an ultimate objective to change the existing social order.

For defense against such aggressive ascensions, states have been conducting security armed operations through military forces to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict. However, now it is a globally recognized reality that states' police and other law enforcement agencies play a critical role as the first line of defense against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies.² All major twentieth-century security operations relied heavily on indigenous police as well as military forces.

According to Kelev I. Sepp's *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, which closely studied seventeen insurgencies, the role of the police is always central to any successful counterinsurgency measures.³ His recommended measures for insurgency hit areas emphasize "police in the lead" with the military providing backup support and strengthening the police with diversified training capabilities to help meet the security needs of the at-risk population.⁴

The homeland security is a wholesome concept which conceptualizes the broad contours of threats emanating in various forms thus making appropriate defensive measures which warrant mobilization of all relevant resources of national power to contribute towards enhancing security and stability of a state while taking care of all factors that influence the state's structure which may ultimate lead towards social disorder and state's failure. While the concept has alternatively been used as homeland defence by Pentagon during 1990s however, the homeland security in the US was formally introduced in the aftermath of 9/11.

Pakistan is a case in point where the homeland security is at the verge of collapse because the daunting challenges due to

a number of factors which are mostly “Home Grown” but duly encouraged by outside actors. Pakistan is struggling to regain the balance. It has troubled in most parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Security situation in Balochistan is below comfort level, and unfortunately the violent move in Karachi has strongly challenged the state’s writ. The problems relating to extremism, fundamentalism and sectarianism also contribute and encourage the terrorist elements.

It has been seven years since 9/11 that Pakistan’s Law Enforcing Agencies (LEAs) are with terrorists/militants at various levels. Pakistan remains engaged in war for world peace, with 2, 00, 000 troops deployed at the front line and 90,000 soldiers fighting on the Afghan border including its Second Line Forces (SLFs) or Civil Armed Forces (CAFs). Its army has taken the role of vanguard in the fight. Being the front line state on the ongoing war on terror, Pakistan has suffered heavily on account of human and material losses. Its economy has suffered badly and lost over \$68, over the past one decade and the war is still far from over. Pakistan army took very heavy toll by losing close to three thousand soldiers while over eight thousand sustained serious injuries.⁵

Notwithstanding Pakistan army’s contribution towards national cause and the world peace, the role played and sacrifice made by Pakistan’s CAFs including the Police, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary and Rangers can’t be undermined too. The Police being the frontline force to ensure law and order in terrorism ridden cities/towns has been extremely vulnerable to the terrorists’ onslaught and made extraordinary sacrifices while protecting the citizens of Pakistan. However, unlike Pakistan army which is sufficiently equipped to undertake challenging operations, the CAFs are under strength, comparatively less prepared and lack requisite training and resources needed to undertake the gigantic task of countering the security challenges of 21st Century.

While the armed forces especially the army is important as a back up support, the CAFs including the police are best

suited force for conduct of counter terrorism operations to enhance homeland security, provided they are equipped with matching resources. They have the congenital flexibility to get access to the informal social networks and much needed intelligence in their areas of operation. Therefore, as a matter of urgency, Pakistan's CAFs are to be trained to act strappingly and robotically with or without the intimate support of Pakistan army which may or may not be available in all circumstances.

Additionally, the other stakeholders involved in emergency management activities are also ill prepared to undertake their primary tasks. The institutions like the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) are not fully integrated with other relevant agencies needed to support them during the crises situation. NDMA seems less of an independent body and more of a political wing of the ruling party with no clear authority and also badly lack in resources. NACTA is in transition process and the author is of the view that it might not get requisite support from other strong intelligence agencies and ultimately, it may also prove a white elephant without substance stationed in the center of Pakistan's capital.

In author's considered opinion, the 21st Century security challenges can't be efficiently handled by the LEAs in isolation even if they are very well trained. The success of the LEAs is also linked with the success on other fronts like provision of justice, employment opportunities, education and health care and reduction of gaps between "have and have not". Notwithstanding the importance of other organizations, the conduct of homeland security operations by having a flexible, adaptive, alert, responsive and astute force is one factor which needs to be reinforced if success is to be achieved. Therefore, to deal with growing or any possible criminality, disorder, insurgency, terrorism, extremism/sectarianism and irregular armed bandits, Pakistan needs an extensive research to formulate homeland security strategy through a comprehensive approach by taking all stakeholders on board.

In this backdrop, this paper aims at assessing efficacy of Pakistan's Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) with special reference to its Second Line Forces (SLFs) or Civil Armed Forces (CAFs), with a view to suggest plausible measures to meet Homeland Security Challenges of 21st Century.

The author intends covering the paper in following sequence: First, defining the homeland security/ explaining its conceptual framework, second, the spectrum of threats to homeland in 21st Century, third, the facets of homeland operations and the role of LEAs. Fourth, Pakistan's homeland security concept and its existing security structure to provide internal security. Fifth, weak links of Pakistan's LEAs and other stakeholders and finally, the proposed guidelines and policy options to streamline the role of LEAs in homeland security of Pakistan.

The opinion /views expressed in this paper are that of author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the institution. Additionally, the study primarily focuses on improving Pakistan's CAFs/SLFs however; Pakistan army would be referred occasionally where required and finally the epicenter of the study would revolve around the Department of Police.

Defining the Homeland Security Concept

The word "Homeland Security" (HS) came in the wake of 9/11 anthrax attacks. Clearly, the tragedy was used as the trigger to implement Homeland Security and Defense policy by the US that has been under design and consideration for many years. It is a new and ever evolving concept. Although, there are some historical threads to this vary idea, yet, on November 25, 2002, the US President George W Bush formally presented it by signing the concept into law Homeland Security Act 2002 (HS Act) for protection against terrorist threats and reduction of nation's vulnerability to terrorism.⁶ Since then, in many other countries, a focus of homeland security concept to fight against all odds including terrorism has emerged and steadily increasing, Pakistan is no exception.

The new Department of Homeland Security represents the most extensive restructuring of the US government since 1947, the year the Department of War was combined with the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and Air Force, to create the Department of Defense. The new Department of Homeland Security combines over one hundred separate entities of the executive branch employing over 170,000 federal workers and commands a total annual budget of \$37 billion.⁷ It is only the US which probably could afford to create such a huge security mechanism, a seamless integrated system that may protect all citizens. But, in the ultimate analysis, probably there is no such thing as total security.

The US defines the homeland security from different perspective from global to national levels as follows:⁸

The prevention, deterrence, and preemption of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.

A concerted national effort to prevent terrorists' attacks within the US, reduces America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizes the damage and recovers from attacks that do occur. Homeland security is, at its core, about coordination, coordination between functions and between governments, developing new tools, and effectively weaving together the nation's experts and resources to connect the dots; a matter of doing some new things, many old things much better, and some old things differently, all in an environment that can punish any mistakes severely.

At the global level, the US leadership relies upon safety of the American homeland, the preservation of a balance of power, and the stability of nation-states relative to terrorists, organized crime, and other 'non-state' actors. American peace must not become vulnerable to rogue powers with inexpensive arsenals, nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We cannot allow such entities to undermine

American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself.

From author's perspective, no other country could afford to have such a broad scope of the homeland security. From author's perspective, the homeland security may be defined as, make concerted efforts to prepare, coordinate and equip the law enforcing body including the intelligence agencies to undertake following tasks while working under one umbrella: First, be able to preempt and deny the terrorists from initiating offensive actions against the public as well as the government agencies/organizations. Second, be prepared to confront terrorists' threats at any level and ensure that they are defeated when confronted, thirdly, should be able to maintain peace and provide guarantee that the writ of the government is not challenged by non state actors and other law breakers including sectarian groups and drug mafia and criminal gangs. Fourthly, the LEAs should be fully prepared and appropriately equipped to extend their support to NDMA in Emergency Management which is a discipline that deals with risk and disaster attached to natural calamities including earthquake, flood, public health and crises related to climate change.

The homeland security concept goes beyond civil defense as it is more active, focusing less upon ultimate survival and more upon preemptive mitigation of threat by actually preventing an attack in the first place. The national security, anti-terrorism, disaster preparedness, hazard management, emergency services, crime prevention, strategic coordination, threat mitigation, and risk assessment are all inclusive of the homeland security. The concept includes the idea of balancing security and civil liberties, making citizens as safe as possible while at the same time maintaining the sovereign principles of liberty and freedom.⁹

It is resolute nationalized endeavor to prevent terrorist acts through: One, prepare for all consequences with contingency plans. Two, take visible but concrete steps to deter the aggressors from taking the initiative. Three, carryout

pre-emptive measures to deny the access so as to avoid the damage, four, take all possible defensive measures and respond with full might if the terrorists/ militants happened to succeed in penetrating the defence lines.

Many analysts believe that "Homeland Security" remains a rather vague concept, but basically suggests a security against an ill-defined threat or enemy.¹⁰ However, others believe that homeland security encompasses a grouping of diverse missions and functions that are performed by a wide variety of organizations. In author's considered view, it might be easy to evolve a comprehensive homeland security strategy on paper however; the implementation part would be very difficult due to the complex nature of coordination required between various stakeholders. Nonetheless, homeland security is all about coordination between security institutions and government, developing new tools, and effectively weaving together the nation's experts and resources to accomplish the subsequent:-

- Achieving unity of effort amongst federal, state and local security agencies.
- Coordinating with all the security agencies and organizations potentially involved in the homeland security operations.
- Identifying key elements of information that various agencies can share.
- Specifying the objectives of the response actions.
- Nailing down the desired end state in any action
- Defining courses of action for homeland operations.
- Identifying potential threats.
- Monitoring and evaluating crisis situation.

Conceptually, homeland security involves "active defense," but it is more than that, involving a kind of non-

departmentalized intelligence which is expected to be one step ahead of the cleverest enemies. A homeland security effort may involve policy analysis, reorganization, diplomacy, intelligence gathering, military build-up, or whatever it takes to proactively defend the homeland. The homeland security is more like an extension of the concept of "mitigation" in emergency management, which involves all actions (structural and non-structural), designed to reduce the likelihood and impact of future disasters.¹¹

Spectrum of Threats to Homeland in 21st Century

The threat to the homeland is diverse and difficult to predict with potential adversaries increasingly adopting an array of persistent and emerging traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive methods, capabilities, and challenges to security of the homeland.¹² This range of both conventional and asymmetric state and non-state threat capabilities fall into three broad categories¹³:-


- Hostile states using conventional or strategic capabilities.
- Hostile states employing asymmetric means of attack.
- Non-state actors using primarily asymmetric means of attack but also limited levels of conventional or strategic means.

In author's candid view, the spectrum of threat to homeland varies from region to region and country to country. The nature of threats that Pakistan is confronted with may not have relevance with the problems and nature of threats that the United Kingdom (UK) or Norway may be facing. The recent surge of the lawlessness witnessed in the UK and earlier on in Norway, indicates the variety of threats that exist globally which can be exploited by insiders as well as by non-state actors. In the high-tech era of 21st Century, the means can be made available if the will is there.

Facets of Homeland Security Operations

The multifaceted potential threats to homeland posed by extremists, radicals/terrorists elements from within and without, illegal immigrants, and other criminals including drug mafia at all levels are becoming exigent. They employ variety of tactic including terror as a political weapon usually organizes with other extremists in small cells and mostly uses religion as a cover for terrorist activities.

Figure 1



Homeland security doctrine and the resultant operations are designed to provide real-time situational awareness and monitoring of the homeland against these militants and coordinates incidents and response activities with increased vertical coordination between state, federal, tribal, local, and private security agencies.¹⁴ It operates against the threats which undermine the writ and control of the government and the security of life and property of the citizen.

Role of the LEAs in Homeland Security Operations

LEAs are administrative unit set up by commandment to maintain internal security of the state. The Oxford English Dictionary sees LEAs as the civil force which is entrusted with the duty of maintaining public order, enforcing regulations for the prevention and punishment of breaches of law and detection of crime.¹⁵ In Pakistani context, LEAs also include armed forces which have dual role to perform. Their primary responsibility is to guard against external threats, but

occasionally they are called upon to help state in maintaining internal security. Thus the SLFs/CAFs, namely, Police, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary and Rangers duly supported by other agencies including intelligentsia have the primary responsibility for internal security of Pakistan.

In the recent times, nature of threats and security discourses are incessantly changing and this expanding security agenda has gone beyond state and military security.¹⁶ Resultantly, stakes for the states are getting very high to formulate their action plan against intricate terrorization ranging from traditional to nontraditional security threats.

In such unpredictable environment, LEAs play imperative role in defending the internal security through conducting a range of security operations which design to detect, deter, prevent and defeat the threats at the operational level. Currently, racketeering, gang activity, and narcotics-trafficking, and the insurgent threats employing Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) tactic are direct the challenges to the security of the populace. Law enforcement organizations are trained to counter these threats from within and without. They operate in a difficult internal security environment with the objective to secure the populace. Against non-military threats, successful employment of LEAs with asymmetric and unconventional capabilities is decisive. Graham Allison of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government describes the importance of the local law enforcement role as follows: "In the war on terrorism, because of their investigative and intelligence capabilities, law enforcement agencies have the unique opportunity to strike terrorists before they can attack."¹⁷

Role of LEAs is necessary and important in homeland security efforts, but they are successful only when their tasks are incorporated into a national security strategy employing all instruments of national power. However, in some countries, their role in homeland security is still directionless. They are not given the clear goal and a specific role, new directives along with resources to implement mission areas of homeland security operations.

Pakistan's Homeland Security Concept

"The first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State"

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah¹⁸.

There are continuous relentless threats to internal security of the states posed by the transnational groups, extremists, militants and terrorists particularly after 9/11. Most of the time in the political arena, these threats emanate because of weaknesses in political stability, governance, law and order, measures against corruption and border security. Pakistan is facing similar security situation mostly due to "Home Grown" causes and the snag in her own internal security architecture and also disruptive effects of terrorization and political violence in neighborhood.


In theoretical framework, 'Homeland Security' is coordinated endeavor to thwart, defend against, counter to and recuperate from terrorist activities and other natural catastrophes. This vary concept in Pakistan is still an indistinct term. Keeping in view broader definition, Pakistan's homeland security concept is more related to activities aimed at preparing for and protecting against attacks on homeland. It includes the fight against internal threats and the safeguard of national security. The analysis of Pakistan's internal security concept demonstrates that its central concern is the threat of terrorism by the terrorist groups and non-state violent actors.

Pakistan's Homeland Security Threats

There are two pronged security threats countenanced by Pakistan. The security challenges posed by terrorists to FATA, KPK and Balochistan are predominantly sponsored by the foreign hands while the security threats to other part of Pakistan are home grown but occasionally engineered and promoted by foreign intelligentsia.¹⁹ Apart from external factors, Pakistan's internal security threats are emanating

from religious extremism and sectarian violence which also have linkage abroad. Moreover, the growing trends of abduction for ransom, promotion of armed wings by the political parties, presence of unaccounted number of arms and ammunition in mega cities are bringing additional pressure on the LEAs.

Figure 2




Presently, emergence of new trends of violence like suicide bombing including the use of explosive jackets and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) by the terrorists has increased sense of insecurity among Pakistani masses. The shocking technique adopted by terrorist groups has taken lives of over 30,000 innocent people over the past seven. The year 2011 witnessed oodles of suicide attacks in Pakistan which killed nearly 15025 security forces and civilians.²⁰ The government has so far failed to devise a workable strategy against the techniques used by the terrorists. The tables below show the figures of fatalities in terrorist acts only in the month of August 2011.

Distribution of Casualties in August 2011 ²¹		
Type	Killed	Injured
Frontier Constabulary	26	70
Militants	207	83
Civilian	399	465
Police	33	33
Paramilitary	2	8
Army	22	17
Levies	5	-
Rangers	-	-
Total	694	676

Additionally, narcotics related terrorism strikes at the social and political foundations of a country, without breaking this nexus, latter cannot be curbed. Unfortunately, Pakistan is again caught in the middle of this crisis. Well trained and fully equipped drug mafia uses Pakistani soil for transporting drugs from Afghanistan to other part of the world and in process, the traffickers besides promoting other social evils also create serious security problems. Regrettably, the US seems encouraging the narcotics cartels in Afghanistan. As concluded by Neal A. Pollard, there might be a natural partnership between some terrorist groups and transnational organized crime syndicates.²²

Notwithstanding above, Pakistan's internal security dimension also takes into account following as expressed in diagram:-

Figure 3



Source: Punjab Police: <http://punjabpolice.gov.pk/>

The above referred facts indicate that Pakistan is under tremendous threat from growing crimes that are destroying its cities and disturbing homeland security dynamics dramatically. Resultantly, this has laid extra burden on the LEAs which lack capacity and are unable to give a matching response to the emerging security challenges of 21st Century.

Strategy for Homeland Security in Pakistan

Pakistan's homeland security strategy is based on following principles:-

- **Pursue:** To pursue and preempt terrorist attacks.
- **Prevent:** To prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting extremism.
- **Protect:** To protect the vulnerable targets by strengthening their security.
- **Prepare:** To prepare responses against terrorist attacks in the light of information shared by

intelligence agencies to minimize the chances of attack but yet if they succeed, reduce the impact of their attack.

➤ **Capacity Building:**

- Continue improving the fighting capacity of the LEAs to cater for ongoing and emerging security challenges pose by the terrorists.
- To strengthen and coordinate other agencies including NDMA to respond appropriately to the crises emerging as a result of natural calamities.

On political front, continue to address vigorously the core causes that encourage and promote terrorism in the society. In other words, take the oxygen from the terrorists that keeps the terrorism growing by the fulfilling the basic needs of the poor masses without discrimination.

Homeland Security Architecture in Pakistan

In Pakistan, homeland security tasks are usually performed by several security agencies distributed among provinces and center. Four provincial governments take care of law and order tasks in their respective domains. The central government exercises control on a series of specialized police agencies, including the FIA, railroad and airport police forces, an anticorruption task force, and various paramilitary organizations such as the Rangers, Constabulary Forces, and the Frontier Corps. In addition to the police force held with respective provinces, the total strength of paramilitary forces varies between 177000 to 185,000. The fresh recruitment in FC KPK has brought the strength close to 55000 from 48000.²³

Forces	Existing Manpower
Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)	19,487
Pakistan Rangers (Sindh)	24,097
Frontier Corps (KPK)	48,648
FC (Balochistan)	45,227
Punjab Constabulary	18,134
Frontier Constabulary (KPK)	22,817
Pakistan Coast Guards	4,067
Northern Areas Scouts	3,679
Total	177,430

The police forces of the four provinces are independent, and there is no nationwide integration; nevertheless, the federal minister of the interior provides overall supervision.

➤ **Ministry of Defence**

- Maritime Security Agency (MSA)
- Airport Security Forces (ASF)

➤ **Ministry of Interior**

- National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
- National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC)
- Directorate of Immigration and Passports

- National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)
- **Civil Armed Forces**
 - Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)
 - Pakistan Rangers (Sindh)
 - FC (KPK)
 - FC (Balochistan)
 - Frontier Constabulary
 - Pakistan Coast Guards
- Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
- Anti-Narcotics Force under the Ministry of Narcotics Control
- **Intelligence**
 - ISI
 - IB
 - Military Intelligence Army
- **National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)**
- **Provincial Government Security Structure**
 - Police Force
 - Crisis Management Cells
 - Crimes Investigation Department

Pakistan's CAFs: Capabilities and Shortfalls

The reader would agree with the author that national power potentials especially the economy and military preparedness indicate the kind of response that nation might

be able generate against any kind of threat emanating from within or from across the borders. Peace can only be achieved and maintained through strength. Pakistan's armed forces are battle hardened and known for their professionalism across the globe. However, the kinds of challenges with which they are confronted domestically are different and require all together a unique approach to tackle them.

Primarily, the CAFs are responsible to handle all kinds of domestic security threats but none of them is neither fully prepared nor equipped to undertake its primary role independently. Thus, since over the past ten years, Pakistan army has been forced to take the lead role which is primarily trained to fight conventional war. It is surprising that Pakistan didn't have counterinsurgency strategy even after years of fighting and in author's considered opinion, even today; Pakistan doesn't have a comprehensive strategy to fight counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations. As highlighted by Mr Khalid Aziz, presence of counterinsurgency strategy could have indicated the limits of Pakistani involvement and its compulsions, thus reducing external demands for it "to do more".²⁴

There are several police organizations working under the control of the Ministry of Interior. One type is armed police organizations such as the Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps, Pakistan Coast Guards, and the FIA. Another type includes entities whose mandate is to improve police functioning such as the National Police Bureau (NPB), the National Police Academy (NPA), and the National Police Management Board (NPMB). Then there are other agencies, not under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior, that are federal laws enforcing agencies such as the National Highways and Motorways Police (working under the Ministry of Communications) and the Anti-Narcotics Force (working under the Ministry of Narcotics Control).²⁵

While taking a wholesome review of the agencies involved in enhancing national security is beyond the scope of this study, however, keeping the current and emerging terrorism

related challenges in view, understanding the role, limitations and capabilities of Pakistan's CAFs (Frontier Corps (FC), Frontier Constabulary and Police) is important to suggest a better course to be adopted by our political hierarchy in future. A brief resume of the capabilities and limitations of these agencies is explained in succeeding paragraphs.

Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary

The Frontier Corps (FC) force was never designed to fight the kind of war to which they are exposed today. Nevertheless with all limitations since 2003, the FC has done a good job.²⁶ New demands and requirements need different kinds of expertise and skills. The government's decision to equip the FC with tanks and guns from within country's resources would take years to make it capable of leading anti-militancy operations.²⁷

Nonetheless, since the last over six years, there is a mark change in the overall efficiency of the FC because of a number of factors. Their salaries have been brought to the desired level and their administration has also been improved considerably. Since 2002, the US has provided vehicles, bullet proof vests, helmets, NVGs to LEAs including the FC. The US is already involved in training over 8400 FC troops in KPK. The US \$ 400 million program also calls for the paramilitary forces to be equipped with more modern weaponry body armor and better weapons and medical evacuation services.²⁸

The package also includes \$ 29.4 million to support expansion of the FC of the KPK by 8 x wings, provide communication and NVGs. The US has already developed a FC training centre at Warsak which is fully equipped with state of the art training facilities needed to train the troops.²⁹ Lt General Khattak, the former Inspector General of FC, KPK said that the move to train and equip the 80000 strong FC force was long overdue.³⁰ Nonetheless, the author is of the view that the US investment would take some time to pay divided of tackling the menace of terrorism.

Similarly, the capacity of the FC Balochistan has also been enhanced over the past eight years. But probably, the attention given to FC Balochistan has been less as compared to that of FC KPK. According to Amir Mateen, FC Balochistan is fighting out simultaneously with Baloch separatists, intelligence proxies of various foreign agencies, Taliban jihadis and sectarian extremists, not to mention drugs and arms smugglers. It deserves credit for manning one of the toughest posts on planet earth.³¹ The FC Balochistan has come under tremendous pressure in the recent past and the terrorists' activities in Blochistan are on increase, warranting a serious re-look towards the operational worthiness of the force.

The author believes that the FC KPK and Balochistan are already overstretched. The KPK FC is deployed in FATA and has encountered the serious terrorism acts conducted by the militants operating in all seven agencies and suffered very heavy casualties. From author's perspective, the real problem is of their release rotation. They continue to operate for years without a pause because of non availability of additional forces to replace them. Very frequently, the FC troops are pushed from one agency to another to every time face the new kinds of challenges posed by the terrorists without respite. Therefore, even if they are well trained and motivated, prolonged deployment retards their efficiency level thus encourages the terrorists to exploit their vulnerabilities.

With regards to Frontier Constabulary, their level of preparedness can't be even equated with that of FC. Its current state of preparedness hardly allows it to perform its primary role of maintaining routine law and order in the country. Frontier Constabulary NWFP with a force of 22000 has a greater role in maintaining law and order in the country including the capital city Islamabad. The author is of the view that the Frontier Constabulary is not designed to undertake the kind of responsibilities which have been imposed on it. This force needs special attention of the authority if the intended responsibilities are to be fulfilled by them amicably.

Key Law Enforcement Force in Pakistan: The Police

The following briefly captures the functioning of each of the federal police organizations.³²

- **Gilgit-Baltistan Police:** The ambiguity regarding the constitutional status of this region means that the federal government is at least partly involved in local policing.
- **Northern Areas Scouts:** This federal paramilitary force is meant to secure areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan) that border along Gilgit-Baltistan and to provide assistance to the local police force for law and order in times of need.
- **Frontier Constabulary:** Frontier Constabulary was initially meant to provide security to internal borders of the so-called settled areas of KPK. Its mandate is now focused on internal security as a federal paramilitary force.
- **Pakistan Coast Guards:** To secure the seacoast, prevent smuggling, and prevent entry of illegal immigrants and enemy agents/saboteurs.
- **Islamabad Police:** To perform policing functions in the federal capital of Islamabad.
- **Federal Investigation:** To investigate cases of corruption and fraud in Agency federally controlled departments and institutions. Its jurisdiction encompasses economic crimes, cyber crimes, banking offences, and enforcement of immigration laws/exit control list.
- **Anti-Narcotics Force:** The ANF is mainly tasked with limiting trafficking and distribution of narcotics in the country, to enhance international cooperation against drugs, and liaise with international bodies including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

- **Intelligence Bureau:** Gathers intelligence and disseminates it to the federal government and through the Ministry of Interior to various police organizations.
- **National Highways and Motorways Police:** NHMP is assigned the task of traffic control functions Motorways Police on national highways under the control of the (NHMP) Ministry of Communications.
- **Pakistan Railways Police:** The Pakistan Railway Police (PRP) carries out policing along the railways.
- **National Police Bureau:** To act as a national focal point on all police-related matters and function as the permanent secretariat for the National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Management Board.

Pitfalls of Existing Model of Police in Pakistan

There is no denying fact that Police Department continues to present frontline defence in cities/towns and has faced serious brunt of terrorism actions during the past many years and their sacrifices are well registered in the history. While Mr Masud Khan Afridi, former Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bannu made a claim that the Police Department is well prepared and is very affective in performing its primary role however; he said that this department has not been able to evolve strategy against suicidal attacks. However, Khurshid Khan in response to the Afridi's claim said that the Police Department is overstretched, extremely hard pressed and ill equipped to effectively participate in ongoing counter terrorism operations. He says that 27 percent additional funds for KPK Police and Rupees 30 billion for Punjab Police to improve law and order are insufficient to meet the requirement of purchasing latest weapons/equipment. This factor is more pronounced in case of KPK and Balochistan. Similarly, its training standards are too low to match with well trained and hardened Talibans. In net shell, Pakistan's SLFs are incapable

and inadequate to confronting and addressing the ongoing challenges of terrorism strife.³³

Despite the fact that some improvement has been made in Police Department, the author is still not confident that with the current level of their preparedness and motivation, the Department will be able to take its primary responsibilities independently. Effective policing is hindered if law enforcement agencies suffer from inadequate training and investigation facilities and are poorly equipped to gather accurate evidence.³⁴ While the rising crime and militancy across the country has forced the government to pay more attention to modernizing the Department of Police and their support infrastructure however, It has been repeatedly pointed out by experts and observers that Pakistan's police forces are "poorly managed, ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt." Some of the glaring problems related to the Department includes³⁵:-

Problems

- Police do not have the academic credentials to understand the root causes of intimidation and its complexities.
- In Police agencies, there are some elements which are indulged in local politics.
- Police agencies are focused on publicity and getting the word out about their effectiveness at crime-fighting while intelligence work is focused on secrecy and never letting intelligence successes be known.
- Police are taught that criminal justice record keeping should be clear and concise, with writing crisp and to the point, while there is no such thing as too much excess or irrelevant information for intelligence work.
- Police organizations are bureaucracies where power struggles and personal rivalries abound, combined with a stifling tendency toward stagnation and lack of

creativity whereas intelligence work rewards eccentricity and creativity.

- Police are prone to negative stereotyping and abuse of power, and any intelligence shared with them may be misused.
- Police are prone to leaks and the leaking of information may occur, tipping the terrorists off about an ongoing operation.
- Police often act officiously and rudely when enforcing security precautions on ordinary citizens, creating a sense of insecurity and giving the public the impression of a police state.
- Police are not psychologically equipped to deal with the kind of massive casualties that weapons of mass destruction can cause.
- Police are not prepared to face enemies who use diabolical means to obtain pseudo-terrorist objectives.

With regards to the Police Department, there are other areas also that need immediate attention of the policy makers. As pointed out earlier, it is highly politicized department that lacks institutional approach very badly. Because of the politicized nature of this department, it only focuses on selected areas and generally ignores their primary role of providing sense of protection to common citizens. Accordingly, they enjoy very bad reputation among the masses thus when needed, the public do not extend their full cooperation towards this department.

Occasionally, the Police Department is projected very efficient through media. Over the last many years, special squads have been trained by the army at various cantonments. However, unfortunately, the well trained squads are not available except for protection duties of the political leaders, their families and friends. The huge investment on the

training of the special squads has no relevance to the safety and security of common masses.

Proposed Policy Options

The reader would agree with the author that no amount of preparedness can guarantee the homeland security unless the issues related to terrorism and extremism is addressed in a wholesome manner while taking regional and extra regional factors in consideration. The foremost issue that needs immediate attention at all levels relates to the core causes of terrorism which must be addressed, the use of mighty stick alone will not yield the desired results. We must learn from the US failures in Afghanistan.

Irrespective of the natures of military forces, without evolving a comprehensive foreign/domestic policy through national consensus, the manse of terrorism can't be eliminated from Pakistan. Pakistan's policy must strike a balance to accommodate both the concerns of international community as well as domestic audience. The military might should be used very selectively. The emphasis should remain on cooperative approach by providing enabling environment conducive to prosperity. The military might may be used sparingly as a last resort when urgently required however; its deterrence can only work if it is fully prepared to undertake the assigned responsibilities. Therefore, while other non military measures to eliminate the threat of terrorism are important, augmenting security mechanism by upgrading is even more important.

Effective unified command is prerequisite for successful operations against militants and extremists and emergency management of natural calamities. In order to continue strengthening the foundations of a prepared Nation, Pakistan needs to organize national efforts for homeland security principles, systems, structures, and institutions through comprehensive Homeland Security Management system by incorporating all stakeholders. It should provide clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all participating agencies in homeland security including

intelligence organizations of the country. The above referred architecture of Pakistan's civil armed forces indicate that it does have sufficient strength with an effective instruments for internal security but these instruments need to be prepared to confront the 21st Century security challenges by humanizing them under a cohesive command.

With a view to achieving the intended results from the joint effort by government-civil society, following steps are recommended: One, citizen awareness supporting detection of terrorists' activities enhances law enforcement ability to prevent attacks and interdict weapons and hazardous material, two, robust public communications system enhances levels of citizen preparedness and improves capability for positive response and lastly, the civil society should feel protected which is important to get maximum support and cooperation from them, so far this remains a weak area that must be addressed on priority if real cooperation is to be achieved from them.

In author's considered view, the NDMA established in the wake of 2005 Earthquake, needs to be made effective. In addition to its primary role of encountering the crises related to natural calamities, it has also a role in terror related disasters, security measures specific to terrorism and strategies to coordinate in the field as well off the field. Being an umbrella organization, it is expected to play its role in mitigating the impact of weapons of mass destruction related terrorism. Therefore, its independent status must be fully restored with requisite funding to take its primary role amicably.

Pakistan has established NACTA in a move to counter terrorism in the country. However, it is still in evolving process. It is proposed that NACTA may be made as an umbrella organization to provide a structural support to enable all LEAs and intelligence agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively in homeland security operations. The existing trends indicate that the intelligence agencies are

competing rather than cooperating with one another. Resultantly, they have not been able to produce the desired results which resulted in delayed actions by the law enforcing bodies. These trends are dangerous for the national security which must be shelved immediately.

Nonetheless, with a view to achieve success in counter terrorism operations, the strategy must take into account: One, the operational plans must be based on proactive strategy, two, the operations once undertaken should have full backing of the nation and must be sustained and continue with full might to completely demolish the structures of terrorism from the intended areas. Three, timely issue of Threat Alerts and information report by Ministry of Interior based on intelligence must be ensured through coordinated effort. Four, the government must make hands-on efforts to acquire advance technologies and ensure continuous support to enhance the capacity of the LEAs and finally, the government must be prepared to undertake the reconstruction work to win heart and soul of the people so that they don't drift back to the state of anarchy and lawlessness which is the recipe for terrorism to reemerge. Pakistan unfortunately has had experience in past which must not be repeated in future.

With a view to make the Department of Police effective, steps may be initiated as an immediate, midterm and long term measures like increase in human resource, motivation of the force, infrastructure, training, quality investigation, preemption and surveillance, prevention and rescue. Our police should be equipped with combat training in collaboration with army. Establishment of Rapid Response Force should be first priority of the government to deal with deteriorating internal security situation.

Police Department being the main pillar to fight against domestic terrorism, special incentives must be given to the Department. It is proposal that, special housing schemes maybe launched for the families of martyrs. The department may have separate hospital facilities in addition to better schooling for their children. Provision of an effective

administrative backup support would defiantly enhance their motivation.

To eradicate the menace of extremism, sectarian and ethnic violence, our police must have modern communications and intelligence system along with high-tech fighting weapons. The endeavor must be focused on construction of new police stations and posts, new barracks / lines, capacity building of existing five police training schools and computerization of all police stations record and provide on-line connectivity to all police offices throughout Pakistan.

The intelligence agencies need to modernize their system of intelligence collection, analysis, investigations and interrogations operations. There is a definite requirement of providing better trained and qualified manpower as well as modern equipment to the intelligence agencies. Moreover, banking system must be modernized for better financial control with a view to exercise control over financial transaction carried out between terrorist networks. This will enable the LEAs / intelligence agencies to trace out the activities of terrorist organizations.

De-weaponization of the society should be a priority to counter terrorism. The campaign needs to be undertaken with more vigor, better planning and a system of incentives. Furthermore, there is a need to forge a comprehensive policy with regard to foreigners living in Pakistan. Determined efforts need to be made to register all foreigners.

The anti terrorist operations have a direct bearing on the population. These are liable to invite resentment, eg the militants have been successful in creating an impression that their fight against Pakistan's armed forces or its citizens is not an attack on Pakistan's sovereignty. A mechanism capable of controlling hostile propaganda themes, while simultaneously floating effective counter themes needs to be constituted.

The history of the recent has proved that media plays an important role in perception building. The terrorists were winning as long as media was supporting them in FATA, Swat

and elsewhere. Thus the media being a strong pillar of national security structure must be incorporated as a part of the overall counter terrorism strategy. In order to guide the media in right direction and harmonize their national building efforts, a comprehensive strategy and the code of conduct for media must be evolved on priority and implemented strictly.

Conclusion

Supervisors streamline maintained Pakistan occupies a special location in the region, which bestows it strategic importance as a major regional player. It also faces multi dimensional threats (physical, psychological, ideological, economic etc) due to internal and external factors. Pakistan's internal security situation made it clear that terrorism and extremism are serious national security threats and have prompted a major reassessment of role of law enforcement agencies in homeland security operations. In the aftermath of the Swat and FATA operations, Pakistan should take proactive steps to remove all barriers among various law enforcing agencies.

Globally, particularly, after 9/11, threats from transnational actors warrant that the combined and coordinated efforts are initiated to address the manse of terrorism. These threats would better be defeated through a coordinated and collaborative response among security agencies. We must take the fight directly to these threats, dismantle transnational threat networks, and unravel the illicit financial nodes that sustain a web of criminality and corruption in our economies. It will require a constant evaluation of the types of illicit threats that will confront us all in the years to come. Together we can combat these threats by combining our efforts against crime and corruption across the society, developing strong law enforcement approaches, and enhancing our cooperation through public-private partnerships.

Let me once again re-emphasize that unlike the army which has fewer constraints, CAFs are ill prepared to take on their primary role. Rahimullah Yusufzai explains that despite

the US promise to train the FC, the situation on ground is quite opposite.³⁶ A major overall of the CAFs in terms of their mandate, service conditions including medical, new training facilities, and equipment including aviation support etc has the potentials to rejuvenate the force. Realizing the stakes of involving army in the light of past experience, the government must mobilize their energies and prepare its CAFs accordingly. There is a real possibility that the army might not be available to undertake its secondary role due to compelling security reasons when it is employed elsewhere to protect national sovereignty from foreign aggression.

Lastly, there is a serious weakness that relates to coordination and cooperation between the stakeholders involved in emergency management activities. While we are quite competent to create white elephants at the cost of national exchequer but we are unable to give clear directions and get the job done out of them. The NACTA established during last year to coordinate intelligence efforts of all agencies has yet to take a step forward. In author's considered view, the other intelligence agencies including the ISI are unlikely to cooperate with NACTA. Therefore, the very purpose of creating this authority is likely to fail despite spending millions of rupees.

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