


Vol. XXX

ISSN 2073-0926



NDU  
**Journal** 2016

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## NDU Journal

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis  
National Defence University, Islamabad

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‘NDU Journal’ is an annual publication of National Defence University, the premier institution of security and strategic studies. The journal is a unique publication of the country which primarily deals with the national security issues of Pakistan. The journal has its own standing among the students, researchers, experts, policy makers and intelligentsia. It has been enlisted by International Political Science Abstracts, USA, Bibliography of Asian Studies USA and Ulrichs Periodicals Directory. Keeping the flag high, all the articles appearing in the journal are selected after a rigorous scrutiny and blind peer review at home and abroad. It is the testimony of quality of contents of the journal that ***Higher Education Commission of Pakistan*** has upgraded the journal to ‘Y’ category.

# **STATE OF HR VIOLATIONS BY INDIAN SECURITY FORCES IN IHK: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION**

*Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema*

## **Abstract**

*Confronted with an indigenous freedom movement, the Indian government has pursued a carefully crafted policy of brutal suppression. In this connection, not only many black laws were enacted and introduced in the Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) to enable its large security forces take all measures to crush the freedom struggle. The paper discusses the nature of Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India followed by a detailed discussion of the draconian laws that have been introduced in IHK. Disregarding periodically issued reports on human rights violations in IHK by internationally acknowledged human rights watch organizations such as Amnesty International, India continues with its policies of human right violations without any remorse. The ability of India to disregard reports of internationally reputed organizations indeed compels the neighbouring states find out the underlying causes of Indian arrogance. The final section of the paper analyses the main factors that enables India to disregard world public opinion and continue with its policy of continuous human rights violations in IHK.*

**Keywords:** *Indian Government, Indian Held Kashmir, Freedom Movement.*

## **Introduction**

Not only the ongoing Kashmir issue is the oldest unresolved international dispute that continues to defy all meaningful efforts towards its resolution but it has also taken an unprecedented toll of South Asian peace. Despite the passage of 68 years and concerted efforts of individuals and organizations including the UN, the centrality of the dispute has not been diminished. It still occupies a paramount

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position in South Asian politics and prevents all meaningful moves towards the desired normalization of the India-Pakistan relations. The dispute originated because of **departing British Indian government's inability to complete** the integration process of states into India or Pakistan before 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947. Since then both India and Pakistan have been locked into a bitter struggle to secure the desired resolution. Not only the two involved countries went to war twice but also experienced countless violations of what was initially called UN ceasefire line and later Line of Control (LOC). **Roughly, India occupied two third of state's territory** whereas Pakistan maintains its control over one third of **Kashmir. Compared to Pakistan's limited number of forces**, India maintains over 700,000 security personnels in Kashmir. The presence of large number of Indian security forces is **deemed necessary to suppress Kashmiri's aspirations for a** promised plebiscite vis-à-vis keep a tight lid over Kashmir situation. In this connection, the Indian security forces have not only been regularly indulging in massive human rights violations of the Kashmiri people but the Indian government has also facilitated the suppressive regime by imposing many black laws and consequently transformed what was known as paradise on earth into a most beautiful prison. To comprehend the massive human rights violations, this paper initially discusses the nature of conflict along with Indian and Pakistani interpretations of the dispute which is followed by the description of operative black laws and a history of human rights violations. Finally, it focuses on why the human rights violations have not been reduced or even effectively checked.

### **Nature of Dispute**

Prior to partition of the Indian subcontinent, the last Viceroy of British India addressed the Chamber of Princes and asked them to declare their accession either to India or Pakistan. In his address, the last Viceroy advised the rulers to take into considerations before finalizing accession of their states the aspirations of people and physical proximity of the state. While most of the Indian states joined India and Pakistan but the rulers of same states did not decide whether

to join India or Pakistan before the partition date. Among these states, the most prominent were Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. While these states were forcibly occupied by Indian forces soon after the partition, the dispute over Kashmir not only survived the ups and downs of the last sixty eight years but also managed to prevent India-Pakistan normalization rather effectively.

India lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1948 under chapter VI of the UN Charter that deals with Pacific Settlement of the Disputes accusing Pakistan of encouraging tribesmen to invade and violate its sovereignty<sup>1</sup>. What is the most intriguing aspect of Indian accusation is that it did not file the complaint under chapter VII of the UN Charter that covers threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression<sup>2</sup>. The UN Security Council, after having heard the two sides passed a resolution on 17<sup>th</sup> January 1948 asking both the countries to desist from aggravating the situation and later passed another resolution on 20<sup>th</sup> January, establishing a mediatory commission which was later known as UNCIP (United Commission on India and Pakistan). The UNCIP visited the area and consulted both the parties and later passed two resolutions (13<sup>th</sup> August 1948 and 5<sup>th</sup> January 1949). These resolutions were accepted by both India and Pakistan and endorsed by the UN Security Council<sup>3</sup>. These resolutions asked for ceasefire, demilitarization of the state and holding of a free and impartial plebiscite by the UN. These resolutions not only recognized the principle of self-determination as the governing principle for dispute settlement but also gave a firm commitment of the UN to the people of Kashmir<sup>4</sup>. Soon after the passage of these resolutions ceasefire was quickly secured but the issue of demilitarization continued to remain unresolved though UN Security Council made concerted efforts through its periodically appointed special representatives such as Sir Owen Dixon, Dr. Frank Graham and Gunner Jarring. Since the desired demilitarization of the state never took place, plebiscite was never held.

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For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue is reflective of unfinished agenda of partition and has, over the years, become a symbol of Indian obduracy and broken pledges. To the Pakistanis, the **process of Kashmir's accession to India appeared contrived and fraudulent**. Pakistan wants the implementation of right of self determination that was promised to the people of Kashmir by the UN as well as India. As it was included in the UN resolutions of 13<sup>th</sup> August 1948 and 5<sup>th</sup> January 1949 that a plebiscite, would be held to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir through a UN supervised plebiscite, Pakistan insists that the Kashmiris must be allowed to exercise their promised right of self determination. Indian government projects the Kashmir issue as a territorial dispute and **Pakistan's quest for holding of a plebiscite as means** to secure Kashmiri territory. India completely bypasses its own commitments to hold plebiscite under auspices of the UN.

Indian argument for forcible takeover of Kashmir is based **on ruler's accession to India and later Indian parliament's** resolution recognizing Kashmir as an integral part of India<sup>5</sup>. Since the right to decide whether to accede to Pakistan or India was given to the ruler, the ruler had decided in favour of India. India completely ignores the conditions stipulated by the last Viceroy that before making a decision whether to join Pakistan or India the ruler must take into considerations the physical location of the state and the aspirations of the people of that particular state. It is interesting to note that when **Junagadh's ruler decided** to accede to Pakistan and the ruler of Hyderabad opted to stay independent, India forcibly took over the state justifying the invasion of both the states on the **basis of people's aspiration. Undoubtedly, vast majority of the** people of Junagadh and Hyderabad were non-Muslims. But India did not apply the same principle when it forcibly took **over Kashmir and employed the legal argument of ruler's** prerogative.

Pakistan does not accept Indian arguments and maintains that it is part of the unfinished agenda of partition and that it should be resolved through an impartial plebiscite. Not only the UN had promised to hold the desired plebiscite but also



the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had repeatedly and emphatically stressed that the holding of plebiscite was not only a promise to the people of Kashmir but also to the world<sup>6</sup>. Indian Kashmir policy has not only been carefully crafted but adjusted to suit the changing environment. **Initially, the major pillar of Indian Kashmir policy was ruler's** right to accede to either of the dominions. During this phase, India also stressed that the both the Kashmir and Indian assemblies have already accepted the accession through their respective resolutions. Later, it changed and began to project its secular ideology and highlighted the damage that the departure of the only Muslim majority state could do to the Union. After signing of Simla Agreement of 1972, India began to delink the Kashmir dispute from UN and began to assert the bilateral nature of the dispute which could only be resolved through a dialogue.

India also argues that she was all the time ready to hold the **plebiscite but the process was obstructed by Pakistan's refusal** to withdraw troops from the areas of its control. Since Pakistan was not willing to withdraw troops and in consequence it was impossible to hold plebiscite, India had no option but to seek confirmation of accession through the elected Constituent Assembly which met on 17<sup>th</sup> November 1956 and confirmed the accession to India. Following confirmation, the people of Kashmir have been regularly participating and expressing their views through periodically held elections. Not only Pakistan does not accept this **argument as other members of the UN share Pakistan's** interpretation. Pakistan maintains that the dispute should only be resolved through an impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the UN as was agreed upon in the resolutions of 13<sup>th</sup> August 1948 and 5<sup>th</sup> January 1949.

## **Black Laws**

Last 68 years have witnessed carefully crafted Indian policy aimed at the avoidance of holding of plebiscite and gradually introducing more and more what the Kashmiri people call as the 'Black laws' with a view to suppressing the

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freedom struggle forcibly. These draconian laws have enabled the Indian security forces to violate human rights without any fear of criticism or legal entanglement either at home or the international level. It is somewhat alarming that the Indian government has not only persecuted innocent Kashmiris but also focused more on the legal protection of human rights violators. Even the international community was unable to effectively influence and restrain the Indian government from introducing black laws. A series of black laws were enacted and introduced in IHK that facilitated the Indian security forces to perpetuate their oppressive regime. The Indian security forces in IHK include Indian Army, Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Special Operations Group etc. Among a long list of black laws, following are the most prominent;

- **Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act** (1978 but amended 1987 and 1990). This enables the government ‘to detain a person without trial for two years under the pretext of maintenance of public order’<sup>7</sup>. The detainees are not often informed of the reasons of their arrest and invariably kept in custody for a much longer time than what was allowed.
- **Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act** enables security forces to use ‘force or shoot and have powers to arrest under the pretext of maintaining the public order’<sup>8</sup>.
- **Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA)** which was enforced in 1985 and amended in 1987. The Act ‘gives security forces special powers in the use of force, arrest and detention. Under the Act, association with, or preparation for, disruptive activities can lead to severe punishment up to life imprisonment’<sup>9</sup>. This Act was extensively employed in IHK and even after its lapse it was used. The defense counsel is not allowed to see witnesses for the prosecution.
- **The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)** was imposed in 1990. This act allowed ‘the Armed Forces to carry out acts of torture, extra judicial execution, arbitrary arrests and other human rights

abuses'<sup>10</sup>. Under this act, officers as well as non-commissioned officers can search any place, stop and seize any vehicle, fire at any person, arrest him on the basis of mere suspicion.

- **The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTA)** was passed in 2002 enabling the force to detain Kashmiri people 'for three months without framing charges against them'<sup>11</sup>. It needs to be mentioned here that it has been withdrawn because of massive denunciation by the individuals and organizations at the international level<sup>12</sup>. POTA enabled security forces to enjoy extraordinary powers
- **Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance 2004** 'provides extraordinary powers to security agencies similar to those previously provided by the POTA'<sup>13</sup>.
- **National Security Act (NSA)** enables forces to detain someone without any charge or trial for almost a year on the basis of preventing him 'acting in a manner prejudicial to state security or relations with foreign powers'. Similarly, **Official Secrets Act (OSA)** enables the government to restrict or even stop publication critical of government<sup>14</sup>.
- **The Newspapers Incitement to Offences Act 1971** and the **Criminal Procedure Code** give 'special powers to authorities 'to search and arrest without a warrant'<sup>15</sup>.
- In addition to the above mentioned black laws, **Enemy Agent Ordinance 1948, the Egress and Internal Movement (control) Ordinance 1948, prevention of Unlawful Activities 1963 and Subversion and Sabotage Act 1965, Official Secret Act (OSA)** have also been employed in Kashmir to deal with periodically emerging situations<sup>16</sup>.

For obvious reason, these laws impede the process of justice and damage the human dignity. These laws deny the basic rights to the accused on one hand and strengthen the hands of the security forces on the other. In many ways, these laws facilitate the government in protecting and shielding the

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perpetrators of human rights violations from prosecution. It is not very unusual practice in IHK to deny the basic information such as under what law or charge an individual is detained for some times. These laws provide the necessary cover to atrocities perpetrated by the security forces. Mental torture, humiliation and third degree methods are frequently employed. Ever since the freedom struggle intensified particularly in late 1980s and early 1990s, India has unleashed state terrorism in IHK.

## **Human Rights Violations**

Not only the preamble of International Covenants on Human Rights recognizes that in accordance with the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**, ‘the ideal of free human beings enjoy freedom from fear and want, can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and political rights. While the preamble of the UN Charter reaffirms faith in the fundamental human rights, its **Article 1 specifically states that the purpose of UN is ‘to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’<sup>17</sup>. The intensification of state terrorism in IHK resulted in increased acts of brutalities. Among these brutal acts include fake encounters, illegal detentions, unnecessary crackdowns, undesired curfews, massacres of innocents, targeted killings, sieges, arson, torture, disappearances, unmarked graves, frequent rapes, and molestation of women etc. The enactment of the black laws enables the security forces to provide a cover to brutalities practiced in IHK. According to Amnesty International Report of 1995, **AFSPA ‘clearly contravene international human rights standard laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’<sup>18</sup>.****

The people of Kashmir have experienced brutal suppression since the advent of Dogra raj in the state of

Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. During the British rule, **complaints against Maharaja's oppression were frequently** sent. In response to these complaints of oppressive tactics, the British Indian government appointed Glancy Commission to investigate Muslim grievances and as **a result of Glancy's Commission's report, Maharaja was asked to introduce** reforms<sup>19</sup>. In accordance with recommendations of Glancy Commission, not only limited land reforms were introduced but also a legislative assembly came in to existence<sup>20</sup>. Following the partition of British India, the role of oppressor devolved upon the successor governments of India. Since the passage of UN Security Resolutions on Kashmir and the emergence of Kashmir as a disputed territory which was recognized by many countries, the people of Kashmir have experienced innumerable human rights violations. It needs to be stressed here that since the intensification of freedom struggle in 1989, Kashmir has been a sight of vicious conflict between the security forces and the Kashmiri freedom fighters as the intensity of human rights violations has rapidly and massively multiplied. Thousands of Kashmiris have been arbitrarily arrested and still continue to be arrested under the existing black laws which provide the security forces immunity from prosecution. In addition, thousands of people have died in custody and many have been executed through secretly arranged encounters and buried in unmarked graves. Many deaths are products of what the forces officially claim to be victims of cross fire.

Undoubtedly, the continuous violations of human rights in IHK is reflective of not only the attitude and arrogance of Indian government towards the people of Kashmir, but also its disdain demonstrated towards the international human rights watch organizations. Despite the repeated and persistent condemnation of human rights violations in IHK by the international human rights watch groups, India does not seem to have been moved or even impressed by such condemnations. It continues to carry on with its policy of suppression and brutalization of the Kashmiris with impunity. Despite the fact that the HR organizations have sent repeated reminders and appeals, not much action has been initiated

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against the perpetrators. However, in some cases such as the rape of Canadian tourists, symbolic and cosmetic proceedings were initiated with a view to dupe and divert the world opinion<sup>21</sup>. Periodically, Amnesty International has been confronting the Indian authorities with numerous cases of **human rights violations ‘in order to get them resolved or to get some judicial oversight on them but the government response remains disappointing’<sup>22</sup>.**

Indian brutalities in IHK represent a worst example of state terrorism in the modern history of mankind. While India regularly projects the mantra of being the largest democracy, it has also become the most prominent human rights violator in the world. A long list of illegal arrests, unlawful killings, rapes, burning of properties have been compiled and projected by the local as well as international human rights organizations, but no change in Indian attitude and policy has been witnessed. The Indian authorities continue to regularly employ suppressive and brutal tactics with complete immunity. Both rapes and torture have indeed become regular elements of security forces policy to intimidate the local population.

Various sources have periodically published figures of human rights violations in IHK. The striking feature of these HR violations figures is continuously upwards movement of the **curve. Perhaps that’s why some Kashmiri leaders have termed it as a ‘systematic genocide’. The latest available figures covering a period from January 1989 to January 2016 are listed below:**

➤ Total Killings	94,305
➤ Custodial Killings	7,042
➤ Civilian arrested	132,734
➤ Structures arsoned/destroyed	106,055
➤ Women widowed	22,808
➤ Children orphaned	107,550
➤ Women gang-raped/molested	10,169 <sup>23</sup>

Undoubtedly, the Indian security forces have systematically violated human rights and humanitarian law. While some human rights watch organizations have risen the issues periodically with the government of India, the response has been cleverly devised policy of evasion, delays, no response and denial. Even some groups have not been able to gain access to Kashmir (OIC Contact Group) as the Indian government refused to allow them to visit Kashmir and hounded those who somehow or the other have already gained access to the disputed area. Allowing independent monitoring could expose the excesses committed by Indian security forces. Instead, the main objective of the draconian laws is to cover the excesses committed by the Indian security forces and facilitate them suppress the freedom struggle.

### **Negligible Progress**

The conflict situation in Kashmir continues to be extremely dangerous and massive human rights violations are regularly documented by various organizations that are constantly watching HR violations in IHK, not much improvement has been registered so far. Indian tendency to put the blame on outsiders continues to be the hallmark of their policy pursuits. Many factors account for negligible progress in this regard. **Undoubtedly, the main factor is Indian governments' obduracy and unwillingness to undertake corrective path in accordance with the advice, appeals and measures suggested by the human rights groups and organizations. According to a report prepared by Srinagar based International People's Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian – Administered Kashmir (IPTK) and the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), it is the policy 'not to genuinely investigate or prosecute the armed forces for human rights violations'.**<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, the reward money for killing Kashmiri youth fighting against India rule in the occupied territory has been increased<sup>25</sup>. In addition, the Indian government does not allow any independent monitoring of the situation in Kashmir<sup>26</sup>.

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Second factor revolves around lack of interest on the part of great powers, which in turn, encouraged the Indian authorities to continue their adopted policy pursuit without any remorse or compulsions. However, it needs to stress that all the major human rights groups/organizations have been regularly highlighting brutal violations of human rights in Kashmir and vociferously condemning India. In some cases, India has been projected as the greatest violator of human rights. The efforts of Amnesty International, Asia Watch, and International Committee for Red Cross along with many other human right watchers are not only commendable but managed to invoke short term interest in many countries. It is rather unfortunate that big powers continue to demonstrate double standards. Their policies amply reflect preferences to trading interests and relationship with India than human rights in IHK. However, it needs to mention here that if rights of a European or an American or any other individual or organization of the developed world are violated, they quickly not only condemn it but also undertake some kind of punitive measures. In case of HR violations in Kashmir, the option that has been so far demonstrated, is either an evasive statement or ambiguous silence.

Third factor that has effectively impeded the desired improvement in reducing human rights violations in IHK is the prevailing conflict situation in South Asia. With a carefully crafted propaganda policy, India has been able to attribute it as a by-product of South Asian conflict cobweb to a considerable extent. While Pakistan has been continuously **striving for Kashmir's resolution, India has been constantly** engaged in projecting the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan as a territorial dispute and scrupulously avoided projecting the true nature of the dispute. It avoids mentioning its **commitment to UN Security Council's resolutions** regarding the holding of a plebiscite with a view to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir. After the passage of Simla Agreement of 1972 and the consequent transformation of UN Cease-fire Line into Line of Control (LOC), its entire focus has been to delink Kashmir from UN commitments. Initially, it began to project Kashmir as a bilateral dispute



between India and Pakistan and later as an integral part of India. The recent two judgments by Srinagar High Court clearly stressed that Kashmir is not an integral part of India<sup>27</sup>.

Fourth factor that has not helped in improving human rights situation in IHK is the lack of low level or no interest shown by the United Nations despite the facts that has established a human rights council. Until the advent of 1960s, the UN was actively pursuing efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue but then it began to demonstrate an indifferent approach coupled with cleverly devised side tracking efforts of the Indian governments. Recently, the current Secretary General of UN Ban Ki-moon has offered his services in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute provided both the countries make a request to him. He also stressed that the peace in Kashmir **'can only be achieved through dialogue'**. He also confessed **that UN's role has been very limited but also asserted that it** can play the role of a truly neutral mediator<sup>28</sup>. Indeed even the Americans also sought to play similar type of role provided both parties accept the mediation of the US. Equally responsible are the big powers, deemed to be the guardians of world peace, for not focusing on Kashmir dispute.

To reduce human rights violations and improve the situation of IHK, the international community as well as UN has to play active and concerted role in this regard. It is often said that the UN has become a maid servant of major powers whose trading interests override any other considerations. Therefore, it is up to the great powers to play their role judiciously and actively. The international community can impress upon the Indian government to improve its record of human rights violations. An impartial inquiry commission or a UN commission can be established to look into all reported cases of human rights violations. For obvious reasons that the Indian government would try to block this kind of move or refuse to accept such a course of action, the UN must seriously think ways and means how to influence Indian government and secure the desired compliance. In addition, the UN in consultation with great powers should seriously consider **strengthening UN's mediation and conflict prevention**

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capabilities<sup>29</sup>. Time has come that collective approach is once again adopted in order to effectively maintain international peace. It needs to be highlighted here that the UN or other countries desiring to reduce the human rights violations in IHK, should be mindful of the fact that India has demonstrated in the past its ability to block, delay and side track such moves. Credit goes to the Indian authorities who always have bagful of tricks. When the hollowness of one excuse becomes visible, it immediately diverts the attention of international community by projecting its replacement by another.

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> **Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice**, (New York: United Nations, August 1971) pp.19-21.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp.22-28.

<sup>3</sup> For details see G.W. Chaudhury, **Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966** (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966) pp.68-75. Also see S.M. Burke, **Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis**, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973).

<sup>4</sup> See **Kashmir-The History**  
<http://www.pakun.org//Kashmir/history.php> retrieved on 28<sup>th</sup> Jan.2016

<sup>5</sup> Many scholars have frequently questioned the India argument based on legality of Kashmir's accession. For details see Alastair Lamb **Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp.81-103.

<sup>6</sup> See Indian prime minister's broadcast to the nation(All India Radio, 2<sup>nd</sup> November, 1947), pp.72-75. For further details about the repeated assertion of the promise see the documents in **The Kashmir Question** edited by K. Sarwar Hassan (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp.39-177.

<sup>7</sup> See 'Draconian Laws and Human Rights Violation' by Usman Hassan in **Kashmir : Challenges & Prospects**, compiled by Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Ali (Islamabad: Muslim Institute, 2014), pp. 69-75. Also see '**Draconian Laws in Indian Occupied Kashmir**' Compiled by Sultan Ahmad, (Islamabad: Special Committee of the Parliament on Kashmir), pp. 3-8.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> See 'A history of Human Rights violations in Indian Held Kashmir' by Syed Nazir Gilani in **Fifty Years of Kashmir Dispute** edited by Suroosh Irfani (Muzaffarabad: University of Jammu and Kashmir, 1997), pp.155-160.

<sup>18</sup> See details listed under Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 in **Wikipedia** [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human\\_rights\\_abuses\\_in\\_Jammu\\_and\\_Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_abuses_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir) retrieved on 28<sup>th</sup> Jan.2016

<sup>19</sup> See Josef Korbel, **Danger in Kashmir**, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) P. 18. Also see Prithivi Nath Kaul Bamzai, 'Kashmir and Power Politics: From Lake Success to Tashkent', (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. (P) Ltd., 1966) pp. 67-69.

<sup>20</sup> See **Azadi: Kashmir Freedom Struggle 1974-1998** edited by Khalid Hasan (Lahore: Printing Professionals, 1999), pp.5-10.

<sup>21</sup> Even after the conviction of two army soldiers who were involved in the rape of the Canadian tourists were not sent to prison but continue to remain in the army barracks. See 'Human rights violations in Kashmir and the UN' by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in **The Frontier Post**, Oct. 10, 1993.

<sup>22</sup> See Human rights violations in IOK, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa20/002/1995/en/> and also see 'Alleged perpetrators stories of impunity in Jammu and Kashmir' [http://kashmirprocess.org/reports/alleged Perpetrators.pdf](http://kashmirprocess.org/reports/alleged%20Perpetrators.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> For further details see **Kashmir Media Service**, <http://www.kmsnews.org/news/?> Retrieved on 16<sup>th</sup> Feb.2016

<sup>24</sup> See **India Ignoring Rights Abuses in Kashmir** by Amrutha Gayathri, <http://www.ibtimes.com/india-ignoring-rights-abuses-kashmir-report-926263>

<sup>25</sup> According to the Secretary General of London based NGO Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights (JKCHR) which has a special consultative status with UN that Kashmiri Muslim youth has been categorized into A++, A+, A, B and C categories. Reward money for killing A++ category is Rs. 1.25 million, for A+ category ranges from 500,000 to

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750,000, for A category ranges from 300,000 to 500,000, for B category ranges from 200,000 to 300,000 and for C category it ranges from 100,000 to 200,000. See **The News**, Feb20, 2016.

<sup>26</sup> See Prof Marco Lomdardi's speech in 'Global Discourse on Kashmir 2006' (Brussels: ICHR Kashmir Centre, 2007) pp.70-71.

<sup>27</sup> For details see 'Kashmir talks: a legal obligation' by Ahmer Bilal Soofi in **Dawn**, December 1, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> See 'How could the UN help resolve the Kashmir dispute', <http://www.dw.com/en/how-could-the-un-help-resolve-the-kashmir-dispute/a-18120254>

<sup>29</sup> See Pakistani Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi's speech in UN, **The News**, Feb 19, 2016.

# **THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P): AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL NORM**

*Dr. Shahid Ahmad Hashmat*

## **Abstract**

*'Responsibility to Protect' is an evolving norm, which has the potential to assist the international community in fulfilling its sacred obligation to maintain international peace and security. Since some members of the UN have serious reservations on its implementation modalities, respect for state sovereignty and a demonstration of responsibility while protecting will give more credibility to this concept. Therefore, greater consensus of all member states, especially those who have expressed their genuine concerns about the proposed concept, must be obtained at the UN General Assembly level. The apprehensions expressed by these countries must be addressed instead of being ignored or overlooked if the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' is to earn universal recognition and acceptability. Necessary checks and balances regarding implementation are extremely important to harness the possibility of misusing this norm for the pursuance of geo-political and geo-economic ambitions of more powerful members of the UN, which itself is a great threat to sustainable global peace and stability.*

**Keywords:** *Responsibility to Protect, Obligation, Apprehensions, Geo-political.*

## **Introduction**

Since its inception, the United Nations has played a very important role in development of many new international norms, conventions and treaties. Besides having a primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, the United Nations has a major role in promoting international cooperation in the field of human rights, economic development and protection and preservation of

global environment. These responsibilities are undertaken while facing ever changing challenges in the international arena. While the post-cold war global order is in transition, the character of global competition has fundamentally shifted from traditional methods of confrontation and conflict to more indirect approaches of pursuing national interests. The main mode of competition, in the contemporary era, remains in the field of geo-politics and geo-economics, i.e. unhindered access to global resources, maximization of industrial production, free access to markets and the promotion of commerce and trade. In the context of global conflicts, the main shift is from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts. Most of the conflicts in the post-World War II period, during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, were confined to a particular region or sub-region. However, many current conflicts, during the first two decades of the 21st Century, have a transnational character with regional and global implications.

Although the United Nations, through the Security Council, continues to promote international peace, yet there exists a growing perception among many member states that the permanent members of the UN Security Council repeatedly use their influence to protect and promote their national interests at the cost of poor and weak member states. The apprehensions are that the United Nations, as an international governmental organization, is used for making decisions in a systematic and institutionalized manner to develop, promote and invoke various international laws, conventions, treaties and agreements, which are helpful for **the protection of great powers' national interests. In this** context, reference is made to the economic sanctions approved by the UN Security Council or military interventions authorized under humanitarian and political pretexts. The history of the UN peacekeeping operations is as old as the Organization itself. However, the concept of humanitarian **intervention or 'Responsibility to Protect', which is commonly** known as the R2P, is a relatively new concept or norm that is still evolving.

## **The United Nations Responsibility for Maintaining International Peace and Security**

The United Nations was established in 1945. Probably, “the founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), thus, they are not mentioned at all in the original UN Charter”<sup>1</sup>. However, “peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism used by the United Nations to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means. The original system devised by the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security is outlined in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter”<sup>2</sup>. In accordance with its Charter, the United Nations is responsible to maintain international peace and security<sup>3</sup>. The Security Council acts on behalf of all member states, under the concept of collective security<sup>4</sup>. Sixty-nine peacekeeping missions have been authorized by the United Nations in the last 70 years. Forty-six peacekeeping missions have been completed so far, whereas sixteen such missions are still in progress<sup>5</sup>. The composition of the peacekeeping missions and details of rules of engagement etc. are governed by the mandate authorized by the Security Council. This is essentially a political function, which is achieved through a consensus of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assist the Security Council to make decisions regarding the authorization of peacekeeping missions by providing the necessary political input and security situation analysis and assessment. Mostly, these missions are planned through a well-established integrated planning process, in which due importance is given to a mass of analyses and recommendations made by various experts serving at the UN Secretariat and field missions.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continuously monitors the performance of peacekeepers across the globe and frequently makes its recommendation to the Secretary General, which are based on post mission analyses and lessons

learned. These recommendations are focused on making the UN Peacekeeping Operations more effective and credible. The Secretary General, besides submitting annual reports on ongoing missions or important issues to the Security Council and the General Assembly also submits periodic reports on specific issues. In the last fifteen years, the United Nations has conducted two comprehensive reviews of the UN **Peacekeeping Operations; the Brahimi's Review**<sup>6</sup> conducted in **2000 and the recent review of 'High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Panel (HIPPO)**<sup>7</sup>, headed by Mr. Ramos-Horta, which was completed in 2015. The recommendations of **the Brahimi's Review have had a profound impact on the** management of peacekeeping operations in the last fifteen years. It is expected that the recent report prepared by HIPPO will also lead to many new initiatives that are long awaited to strengthen the UN peacekeeping operations.

## **Evolution of the Concept of the R2P**

The preamble of the United Nations Charter clearly states that:

**"We the peoples of the United Nations** are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of the war, which twice in our life has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another a good neighbours, and unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, ----"<sup>8</sup>.



These noble aspirations are further explained and **elaborated in ‘Chapter 1, Purposes and Principles’ contained in the Charter**. Charter emphasizes resolution of conflicts, among nations through peaceful means rather than recourse to aggressive use of force, except in cases of a self defence or for collective defence, as and when authorized by the UN. Moreover, all true religious teachings and human value systems, throughout human history, have opposed indiscriminate use of violent means while persecuting armed conflicts and war. But the history of warfare indicates that human beings, many a times, have used excessive and disproportionate force to overpower their adversaries. Therefore, religious scholars, political philosophers and thinkers have tried to minimize or control the horrors of war. Islamic teachings on this issue are full of clear commandments by its Prophet, Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), which prohibits unwarranted use of force during war and emphasis on protecting old persons, women, children and unarmed people. Similar traditions are found in other religions as well. In recent era, the provision of the Geneva Conventions and its additional Protocols<sup>9</sup>, the Hague Convention<sup>10</sup> and development of International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) and Law of Armed Conflict (LAC)<sup>11</sup> are significant developments in this regard.

Whereas the UN peacekeeping efforts are generally appreciated, the Rwanda Genocide<sup>12</sup> and the Srebrenica Genocide<sup>13</sup> are always remembered as failures of the international community and the United Nations to protect innocent and unarmed civilians from crimes against humanity and genocide. These horrific incidents have forced the international community to seriously look for more effective arrangements to ensure that such heinous crimes are not repeated again<sup>14</sup>. **Thus, the concept of ‘Responsibility of Protect (R2P)’**. The evolution of R2P concept, can be summarized as following:

- **“In 1994, the whole international community – the United Nations and its member states failed to honour that [its] obligation. Approximately 800,000**

Rwandans were slaughtered by their fellow countrymen and women, for no other reason that they belonged to a particular ethnic group”<sup>15</sup>.

- An independent report commissioned by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, into the Organisation's [*the UN's*] failures during the Rwandan genocide condemned him [*the Secretary General*] for ignoring evidence that a slaughter was planned and his [*the Secretary General's*] failure to act once the killing started<sup>16</sup>.
- In December 1999, on receiving the report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan acknowledged the failure of UN peacekeeping forces to prevent the genocide in Rwanda and expressed his regret on this failure. He said:

*“All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. There was a United Nations force in the country at the time, but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide. On behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse”<sup>17</sup>.*

- In his statement, he declared the Srebrenica genocide of 1995 as a “shameful event.” While promising that “the United Nations can and will act to prevent or halt any other such catastrophe in the future”, he emphasized his deep commitment “of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter”<sup>18</sup>.
- During 1999 and 2000, Kofi Annan asked the member states of the United Nations to resolve the conflict between principles of non-interference and state sovereignty and the responsibility of the international

community to respond to massive human right violations and ethnic cleansing<sup>19</sup>.

- **In response to Kofi Annan's request, the Govt. of Canada** formed a panel of international experts - the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICSS) - which conducted extensive consultations with governments, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), academia and think tanks. ICSS issued its report – **'The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)'** in 2001, which was a foundation to achieve an international consensus on these issues<sup>20</sup>.
- In December 2004, the United Nations issued a report of **'High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More secure world: Our Shared Responsibility'**<sup>21</sup>.
- In March 2005, the **UN Secretary General's report entitled "In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all"**<sup>22</sup> was released. These two key documents brought the issue of R2P to global attention.
- R2P was then included in the Agenda for the UN Reforms, which was discussed and negotiated by the General Assembly throughout 2005.
- After detailed deliberations, the UN Reform negotiations culminated on a meeting of the heads of the state and governments in September 2005. A consensus Summit Declaration, which is known as UN Summit Outcome Document<sup>23</sup> was released as result of this meeting.

### **The UN Member States' Commitment to Right to Protect: Issues and Concerns**

The UN Summit Outcome is a very comprehensive document, which, besides dealing with many issues/reforms to improve the effectiveness of the UN, included the commitment of all member states to R2P that is covered in paragraphs 138 to 140 of the General Assembly resolution on the Summit. The heads, states and the governments agreed to

the following points and their **consensus on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was a milestone in the development of this concept of** and its acceptance at an international level.

**“Each individual State has the responsibility** to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning **capability”**<sup>24</sup>.

**“The international community, through the** United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications,

bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and **conflicts break out**"<sup>25</sup>.

**"We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide"**<sup>26</sup>.

### **Role of the United Nations and the International Community with regard to R2P**

The World Summit Outcome was reaffirmed by the Security Council in April 2006. Through UNSC Resolution 1674, the UN Security Council accepted its role of protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and the protection of civilians in armed conflict<sup>27</sup>. However, the UNSC Resolution 1674 maintains that further discussions are still needed to determine as to how R2P will be put into practice, particularly when should this instrument be applied and what measures should be used.

After adoption of the R2P concept by the Security Council **in 2006, 'Protection of Civilian' mandate and functions** relating to R2P were included in many new and ongoing peacekeeping operations. Many member states have requested that the peacekeepers should be adequately trained and equipped to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The UN Secretary General, in its 2015 Report, has **acknowledged that "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the international community has also employed more robust tools, including sanctions designed to discourage the targeting of civilians, the establishment of peacekeeping missions and the authorization of military action with the express purpose of protecting civilians"**<sup>28</sup>. Taking due cognizance of apprehensions

expressed by many member states about the possibility of powerful members abusing the UN mandate to their advantage, the Secretary General has emphasized that, **“Collective military action must also be calibrated and proportionate, with rules of engagement that are both consistent with the protective aim of the operation and fully compliant with international law. Consideration must also be given at the earliest possible stage to the support required for post-crisis peace building. These efforts to improve decision-making, monitor implementation and honour civilian protection standards will all contribute to achieving the goal of responsible protection”**<sup>29</sup>.

The UN Secretary General has encouraged the governments to appoint a national R2P Focal Point<sup>30</sup>, who will be responsible to promote the R2P at the national level. He will also support international cooperation by participating in a global network. Appointment of a national R2P Focal Point demonstrates the commitment of various states to implement the R2P concept. This initiative was launched in September 2010 by the governments of Denmark and Ghana, in collaboration with the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect<sup>31</sup>. The first meeting of national Focal Points was held in May 2011<sup>32</sup>.

Since September 2010, fifty-one countries have appointed the National R2P Focal Point. These countries include: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, United Kingdom and United States. The European Union has also appointed a R2P Focal Point<sup>33</sup>.

An informal cross-regional group of almost fifty UN member states, who share a common interest in promoting and advancing the R2P within the UN-system, has also emerged as **'Friends of R2P'**. The group is co-chaired by governments of the Netherlands and Rwanda<sup>34</sup>. Another support group, which is known as the **'International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P)'** was also founded in January 2009 by representatives of eight regional and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). **"The coalition brings together NGOs from all regions of the world to strengthen normative consensus for R2P, further the understanding of the norm, push for strengthened capacities to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and mobilize NGOs to push for action to save lives in R2P country-specific situations"**<sup>35</sup>.

### **Three Pillars of the R2P**

After endorsement of the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty by the United Nations General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit **Outcome Document** and the **UN Secretary General's** further consultation with all stake holders, three pillars of R2P were developed<sup>36</sup>, which are summarized as under:

- **The Protection Responsibility of the State:** Every state has the **'Responsibility to Protect'** its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
- **International Assistance and Capacity Building:** The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.
- **Timely and Decisive Response:** If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter<sup>37</sup>.

## **The UN Secretary General's Efforts to Promote the R2P**

After the unanimous adoption of the general principles by the heads of states and governments in 2005, the UN Secretary General has submitted several reports on the R2P to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Intense discussions have taken place on each report among the experts of international law and law of armed conflicts, and academia and practitioners in the field of peace operations, which cover various legal, political and practical aspects pertaining to the evolving concept and international norm of responsibility to protect<sup>38</sup>.

The last report of the Secretary-General on the R2P (A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the responsibility to protect<sup>39</sup>), which was issued in 2015 takes stock of the UN efforts during the last decade (2005 -2015) to advance this concept/norm. The report assesses progress on the three pillars of the R2P and surveys emerging threats and challenges. The Secretary General has emphasized that, **in order to uphold the responsibility to protect, the “Member States should:**

- Declare atrocity crime prevention and response a national priority, undertake a national risk assessment and articulate an actionable whole of government strategy for both domestic and international policy.
- Expand international and regional focal point networks and empower focal points with the institutional authority and resources necessary to drive policy change.
- Advance prevention by expanding responsive and flexible funding for preventive diplomacy, updating early warning systems to address atrocity crime threats and better connect with mechanisms for early action, regularizing discussion of atrocity crime risk factors in peer review processes, and conducting a review of lessons learned to date.



- Include regular consideration of atrocity crime prevention and response in the deliberations and activities of relevant regional institutions and expand the sharing of best practices and lessons learned, both within and across regions.
- Provide United Nations peace operations with the military and civilian capabilities necessary to respond rapidly and flexibly to situations at risk of atrocity crimes, and develop training and guidance relevant to the implementation of the responsibility to protect.
- Prevent recurrence by tailoring post-conflict peace building to atrocity crime risks, including through support for transitional justice, reconciliation, and dedicated early warning and conflict resolution capacity.
- Expand efforts to prevent violent extremism and counter incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence by non-state armed groups, including thorough cooperation with religious and community **leaders and by drawing on new technologies**<sup>40</sup>.

Besides emphasizing that “implementing the responsibility to protect requires swift, early, determined and coordinated **action at the global, regional and national levels**”, the Secretary General has highlighted six core priorities for the next decade, which includes: demonstrating political commitment; investing in atrocity crime prevention; ensuring more timely and decisive response; preventing recurrence of atrocity crimes; enhancing regional action; and strengthening peer networks<sup>41</sup>.

In order to monitor and prevent all such crimes pertaining to genocide, the Secretary General appointed his first Special Advisor on Prevention of Genocide in 2004<sup>42</sup>. Later, in 2008, the Secretary General also appointed his Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect<sup>43</sup>. Both the advisors have distinctly different yet closely related responsibilities. Therefore, both are functioning through a common office and staff<sup>44</sup>.

## **The Responsibility to Protect and State Sovereignty**

Sovereignty is an important concept related to the modern nation state system, which “has been regarded as the defining feature of the State”<sup>45</sup>. Prof. A. K. Chaturvedi considers that “it is, in fact, this element which distinguishes the State from other association. In every State, there is an authority whose will is legally binding over all individuals and associations within the confines of its territory”<sup>46</sup>. The ‘Sovereignty of the State’ has two dimensions, international and domestic. At the international level, sovereignty allows undisputed authority to interact with other states and international institutions, on behalf of a state. Moreover, all states are considered equal on the basis of sovereignty, at least theoretically. This concept forms the basis of an equal status of all UN member states in the UN General Assembly, irrespective of their size, political influence and economic power. The UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2, para 2 states: “The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”<sup>47</sup>. This status of equality, how nominal or perceptual it may be, comes with the responsibility of fulfilling international obligations with due regard and respect for all international treaties and conventions. The domestic dimension of state sovereignty deals with a state’s absolute authority to make national laws and the use of legitimate force to enforce such laws. Besides, many other functions of governance, the state has an exclusive responsibility to ensure the protection of life, property, honour, and dignity of its citizens, including ethnic and religious minorities without any discrimination.

The UN Security Council acts on behalf of all member states on the principle and concept of ‘collective security’. Article 24 of the UN Charter states: “In order to ensure prompt and effective actions by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”<sup>48</sup>. All UN peacekeeping operations are essentially authorized by the Security Council. These are governed by three established

principles; the consent of the parties to conflict, impartiality, and no use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate. It is extremely important that all UN peacekeeping operations are launched with due regard for internationally acknowledged norms of the sovereignty of states.

Since all states are responsible to protect their citizens from genocide, mass killing/atrocities and crimes against humanity, any failure to do so is considered a failure in terms of exercising their sovereign authority or at least an inability or unwillingness to do so. In such a situation, it is argued that the international community has a collective responsibility to act, in order to prevent and stop crimes against humanity. In some cases, a government, acting on behalf of the state, may be found involved in perpetrating, supporting and/or sponsoring such crimes. Therefore, the former UN Secretary **General, Kofi Annan has asserted that “state sovereignty is no longer an absolute shield behind which governments may hide to do what they please”<sup>49</sup>**. Thus, it is generally believed that if a state is involved in ethnic cleansing and genocides or when it fails to protect its citizens from such crimes, its claim for sovereign authority over its territory and its citizens is no more valid. In such circumstances, the international community has an obligation to intervene, in order to protect those innocent people who are facing such atrocities.

The concept or the contention mentioned above has merit but many countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Pakistan and Russia have expressed their apprehension about the manner in which the international community has responded to various human crises across the globe in the recent past. A reference is frequently made to unilateral decisions made by **some permanent members of UN Security Council or NATO’s** military interventions in different countries without clear UN authorization. To support their apprehension, they also rely on the evidence of selective intervention in different countries through authorization of the UN peacekeeping missions. It is also argued that greater chaos and escalation of the conflicts has taken place as a result of most of such interventions.

It is also feared that the R2P or humanitarian intervention may be used by powerful states to mask their geopolitical **ambitions such as the US / NATO's invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.** Such adventures are seen as occupation and control of global natural resources of the region. These interventions are also attributed to changing those regimes that were considered as an obstacle in attaining exclusive control of natural resources of respective countries. The similar argument is being made for the ongoing civil war in Syria as well, where world powers are deeply entrenched to support one faction or the other. The validity of military intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya can be ascertained by evaluating the current situation in these countries, whether these places have become safer or more dangerous after these interventions.

These apprehensions cannot be overlooked as unsubstantiated because a similar apprehension has been expressed by the Secretary General in his Report of July 2015 to the Security Council and the General Assembly, which states:

**“Finally, while the 2005 World Summit Outcome called upon the Security Council to address atrocities crime case-by-case basis, the Council's inconsistent response to situations featuring genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity continues to affect the standing of the responsibility to protect. The Security Council has too often failed to live up to the global responsibility, allowing narrow strategic interest to impede consensus and preclude a robust collective response”<sup>50</sup>.**

Whereas, unanimity of opinion and convergence of foreign policy objectives may exist among some permanent members of the UN Security Council such as USA, France and UK, the difference of opinion expressed by the Russian Federation and China needs to be analyzed more objectively. It is worth

mentioning that these permanent members of the UN Security Council have used their vetoes to block the Security Council resolutions seeking military intervention in Syria, in the recent past.

Though many countries have indicated their support for the R2P, yet many countries, in their individual capacity or collectively, have expressed their desire to bring the concept in line with their proposals. In September 2011, while speaking on the R2P discussion at the UN General Assembly, the **President of Brazil, declared: “Much is said about the responsibility to protect; yet we hear very little about responsibility in protecting. These are concepts that we must develop together”<sup>51</sup>**. To explain the Brazilian position on this issue, the Brazilian Permanent Representative to the UN **presented the concept of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’, in November 2011<sup>52</sup>**. Brazil gave its qualified support for the R2P but pointed out various problems with its implementation, by **saying that “There is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change. This perception may make it even more difficult to attain the protection objectives pursued by the international community”<sup>53</sup>**.

To overcome this perception, Brazil suggested complementing the concept of the R2P via the principles of **the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RWP)**. The Brazilian proposal of RWP includes following:

- **“All three pillars of the R2P ‘must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing’;**
- **All peaceful means have to be exhausted; a ‘comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences of military action’ must precede the consideration of the use of force;**
- **The use of force can only be authorized by the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the Charter, or (and this is noteworthy) ‘in exceptional circumstances,**

by the General Assembly, in line with its resolution 377 (V);

- The authorization of the **use of force must 'be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements', and the enforcement must remain true to 'the letter and the spirit' of the explicit mandate;**
- To ensure proper monitoring and assessment of the interpretation and implementation of the **Responsibility While Protecting, 'enhanced Security Council procedures are needed'. The Security Council is also obliged to 'ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force'**<sup>54</sup>.

## **Conclusion**

The responsibility to protect their citizens against ethnic cleansing, genocides, mass murder/atrocities, and crimes against humanity, in all forms of armed conflicts, is a primary obligation of all states. This responsibility becomes more important in view of the history of previous hostilities or level of ongoing conflicts, which may lead to any such possibility in present times. If a state lacks the capacity to prevent such crimes, it is mandatory for its government to seek immediate help and assistance from the United Nations and other members of the Organisation. Many other organizations, which are working for regional peace and security, also have substantial capability to assist their member states or other states in their respective regions. The international community should also assist and help all states to build their capacity to undertake these tasks. In a situation where any state is unable or demonstrates its unwillingness to protect its citizens, the international community must respond proactively and effectively to eliminate all potential threats, which can commit such crimes.

However, due regard must be paid to the provisions of international law and the universally accepted principles of the use of force. Moreover, all such actions must be undertaken with the authorization of the UN Security Council. The Security Council should also adopt uniform standards for

taking such decisions, which will grant greater transparency, acceptability and legitimacy to its decision-making process. **The Brazilian concept of 'Responsibility While Protecting' needs to be incorporated with the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect'. Any authorization under the R2P must not entail any** hidden agenda for regime change or political blackmailing of the legitimate government of a targeted state. This instrument should also not be used to engineer internal revolts against legitimate governments, as it could lead to a bigger and unmanageable chaos instead of producing an enduring peace.

## **Notes**

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# A CONSTRUCTIVIST RESPONSE TO ISIS

*Lieutenant General Zahid Latif Mirza*

## **Abstract**

**Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**, endorses religiously motivated, violent behaviour against those who do not agree to its world view and flawed understanding of Islam. The growing potential of ISIS military capability, financial resources, media and cyber warfare potential coupled with occupation of vast resource rich spaces in Syria and Iraq has propelled it on the world stage. “ISIS is now the thing al-Qaida never managed to become: a movement that inspires volunteers”<sup>1</sup>. With a view to develop comprehensive understanding, there is a need to evaluate various dimensions of ISIS. The whole phenomenon of ISIS in the concluding part of the paper shall be viewed from a scholarly perspective of Constructivism to carve out a response.

**Key Words:** Violent behaviour, Financial, Cyber warfare, Constructivism

## **Introduction**

ISIS emerged as a part of Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Gradually, it has transformed into a powerful state-like actor that is reshaping the Middle East. While discussing the changing environment of Middle East in contemporary scenario, it is important to understand the context how ISIS has emerged and won the sympathy of Muslim youth in the Middle East, the West and elsewhere. Most of the affected youth are aware of the relentless bombing and killings which have been going on in the Middle East thus nurturing a deep sense of hurt and injustice. They fell prey to the sophisticated propaganda carried out by militant organizations via social media and other networks. Most of them have only the superficial knowledge of Islam, and they are conferred a high status as the “Warriors of Allah” and assigned terrorist missions.

## **Middle East Environment**

Middle East evolving landscape is complicated and violent with complex dynamics. Presently, Iraq is deeply embroiled in intra state conflict characterized by intense sectarian divide. **US signature though in the form of “advisers” only has re-emerged in Baghdad.** In Syria, the civil war with ever **shrinking authority of Assad’s regime has almost destroyed the** political, social and ethnic fabric of society. The two war-ravaged countries with large swaths of spaces beyond their writ have given rise to many Non-State Actors including ISIS. The US led Western world has preferred a regime change in Syria. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states also desire the Syrian President Bashar al Assad to leave, and have supported rebels fighting against him, though expecting a blowback from ISIS. The recent initiative of raising a coalition of 34 Muslim countries is also an effort to defeat the ISIS. Russian and **Iranian support to reinforce Assad’s hold on power has deeply** intricate regional environment. The UK and other western countries are also worried about radicalized Muslims coming home from the battlefields of the Levant. Mass migration of refugees to Europe is an emerging challenge for the Europe, Turkey, Israel, KSA and Iran are the only strong states in the region. **“Internationally, strategies are being reconsidered and alliances shifting as erstwhile enemies become friends, however temporarily”<sup>2</sup>.** The US and Iran, at loggerheads for decades, share some common interests in Iraq but are at loggerheads over Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Palestine, the **region’s oldest conflict, too is simmering with the latest spell of** fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

**“Modern terrorist organizations, such as ISIL, are creating more complex and nuanced propaganda to lure these disenchanting youth in the Middle East and the West”<sup>3</sup>.** The Youth of Muslim countries is disappointed from ruling elites. Lack of social justice, poor governance and massive corruption has helped the ISIS in drawing exposed sections of society to its ideology. The ISIS fully capitalizes on cyber space and massive media campaign. There is a blank hope that majority of Arab rulers will reconsider their policies and make their

governments more representative and answerable. Dictated by self-interest, some of them have preferred to rely on major foreign powers to prop up their regimes thus losing the trust of their people.

## **Genesis of ISIS**

ISIS took roots after the Americans control of Iraq in 2003. The Second Gulf War resulted the crushing of Saddam Hussein's regime, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the destruction of the government structures. Resultantly, a huge security and governmental vacuum was created and the country's delicate social fabric was severely damaged. United States Army remained stationed in Iraq for nine years (2003-2011) but failed to organize effective Iraqi Army and security forces to fill the newly created security vacuum "(President Obama acknowledged the very fact in his speech in UN in September 15)"<sup>4</sup>. Americans encouraged the establishment of a democratic national Shi'ite regime in Iraq headed by Nouri-al-Maliki. However, the regime alienated the Sunni population, which had traditionally ruled the country; even though they were a minority. United States withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and Nouri-al-Maliki's regime could not manage the ethnic and sectarian divide in an apt manner.

The Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq, established in 2004, entered the security vacuum and exploited the growing politico-social Sunni alienation. It grew in strength after the U.S withdrawal and expanded into Syria due to civil war which began in March 2011. "ISIS could not have become such a battle-hardened, well-funded jihadi group without the help of leaders and sympathizers in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf"<sup>5</sup>. The establishment of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria took place in four stages:-

### **➤ First Stage (2004 - 2006)**

- **The founding of Al-Qaeda Branch in Iraq by Abu Musab-al-Zarqawi:** It initiated a campaign against the American and coalition forces and the Shi'ite population. The first stage ended when Abu

Musab-al-Zarqawi was exterminated in an American targeted attack in June 2006.

- **Second Stage (2006 - 2011)**
  - **Organization of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI):** It acted as an umbrella organization for a number of militants groups that fought against the United States, its coalition allies and the Shi'ite population.
- **Third Stage (2011- June 2014)**
  - **The consolidation of ISIS:** Gradually, it gained strength with American withdrawal from Iraq and established a branch in Syria following the outbreak of Syrian civil war, thus laying the foundation of ISIS.
- **Fourth Stage (As of 2016)**
  - **Growth and Expansion:** The most significant success was the capture of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Coupled with it, ISIS moved into Eastern Syria where its capital was established in Al-Raqqah and declared the establishment of Islamic Caliphate headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In **September 2014** “the United States and allied forces launched air strikes against Islamist militants in **Syria**”<sup>6</sup>. Recent attacks in Paris by ISIS will also have global repercussions which are yet to unfold.

## **Salient Features and Ideology of ISIS**

“ISIS emphasizes jihad as its chosen means to overthrow the regimes in Iraq and Syria, establish the Islamic Caliphate, and fight against its internal and external enemies until the **implementation of the vision....**”<sup>7</sup>. Important features are as under:-

- ISIS believes in flawed understanding of Islam, endorses religious violence, and declares these infidels (concept of takfir) who do not agree with its interpretation.



- As a caliphate, it asserts religious, political and military dominance over all the Muslims worldwide.
- Declares that legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes obsolete by the expansion of the caliphate.
- ISIS started as a militant organization as Al Qaeda in Iraq but transformed into a state like entity with the occupation of vast territories in Syria and Northern Iraq.

### **ISIS as a Rational Actor**


ISIS is a rational actor, with a clear goal. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his famous Book “On War”, “*no one starts a war—rather, no one in his senses out to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it*”<sup>8</sup>. The international community, however, seems relatively perplexed about the exact nature of ISIS’ objectives. Similarly, Clausewitz famous dictum “War is a continuation of policy by other means,”<sup>9</sup> also reflects that the use of violence by a state or a state like entity is to achieve certain political objectives and therefore in ISIS’s perspective, their struggle is rational and for a purpose. An enemy without rational aims/objectives can be easily defeated. Therefore, it can be argued that ISIS too is a rational actor though with a distorted world view, pursuing its political goals through the use of extreme violence. International community needs to focus on crystallizing the political and strategic objectives of ISIS and how it is exploiting the deep divide in the Muslim world. Identifying ISIS’ Centre of Gravity is also pivotal, which resides in its extreme ideology. A counter ideology is the only viable response, for achieving sustainable peace articulated through a united Muslim world. *From constructivist perspective, it is the identity of ISIS, which is defining its interests. By defeating its identity, ISIS and its followers can be pushed back.*

## **Notion of Space and its Relevance for ISIS**

The possession of well-defined territory is critical for ISIS & its caliphate recruitment. The retention of vast captured spaces and its gradual expansion is vital for its survival, as its political authority can only emanate from defined territory. **“Without territory, there can be no caliph and caliphate.** The establishment of the caliphate on 29 June 2014 was of prime importance to ISIS and it started a virtuous cycle. According to their views, Pious Muslims should want to live in the caliphate, thus they should (and have been) immigrating to the caliphate. **This has provided ISIS with a flood of ‘colonists’ as well as new fighters and recruits”<sup>10</sup>.** Moreover, a substantial portion of ISIS fighting force has volunteers from outside Iraq and Syria. As per Jason Burke the expat Muslims facing identity crisis in the West on reaching home country become readily available for radical Islamic revival<sup>11</sup>.

## **Organizational Structure of ISIS**

*ISIS has long term political, strategic and military objectives. With a view to achieve these objectives, it has articulated a comprehensive organizational structure catering for its multidimensional requirements.* Abubakr al-Baghdadi is the sole decision-maker and his decisions are followed through an absolute system. Turkemani, known as Fazl Ahmad Abdullah al Hiyali who is appointed as his deputy. He is an ex Iraqi Army officer with expertise in special operations<sup>12</sup>. ISIS has significant number of former Iraqi military officers who were serving in the Iraqi Army during **Saddam’s regime. It is broadly structured<sup>13</sup>** as follows: -



## **Military Strategy**

*ISIS military strategy revolves around expansion of territorial control and is aimed at converting military successes into political victories. Control of vital spaces in Iraq and Syria lends ISIS strategic advantage for declaring its Islamic Caliphate. Control of critical infrastructure including natural resources increases its financial capacity and international leverage. Along with consolidation of captured areas, gradually expand towards North, South and West in Syrian and Iraqi ungoverned or lightly held spaces with a purpose to create exterior lines of communication eventually. If happens, it will force the international community to operate from the exterior lines, thus requiring more forces and intricate multi-national coordination thus adding to operational and strategic difficulties.*

## **Military Capability**

ISIS's forces are organized into various fighting and supporting branches which include Artillery, Air Defence, Special Forces. Appropriately grouped, these forces operate tactically with a decentralized Command and Control. Possessive requisite capability to reinforce its tactical forces with operational reserves, which are directly under command of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It has reasonable capability to undertake operations both in conventional and unconventional domains. Living off the land, it possesses requisite flexibility to group and re-group in different zones both in Iraq and Syria, for rapid response.


## **Social Media Strategy**

“Countering ISIS in the virtual battlefields of social media is even harder. The group's brutality and its hyperbolic talk of a transnational caliphate has attracted supporters”<sup>14</sup>. The social media strategy of ISIS not only facilitates recruitment but also assists in achieving its military objectives. Graphic images are meant to inject fear and psychologically overawe the rivals. Submission to ISIS may be termed as a better option

than confrontation. ISIS allows non-believers to live in ISIS controlled territory if they submit to ISIS and pay jizya- a special tax. Use of social media is an effort to win battles without fighting, as the Chinese strategic thinker Sun Tzu wrote, **“to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”**<sup>15</sup>. ISIS has dedicated social media organization which offers publications in various languages including German, English, Russian, and French. The English language digital magazine ‘Dabiq’ is result of such efforts which facilitates recruitment and motivates the youth.

## **Financial Capability**

**“The Islamic State’s staggering successes come at a cost. After all, it’s not cheap to wage war and manage territorial conquests whose population is now roughly the size of Austria’s.” ISIS possesses enormous financial capability. It has control of oil fields in Iraq and Syria. ISIS also controls approximately 45% of the Syria’s gas reserves but profits are insignificant due to non-production of gas but it continues to occupy more gas fields. Revenue generation is from marketing petroleum products, estimated at several million dollars a day. Donations from the rich, protection money, criminal activities and collection of taxes are the other sources. Its oil profit has declined due to recent increase in aerial attacks by the Americans and their allies. As a whole its financial capacity makes it independent to undertake wide ranging operations domestically, regionally and at international level.**



**Oil and Gas Fields Controlled by ISIS<sup>16</sup>**

## **Interest of Major Powers/Key Players**

The attacks in Paris have once again brought into focus the existing capacity of various terrorist organizations to inflict massive casualties. The French President expressed his resolve and in concert with other allies, France has conducted air strikes in Syria. Growing anti Muslim sentiments in the West and influx of refugees in Europe have further added to the complexity of whole issue.

**“Turkish fighter jets shot down Russian plane near Syrian border”<sup>17</sup>.** It is the first Russian aircraft to be shot down by a NATO state since 1953. American support for Turkish actions also reflects the divergence of interest amongst USA and Russia in Middle East and the growing complexities of conflict in the Middle East thus posing serious challenge to unify international efforts.

### **US**

Dominate Middle East in the context of control and regulation of oil prices and its flow, security of Israel, arms sale to major Gulf States and manage political dynamics in a manner that it supports U.S strategic objectives in the whole region. **“US officials believe, with sufficient training and continuing allied airpower – the Iraqi Army, Kurdish forces and moderate Syrian rebels will be able to defeat ISIS and take back the territory it seized over the next several years”<sup>18</sup>.** It calibrated its support to **ISIS to dismantle Assad’s Regime and neutralize Iranian and Russian influence in the region without accepting ISIS as a legitimate strategic actor.** So far it has **“ruled out the presence of ground troops to fight against ISIS”<sup>19</sup>.**

### **Russia**

**“Syria is considered as Russia’s ally in the Middle East: President Assad asked Moscow for help, and Russia has stood by its ally in very difficult circumstances”<sup>20</sup>.** Its posturing is meant to counter Western influence in the region working

against Russian strategic and economic interests in Middle East and Mediterranean. Russia by capitalizing on the evolving environment, wants to mitigate effects of sanctions in the aftermath of Crimean crisis by getting integrated into fight against ISIS. Simultaneously, its focus is to eliminate threats **to Assad's Regime by rebel forces**. **"Initially Russian air strikes were principally focused on Syrian rebel groups"**<sup>21</sup>. Slowly Russian strikes are getting focused on ISIS also after shooting down of Russian airliner by ISIS.

## **EU**

**"The spread of ISIS across the Middle East made a significant impact on Europe. Unrest has forced record numbers of people to flee the fighting in Syria and Iraq and embark on dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean"**<sup>22</sup>. EU shares terrorism and security concerns emanating from the Middle East as under:-

- Safety and security of European citizens travelling to/ employed in ME region.
- EU nationals taking part in Middle Eastern conflict and returning home with a radicalized mindset.
- Export of Western values and democracy in ME region.

EU has still not developed a unified response against ISIS due to difference of opinion and lack of resolve to fight against ISIS. Even in the aftermath of Paris attack, the military involvement of EU member states as a whole has not been crystallized.

## **KSA/GCC**

**"Saudi support for the Syrian opposition is motivated by decades-long desire to break the alliance between Syria and Iran; Saudi Arabia's chief rivals for dominance in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East"**<sup>23</sup>. Their efforts are aimed at containing ISIS expansion beyond Iraq and Syrian borders with the aim of nullifying ISIS effects militant activities in KSA/GCC.

## **Iran**


“Iran has taken a lead role in defending the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad and strengthening the Baghdad government in war against the Islamic State of Iraq and **Greater Syria (ISIS)**”<sup>24</sup>. It is keen to safeguard geo-political and economic interests as a key regional player by supporting current Syrian and Iraqi regimes.

## **ISIS Presence in Afghanistan**


ISIS is endeavouring to establish itself in Afghanistan, resulting in confrontation against the Taliban who have taken a violent dimension. “Reports began emerging in 2014 that some Afghan militants had shifted their allegiance to the Islamic State, the government and international response remained measured. Experts noted that in Afghanistan, the Islamic State represented more of a splintering of the Taliban than a major expansion of the core group out of Syria and Iraq”<sup>25</sup>. Weak institutions, disorganised Afghan Army and availability of ungoverned spaces may result in further expansion of ISIS in Afghanistan.

## **Pakistan**

The rise and success of ISIS can play a dangerous and inspirational role in Pakistan, where number of religious organizations is operating with divergent views. Some organizations pursue multiple agendas such as transformation of society according to their ideologies, the enforcement of Shariah law, establishment of ***Khilafah*** (caliphate) and fulfillment of their sectarian objectives through militancy. Such organizations can be influenced by the success of ISIS in various ways. The map released by ISIS shows countries for expansion marked in black across North Africa, into mainland Spain, across the Middle East and into Muslim countries of Central and South Asian region. Interestingly, the ISIS map shows both Afghanistan and **Pakistan as part of the Islamic caliphate State’s Khurasan Province**<sup>26</sup>.



Pakistan needs to counter this potential threat mainly through **‘Three Pronged Strategy’** as diagrammatically shown below.



## **Constructivist Perspective of ISIS**

The whole phenomenon of ISIS, can be viewed from different theoretical perspectives. Though realism is the dominant lens through which international politics can be viewed but Constructivism as a social theory of International Relations offers a more penetrating lens to analyze the rise of



ISIS and how world should respond to it. Constructivism looks at states as social beings and therefore, the individuals and states are basically social. Thus individuals and states take a profound influence from the environment; they live in as human beings and states as the basic units of Westphalia system. Taking this discussion further, as per constructivists, reality is socially constructed thus the nature of relationship that evolves over a period of time is an outcome of interactive processes.

As per K.M. Fierke **“as fundamentally social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from the context of normative meanings, which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them”<sup>27</sup>. Alexander Wendt quoted by K.M. Fierke explains it very aptly in his famous article (1992), “Anarchy is what states make of it”<sup>28</sup>**. In a world defined by anarchy, how states interact with each other in the social structure, in which they are embedded, creates a social reality based on their interaction.

Similarly, the legitimacy of any given issue is also derived from the norms and shared understanding. Thus the nature of relationship that is friendly or having enmity within a social structure is based on shared ideas. This is how; the states view the prevailing regional and international environment and shape perceptions about friends and foes in the international system.

Social construction of reality can be best understood in simple terms. **“To construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist”<sup>29</sup>**. Any phenomenon, once humanly created, has its meanings and use in a given frame of reference with social values and norms. States, alliances, international institutions, non-state actors are all product of human interaction in a social world.

## **Understanding the Rise of ISIS through Constructivism**

In the Middle East, after the invasion of Iraq, the identity of ISIS gradually took shape through the complex social, political, ethnic and cultural environment. Iraq's invasion by USA and thereafter instituting Maliki's Shite's dominant government structures including military which led to violent suppression of Sunni minorities, gradually gave rise to ISIS. The physical, social and political repression *socially constructed ISIS* thus giving it meanings, its own values and norms and a distinct identity.

In Syria the intra-state conflict, the collapsed domestic institutions including political and social structures also contributed to the rise of ISIS. The inherent nature of Syrian conflict particularly the deep ethnic and sectarian divide created the identity crisis which was fully exploited by the ISIS. *Identity is basically relational*. Identity indicates oneself and in relation to who others are. Identities, therefore, define set of choices. This glaring vacuum in the realm of identity crises was fully exploited by ISIS, by projecting that it does not care about cast or creed or nationalities, but its objective is to establish and expand caliphate. *It can be concluded, that its success was mainly based on giving people sense of ownership and a distinct identity who were not aligned ideologically, religiously or culturally with Maliki's regime in Iraq and Assad's regime in Syria.*

In Constructivism, identities being socially constructed can be treated as variables that are dependent on political, religious, ethnic and social context. It validates constructivism, as ISIS identity was an outcome of Iraq - **Syria's fragmented** environment. ISIS identity was further strengthened by the loss of writ by Iraqi and Syrian governments within their geographical confines leading to capture of vast swaths of land and resources by ISIS consolidating its identity. It is the identity of a state or actor through which it defines its interests. It is ultimately these defined interests which states and other entities pursue through various violent and non

violent means. ISIS, therefore, needs to be seen through this social prism. From ISIS perspective, the way it has defined the identity of Iraqi/Syrian government and rest of the world who **don't agree to their view of Islam, has further compounded the whole issue by creating a deep ideological divide.**

## **International System and the Identity of ISIS**

Westphalia nature of international system and the ISIS as a state like entity makes its identity not recognizable in the comity of nations. Caliphate as defined by ISIS recognizes no borders in ideological sense, though retention of physical spaces as of present is pivotal to its survival. ISIS world view therefore, runs against the international norms thus projecting its identity as a challenge to the world peace. Conceptually, ISIS is an anti-thesis to the modern concept of state system **which defines ISIS' identity at odds with notion of identity of a state as per international norms of sovereignty, recognized geographical borders and its obligations towards other states.**

As a whole, constructivism is validated by examining the shaping of identity of ISIS by various social processes in Iraq and Syria including impact of 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

## **Aftermath of November 2015 Paris Attacks and Constructivist Response**

In the aftermath of Paris attacks, the major world powers and other stake holders are focusing on the use of force with additional quantum and more fury. Conceptually, the response of international community has nothing new but old identical features i.e use of kinetic means to degrade and ultimately destroy the fighting potential of ISIS are such a response to lead to success by eliminating the threat which does not reside in physical domain. Therefore, the use of organized violence against a violent act cannot transform the conflict towards sustainable peace which should be the ultimate objective of international community. By re-defining the identity of opposing sides, a better response can be articulated to bring an end to these violent acts of terrorism in the name of religion. A

constructivist approach to ISIS would follow an indirect strategy to explore how identities and responses are constructed through interactive processes. Deeply entrenched identities as these presently exist define the relationship of opposing sides in antagonistic manner. Its transformation can bring a positive end state that is lasting peace and harmony within Islamic World and between two great religions.

ISIS by attacking western world has constructed its identity in an oppositional context that is anti-West and bearer of Muslim cause. Constructivism may look for alternative approaches for giving appropriate meanings and responding to **events like Paris attacks. The title of 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' brings a particular objectivity into being and construct a social reality.** Some audience in the Muslim world may accept its legitimacy thus serving as a powerful tool for recruitment by justifying their cause. Similarly, the images of Paris attacks through repeated projection on mass media has deepened the feelings of being victimized in Europe. Both sides may reinforce their identities justifying ever increasing use of force vis-à-vis their respective sides thus an unending violent vicious cycle trapping the two opposing sides in an unending conflict.

## **Conclusion**

As regard its future, ISIS will further evolve itself based on responses of international community. Ultimately, it is the Muslims, which have to find a viable response to ISIS by **addressing the identify issue as it relates to the 'Muslim World View' versus 'ISIS View'. A realist approach to ISIS phenomenon as currently followed by major stakeholders may not be effective. Complexity of Middle East's environment, the convergence and divergence of interest of great powers and regional players, it has all the possibilities of prolonging this challenge indefinitely. Only through the constructivist approach, an answer to this international challenge can be found.**

## **Notes**

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# **BACK TO THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND IQBAL'S ALLAHABAD ADDRESS**

*Brigadier (Retired) Tahir Ul Mulk Kahlon*

## **Abstract**

*This paper is a critical investigation of the historic address by Allama Muhammad Iqbal to the delegates of Indian Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad. The 'address' became genesis of ideology of Pakistan and hence is extensively discussed in national and regional politics in that context. This analysis is however distinctive as it highlights its significance regarding national security and governance in contemporary Pakistan. It exposes contextual semblances of strategic dimensions amongst problems of Muslims and their aspirations in 1930 and the national security milieu of Pakistan in 2016. The paper provokes Iqbal's philosophies to discern lessons for national security administration as well as public policy stakeholders and actors. The discussion and conclusions are delimited and of relevance temporally and spatially.*

**Keywords:** *Allama Iqbal, 1930 Address, Ideology of Pakistan, Security*

## **Introduction**

Pakistan today is rife with narratives as to what really plagues this country and keeps it underdeveloped, infested with extremism and subjected to terrorism. International political pundits and strategists are openly expressing doubts on the sustainability of this state<sup>1</sup>. On a national scale, people are confused. They simultaneously express doubts about Pakistan's future but raucously criticize an Indian actor for having "no faith in Pakistan", and "telling the uncomfortable truth"<sup>2</sup>. While abject poverty and skewed wealth spread is commonly ascribed to public discontent, contemporary government philosophy is rhetorically loaded against

extremist ideas that breed intra nation / societal conflicts. There is proliferation of notions about national problems and their solutions, each devoutly sticking to respective ideologies and vehemently opposing the dissent. There is ample debate on media on the **failure of 'governance' in media which** conveniently tosses the blame on government for its bankruptcy to ensure efficiency in public administration without ever focusing on the waning national harmony.

**Pakistan portrays a Hobbesian situation of 'war of all against all',<sup>3</sup>** a semblance of anarchy. Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) suffers from insurgency and violent terrorism flowing out of an extremist ideology. Armed to teeth, foreign funded terrorists want to impose their version of a theological state. Kashmir has perpetually remained a flashpoint suffering Indian transgressions, aggressions and human rights violations thus conclusively inhibiting development of an emancipated civil society. It continues to simmer and people of Indian Occupied Kashmir face perpetual threats to their lives unable to imagine about prosperity. Punjab brags a mix of feudalism-industrialism divide and inter sect battles. Sindh is chaotic, sunk deep in the muck of corruption, ethnic battles and power wielding political and criminal gangs. Finally, Balochistan continues oscillating in various stages of insurgency.

Despite sounding pessimistic, the national scene leads to question the foundations of this country and value of its ideology for nation building. To put it in the words of Stephen **Cohen it is "the failure of the idea of Pakistan, which is a far more subjective and contentious matter"**<sup>4</sup>. Why Pakistan disintegrated and has to continuously struggle for its existence? There are questions about national cohesion and erratic governance and public policies. All these are crucial questions. Public ruckus on faith, national ideology or identity can be lethal for the prosperous and sustainable future of any country. National integration, cohesion and unity are therefore paramount; not only as an end but also as means to the end. The architects of the idea of Pakistan had envisioned



a modern country to be a promoter of international peace and not hatred; as it is currently perceived, unfortunately.

This paper endeavors to review the predicament of Pakistan by going back to its genesis and ideology. There are many options to do that, however it constructs on Allama Iqbal's address of 1930 to "engage the idea of Pakistan -- to perfect and refine the concept of the Pakistani nation"<sup>5</sup>. It is the most logical and germane foundation for contemporary Pakistan. The paper provides some insights and suggests solutions to the skepticism about the ideology and problems of governance in Pakistan. The first part of the paper reveals synonymy of current national environment with that of the Muslims in 1930. The second part then focuses on the philosophical interpretation of the problems and solution by Allama Iqbal and its significance for modern Pakistan. The discussion remains centered only on the national security elements of contemporary relevance.

## **Ecological Synonymy 1930-2016**

### **Hindu Contrariety**

Hindu antagonism was the provenance for a separate Muslim state and foundation of Two Nation Theory. Hindus and Muslims could never mingle as their cultures had no affinity despite ample political rhetoric during Muslim and British rules. Random efforts to create empathy never sustained as it was overshadowed by history of hostility and friction. The creation of Pakistan was anticipated to produce a thaw among these communities and usher eventual peace in the sub-continent. The antagonism however did not sink and instead turned gory after creation of Pakistan, beginning with Muslims massacre during migration. Indian aggression and annexation of weak Muslim states immediately after independence, invasion of Pakistan in 1965, subversion/sabotage and later capture of East Pakistan are a few of the blatant depictions of Indian hostile stance. India continued to subjugate and engage in Muslim genocide, be it Kashmir, Haiderabad,<sup>6</sup> Gujrat<sup>7</sup> or Samjota Express<sup>8</sup>. Murder, arson and

torture of Muslims recently escalated again with overt display **of Hindu belligerence under the patronage of Modi's Hindu** nationalist government. Muslims are being asked to migrate to Pakistan or merge in Hinduism. Internationally, without a letdown, India continues to foment terrorism in Pakistan augmenting it with cross border bombing on Line of Control and killing of innocent Pakistani civilians<sup>9</sup>. India has created, abetted and sustained insurgency in FATA and Baluchistan<sup>10</sup>. In the nutshell, India continues to threaten<sup>11</sup> and undermine **Pakistan's security and sovereignty through covert and overt** hostile operations, and by creating and encouraging centrifugal attitudes;<sup>12</sup> an East Pakistan déjà vu. Such policies originate in historical abhorrence of Muslims from 8<sup>th</sup> century. Indian government publicly prides aggression in East Pakistan,<sup>13</sup> and Hindu hostility continues to rise and impact national security situation in Pakistan: a phenomenon envisioned in 1930.

## **Socio-political Polarization**

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Jinnah) joined Indian National Congress on his debut in politics. He idealized **united independent India and was hailed as the "best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" by Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a powerful Congress leader**<sup>14</sup>. **"What we want is that Hindus and Muslims should march together until our object is obtained"**<sup>15</sup>. It was in 1920 that he resigned from Congress<sup>16</sup> realizing the futility of his judgement. He had by then full **conversion and conviction to Iqbal's vision of "a deeper appreciation of Muslim identity"**<sup>17</sup>. From then on, he **"continued to directly borrow" from Iqbal's philosophies**.<sup>18</sup> **The elections of 1937 had a "traumatic effect upon Jinnah"**<sup>19</sup> and put the last nail in the coffin of communal socio-political homogeneity.

Conversely, there were Muslim leaders who did not believe that religion was a sufficient or necessary ground for a separate country. They trusted Congress promise of a secular state, despite its top leaders like Madan Mohan Malaviya and Vallabhbhai Patel vowing for a Hindu India<sup>20</sup>.

This indicated a strong polarization of thought amongst Muslims. Pakistan thus historically suffered a lack of consensus on the issue of one nation founded purely on faith. Separation of East Pakistan despite commonality of belief was its excruciating consequence. Ironically, such socio-political polarization sustains in current Pakistan except fading occasionally. There remains an ideological diffusion oscillating amongst Islamization, socialism, democracy and despotism. The constitutions of 1956, 1962, 1973, and around two dozen amendments in the 1973 constitution depict the socio-political fragility and contradictions. It has become disquieting with extremist ebbs since 9/11 incident and consequently the American war on Afghanistan. Occasional efforts through constitutional changes have failed to take ground as did Congress ideology of one Indian nation in 1930s.

## **Feudalism**

Iqbal used the term of “Punjabi Ruralism”<sup>21</sup> which bestowed political benefits to feudals in Punjab across the religious divide. In feudalism, he found a lack of commitment to Islam and antagonistic attitudes towards the socio-religious and economic issues facing the Muslim community. They dominated the channels of information (contemporary Media) and exploited the disempowered social structure to perpetuate their power. Feudalism and princely states were a part of British governing system. Rulers had created loyal rural elite as a bulwark against any challenge, showering them with land-grants and socio-political status; and conclusively enslaving them to their economic interest<sup>22</sup>. Poor masses were ignored to be used as crowds for political activism, and even for communal strife.

While Pakistan immediately absorbed its princely states, it **did not come hard on the phenomenon of “Punjabi Ruralism”**. The gap created by Princes was filled by Khans, Maliks and Sardars due to lack of national political direction and a bureaucracy beholden to the perks of Raj<sup>23</sup>. Migration, rapid urbanization and corruption created new elite, owning industrial and business empires. Consequently, socio-political

landscape of Pakistan has remained unchanged except that there are no more Hindu merchants or Sikh feudals. Pakistanis remain subjugated and disenfranchised. Westminster style democratic governance, that Pakistan inherited, was abhorred by Iqbal who was convinced of its **“unsuitability for Indian culture” in 1930. The same system is** currently thriving, while people are losing faith in the **governance. Iqbal’s “Punjabi Ruralism”** though has eclipsed in Punjab, but is alive in other provinces of Pakistan. Subjugation of Muslims (minority) by Hindus (majority) was a major reason of Muslims support for Pakistan. It now provides raw material to extremist ideologies in Pakistan as theorized by Robert Kaplan that an environment devastated by poverty, conflict and the absence of civil society gives rise to extremist and dangerous ideologies<sup>24</sup>.

### **Mass Marginalization**

Muslims in India did not have a political voice and were too meek to be significant in public policy making forums. Muslim popular trust, rally and support to Muslim league was thus pre-texted on their alienation, subjection and powerlessness. In united India, as exclaimed by Iqbal, they **were “destined to a perpetual minority on the mercy of dominant Hindu majority”**. While India dismantled the structures of marginalization, conversely it was sustained in Pakistan in different dimensions. East Pakistanis were the first to suffer when their majority was usurped by rejecting universal democratic canon of one man one vote; and later through creation of artificial parity by instituting One Unit. Imposing the language of minority i.e. ruling migrant bureaucracy and urban elite, proved a death knell for marginalization of East Pakistan. When vote parity was restored in 1970 elections, the consequence of marginalization was Bangladesh. Contemporary Pakistan continues to simmer in similar issues amongst its federating units. 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment and apprehensions on its implementation are a practical manifestation of such emotions.

On independence, new rulers of Pakistan retained the non-representative and centralized governing system under British India Act of 1935. For the inhabitants of Pakistan, it essentially was a change of face from British to mainly immigrants; and majority from Hindus to Bengal and later Punjab. People continued to be disempowered. For Punjabis, whose livelihood is traditionally tied to agricultural, governance remained extraneous while feelings of alienation stooped in other provinces. The Senate of Pakistan, which grants equality to federating units, is designed on the British pattern and hence is incongruous to a federal structure. Senators are like Lords, representing elite interests than provinces. It enjoys limited powers of debate and has no say or control on national purse. Since all public projects are oiled by money, National Assembly with disproportionate representation monopolizes creation and sustainability of public policies. Pakistanis now confront marginalization and communalism of ethnic, economic and social dimensions. The power has become more or less diarchal: the political power with elites (from all provinces) and money and media power with urban community of Sindh, leaving masses marginalized.

## **Minorities**

Muslims in India felt and expressed the pains of being a minority. Consequently, constitution of Pakistan lucidly guarantees absolute freedom for religious minorities, so that they do not suffer the trauma of Muslims in India. Jinnah was a vociferous proponent of religious freedom and equal rights for religious minorities<sup>25</sup>. In the first constituent assembly of **Pakistan he stated: “You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”**<sup>26</sup>. While constitution is a theoretical reality, its application in Pakistan has not been exemplary. **“Ahmadiyya community was (almost overnight) turned into a non-Muslim minority”**<sup>27</sup> adding to the lot of dissatisfied minorities. General Zia, who had extensively pricked the 1973 constitution for his personal perpetuation, also stung venom

by removing the word “Freely” (religious practice by minorities) from the Objective Resolution,<sup>28</sup> which was reinserted later through 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendment. The protection, rights and fate of minorities remain pertinent to Pakistan except flipping sides. Pakistanis have to thus counter harsh criticism and aroused sentiments on their espoused national ideology and its practice. Minority Rights Group **International recently ranked Pakistan as the “world's top country for major increases in threats to minorities since 2007”<sup>29</sup>.**

### **Access to Justice**

Access to justice in Pakistan is dismal, even acknowledged by Chief Justice of Pakistan<sup>30</sup>. Law and order situation in Pakistan has its root in public consternation over lack of opportunities to fair and speedy justice. Creation of military courts stands as proof of inadequacy of criminal justice system. **Hobbes claimed that “Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice”<sup>31</sup>.** Absence of justice subjugates poor to the rich and the weak to the powerful. Power can only be restrained by state through a fair and approachable justice system. Aristotle exhorted that, **“When separated from law and justice, he (Man) is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous and he is equipped at birth with arms, which he may use for the worst ends”<sup>32</sup>.** The idea of Pakistan had an appeal for poor and powerless masses who foresaw a promise of justice, equity and equality in the new state. Indian Muslims were suffering a rutted social justice because they did not possess capacity and capability to approach the state for justice. People of Pakistan can now reach the judicial system, but there are questions on its fairness, affordability and burdens. Practically, Pakistanis remain deprived of justice as were Indian Muslims in 1930. **Aristotle has warned that, “Justice is the bond of men in states”<sup>33</sup>.**

## **Poverty and Uneven Wealth**

Poverty and skewed distribution of wealth are commonalities of 1930s and of present Pakistan; which somehow have worsened comparing population density. While poverty of Muslims in India consequently led to creation of Pakistan, it now breeds crime, corruption, insurgency and terrorism. 1930s India had concentration of wealth in aristocracy comprising landlords or princes. Conversely, in Pakistan multiple breeds of elites have come up **comprising land mafias', industrial cartels, financial tycoons and corrupt public servants leaving morsels for public at large. Pakistan's desultory land reforms made some trivial difference** in Punjab but failed elsewhere in Balochistan, FATA and Sindh<sup>34</sup>. This disproportionate distribution of wealth is a source of anxiety, frustration and lack of trust in state. It is hard to convince people especially rural population that Pakistan has really met its promises of socioeconomic justice.

## **Imperious Bureaucracy**

Indian Muslims did not enjoy representation in public bureaucracy. Whatever of Muslim bureaucracy existed, it was mainly from areas that now form part of India. Non-political executives were also not of their choice. In colonial government, people did not have recourse to accountability of the bureaucracy. Fatalist Muslims remained partly contented considering it a phenomenon of rule by aliens. Iqbal rightly **apprehended that "independent united India will be a mere change of masters."** Unfortunately, contemporary Pakistan does not fare well on accountability of both bureaucracy and political governments. Powers remain centralized with **'federal' public bureaucracy. People and their chosen representatives are dependent on public servants instead being vice a versa.**

## **Class structure**

Hindu caste structure was looked down upon by Muslims. Muslims did not possess upper class status and majority of

Hindus did not like to socialize with Muslims. Muslims hoped that Pakistan would provide them with a classless structure. How much Pakistan has succeeded in building a classless society, remains a point of perception and debate. Wisdom from Allahabad: Back to the Future “Diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed in the best interests of the very life of our people, **may prove fatal**”. Iqbal, Allahabad 1930.

The preceding discussion is neither a comprehensive analysis of socio-political milieu of 1930s nor of contemporary politics and governance. It is purely contextual to the topic and focuses on the similitude and **significance of Iqbal's** philosophy for contemporary Pakistan. Pakistanis have commonly regarded his expose purely as an ideology of Pakistan, thus missing the depth and universality of this thought and its practice. Very few (if none) of graduate Pakistanis have even read the contents of this address<sup>35</sup>. Governments in Pakistan have, by omission or commission, **strayed from Iqbal's vision despite its striking reflection in** Lahore Resolution of 1940 and Objective Resolution of 1949.

One may note absence of word ‘country’ in Iqbal's address as well as Lahore Resolution of 1940. Iqbal however, later made clarification that he was not asking an independent ‘country’ for Muslims in his 1930 address. “You call me a protagonist of the scheme called Pakistan. Now, Pakistan is **not my scheme**”<sup>36</sup>. The reason could be the context of the address, political situation and organizational issues of Muslim League in 1930. However, there is no doubt that his address laid a foundation of Muslim state(s) in the subcontinent and with a distinct philosophy of governance. The relevant lessons for public policies and strategies for contemporary Pakistan are discussed in the following subsections.

## **Communal Harmony**

Governing system of a country is a melting pot of centrifugal sentiments. The problem Pakistan continued to



face from its inception was of the harmony among diverse ethnic groups. Public policies in Pakistan never focused on communal aspirations and priorities or considered it a serious business of state. It provided a gap to centrifugal voices to corrupt the ideology of Pakistan. The subject was left open to debate with opposing ideologies and thus keeping the people confused about this country.

**Iqbal saw Muslims divided, having lost “herd instinct” and perusing “independent careers” without contributing to the development of a vibrant Muslim polity. Iqbal terms this as a “strategic folly”. He provided a foundation and intellectual justification for communal harmony in a specified territory. His logic of harmony was founded on the commonality of faith which had following tenants:**

- **Muslim society has distinct culture of “homogeneity and inner unity”. The basis of (Pakistani) society should be stimulated by the Muslims’ deep commitment to Islam**
- **Muslim institutions should be exploited to create a polity having social structures regulated by a legal system of ethical ideals**
- **Muslims’ “basic emotions and loyalties” should be channelled to unify scattered individuals and groups and “transform them into a well-defined people”.**
- **Islam should be “a power of the utmost importance in the lives of individuals as well as States”. But it will not be a destiny, as claimed by fundamentalists because it is “itself a destiny”. Moreover in “critical situations Islam has saved Muslims and not the vice versa”.**

Iqbal stated that Islam does not bind but frees outlook from petty geographical considerations thus **“nationalism based on geographic boundaries” should be negated**. That contains a sound warning in the context of contemporary Pakistan for the so called ISIS and Taliban ideology of internationalization of Islam for a global theological Muslim state.

Iqbal was mindful of the racial ideologies. He was addressing in the framework of dissenting voices urging Muslims to remain part of India in the British democratic system. He was apprehensive that racial divide and strong caste system could be hijacked and misapplied. He cautioned that it would lead to proliferation of racism and be fatal for **Muslims. It would lead to “the growth of standards different from and even opposed to the standards of Islam” and deprive them of the opportunities of “free development”.** To support his argument, he mentioned the failed philosophies of King Akbar, Kabir Panth and Guru Nanak, which failed to make a single Indian nation. Iqbal warned that without Islamic system and **“fullest cultural autonomy” it would be difficult** to create a harmonious society. To him, Islam has no specific country, no specific language, no specific script and no specific mode of dress<sup>37</sup>. Thus, Iqbal provided the foundations of communal harmony for Pakistan through Islam; making other diverse characteristics subservient but complementary to it.

## **National Unity**

Pakistan as a nation-state has always been a contentious subject. The bases or attributes of a nation such as language, race, history, identity of economic interests and viable territorial frontiers were sought to be incorporated among **those of the ‘Pakistan’ demand in 1940. Iqbal realized this fact and advised to exploit such strengths for seeking unity, “not in the negation of diversity but in the mutual cooperation”.** He advised Muslims to construct a nation with **“Islamic principle of solidarity”.** Stephen Cohen while giving advice to USA sounds Iqbal when he says that in Pakistan **“national unity, security, and integrity will be achieved if the primary emphasis is placed on promoting equity and harmony rather than on suppression of ethnic differences in the name of unity”**<sup>38</sup>.

Iqbal envisioned the difficulties in creating national unity, saying that Muslims suspect mutual intentions and want to **inwardly dominating each other. “They cunningly conceal their egos”** and are **“as narrow-minded as a caste or tribe”.** He

thus advised them to be tolerant and forthcoming to provide all diverse groups a “right to free development” according to their “cultural traditions”. He apprised that national unity/homogeneity has been bestowed on Muslims as a “free gift” of Islam.

National unity, according to Iqbal could only be achieved by:

- “Determined people”
- Focusing on “single purpose”
- Possessing a “unified will”
- Rising “above sectional interests and private ambitions”
- Learning to “determine the value of individual and collective action, however directed on material ends”
- Passing from “matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity”

Iqbal sounded a warning for those with notions of a nationality based on the principle of territory. He shunned such belief by giving example of Europe where “universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity”. Despite his criticism of territorial nationalism, he believed that Islam was not antagonist to nationalism in Muslim countries. He therefore advised Muslims to “seek inspiration” from “ever-vitalizing” ideas of Islam which would unite the scattered Muslims to regain their “lost integrity” and save them from “total destruction”. To him “sectional bickerings” were not a harm but “principle of structure as a people” which prevented people to become “rebellious”. Quoting Quran, “Hold fast to yourself; no one on earth can hurt you, provided you are well guided” (5:104), he counselled Muslims for unity through inculcating a “collective ego”.

## **Leadership**

Leadership is catalytic for change and Iqbal showed concern about the problems of Muslims’ leadership in India. He admitted that Muslims had “failed to produce leaders”

referring to it as an “evil”. About himself he clarified that, “I lead no party; I follow no leader”. Iqbal was not satisfied about the performance and potential of the existing leadership which he termed as “narrow visioned”. Iqbal did narrate attributes of Muslim leadership, which are summarized as under:

- Possess a Divine gift or experience
- Keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam
- Keen perception of the trend of modern history
- Be a real driving force of people
- Possess true statesmanship
- Sagacious; not to ignore facts and to exploit them to greatest advantage
- Committed to Muslim ideals and aspirations
- Visionary and sensitive to the forces which are shaping the destinies of people nationally and globally

### **Islamic or Secular State**

Iqbal was lucid about the governing ideology of the state when he questioned “Is religion a private affair”. He advised that Islam as a “cultural force” must be preserved because it had worked the best in India and created a Muslim “society with its remarkable homogeneity”. Having a deep sense of political environment, Iqbal earnestly called upon Muslims to organize with “unity of will and purpose”. He described its lack at that time as “the second evil” in Muslims.

Humans to Iqbal are not citizens with material interests only and their “spirit situated elsewhere”. He prophesied that Muslim state without Islamic governance principles would be “ill-adjusted” and “dominated by interests not human but national”. He warned that it would be a grave mistake to “separate spiritual from temporal” because it would lead to disintegration and destruction resulting from the “growth of racial consciousness”. Iqbal was unequivocal that religion must be central in the “life of individuals as well as States”. This is precisely in line with his verse (not in Allahabad Address) ie:

Jalal-E-Padshahi Ho K Jamhoori Tamasha Ho Juda Ho  
Deen Siasat Se To Reh Jati Hai Changaizi (Statecraft  
divorced from Faith leads to reign of terror, though it  
**be a monarch's rule or democracy's skit**)

## **Federalism**

Pakistan by default, was a federal state. Still Jinnah was **unambiguous on federalism stating that “the theory of** Pakistan guarantees that federal units of the National Government would have all the autonomy that you will find in the constitutions of the United States of America, Canada, and **Australia”<sup>39</sup>**. Pakistan adopted Government of India Act 1935, having colonial tones of a strong central government run by powerful central bureaucracy. This created a mixture of centralization and federalism in Pakistan. Centralization was consistently strengthened by authoritarian, dictatorial and non-participatory political governments. Some governments exploited Islam to counterbalance anti center sentiments but practically the spirit of federalism remained compromised. Pakistan failed(s) to take guidance from either Jinnah or Iqbal who considered federalism as a framework within which multiple ethnic groups can protect their rights. It is a mechanism of governance for conflict prevention and to stimulate cooperation which leads to national cohesion and **hence “unity in diversity”**.

Federalism remains a critical issue having a broad national consensus per se, but with differences in its interpretation and implementation. There is a perpetual bickering by provinces for greater autonomy while central governments, be it democratic or despotic, have remained reluctant to devolve power. Pakistan briefly went through the experience of One Unit which unfortunately created more problems. The 18th amendment in the constitution is an effort towards strong federal structure.

Iqbal realized India as a land of racial, climatic, creedal, linguistic and religious variety that without adequate representation of all interests, **it would become “oligarchy”**.

He maintained that federation was the only way of “stable constitutional structure” for such population characteristics. Dilly dallying with federalism in contemporary Pakistan has been a major cause of national instability and insecurity. Iqbal had cautioned that a system “born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism” would keep the country in a “vicious circle of a unitary central government”. Pakistan paid for this mistake in 1971 and still does not appear serious enough.

## **National Defence**

Iqbal's elucidation of national defence is very relevant for Pakistan. He claimed that his vision for autonomous state(s) would be the most “valuable asset to Islam” and a source of Indian, Asian and global “security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power”. This is in stark similarity with Stephen Cohen who writes that, “The failure of Pakistan would be a multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves order and predictability. A collapsing Pakistan would place Iran, India, and China in particular at risk”<sup>40</sup>. Iqbal also assured Hindus (India) not to fear from “Muslim states” (Pakistan).

Confessing not being a “military expert”, he sounded prophetic in description about the strategic importance of KP, Sindh and Karachi. Quoting Al-Masudi (Sindh is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam) he said that Sindh had had “back towards India and face towards Central Asia”. He envisioned “inevitable growth” of Karachi as a “rival” to Bombay with “infinite commercial possibilities”. He deplored British policy of giving “extraordinary importance” to the land defence and ignoring “naval position” thus leaving a “defenceless sea coast”: Despite being appreciative of the “martial races” he advised that military should comprise “efficient and experienced people of all the communities”. A “neutral military” based on a “federated units”, would “intensify patriotic feeling”.

## **Governing Pakhtoons**

Iqbal made revealing observations about the strategic value of KP and FATA. Paying tribute to Pakhtoons he accredited them to be the best defenders of India (Pakistan) against any “foreign invasion, be that invasion either of ideas or of bayonets”. He therefore batters and ridicules the British stance of denying them political rights on the logic that Pakhtoons live in a “powder house”. For Iqbal, political rights are fundamental to humans whether they live in a “powder house or a coal mine” because human rights are “light not fire”. He warned that “brave, shrewd and determined” Pakhtoons would “surely resent” denial of rights and that it would be imprudent for rulers to ascribe unrest and trouble in Pakhtoon province “to any extraneous causes”. He advised to treat this province at “equal footing with other Indian provinces” and comprehend that Pakhtoons are “by instinct, more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India (Pakistan)”.

## **Minorities**

Iqbal advocates that every community is entitled to “its free development” in its own way. “A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble”. He advised rulers to grant “highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities” because this is what Quran has ordained them. He went beyond and advised “to defend their places of worship” when needed. He stresses that minorities are the ‘people of the Book’ and hence there have to be no social barriers between them and Muslims. Islam permits intermarriages with them, which according to Iqbal is a divine step for the “final combination of humanity”. To support that he quoted Quran: “O people of the Book! Come; let us join together on the word (Unity of God) that is common to us all.”

## **Conclusion**

Pakistan today is not what Iqbal had envisioned in 1930. It is a sovereign country and its creation was preceded by the worst communal bloodbath ever experienced by the world. The prevalent national security situation demands a critical introspection. It has links with socio-economic conditions, existence of strong regional and ethnic groups, militancy, sectarianism and the minuscule minorities. It is here that reflecting on Allahabad address provides crucial insights on national security situation and a philosophical way forward. It is therefore not an antique, but a beacon towards our future. **Galileo said that “Unfortunate is not the country that lacks in heroes but that which needs heroes”<sup>41</sup>.** Pakistanis are not unfortunate from both dimensions. They are unfortunate not to ‘know’ it.

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## **IMPACT OF DISASTERS ON HUMAN SECURITY: AN EMERGING PARADIGM FOR PAKISTAN**

*Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan & Ms. Afsheen Zeeshan*

### **Abstract**

*Climate change and disasters are ‘security’ problems and there has been a very strong perspective that climate change may initiate violent global conflicts. This paper highlights the impact of natural disasters on vulnerability of social groups, their livelihoods, peace and the role of the state in disaster management in the context of human security. It enlightens that natural hazards are gradually destabilizing human security, not only in the present circumstances but will also increasingly do so in the future, by disturbing access to the quality of natural resources that are imperative to sustain livings. The concept of human security encourages the international and national bodies to deliberate upon the necessities of the most vulnerable segments of the population, particularly protecting women, children, and the senior citizens. As a comparatively fresh theory, human security is still being discovered and discussed by researchers and experts. Thinking about its application to natural disasters, is an important phase of the further evolution of human security concept. In this paper, emphasis is on exploring the human security issues in the context of disaster management process in Pakistan. Comprehensive and efficient disaster risk reduction practices must include all features of the human security approach. By making it more categorical in our disaster management efforts, we will be able to have improved strategies and better preparation for disaster avoidance without neglecting the most vulnerable parts of the communities.*

**Keywords:** Climate, Human Security, Disaster Management, Risk Reduction.

## **Introduction**

The traditional meaning of security is armed defense of national interests whereas human security delivers an unconventional and human-centered perception that emphasizes on security and defense of individuals<sup>1</sup>. Protection of human rights and concerns of development are the principal elements of human security theory. It endorses a people-centered strategy based on necessities, capabilities and experiences of folks on the ground<sup>2</sup>. Now, this term is extensively applied in all the peace-building initiatives and humanitarian assistance.

The UN Resolution A/RES/66/290 unanimously approved **definition of Human Security on 10 September 2012**, as “the right of people to live in freedom and self-respect, free from poverty and misery”<sup>3</sup>. Natural calamities are key threats to human security, intimidating human existence and injuring **the fiscal and social grounds of people’s welfare. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)** is indispensable to defend human security in the areas prone to natural calamities. Demographic and environmental settings are shifting gradually; however, populace growth and increasing trends of migration highlight that people are now more exposed than ever to the shocking impacts of natural catastrophe. Nevertheless, this danger cannot be stopped, as inhabitants are widespread and disasters happen unpredictably, it can certainly be managed. Current developments in innovative technologies have allowed forecasting about the possibilities of disasters and such advancement have helped people to cope with and lessen the danger faced by human security as a consequence of natural disaster.

Human security also accentuates empowerment policies, facilitating people; both individuals and societies, to perform on their own behalf and on the behalf of others. Mainly during rehabilitation processes after disasters, it would advocate a bottom-up methodology integrating the voices of all those who are affected. In disaster preparedness, human security would contribute in managing policy development by making

resilient actions and situations certain and including consideration of human and community essentials<sup>5</sup>.

## **Evolution of Human Security Concept**

The concept has developed ever since the United Nations Development Programme UNDP primarily launched the term in 1994 as a part of Human Development Report<sup>6</sup>. This term is further classified into seven main categories of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security<sup>7</sup>. The concept of human security has speedily materialized in global politics, with the formation of the Commission on Human Security in 2001<sup>8</sup>. However, a traditional idea of security highlights the armed shield of **state's interests; human security delivers an unconventional, human-centered outlook that emphasizes safeguarding and defending individuals' "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear"**<sup>9</sup>. It involves a comprehensive understanding of security, by integrating worries about human progress as well as human rights. The UN Commission on Human Security defined human security as a guarding phenomenon for fundamental freedoms and protecting people from serious and prevailing dangers<sup>10</sup>.

In the initial years of debate on human security within the United Nations, there was confusion between the concept of human security and the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) that headed some countries to recognize human security as a rationalization for intrusion. The UN Secretary **General's 2010 report on human security presented a** flawless difference between these two concepts<sup>11</sup>. R2P is related to human security in a way that it emphasizes on defending people rather than guarding national borders and deals principally with intense fears, thus centering on the freedom from terror. In addition, R2P still needs government-based and global reactions. Whereas, human security engrosses numerous participants such as individuals and their families, national and government organizations at all government levels and international community. It is a comprehensive concept that involves human security in present as well as

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security of future generations by providing them with more equitable and sustainable future.

The following figure explains the comprehensive framework of sustainable human security by highlighting all contributing factors of human survival, development, dignity and sustainability.



*Source: The International Journal of Sustainable Human Security<sup>12</sup>*

From an operational perspective, human security aims to address composite conditions of insecurity through cooperative, responsive and sustainable actions that are people-centered, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented<sup>13</sup>. In addition, human security uses a hybrid methodology that brings together all these components through a protection and empowerment framework. To design a human security programme, three stages must be considered: Analysis, Mapping & Planning; Implementation, Impact Assessment<sup>14</sup>. Each stage of human security programme delivers information about gaps in knowledge and research.

## **Human Security Index**

The Human Security Index integrates environmental, social and economic features. The environmental components include issues related to nature and ecosystem; the social elements incorporate gender, population, education and food security; and economic essentials consist of income, savings and debts<sup>15</sup>. This index has purpose of characterizing the security of an individual or group at home, village, country and the Earth<sup>16</sup>. Maps on each key elements and the combined Human Security Index itself specify some circumstances, which might primarily be unpredicted. They advocate that this index is actually a valuable complement because it can be used as a replacement of customary reportage and provides deeper understanding of the situations of individuals and societies<sup>17</sup>.

## **Human Security versus National Security**

The development of human security model prioritizes **individuals' security over national security and theorizes** poverty as an actual threat to the security of people. Thus, it needs more consideration for sustainable development as a practical approach to ensure human security<sup>18</sup>. However, by following this mechanism, the national security must not be underrated and the role of the state in providing human security must not be overlooked. To obtain all targets related to human security, it is essential to include all state and non-state actors in the process by integrating human security with national security. But in Pakistan, an agreement regarding the content of what establishes threat to human security is vague due to the fact that all parties involved i.e., state, international organizations, NGOs and civil societies are advocating their own outlook of human security, centered on their respective interests.

## **Human Security Threats due to Natural Disasters**

When one deliberates upon 'human security', usually the perspective that comes to mind is conflict and war. Natural disasters are ignored in this agenda that originate several

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complications such as large number of deaths, extensive damage, widespread dislodgment, and intensified vulnerability for people, particularly for segments of the people already marginalized. Even though some countries are competent to rebuild the infrastructure and rehabilitate people after disasters, yet they are not capable to reproduce health, standard of living, self-respect, prospect, political freedom, consumer dealings or associations that existed prior to the incident<sup>19</sup>.

A significant distinction during implementation of human security to natural disasters highlights the role of army and nature of civil-military relations. In public conflicts, army can occasionally be a key threat to human security, but in the incident of natural disasters, army with its substantial operational capability and field knowledge, may instead be a main provider of human security.

The comparison of impacts of war and disasters on human security can best be described with the help of following table<sup>20</sup>.

	<b>War between Countries</b>	<b>Natural Disasters</b>
Control of Event	These actions are completely organized by human beings. Human beings dictate when it starts and when it finishes.	No control over natural disasters by human beings such as earthquakes, hurricane, volcanic eruption, tsunami, floods etc.
Cause of Death	People are ordered to kill people. People are killed with weaponries. Citizens can be killed inside structures, which collapse. Can be justified in	People expose themselves to natural disasters for numerous reasons. People are not killed with arms. Residents can be killed inside



	relation to national security.	buildings which collapse. Not related to national security.
Financial Issues	Main investments on weapons of mass destruction (research, development, procurement)	Restricted investment to understand dynamics of natural phenomenon.
Relations to Political Issues	Related to political boundaries (nations, territories) or ideological beliefs.	Not linked with political boundaries or ideological beliefs.
Regrets	Regrets over companions lost in “the field of battle”. No regrets for casualties suffered by the rivals.	All mortalities are regretted.

Natural disasters threaten the security of people, which can be classified as:

- **Economic Security:** When natural calamities occur, people are not affected similarly; poor, socio-economically weaker segments of the population suffer disproportionately. When individuals lose their source of earnings, it makes them more susceptible to any upcoming hazard, be it another natural tragedy and financial brush off. Actually, the fiscal values of such happenings are shocking. For example, flooding phenomenon in Pakistan cost it 2% of its GDP (UNISDR 2012), a noteworthy amount for a country coping with several serious socio-economic problems<sup>21</sup>.
- **Food Security:** Immediately after a devastating disaster, affected people generally face a severe difficulty of receiving adequate quantity of nutritious food and clean drinking water, which cause serious

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health problems. Food insecurity does not only happen in instant recovery period, but, floods and storms destroy the farmlands which cause food scarcities

- **Health Security:** Immediately after a disaster, health problems are instantly apparent as individuals suffer from injuries. The immovable sick and aged patients need extraordinary attention and their requirements have to be integrated in evacuation procedures. In the meantime, problems rapidly arise for those suffering from pre-existing health concerns, and need treatment or medicine that may not be easily accessible. If medical records have been misplaced or destroyed in the calamity, it can create serious difficulties for the patients.
- **Environmental Security:** Natural threats - intermingled with prevailing human susceptibilities such as land shortages; population growth, cultural/racial conflict and poverty- drive people towards marginal zones increasing their exposure to natural disasters. Poor quality lodging and physical infrastructure leave societies more at the danger of deaths, injuries or homelessness in case of disasters. Such tragedies often become problematic by secondary disasters that may be nuclear or technological in nature.
- **Personal Security:** As a consequence of natural catastrophes, individuals can lose all; their loved ones, households, properties, and entire livings, sometimes in just minutes. In the instant response phase, there are substantial tasks to make certain that people obtain satisfactory accommodations and aid. Affected families are forced to stay in provisional shelters where they remain helpless with insufficient belongings and inadequate privacy. Complicated gender-based problems persist in a post-disaster situation such as gender violence, human trafficking, and personal abuse etc.
- **Communal Security:** Natural disasters affect community security in various ways. Most people obtain their security from their association with

different groups such as relatives, societies, companies and ethnic or racial groups, which deliver practical sustenance and a set of standards by which to live. So the communities with inadequate societal funds; thus already with a community security problem, are less capable to recuperate from disasters.

- **Political Security:** It is essential for human security that people should be able to live in the communities that honour their fundamental human rights and that these fundamental rights are more likely to be respected in societies that hold multi-party elections but all forms of political government are capable of generating political insecurity, through administrative ineffectiveness, bug-passing and disinterest. In the perspective of natural disasters, human security can be augmented through governments expenditure more in other domains than on disaster preparedness and mitigation. A perfect example of this is Pakistan, which continues to spend large sums of money on other issues without appropriately financing the disaster management and risk reduction fields, regardless of recurrent floods and **other disasters that have shattered the country's economy over the years.**



*Source: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security<sup>22</sup>*

## **Natural Disasters as Threats to Peace:**

The legal system has a term for harsh natural occurrences believed to be outside the control and accountability of **humans: “acts of God”**<sup>23</sup> natural disasters and dangerous environmental happenings are estimated to rise in number on an international scale, increasing levels of monetary, social, and civil stress that could aggravate both political and global wars. Large scale natural disasters could also damage basic elements of the international economy such as water, food, medicine, energy, livelihoods, supply chains, beginning extensive fears that could increase the severity of proactive defensive actions. Intelligence agencies, academia and think tanks should focus their attention on the possible key calamities in different parts of the world to cause social, **political and economic “ripple effects” that lead to lethal battles.** Climate change and natural disasters, in fact, act as risk multipliers for instability in some of the most volatile areas of the world. Expected disasters could worsen the marginal living standards in many African, Middle Eastern and Asian nations, by causing widespread political uncertainty and conflict.

Natural disasters can radically uncover deep societal discriminations and government unresponsiveness or ineffectiveness, stimulating hostility movements. In 1970, the government in Western Pakistan reacted ineffectively to the cyclone that hit Eastern Pakistan; intensely contributed to the separation of what became Bangladesh<sup>24</sup>. Decreasing the direct damage of such tragedies needs initiatives in three areas: increasing regional resilience, refining relief competencies, and where mandatory, assisting replacement from the most exposed zones. Avoiding adverse concerns about political strength and human security will entail both national and international cooperation to promote the importance of avoiding intense clashes that could rise from **these “natural attacks”.**

The Himalayan range comprises high altitude glaciers that provide water to several rivers in Asia. These rivers supply

water to more than half of the world's inhabitants. Many people in Asia rely on glacial melt water during dry weather. Faster glacial melt interrogates the very persistent nature of several Himalayan flowing rivers. This is expected to have vast consequences for those reliant on the resource affecting water availability for agricultural purposes. It is forecasted that if present trends persists, 80% of Himalayan glaciers will be gone by in 30 years. The current trends of glacial melt propose that the Indus, Brahmaputra, Ganges and other rivers across the northern Indian plain could likely become seasonal rivers in forthcoming years. This presents a trial for decreasing the vulnerability of more than 1.3 billion people living in the main river basins downstream from the Hindu Kush-Himalayan area. The quick retreat of the Himalayan glaciers has concerns for water-related hazards, such as glacier lakes outburst floods, and for water stress, as an outcome of the decline in fresh water supplies during the lean period. The struggle prospective originating from the meltdown of Himalayan glaciers triggers the causes leading to cross-border water-related disputes, such as per capita water availability, the level of water extractions for yearly use in relation to its availability, and the degree of dependency on water resources that flow in from the borders<sup>25</sup>.

## **Human Security and Disaster Management in Pakistan**

Natural disasters and their relation with human security challenges in Pakistan is at several levels and these calamities have claimed more lives and affected people in current years more than ever before. Pakistan is a region, which is prone to many natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones etc. It has an established structure of national, provincial and district level Disaster Management Departments in order to mitigate and manage disasters but the mechanisms are rather weak **as they don't** tackle human security and migration issues. It is evident that creating disaster resilience is not the only concern of disaster management authorities rather a combined effort of all the

important stakeholders comprising government, emergency planning authorities, business and community organizations.

### **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**

Its seven members including Pakistan approved in 2005 the Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management and Disaster Prevention, from which a number of disaster management bodies were initiated (SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre, SAARC Meteorological Research Centre, and SAARC Centre for Disaster Management and Preparedness)<sup>26</sup>.

### **Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)**

After observing the outcomes of the 26 December 2004 tsunami, APEC countries approved the Strategy on Response to and Preparedness for Natural Disasters Emergencies and created Task Force for Emergency Preparedness in 2005. In August 2008, they explained the Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia-Pacific Region: 2009 to 2015; which has the goal to improve bilateral and multilateral treaties on collaboration and training for disaster reduction but also cooperative disaster preparedness activities for twenty-one members including Pakistan<sup>27</sup>.

There are three main deficiencies in all collaborated initiatives of SAARC and APEC. First, these agreements are not able to address industrial disasters, as these do not assign responsibility to any institution or authority about paying compensation to victims. Whereas according to International Laws, it is obligatory to ascertain the responsible for compensating for the loss done to the environment and the inhabitants. Furthermore, current texts do not focus on the operative techniques to decrease the possible humanitarian impacts of disasters, decreasing the helplessness of people at threat. This can be attained by appropriate design of environmental legislation and observing their execution.

Thirdly, those texts do not tackle the difficulties of displaced persons who have to leave their homes because of natural and/or industrial disasters. Even though they pass the borders or move within the country, this phenomenon causes numerous concerns regarding their rights, rehabilitation, migration, etc. Hence, regional and sub-regional mediums should approve agreements along these guidelines to safeguard human security in disasters.

Financial barriers are present in the ways of implementation of policies that have been formulated for the integration of disaster risk reduction activities in development to deal with human security challenges. If funds are approved, the fair utilization of these funds becomes an issue, as we do not have a compatible accountability process to monitor the discrepancies in the process. Lack of effective training and problems related to incompetent staff also create hurdles in reaching the grass root level, hence the goal of coping up with human security dilemmas is difficult to achieve. There are good research institutions in the country but a very limited research is available on the problems associated with human **insecurity and its impact on Pakistan's economy in the long** run especially in the context of disaster management.

Recent disasters in Pakistan gave us many lessons, which are harsh realities. There are discrepancies in disaster preparedness plans at all levels; national, provincial and district. These include problems in communication networking and dissemination of information among concerned authorities/departments, delayed response due to mishandling of relief distribution, resource utilization, duty delegation to man power and lack of coordination within federal, provincial, district administration and community. These all factors led to huge losses of life and property.

There is no distinctly approved model of institutional adaptation to emerging paradigms of human security in the context of disaster management, nor are there perfect standards for what establishes a successful or effective institution. There is an evolving global trend that a number of

features matter, comprising an institution's legitimacy (legal and moral), its alertness to its components, its significant principles and its commitment to them, its capacity to learn and investigate, the amount of resources available to it, its independence from short-term political pressures, the quality of its management, and the transparency of its decision making process. When we evaluate all concerned authorities that are responsible for disaster management in Pakistan according to this criteria, we observe many weaknesses that impede the success in protecting human rights in pre, during and post disaster scenarios.

### **Policy Recommendations for Addressing the Problems of Human Security in Disaster Management**

In Pakistan, concerned disaster management authorities do not provide adequate legal and institutional framework to ensure human security. To resolve the dilemma of human insecurity in Pakistan, concerned institutions should ensure the provision of rights to environmentally displaced people. These rights include; rights to information sharing, rights to assistance, rights to water and food relief, rights to housing, rights to healthcare, rights to respect for the family, rights to education and training, and a right to work. Provisionally displaced persons should have a right to return to their dwelling whenever suitable for human habitation and their right to reintegration should be guaranteed by the state. Permanently displaced persons should have a right to relocate themselves in accordance with the plan approved by the Government. Operational insurance legislation in order to assist sufferers in resettlement process should be approved.

It is time we realize the impact of disaster is not only directly linked with human security but also has its impact on political, economic and social structure with long term effects. Unless we join hands in our field of knowledge, share information, stimulate awareness, increase responsiveness and use the already trained human resource effectively, there will always be fingers raised at us. The survivors of disasters in



gaining access to proper aid for assistance, recovery and mitigation of the effects of disasters must be supported. All concerned institutions must ensure the provision of all human **rights during crises and collaboration in building people's** resilience.

Awareness programmes or campaigns about causes and effects of climate change to build capability for adapting to its impact, mostly to poor and excluded people must be designed. Human rights need to be a focal point in all relief practices, emphasizing the right of those affected people to live with self-respect. At the same time, it is unquestionably significant that people should be enabled to change their conditions. The government, concerned authorities and communities must be well equipped and prepared to face the situations arising as consequence of a natural disaster. It needs serious collaborated effort at all levels to use all available resources in the best possible manner and create more opportunities for good quality research on human security problems associated with climate change as good research proposes effective current as well as future solutions. Recognition of the risks to human security related to climate change and disaster occurrences has initiated increasing attentiveness towards the linkages between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Therefore, it is the need of hour to establish research institution to propose appropriate strategies to address human security issues. Vulnerability reduction is a key tactic for decreasing disaster threats to human security. But, despite greater focus on the significance of political and economic security contexts, climate change adaptation and traditional disaster risk management practices continue to be mostly delinked from vulnerability reduction in our country. In fact, history of humanitarian responses to natural disasters in Pakistan presents a very few examples of practices associated with vulnerability reduction. It is a general trend that an unbalanced prioritization of relief and recovery **procedures to return to 'normality,' rather than concentrating** on the circumstances that cause danger and vulnerability. This general trend must be altered to make better efforts for improvement of human security.

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Reduction of root causes of vulnerability is very essential. Trying to discover the root causes guides us to explore the dynamics which are associated with human insecurities, complications related to lives and livelihood, health, education and environment. Communal Information System (CIS) must be developed in order to empower high-risk communities and equip decision makers with adequate skills to monitor vulnerability. This system is simple, inexpensive, demands little effort, is user friendly and of great utility as it must be implemented by the community. At the community level, events such as awareness campaigns, community meetings and the distribution of literature on early warning systems support to build individual capability to respond to emergencies and make certain that security measures are well understood by every person. Involvement of local women in all development actions is necessary; since it is the women who best know the elementary necessities of home and family.

Peace education interventions should be planned to work with the people and structures in a particular place, increasing their ability to form their own lives and surroundings within the agenda provided by the principles of a peace culture. School children, college & university students must be provided with new, exciting and interactive educational techniques to comprehend risk management and disaster risk reduction as a part of sustainable development. Electronic means of education have a lot of potential and provide unlimited prospects for capacity building in the area of disaster risk management and human security. However, the procedure of revolution in traditional culture of teaching and learning in Pakistani educational institutions will require comprehensive and constant efforts in the areas of training, advancement and availability of technology, to both students and teachers. International best practices, approaches and tools for data acquisition, mapping, hazard modeling, visualization, risk and vulnerability assessment and communications must be adopted on regular basis.

## **Conclusion**

In Pakistan, there is no commonly accepted definition of human security by concerned disaster management authorities and there is no particular scientific discipline to research on issues related to human security. There is a lack of formal training as well as linking mechanisms between disaster response and security. The governmental institutions are not investing to find solutions of human security problems and the most important domain is vulnerability reduction, which is being neglected at all planning and implementation levels. We cannot decrease the risks of natural disasters to human security but we can find the ways of coping up with these threats effectively. Climate change and disasters are uncertain and uncertainty requires proactive steps to control and reduce the loss. As the concept of human security is a comparatively new phenomenon, policy makers have had to reconsider techniques of safeguarding the physical security of people. Easy access to advanced technology can be combined with the aid and funding of global allies and means to protect individuals from natural disasters can be discovered. Human Security is directly related to disaster reduction, and improving human security secures the route towards sustainable development.

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# **WALKING AWAY FROM RADICALIZATION THROUGH EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN**

*Colonel (Retired) Arshad Mahmood*

## **Abstract**

*Radicalization is one the major threats to the stability of contemporary world. While analyzing the process of radicalization of a society, it is important to establish any possible correlation it has with the impediments of poverty or illiteracy already embedded within a society. Although Pakistani society survived the diversity in its ethnic, religious and sectarian composition, yet its social fiber was miserably damaged by the two international events that negatively influenced its political, and social cohesion: firstly, the long and sustained Afghan War (1979-89); and, subsequently the drastic events of the 9/11. The case-study of Pakistani society has been discussed in this research to highlight any possible role of illiteracy towards radicalizing a society and whether de-radicalization can be achieved by educating a society.*

**Keywords:** *Radicalization, Society, Illiteracy, Education*

## **Introduction**

Today, the prevailing national and international security dynamics have forced almost all the societies around the globe to combat new challenges related to their identity, belief and ideology. The technological advancement, growing economies and globalization, besides contributing towards enhancement in the quality of life, have also magnified the scale how domestic situation of a state can affect the international system. Cyber threat, climate change, population outburst, food security, unjust distribution of wealth and communal diseases are a few amongst various other phenomena that challenge the stability and security of the globe at large.

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Previously, the battles of insurgency and terrorism were fought within the territorial boundaries of a State. Yet lately, these conflicts have taken up the international stage by storm. Social, political, or religious ideals form the integral strands of a society; however, not respecting others ideals and asserting ones opinion through violent means or in a radical manner on others, results in chaos and unrest.

Pakistan is no exception to being victimized by the growing global trend of radicalization. Pakistani society for long survived the diverse mix of its racial, linguistic, cultural and religious composition. In his historic address to the first session of the constituent assembly on August 11, 1947, the father of the nation – Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah – **said, “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan” and, “....you will find in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”**<sup>1</sup>. Evidently, the philosophy behind creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947 was inclusive and pluralist in nature. However, the state later fell prey to the curse of radicalization.

The prevailing security paradox of the country and the vulnerability of its society towards radicalization is a derivative of social, economic as well as political disorder. One major cause which has led to the erosion of societal character of Pakistani nation is presumed to be its low preference to education. This paper is in context of finding a path for Pakistan to move away from radicalization and is based on the hypothesis that illiteracy breeds radicalization.

### **Conceptual Framework**

Researchers and political analysts from all schools of thought share unanimity of belief that states are the unitary actors in international relations. Beside their survival and security, states are also concerned about their identities in



international politics. A **state's** efforts to secure its national interests, territorial integrity and values, contributes in shaping its character in the international system.

The proponents of neo-classical school of thought assume **that no single variable can define a state's disposition; rather it's a sum total of diverse imperatives. When Gideon Rose coined the term neo-classical realism in a 1998 *World Politics* review article<sup>2</sup>, he was quite determined that a state's behaviour as a unitary actor in international politics depends upon three variables: firstly, *the systemic variable*, the order in which power is distributed in world order; secondly, *the cognitive variable*, the perception and misperception of states; and, thirdly, *the domestic variables*, the way a state's institutions, elite and other societal actors contribute in shaping a state's foreign relations.**

A state never compromises on degradation of its social fiber and accepts no regional and international compulsions in this regard. Although regional and international security and political orders pose direct threat, but poverty, illiteracy and social inequalities are equally dangerous challenges for a state at its domestic front.

Possessing individual opinion on social values is **everyone's right, but it is equally important to respect others norms and opinions as well. Molding others views by imposing one's own will**, leads a society to the path of radicalization. Radicalization as defined by Dutch Intelligence Service is nothing but the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to democratic structures and institutions<sup>3</sup>. Historically, only those nations could keep their identity intact who nib the monster of radicalization in the bud. The process of radicalization in a society starts from the day it allows extremist elements to grow. Radicalization does not overpower a society overnight yet if gone unchecked, it can result in eventual disintegration of a society. The Arab Spring that engulfed the Middle East – eroding its rich values and security dynamics – was an outcome of sustained social


injustices and denial of human rights under prolonged authoritarian regimes in the region. The early and correct identification of drivers of radicalization in a society is therefore vital for its sustainability.

## **Activation of Radicalization**

Radicalization involves two basic characteristics:

- Terrorists – the extreme or radical elements that are minimum in number within a society yet contain the capability of causing serious implications for it.
- Their recruitment cum operation is from within the fabric of the society. This can be conceptualized in the view of Mao Zedong that guerrilla soldiers must operate as ‘fish in the sea’<sup>4</sup>.

**Figure-1: Generalizing Process of Radicalization**



Source: Magnus Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe* (London, Routledge, 2010): 23

Radicalization can be described as a three layered process generating from roots of a society (Figure-1). The progression starts when at the third tier the whole or at large a society turns a blind eye, to extremist narratives being floated by a

radical agent. This provides tacit support to the process of radicalization and act as medium for terrorists to grow **validating Mao's theory of fish in the sea.**

From within the operating societal avenue, a young marginalized group emerges as 2<sup>nd</sup> tier. This group due to its strong political, social and economic division is considered most susceptible to radicalization as it is willing to assert itself in order to establish an identity. Finally amongst the alienated group, terrorists and their managers emerge at the top tier of radicalization pyramid.

## **Linkage of Education with Radicalization**

The subject of radicalization can be discussed in three tiers i.e. structural, societal and individual. It is important to note that all the three categories are interwoven and complement each other, but with different goals and objectives. No state would like its society to be a victim of radicalization, though it may use various tools in radicalizing societies of its rival states to destabilize them.

Taking radicalization as a dependent variable, there are two independent variables attached to it: (1) illiteracy which breeds radicalizations; and, (2) education that may stop a society from radicalization. Further, while analyzing the process of radicalization in a society, two questions carry significant importance: why does a society opt to follow the path of radicalization in the first place? and, how is an established factor – e.g. poverty or illiteracy – linked with the process of radicalization? All of these need independent analysis.

**Figure-2: Illiteracy Breeds Radicalizations**



## **Illiteracy Breeds Radicalization**

If illiteracy as an independent variable is the root-cause of this evil, the next query is related to its causal relationship with the dependent variable of radicalization. Illiteracy possesses a complex and multifaceted relationship with the process of radicalization. As explained in figure-2, this whole process unfolds as a chain reaction where; an ignorant and illiterate society, by virtue of holding poor capacity of conducting cost-benefit analysis at individual level would rarely be rational in its decision making process. Radical narrative may thus accommodate itself more easily in an **individual's perception and thought process**. Ted Robert Gurr explains in *Why Men Rebel* (1970) that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, according to Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis presented by Dollard and his colleagues in 1939, **“human become violent if they are frustrated in their efforts to attain a particular goal: severe frustration leads to anger and anger leads to violence”**<sup>6</sup>. Resultantly, a simple and ignorant society may thus turn violent more readily than an educated one.

## **Is Religion Linked with Radicalization?**

All prevailing explanations of radicalization reveal that it is not directly linked with religion – as no religion teaches violence as a valid mean to societal reforms. Use of religious values as a motivating force by radical elements is an easy methodology primarily due to three factors. Firstly, masses due to lack of religious knowledge, believe in whatsoever is told to them by the religious clergy. Secondly, they are very sensitive to their religious values and belief, preferring to sacrifice even their lives if convinced that their religious beliefs are under threat. Lastly, they always believe that solution to all their problems lies in implementation of religious system in the country. This makes politicization of religion for the purpose of propaganda and exploitation easier. The example of Swat, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) or the Movement for Enforcement of Islamic Law

**floated the narrative of “swift and correct” justice. It enforced** Wali of Swat rule under the banner of security and stability for the people of Swat<sup>7</sup>. Wretched with the lengthy, expensive and inefficient judicial system, the citizens of Swat valley had long desired for an efficient and accessible judicial system. Their popular demand was well exploited by the militant organizations to develop their narrative which contained a hidden agenda.

Though the proponents of variant theories of international relations hold opposing views on the role of religion in **shaping a state’s character in domestic as well as global** landscape, yet the historical evidence suggests that exploitation on basis of religious beliefs in a society for political gains is not a new concept. In the pre-Westphalia European societies, the social order was dominated by the Church. Church validation was considered to hold divine influence. Any contradiction to it was contemplated as **blasphemy. The overall effect of the Catholic Church’s** absolute dominance on social and political life of Europeans was extremely negative as it sparked unrest in society. Besides undergoing a long and bloody thirty year war in the sixteenth century, their societies turned to be highly radical with emergence of Protestants in Catholic Church. It was finally the Peace Treaty of Westphalia-1648, which laid the foundation of modern social order. Historians like Croxton believe that **“Westphalia was also celebrated in a religious context and the Peace of Westphalia as an inestimable gift of heaven”<sup>8</sup>.**

In the modern history of international relations, the element of religious violence can also be seen in Israel and India, besides extremist elements in Muslim societies in the aftermath of the 9/11. The major difference in all these cases is that in case of Israel and India, extremism is adopted as State policy, whereas, non-state radical actors with foreign support have shaped the grim security picture of Muslim states **especially in the Middle East. Israel and India’s elections are** contested on the basis of hardcore realism. For instance, in Israel the promising candidate in elections is the one who promises **to crush Palestinian’s legitimate right of existence.**

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No leader can win elections or survive his office if he follows the policy of coexistence with Palestinian population. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin was elected as Israeli Prime Minister and in three years came closer to peace with Palestinians than anyone else could have in 47 years. He was, however, assassinated in 1994 which subsequently marked the decline of the Israel-Palestinian peace process and hopes for a lasting settlement of the dispute<sup>9</sup>.

As regards to India, the surety-bond for success of a candidate lies in his skilfulness of utilizing Pakistan card, by provoking the already existing anti-Pakistan sentiment and hatred against minorities living in India. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian far-right regional political party, Shiv Sena are known for their staunch Hindu nationalist ideology. Shiv Sena turned to a violent anti-Muslim position in the late 1980s and has been in alliance with the BJP since then<sup>10</sup>. Their alliance won elections in 1995<sup>11</sup> and both have been involved in numerous acts of violence against minorities.

## **Education Scotches Radicalization**

If illiteracy is the major cause of radicalization, then education must be the right tool to counter it. An enlightened and educated society is less likely to buy radical narratives. Education reforms leading to political and economic betterment can reduce the risk of radicalization of a society.

## **Lessons from Abroad**

The evaluation of research done on radicalization of societies has helped in establish the linkages between radicalization and socio-political dynamics of a country. After 9/11, the US government came under increased pressure to counter radical elements that shape and intervene in its society<sup>12</sup>. It was, however, not before 2006 when the US administration commenced serious measures to counter it. The policy was aimed at close coordination with American Muslims to contain Al-Qaida's influence in the region. In May

2008 the Senate Homeland Security Committee presented a report which declared the US domestic counter-radicalization efforts as "limited and isolated"<sup>13</sup>. The incidences like Orlando shooting suggest that even President Obama has not invested much in de-radicalization of American society. A lot remains to be done in this direction.

Though Australian society does not face any serious threats of terrorism, but its government perceives a threat from foreign fighters and extremists, and thus has been working since 2010 on developing a Counter Violent Extremism Strategy<sup>14</sup>. The main focus of the initiative is on counter-radicalization with strong emphasis put on religious education assuming that radical Muslims possess narrow understanding of the Islamic teachings<sup>15</sup>.

From 2012-15, a perception survey was conducted in Dhaka city under Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), to establish causes of vulnerability of their society towards radicalization<sup>16</sup>. The structured questionnaire was designed to **view respondent's perception on radicalization from various** angles. The statistical results showed that over 58% consider illiteracy as the main cause of radicalization. Whereas, 55% to 56% people believe that youth and people with less knowledge of Islam are most vulnerable to radical organizations<sup>17</sup>.

The case-study of Nigeria is even more interesting, as the **country's security environments has seriously been undermined by non-state actors – especially Boko Haram – since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999. The concept** of radicalization in Nigeria, has gained significant currency among government officials, media practitioners, scholars and security officials<sup>18</sup>. In 2013, the US Institute of Peace commissioned a study to examine the factors of youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups in Nigeria<sup>19</sup> despite being offered incentives by their government. The commission report ascertained three factors as root-causes of the problem. Besides 83% results indicating poverty as the main cause, about 90% to 75% held religious ignorance and

illiteracy as being responsible for the growth of radicalization<sup>20</sup>.

## **Radicalization in Pakistan**

Until the fall of twin towers in New York on September 11, **2001, Pakistan's character in international community had** remained to be non-violent and that of a model moderate Islamic state. Its modest approach toward societal norms had not only been domestically acclaimed but it bore international recognition as well. Fawaz A Gergis in his account ***America and political Islam; clash of culture or clash of interests***, states that upon Pakistani premier **Benazir Bhutto's official** visit to White House in 1995, President Clinton praised Pakistan for blending the ideals of a young democracy with traditions and practices of Islam. Further Clinton also **acknowledged Pakistan's positive role in fighting international** terrorism and stressed its role as moderate Islamic country in Islamic world<sup>21</sup>. It is also worth highlighting that after the fall of communist Soviet Union, the US administration had considered two models for presentation to the newly emerged Islamic republics of Central Asia. Though, Bush tried to sell the Turkish model, Clinton was inclined towards Pakistan due to its moderate orientation in a politically volatile region<sup>22</sup>. Later, the drastic effects of the 9/11 and ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT) completely turned the tables for Pakistan.

In a historical perspective, the account of radicalization of the country can be discussed in three periods: Political Radicalization (1947-1971); Sectarianism (1971-2001); and, Extremism/Terrorism (2001 to date).

## **Period of Political Radicalization (1947-1971)**

Soon after its inception, Pakistan had to face a number of challenges related to its survival and identity on the world map. A number of internal and external dynamics also played significant role in **building Pakistan's initial image in the** world. As a newly emerged state with meager resources, **Pakistan's first and foremost concern by the late 1940s and**



early 1950s was related to its survival. The obvious Indian threat at its Eastern border, and the Cold War rivalries between superpowers forced Pakistani elite to opt for the politics of alliances. Whether, the decision of joining the American camp was rational or not, but it proved to be the first step towards political polarization of the society, and **played a decisive role in reshaping Pakistan's international image.**

**The state's internal challenges were even more complex in nature.** The country suffered tremendous economic hardships during its initial period. This was coupled with exploitation of masses at the hands of power hungry politicians. Yet another **factor was the State's search for a new identity within the international system.** Although the Pakistan movement was **run on basis of "Two-Nations Theory", but the father of the nation never wanted it to be a theocratic State.** Quaid's **address to the country's first constituent assembly on August 11, 1947 clearly speaks of his vision of Pakistan's identity as a tolerant and moderate society. To this regard he said: "We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State"**<sup>23</sup>. Many religious and political philosophers of the country, however, forged a separate identity for the newborn nation resulting in a political divide based on religion within the society.

The most significant factor responsible for political **radicalization of the society was the country's initial governance issues.** From 1947 to 1958, Pakistan had tried eight Prime Ministers, four Governor Generals and two Presidents<sup>24</sup>. Apart from Khan Liaquat Ali Khan, all were raised to and removed from power undemocratically. Furthermore, this period is marked with continuous power struggle between the offices of President and Prime Minister<sup>25</sup>. This overall situation paved way for Army to step into politics by taking over the democratically elected **government in 1957. Furthermore, the country's first general elections were held in 1970, which was about quarter of a century after its independence.** This further ignited the process of political radicalization making the citizens

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especially those of East Pakistan feel victimized as seconded by the relative deprivation theory. This resulted in the **eventual dismemberment of the country's Eastern wing** in 1971.

### **Period of Sectarianism (1971-2001)**

The second phase of **Pakistan's history** proved to be even worse from the perspective of growth in radicalization. In a nutshell the country's prevailing security situation is the spin-off of its domestic and foreign imperatives. Three important events can be seen as major contributors towards this development: first, the Afghan War (1979-89); second, the **Iranian revolution; and, third, the Kashmiri's movement** for their right of self-determination.

In 1979, two important developments occurred on **Pakistan's north-west** (Afghanistan) and west (Iran) borders. Iran underwent Islamic revolution involving the overthrow of Pahlavi dynasty and its eventual replacement with Islamic republic. The same year, former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan for the fulfillment of its geo-strategic objectives. The Soviet strategic miscalculations encouraged the US to build a coalition against communism and to bring the cold war to an end. Both the above mentioned **events in Pakistan's** immediate neighbourhoods left an everlasting implication on the **State's economic, security and social paradigms**.

Pakistan could neither afford to remain aloof from all the regional complexities, nor did its leadership make any rational choice in securing long term national interests. Pakistan not only became **Washington's frontline ally in its fight against** Moscow, but also trained proxies to counter USSR for USA, in terms of training, armament and financial liaison. Pakistan was further burdened by the influx of over 3.2 million Afghan refugees on its land.

The third significant development occurred in the form of resurgence of Kashmir movement in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) in 1987. Not anticipating its long term

implications, Pakistani decision makers rendered moral and physical support to Kashmiri freedom fighters so as to attrite Indian forces in the disputed territory. By definition anything a state does beyond its territorial limits, is an extension of its foreign policy. Every state has the right to privatize its assets but no government can afford to privatize its foreign policy. Pakistani leadership, however, did so by implementing its Kashmir policy through non-state actors<sup>26</sup>. Pakistan paid a very heavy toll for its flawed Kashmir policy in terms of growth of extremists in the society during 1980s and 90s.

**The country's leadership also failed to prevent Saudi Arabia and Iran in promoting their religious ideologies.** The flow of funds and weapons – though in the name of Afghan Mujahedeen – soon promoted a new societal culture i.e. the sectarianism. Unfortunately, the same society which was known for its moderate character started transforming the extremist in favour of their particular sectarian beliefs.

### **Period of Extremism and Terrorism (2001 to date)**

**In the third phase of country's history, the nation** has been reaping what was sown by its leadership. Although the aftershocks of the 9/11 were experienced by almost every nation but Pakistan was the worst-hit. The worst thing happened to the country in the GWOT is that the image of the country was demonized at the international level, besides evoking internal differences amongst various sects and ethnic groups.

**Suddenly it wasn't the same Pakistan as it was before the 9/11, as today radicalization has emerged as the biggest threat to Pakistan's sovereignty and needs to be curbed intelligently with vigour and visionary state's policies.**

### **Analyzing Pakistan's Education System and its Effects on Society**

Illiteracy alone cannot be held responsible for an increasing trend of radicalization in any society including the

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Pakistani society. It is an accumulating effect of a number of internal and external variables under which a state is bound to operate. For the case-study of Pakistani society taken in this research; the role of illiteracy has been conceived as a major cause of radicalization. It encompasses two aspects ONE, education or literacy is directly linked with other economic, political and social phenomena; and, TWO, it is a solution oriented hypothesis i.e. if illiteracy is the cause, then radicalization can be best encountered with education.

### **Elites Perceptions viz-a-viz Performance of Educational Sector**

The proponents of Neo-classical theory of IR are of the **view that a state's domestic and international behaviour** is a reflection of its **elite's** perception. Particularly in case of third world countries that have remained under colonial power, elites thinking is vividly visible in their domestic as well foreign policy. The dilemma of the third world is that their elite perception is largely coloured by the experiences of colonialism that these societies have undergone<sup>27</sup>. Since Pakistan and India have remained under prolonged British rule, their policies towards social and education reforms show **clear imprints of their colonial master's legacy**. There is a persistence of colonial policies in both the countries especially in the field of education. This has kept the education system away from growth and innovation. A critical evaluation of the **Pakistan's education system and its contribution towards** radicalization of society is therefore fundamental in finding a future course of action for the nation.

### **Pakistan's International Standing in Education**

Once compared with the international standards, **Pakistan's performance** is far too low in education sector at present. As per the statistics of "The National Plan of Action (2013/14-2015/16)" only 68 percent of children (between the age of 5 and 9) are enrolled every year<sup>28</sup>. Among the out-of-school children the predominant reason for girls is "parents do not allow" (40 percent) and "boys not interested" (37

percent), followed by heavy education expenses (16-21 percent)<sup>29</sup>.

**While relating the country's relative position with other members of international community, one finds that Pakistan's successive governments have performed poorly in education sector. The state's literacy rate is under 55 percent.** As per the United Nations Institute of Statistics report there are 78 countries with over 90 percent of literacy rate including China, Japan, US, UK, France and Germany. Even India and Bangladesh with over 60 percent are ahead of Pakistan<sup>30</sup>. This makes the country's ranking at almost rock bottom of global landscape i.e. 139 out of 153 nations<sup>31</sup>.

**To counter radicalization, the country's elite** is required to realign their priorities by giving education its due share. Adequately educating the future generation is need of the hour so that it does not fall prey to extremist ideologies.

### **Types of Education Systems**

There are three parallel education systems currently working in the country: public, private and religious education systems<sup>32</sup>. The public sector or Urdu medium caters for the larger population of the country – comprising approximately 60 percent of the total 90 percent school going children<sup>33</sup> – belonging to lower middle and middle class. Religious seminaries (*Madrassah*) cater for the poorest strata of the society which cannot afford the upbringing of their children. Boarding and lodging in *Madrassah* is free and most of the funding is through donations collected / received from within and outside the country. The upper middle and elite class, however, send their children to private English medium educational institutions.

### **Quality of Education**

The concept of education is not related to the number of years one spends in an education system or just acquiring a degree, rather as to what content is being taught to the

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scholars. Within each education system there are multiple syllabi being taught in different institutions. Each religious seminary teaches what is aligned to its philosophical ideology. Worst of all, every faction considers only their values to be correct, whereas, very few advocate on respecting others beliefs. Consequently, the element of tolerance and critical thinking starts to diminish the moment a child is inducted in such an educational institution. This paves the way for radicalization.

Similarly, public sector has also miserably failed in developing national consensus on standardized syllabi. With the approval of 18<sup>th</sup> **amendment in the State's Constitution**, education sector has now shifted from federation to its federating units. The jurisdiction change has delegated the key subject of education policy, curriculum, planning and standards to the exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction of provinces<sup>34</sup>. So every province has set its own education standards and goals to achieve with no national level objectives.

Likewise, the private institutions have their own agenda. Being rather expensive, they are not meant for the majority of the population, and even within them there is no standard curriculum.

This disparity in system of education is the major cause of polarization of societal attitudes. These are not simply different systems or curricula, rather different mind-sets being taught and groomed within the same society. These different mindsets breed different ideologies and approaches toward societal and national norms and values, ultimately resulting into extreme polarization and possible clash of interest within a society.

## **Investment on Education**

Western states have learnt the value of education and progress the hard way through their bloody history of violent conflicts. The highly radicalized societies of pre-Westphalia

era, transformed to serene culture with the rise of enlightened movement in the seventeenth century. The main emphasis of the enlightened thinkers was on tolerance, reasoning, progress and liberty of ideas. Out of political necessity, a certain level of tolerance of different creeds had occurred in the seventeenth century<sup>35</sup>.

This is the main reason as to why they invest so heavily in education. France, US and UK, all spend approximately six percent of their GDP on just maintaining what milestones they have achieved in education. Even Russia, Japan and China spend between 4 to 5 percent on education<sup>36</sup>. Pakistan, despite not having fully developed educational setup, spends just over two percent on enhancement of literacy level in the country<sup>37</sup>.

### **Incentives and Job Securities**

Two significant queries are interlinked once it comes to attraction of youth to radical narrative: what incentives they **enjoy and how they are injected in the State's economic system** upon completion of higher education. As regards to **former, it's worth mentioning that lack of incentives is one of** the major causes of out-of-school and dropout children from schools. Education in Pakistan is too expensive and with limited state sponsorship, it becomes even inaccessible to a large population. Statistics show that Pakistan falls in the category of higher rate of unemployment. Where countries like New Zealand, Denmark, Estonia, Kuwait and Turkmenistan which have shown negative trend towards unemployment, Pakistan is still struggling with over 5 percent of unemployment<sup>38</sup>.

The situation of education policy is contributing negatively in directing youth towards radical organizations and narratives.

### **Important Conclusions**

The inquiry on the root-causes of the radicalization, **linkage of illiteracy and evaluation of Pakistan's education**

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system, quality of education and state's preference to education leads us to following conclusions:-

- States always remain committed in securing their national interests and concerned about their identity in international politics. Neo-classical realism theory of international **relations claims that a state's character in** the world politics depends on three variables i.e. systemic, cognitive and domestic variables.
- States are at a constant war with forces from within and outside their geographical territory that challenge their social, cultural and religious values.
- With overall advancement in technologies, economies and globalization certain small scale domestic issues have grown into dangerous global challenges. Radicalization, likewise, has become an international phenomenon calling for a collective response to save the future and security of international system.
- Radicalization is a three layered process which generates from within the roots of a society and if not tackled with timely and accurate measure, results in disintegration of the society and threatens the larger international scenario as well.
- Studies conducted by nations vulnerable to extremism suggest that radicalization is universal phenomenon.
- Amongst all established factors poverty and illiteracy are two dominating reasons that contribute to the susceptibility of a society towards radicalization.
- There is no particular variable that leads to the radicalization of a society, and therefore no single variable leads to de-radicalization.
- Despite the diversity in ethnic, religious and sectarian population, Pakistani society remained moderate for a long time after its inception in 1947. However, two international events and state negatively dealing with them contributed in encouraging radical narratives being floated and adopted by the citizens of the State: firstly, the long and sustained Afghan War (1979-89); and, subsequently the drastic events of the 9/11.



- Like any other society illiteracy and low preference to education is the major cause of growing radicalization in Pakistani society and education holds the key to de-radicalize it.

## **Walking Away from Radicalization**

After having established that it is the lack of educational prospect and the content being taught in the existing education system that has contributed in radicalizing a previously moderate society, it is now plausible to find ways through proper educational policies and appropriate syllabi content to de-radicalize the society. A few plausible measures are recommended below which may help in doing the same.

- **Education Emergency:** In order to defeat the growing extremism and radical ideologies, there is a dire need to launch a whole-hearted campaign against illiteracy and bring the country's education level to world class standard. It is recommended that the state should declare "Education Emergency" in the country with the aim to achieve literacy level over 90 percent in the next five years. This would bear double advantage of not only improving Pakistan's soft image abroad and moderating the masses at home. Ultimately, the people of Pakistan shall transform into rational actors and their chances of falling prey to radical theories would reduce drastically.
- **Investment on Education:** There is a famous Chinese proverb which states that, "if you are planning for a year, sow rice; if you are planning for a decade, plant trees; but if you are planning for lifetime, educate people." Nations all across the globe make investments for hundred years to come. The best investment for making a nation is in the education sector. It is recommended that Pakistan – as part of education emergency campaign – should enhance its education spending to over 7 percent of its GDP till we achieve the target of over 90 percent education rate. Later, the

allocation on education should not fall below 5 percent per year.

- **One-Nation-One-Education:** Following the philosophy of “One-Nation-One-Education,” there should be one education system in the whole country which should strictly be under state’s control. There may be education institutions working under private, public and missionaries, but there should not be any discrimination as regards to admissions, funding, fee structure, medium of education and examination policy. Further, there should be one curriculum applicable in all institutions. The curriculum should meticulously be prepared and scrutinized keeping in mind the national goals and objectives, religious and social values to attain the element of pluralism.
- **Enticements and Incentives:** In order to make education accessible to all and motivate people to send their children to school following measure are recommended. Firstly, policy for free and compulsory education for all up to secondary level be announced. Secondly, for higher secondary level, every institution be instructed to introduce scholarship for needy and talented children. Similarly, for higher education, fee waiver should be granted to students who secure positions in board examination. Thirdly, in order to encourage industrialists, landlords and business community for contributing towards this as a national cause, it is recommended that, tax relaxation be given to those who take educational responsibility of lower class, especially the children of their employees. Last but not the least, it is recommended that all those students securing first five positions in universities, be given guaranteed jobs in public sector.

## **Conclusion**

Radicalization, with the passage of time has become a global phenomenon which poses a serious threat to the security paradigm of the world at large. As an international threat radicalization also needs to be tackled with joint efforts

by international institutions and actors. While conducting a terrorist attack, terrorists do not segregate targets between religion, nationality, creed, gender and age, rather collateral damage is done in order to spread fear and violence. Similarly, in our effort to combating terrorism, there should be no discrimination. A terrorist should be treated as a terrorist irrespective of his religion, nationality, creed, gender or age.

At home front, there is a need of adopting even a more pragmatic and rational approach while dealing with this problem. Apart from efforts by the state, it is the responsibility of each one of us to identify the radical elements in our ranks and critically analyze their narrative in the light of the teaching of our religion. That could only be possible when we are aware of the true meaning and philosophy of our religion. Without education this is not possible.

Lastly, education is not related to the numbers of years one spends in an educational system or the degree which one attains, but the quality of knowledge and enlightenment attained through this. There is no security for the future of our generations, if we fail to impart quality education to them.

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## **Notes**

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# **CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC): PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD**

*Brigadier Waseem Ishaque*

## **Abstract**

*To realize the vision of common prosperity of mankind, President Xi Jinping's initiative on strategic vision of "One Belt One Road" or Silk Road Economic Belt and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road, are indeed manifestations of "Great Chinese Dream" of regional connectivity and enhanced economic integration which prevailed in the past and have to be revitalized for eventual benefit of relevant countries, the region and the world at large. Pakistan-China relations have special significance; therefore, Pakistan has been integrated in the esteemed project of "One Belt and One Road" through CPEC.*

*This paper outlines the contours of Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (CPEC), its strategic significance as part of "One Belt and One Road" vision and its paybacks to China, Pakistan and the region. Certain questions have also been put across for accruing the opportunities it offers to China and Pakistan. The paper also highlights various challenges being faced by both China and Pakistan in executing the vision and proposes way forward.*

**Key Words:** *One Belt One Road, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Win-Win Cooperation, Fate Changer for Pakistan, Regional Integration*

## **Introduction**

The Center of Gravity of world economy is leaning towards Asia with the rise of China as an economic giant at the international stage. The Chinese people are peace loving, peace searching and peace developing. With an exceptional history of more than 5000 years of uninterrupted civilization,

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the Chinese nation has enormously contributed towards the progress and the development of mankind. Empirically it has been proved that Chinese nation despite foreign aggressions, invasions and humiliations have never become revengeful with personal vendetta and have never demonstrated to be hegemonic. Survival and Self Help have been the dominant underpinnings as a national priority. Thus it can be appreciated that peaceful development of China is for the better service to humanity and inclusive development of the world through win-win cooperation. **China's practical steps in line with these objectives make it clear that the good neighbour approach to diplomacy encompassed in its harmonious world concept has become the basic blueprint for its international strategy.** The vision of a harmonious world stalks from the ancient Chinese culture and symbolizes the **Chinese cultural desire and practice of "advocating peace", "acting in good faith and cultivating friendship with neighbours", and "living in harmony with all others far and near". National rejuvenation and Peaceful development are at the core of policy planning which is summarized in the comprehensive concept of Chinese Dream. President Xi Jinping States "To realize Chinese Dream, we must adhere to peaceful development. We will unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development, unswervingly pursue the mutually beneficial and win-win strategy of opening up. We are not just committed to China's own development; we are equally serious about fulfilling our responsibilities and making contributions to the rest of the world. Our development will not only benefit the Chinese people, but also the rest of the world"**<sup>1</sup>. It can be understood explicitly that China's peaceful development is not China specific, rather caters for Chinese nation's great aspirations of positive contributions towards humanity and common development of rest of the world with inclusive coexistence.



## **Analytical Debate on China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)**

### **The Origin of CPEC**

The Corridor strategy can be traced back to the 1960s as **part of Pakistan's efforts to develop Gwadar port as an** alternate port and shipping hub, which could ultimately uplift province of Balochistan, serve as an important conduit for China and assume the role of regional transit and transportation hub in maritime domain. The geo strategic environment following 1960s did not favour the initiation of project, therefore remained in the background. In November 2006, President Musharraf during his visit to Beijing initiated the vision of trade corridor between China and Pakistan linking Kashgar with Gwadar via Korakoram Highway (KKH). The cornerstones of the project remained the Gwadar port and the trans-Pakistan pipeline. **Pakistan's political instability following Musharraf's standoff with judiciary distracted the government and no worthwhile progress could be made.**

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan on 22-23 May 2013 outlined strategic vision of Pakistan-China Economic Corridor. The project was hailed by then President Asif Ali Zardai and the Prime Minister in waiting Mr Nawaz Sharif during their meetings with the visiting Chinese Premier. Pakistani media, think tanks and public expressed full support with lot of enthusiasm and thanked China for assisting Pakistan with huge investment. President Xi Jinping has also given his full support to the project. The vision was immediately followed by all the relevant ministries of Pakistan and China and great progress has been made in actualizing the concept.


During the visit of Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain to China in February 2014, both the countries reiterated solidifying their plans on proposed Economic Corridor. President Mamnoon Hussain stated in Beijing on last day of his **visit on 19 February 2014 that “project is going to be a**

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*monument of the century. It will benefit not only Pakistan and China, but also the whole region with billions of people”<sup>2</sup>.*

### **Components of CPEC Vision**

To benefit Pakistan from President Xi Jinping’s strategic vision of “One Belt and One Road” exclusive mega projects for Pakistan have been envisioned with name of “*China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will serve as catalyst for Pakistan economic development*”<sup>3</sup>. The proposed Economic Corridor stretches about 3000 KMs from Kashgar in Xinjiang Province to Gwadar in Balochistan Province of Pakistan. “*US\$ 45.6 billion have been proposed for the project which is expected to be completed by 2030*”<sup>4</sup>.



### ***Proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor***<sup>5</sup>

In November 2014, the Government of China announced investment of S \$45.6 billion in several energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC with the breakdown as;” *investment of around \$33.8 billion in various energy projects and \$11.8 billion in infrastructure projects. US\$622 million have been pledged for the development of Gwadar port. Under the CPEC agreement, \$15.5 billion worth of coal, wind, solar and hydro energy projects will add 10,400 megawatts of energy to the national grid of Pakistan to alleviate the growing energy crisis*”<sup>6</sup>.

CPEC has three main components which are discussed separately.

## **Karakoram Sector**

Gilgit-Baltistan, the northern extreme of CPEC is of increasing significance to the Pakistan and China as the 1984 occupation of the Siachen Glacier by the Indian army injected a militarized element into the area. The proximity of Gilgit-Baltistan to Afghanistan, Tajikistan and India, in addition to Xinjiang and Tibet, makes the region a strategic, logistical and political asset. Road connectivity with China via Karakoram Highway (KKH) enabled Pakistan to access Gilgit-Baltistan, and Xinjiang and also helps safeguard political and strategic interests of Pakistan. The structures are maintained and **upgraded by Frontier Works Organization (FWO), China's Production and Construction Corps (PCCC) and telecom companies like Huawei, Zong, ZTE and Pakistan's Special Communications Organization (SCO),** provide uninterrupted coverage to Gilgit-Baltistan including major towns along the KKH, which improves connectivity and surveillance capabilities. The up-gradation plan will convert KKH into a 90-feet wide express way for a threefold increase in the existing capacity. Corridor Development Plan is construction of 19 tunnels, which will be dug out on the road- stretch between Hunza and Khunjerab Pass. One major tunnel called **"Friendship Tunnel" will pass under the infamous Khunjerab Pass, which is also known as China's Khyber Pass will provide** all weather access to revolutionize inter-regional travel and freight carriage. Further, a 1,100 km long rail-link will also be **laid, which will cut the distance between Pakistan's capital Islamabad and Kashgar to seventeen hours.** In addition, oil and gas pipelines (OGP) will also run across the corridor linking the existing fuel-lanes of Central Asia and China to refineries on Pakistani ports, and the Middle East. Fiber optic communication link will also be established in second phase of the project.

## **Gwadar Sector**

Pakistani ports and KKH are the lynchpins that ensure **China's long term economic sustainability. The Gwadar port** eventually, will give China an entry point into the Arabian Gulf, thus widening its geopolitical influence in the region. China is also planning to improve the holding capacity of Gwadar port to 100,000 dead weight tonnage (dwt) of dry cargo and 200,000 dwt of oil tankers. The development and operationalisation of Gwadar Port will be of strategic significance for both China and Pakistan. Especially for China, the distance from Gwadar port to western province of Xinjiang is approximately 3000 KMs, which is significantly less than the sea route passing through Strait of Malacca, thus the trade through CPEC between Africa –Middle East and mainland China will be greatly facilitated. The oil can also be stored and pumped through proposed pipe line to China from Middle East. *“In particular oil from the Middle East could be offloaded at Gwadar, which is located just outside the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and transported to China through the Balochistan province in Pakistan. Such a link would vastly cut the 12,000-kilometre route that Mideast oil supplies must now take to reach Chinese ports”*<sup>7</sup>. For Pakistan, the development of Gwadar port will serve as an alternate commercial hub which provides an alternative strategic link to the mainland Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and China. The development and expansion of Gwadar Port to enable it to operate as commercial port with allied oil and other storage facilities and construction of international airport at Gwadar will also be carried out by 2017.

## **Mainland Pakistan Networks**

The work at fenced four-lane **motorway in the country's** northwest has already begun. The 60-km-long, 4-lane fenced Hazara Motorway in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province will cost \$297m and take two years to complete. The Gwadar-Kashghar route was originally planned to run through Bisima, Khuzdar, Kalat and Quetta onto Zhob, D. I. Khan, Hassan Abdal and onwards to Kashghar (Western route) but it has been

changed to Bisima, Ratodero and towards Punjab (Eastern route), which means bypassing the Baloch and Pakhtun areas. The eastern route does not include a major portion of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from where the project was otherwise supposed to wind through. According to the new plan, the corridor route turns from Havelian towards the East and links up with the Islamabad-Lahore Motorway, to include Punjab. From here, the corridor is linked to the Lahore-Karachi Motorway and then to Gwadar. That is why there were recent protests in the Senate by members from Khyber- Pashtunkhwa (KP), FATA and Balochistan. Officials at the Planning Commission argue that the completion of infrastructure in K-P and Balochistan will take a few years and thus it was imperative to utilize the existing infrastructure. This was done to accommodate Chinese concerns rooted in the security condition in K-P and Balochistan. Recently, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly unanimously passed a resolution opposing any change in the western route. There is now a third plan under consideration which also envisions going through Balochistan and KP covering economically backward parts of the country.

Pakistan railways in cooperation with Chinese Consortium will establish Gwadar-Khunjab Rail Link at an estimated cost of over US\$ 2.3 Billion. Pakistan Intermodal Limited (PIL) **will be Pakistan's First Private Train Operator**, to facilitate efficient and cost effective freight movement between Pak-China Economic Corridor through its well established intermodal network across Pakistan.

### **Analysis of the Opportunities Brought by China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)**

CPEC promises enormous opportunities for China, Pakistan and the entire region. However, certain research questions have been formulated to build comprehensive debate on the opportunities:-

- Will the prospects of corridor further strengthen China and Pakistan's relations?
- How security of both China and Pakistan will be

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- maximized?
- Will Pakistan be able to optimize from greater regional connectivity?
- How CPEC will become economic fate changer for Pakistan?
- What prospects of enhancing people to people contact are promised by CPEC?
- Will construction of mega projects be completed as per planned timeline?
- How CPEC will be a new modal of win win cooperation and help in building community of common interests.

### **Will China and Pakistan's Relation Solidify?**

CPEC is the practical manifestation of ever flourishing relations between China and Pakistan, where President Xi Jinping's strategic vision of "One Belt and One Road" separately caters for development and connectivity with aim to assist Pakistan to reap the benefits of China's economic development and regional integration initiatives. Chairman Pakistan – China Institute Islamabad Senator Mushahid Hussain opines that the *"relations with China were a factor of national unity in Pakistan since all political parties and provinces supported it"*<sup>8</sup>. During his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, Premier Li Keqiang stressed in his meeting with President Zardari that his visit to Pakistan will *"open a new chapter in bilateral ties, chart a new course for practical cooperation and thus lift their traditional friendship to a new heights"*<sup>9</sup>. He also added that *"the all-weather cooperative friendship between China and Pakistan not only boasts a solid foundation but also enjoys great prospects"*<sup>10</sup>. Prime Minister in Waiting at that time Nawaz Sharif in his one on one meeting with Premier Li described that *"the friendly foreign policy toward China has been the common aspiration of all Pakistani people, and Pakistan regards it as a priority no matter which party takes power"*<sup>11</sup>. Chinese Premier Li Kiaqing in his meeting with speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly on 30 January 2015 stated that *"China-Pakistan economic corridor functions as the strategic framework for the cooperation of the two nations"*<sup>12</sup>.

## **Will CPEC Enhance China's Security?**

China's economic, political and security interests are interlinked. Without short and safe overland connection to the ports, China will find its security interests compromised since it lacks blue-water naval capacity and aircraft carriers in the Gulf. With almost half of its oil imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz, China is conscious of the need to enhance its political and security influence in the region. Linking Gwadar ports overland to Chinese western provinces attains significance. Maintaining control over Khunjrab Pass will also help China maintain its control over Shaksgam and the neighbouring valleys, which otherwise may create choke points along the historical silk route and threaten Chinese control of Xinjiang. At the same time, overland access to Iran and Afghanistan from Pakistan will help reduce threat perceptions arising from the Indian and American presence in the Gulf. By approaching Afghanistan through Gilgit-Baltistan rather than Central Asia, China will benefit by avoiding competition with Russia for strategic depth in what Russia considers its near abroad.

## **Addressing Malak Dilemma for China?**



*(Sea Lines of Communications<sup>13</sup>)*

*(CPEC<sup>14</sup>)*


The development and operationalisation of Gwadar Port will be of strategic significance for both China and Pakistan.

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Especially for China, the distance from Gwadar port to western province of Xinjiang is approximately 3000 KMs, which is significantly less than the sea route passing through Strait of Malacca, thus the trade through CPEC between Africa –Middle East and mainland China will be greatly facilitated. The oil can also be stored and pumped through proposed pipe line to China from Middle East. *“In particular oil from the Middle East could be offloaded at Gwadar, which is located just outside the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and transported to China through the Balochistan province in Pakistan. Such a link would vastly cut the 12,000-kilometre route that Mideast oil supplies must now take to reach Chinese ports”*<sup>15</sup>. Similarly, the development and opening of Chinese western provinces will be greatly facilitated. For Pakistan, the development of Gwadar port will serve as an alternate commercial hub and provide alternate strategic link to the mainland Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and China. Addressing at Boao Forum on 14 April 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated *“Our geography links China and the New Silk Road to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. This is the linear dimension of our relevance with the Silk Road”*<sup>16</sup>.

### **Will it result in Greater Regional Connectivity and Integration for Pakistan?**

CPEC is aimed to integrate the economies of both China and Pakistan. Several economic zones and hubs have also been planned along the proposed route to generate economic activates, alleviate poverty and offer huge economic incentives for the population to the adjoining areas of CPEC.



(Gwadar Port Regional Reach<sup>17</sup>)



Apart from bilateral benefits, CPEC will also transform future of entire region driven by the economic activities, energy supplies through construction and development of ports, pipelines, railway infrastructure and roads. Senator Mushahid Hussain reiterates that *“will play a crucial role in regional integration of the ‘Greater South Asia’, which includes China, Iran, Afghanistan, and stretches all the way to Myanmar”*<sup>18</sup>. Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that *“the corridor will serve as a driver for connectivity between South Asia and East Asia”*<sup>19</sup>. Similarly Central Asia will also get access to Gwadar through Afghanistan.



(CPEC, importance for regional countries<sup>20</sup>)

CPEC is assumed to be strategically vital for both China and Pakistan due to its growing trade, regional collaboration and development of Gwadar Port. It also offers win-win opportunity for both friendly countries. According to Director General of Planning Commission of Pakistan, Syed Mujtaba Hussain, *“CPEC has the potentials to turn Pakistan into hub of regional cooperation if the opportunity is wisely availed in Pakistan”*<sup>21</sup>. China played a key role in the construction of Gwadar Port which was completed in 2007, with the cost of US \$1.6 billion in the project. Its attractiveness derives from its location as a deep and warm-water port just 250 miles from the Strait of Hormuz through which 40% of the world’s oil supplies are transported. The operation of this port has

also been handed over to China since 2011, which was previously being operated by Singapore Port Authority.

### **Will CPEC be an Economic Fate Changer for Pakistan?**

CPEC is widely believed as a fate changer for Pakistan due to unprecedented investment of US\$ 45.6 billions promised by China for Pakistan. As per the statement of Senator Mushahid Hussain, The Chairman Pakistan-China Institute Islamabad *“CPEC is of huge significance for the revival of Pakistan’s ailing economy, the resolution of energy crisis and strengthening of federation of Pakistan through development and building of infrastructure”*<sup>22</sup>. Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif in his meeting with Mr Yu Boren, the Chinese first Consul General in Lahore stated that *“Pakistan-China Economic Corridor is an important step in the growing trade and economic relations between the two countries and will usher in a new era of progress and prosperity in Pakistan”*<sup>23</sup>.

### **Will CPEC be a new Model of Win-Win Cooperation between China and Pakistan?**

Both Pakistan and China have to gain immensely from the CPEC which contains huge potential in several fields. Khalid Masood, President of Islamabad Council of World Affairs opines that *“CPEC will bring development and prosperity for both China and Pakistan. It can help China get connected with the Gulf region, Africa, Europe and the other parts of the world in an easier way and in a shorter time. Meanwhile, for Pakistan, there will be more business and trade activities in the region. Pakistan will also become the center of energy transmission from the Gulf region”*<sup>24</sup>. It is widely appreciated that the successful completion of CPEC will open new vistas of commerce, trade, transportation and energy supplies.

## **Will CPEC provide New Opportunities for Enhancing People to People Contacts?**

The ever expanding relations between China and Pakistan is manifested through Premier Li stated during his address to Pakistan's Parliament in 2013, *"Chinese people refer to Pakistan as Iron Pakistan, meaning that the Chinese people view Pakistan as a trustworthy friend and the friendship is as solid as iron"*<sup>25</sup>. Premier Li further added that although *"all-weather friendship has strong public support, and urged to further expand their people-to-people and cultural exchanges as they are the solid foundation for the development of bilateral ties"*<sup>26</sup>. CPEC promises huge opportunities of people to people and cultural exchange programmes due to enhanced communication facilities and better travel and lodging facilities for tourists, media, public and students of both countries.

## **Will Construction of Mega Infrastructure Development Projects be timely Completed?**

The proposed vision involves massive construction projects of roads, railways, infrastructure developments in the domain of transportation, trade and investment, energy and related natural resources. Construction of oil storage facilities, oil refineries at Gwadar and development of pipelines from Gwadar to Kashgar and several logistic hubs along the route have been proposed, which apart from bringing economic activities will also generate huge employment opportunities and business activities in Pakistan. The expansion and re-alignment of KKH will allow speed with safety and cost reduction by accommodating heavy-laden trailers under extreme climatic conditions. The corridor development project will link Central Asia and China to the Asian highway network, passing through Afghanistan and Iran. In essence, the conduit will facilitate a range of world class transport services such as freight management, trucking, modern dry-port infrastructure, an efficient logistical chain, customs clearance and border terminals, which will lead to a quantum leap in regional trade. This upgrade will ease commercial

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exchanges to further integrate Pakistan's economy with north-western China. The corridor is expected to serve the economic needs of both countries with an eye on advancing their strategic interests in the Gulf. Expanding the Karakoram Corridor to an expressway, railway line and OGP through it may help reduce the trade volume along the sea-lanes. Similarly, the existing motorway will be extended from Lahore to Karachi and further extended to Gwadar via Ratodero. Another dimension of this project in linking Balochistan and KP provinces through CPEC which will apart from infrastructure development will generate economic activities for relatively under developed provinces. The western alignment of CPEC envisages construction of road link from Gwadar to Khuzdar-Quetta-Zhob-Dera Ismail Khan-Peshawar and joining existing motorway. Similarly the project involves construction of dual carriage railway line from Multan to Peshawar, upgrading existing railway infrastructure throughout the country and linking Gwadar also with rail. Huge investment in energy sector will alleviate power shortages and provide enough power for industrial development and economic zones. By and large, CPEC will be all encompassing investment aimed at generating massive economic activities for Pakistan.

**Will CPEC help in Building Community of Common Interests?**

President Xi Jinping's vision of One Belt and One Road is not only a grand strategic hallucination for rejuvenation of China, but is also anticipated as an advantageous conduit for the prosperity and development of relevant countries and the regions. This strategic vision will help in building the global community of shared values, mutually beneficial interest, common prosperity and common destiny through a win-win cooperation and peaceful co-existence. The underlying philosophy lays the foundations for connection of hearts and minds of the peoples of the region. It encourages promotion and cooperation in the exchange of people to people contacts especially in the fields of economy, science, trade, culture, education, transport and host of other domains as specified in

the relevant vision documents. CPEC as a part of One Belt and One Road vision also envisions the spirit of building community of common interests as it will not only benefit Pakistan but also the adjoining countries and the regions.

### **Analysis of the Challenges Visualized in the China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)**

As every new undertaking specially one of bilateral as well as regional significance will have difficulties and challenges to confront, covering variety of dimensions. The anticipated challenges in the implementation of CPEC are highlighted in the ensuing paragraphs.

### **Skepticism (Strategic Significance of Gwadar Port and Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan)**

The strategic importance and significance of Gwadar Port need not be over emphasized. Located at the mouth of Strait of Hormouz, it is a gateway to South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and China. It is also hugely important for Pakistan as an alternate port to Karachi enormous economic and commerce potentials when fully developed. Huge controversy over the development of Gwadar port has been appearing in the media with varying dimensions of analysis. United States presence in Afghanistan, the Gulf region and Middle East with competing strategic interests give much credence to negative arguments. Certain news items have also highlighted Gwadar Port as Chinese String of Pearls strategy which portrays negative propaganda despite noble intent of both Chinese and Pakistani Governments. These are purely development and economic oriented projects aimed at bringing prosperity and stability of Pakistan and the region. CPEC may also enhance the threat perception among the neighbours, especially India which claims Gilgit-Baltistan as party of J&K thus lays claim. Some analysts see Chinese projects as part of its plans to encircle India.

## **Non Availability of Broad Based Road Map for CPEC**

Premier Li Keqiang proposed CPEC in May 2013 and later on President Xi Jinping had announced this strategic vision of One Belt and One Road in September 2013. Despite huge **government and peoples' enthusiasm in both countries, a comprehensive Road Map alongwith implementation strategies have not been announced.** The information provided to public is generally through print media in bits and pieces which generally lacks coherence.

## **Lack of Adequate Publicity**

Despite lapse of more than two years, the esteemed project is highly under reported in both electronic and print media in China as well as in Pakistan. Public in both countries is also not very well informed about the contours of the projects. Similarly, in the international media, occasional appearance in the form of short statements are some of the challenges with respect to publicity, which are creating uncertainties and allowing space to those elements who are interested in the negative propaganda.

## **Challenges posed by Regional Power Politics**

China believes in five principles of peaceful coexistence. The fundamental ingredient of China's foreign policy philosophy is that it does not believe in power politics. *"China will not play power politics and will not interfere in other countries internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries"*<sup>27</sup>. In the backdrop of regional power politics, like USA's presence in Afghanistan, Gulf, Middle East, USA's relationship with India and Pakistan and China's own relations with both countries indeed pose challenges with respect to managing regional Power Politics. Although not very much **debated now a days, USA's own initiative of New Silk Route connecting Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is also one of the issues which has to be deliberately addressed.** Managing regional Power politics which will prove to be major impediments for the

successful completion of CPEC. No alternate other than skilful diplomacy and removing misperception through enhanced multi channel communication and win-win cooperation can help in managing the power politics and converting competing interests into common and mutually beneficial interests for benefit of Pakistan, China and indeed the entire region.

### **Suspicious regarding Gwadar Port**

Pakistan has demonstrated marked excellence in managing her relations with two great powers i.e. USA and China. Despite roller coaster ride, the relations with USA are **on upward trend. Pakistan's deep rooted friendship with China** is exemplary and not at the cost of any other country. Pakistan has to demonstrate statecraft in managing and balancing these relations as both are very vital for Pakistan. As highlighted at paragraph 4.4, there are occasional negative reports on CPEC in international media especially with reference to Gwadar port.

### **Institutional Capacity Building of Pakistan**

Absorption capacities especially in view of struggling security situation is also challenging and uphill task. The ministerial working and approval system, availability of skilled labour, construction material, power generation facilities and output, transportation means and availability etc are some of the challenges which may retard the progress of the project. Capacity enhancement before commencement of work will impose big challenge.

### **Security and Safety of Chinese Nationals working in Pakistan and Issue of Terrorism/ Extremism**

Despite fool proof security arrangements, yet there have been sporadic incidents in the past directed against Chinese citizens working on several projects in Pakistan, thus constraining the bilateral relations. With promised investment of US\$ 45.6 billion under CPEC unfolding in near future, many Chinese experts will be coming to Pakistan. Despite

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being universal trend, this has affected China and Pakistan the most. TTP and Alqaida in Afghanistan and ETIM in China have been involved in heinous crimes of terrorism in both the countries. Despite enormous sacrifices and valiant operations conducted by Pakistani security forces, the criticism still continues in the western media. Pakistan and China has good understanding on counter terrorism efforts on ETIM. During his visit to Beijing in November 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated ***“Pakistan would resolutely fight the East Turkestan Islamic Movement terrorist force”***<sup>28</sup>. Managing the issue of terrorism and extremism will be highly significant in future bilateral relations of both countries. Similarly, the proposed alignment of CPEC will have to pass through Chinese Province of Xingjian where ETIM has been active, Province of KPK where Pakistani Taliban have been operating and Province of Balochistan where occasional law and order incidents have been taking place in the past.

### **Consistency of Policies and Security of Chinese Investment in Pakistan**

There is no denying the fact that irrespective of form of government in Pakistan, relationship with China has been carried forward as national obligation and priority. However, it is regretted to express that on the eve of planned first visit of President Xi Jinping to Pakistan in September 2014 to India and Pakistan could not take place due to political deadlock in Islamabad. This is a significant setback in our history of relations when viewed from Pakistan public point of view as it materialized for India. However, recent visit on 20-21 April 2015 has been celebrated by across wide segments of Pakistani society.

### **Way Forward**

After comprehensive debate on the opportunities and challenges brought by CPEC, certain recommendations are highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs.



## **Perception Management**

These are purely development and economic oriented projects aimed at bringing prosperity and stability to the region; therefore, have to be portrayed in the same manner. Pakistan needs to signify the importance of an alternative port due to enormous commerce at Karachi port. Themes be developed to counter controversy over Gwadar port. The noble intent behind the project needs to be highlighted by both Chinese and Pakistani Governments to obviate Indian perception of encirclement.

## **Issuance of Policy for Unanimous Approach**

A comprehensive White Paper on CPEC highlighting the spirit, motivations, benefits, details of projects with implementation strategies and timelines be issued for **rejuvenation of Pakistan public and adopting “Whole of Nation Approach”**.

## **Widespread Publicity**

It is strongly felt that as an esteemed national priority for bringing good to the Pakistani nation, economic development and prosperity, the national and international media and public have to be galvanized through wide media coverage on the purpose, intent and efficacy of CPEC under overall **strategic vision of “One Belt One Road” project through extensive debates, newspaper coverage, seminars and symposiums to convey the spirit of this project. “Whole of Nation” and “Whole of Government” approach is suggested for wider publicity which will not only inform the audience but will also generates the ownership across the length and breadth of Pakistan and China.**

## **Managing the Regional Power Politics**

No alternate other than skilful diplomacy and removing misperception through enhanced multichannel communication and win-win cooperation can help in

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managing the power politics and converting competing interests into common and mutually beneficial interests for benefit of Pakistan, China and indeed the entire region.

### **Managing Relations with Leading Nations**

Pakistan has to demonstrate statecraft in managing and balancing these relations as both are very vital for Pakistan. Pakistan has to proceed proactively in balancing her relations with USA and China and counter media strategy to portray the correct spirit and noble intent of CPEC as it is for the prosperity and economic development of Pakistani nation.

### **Aptitude for Concurrent/Myriad Works**

Capacity enhancement in required fields and relevant departments should be concurrently undertaken, otherwise work on the project may impede due to several capacity related issues.

### **Issues of Terrorism and Extremism**

The existing level of cooperation has to be further optimized and joint efforts are recommended to be undertaken in defeating three evil forces ie, terrorism, extremism and separatism which may impede the work on CPEC. Extra ordinary security measures are recommended to defeat the visualized designs of evil forces for uninterrupted work on CPEC.

### **Broad-based policies for continuity of CPEC**

As CPEC is a long term project therefore, the consistency of policies by each following government as esteemed national priority has to be ensured as it is in our vital national interest. Similarly, constitutional guarantees in the form of appropriate legislation be carried out by the parliament for security of Chinese investments and continuity of CPEC.

## **Conclusion**

China has proven to be a time tested friend and with a clear policy towards Pakistan. It has helped Pakistan in number of ways like economically, diplomatically and technologically. In the emerging world order, this relationship is likely to grow further as it is based on mutual respect and mutual trust. For Pakistan, there are immense opportunities, which can be capitalized through wisdom and pragmatic leadership. Pakistan needs to exercise strategic patience in the short term and improve upon domestic stability and economic situation to make strides in achieving positive relevance and rightful place in the comity of nations. In all probability, strong China in the future will play a more positive role for **Pakistan. In the context of service to mankind, The “One Belt and One Road” is unique initiative of President Xi Jinping of 21<sup>st</sup> century** which is focused on common development and prosperity of mankind and lasting stability of relevant countries and the regions due to enhanced economic integration. The noble project has benign intent aimed at enhancing people to people contacts, rejuvenate and reinforce the resources integration and promote common development of Asia, Europe, Middle East and Africa alike and contribute towards growth of global economies. CPEC as part of One Belt and One Road initiative is testimony of ever growing Pakistan China friendship which promises economic and development turnaround of Pakistan, therefore, has to be vigorously pursued.

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**Notes**

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<sup>5</sup> Pakistan is Set to Build Economic Corridor, Satoshi Waki, *Asia.com*, 6 December 2014, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Pakistan-set-to-build-economic-corridor> (15 February 2015)

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<sup>8</sup> *ibid*

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pakistan-economic-corridor-linking-iran-to-the-new-infrastructure/ (4 May 2016)

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

<sup>16</sup> **Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif addresses a session on ‘Reviving the Silk Road — A dialogue with Asian Leaders’ at Boao Forum for Asia 14 April 2014**

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<sup>18</sup> Shannon Teizi, China and Pakistan Flesh Out New Economic Corridor, The Diplomat, 20 February 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/china-pakistan-flesh-out-new-economic-corridor/> (6 March 2015)

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*

<sup>20</sup> Saumya Sil, What is the Importance of Gwadar Port in International Trade for India, Pakistan & China? Quora, 2 March 2015, <https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-Importance-of-Gwadar-Port-in-International-Trade-for-India-Pakistan-China> (4 May 2016)

<sup>21</sup> Sana Asghar, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor a Fate Changer for Pakistan, Daily Times, 3 December 2014, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/business/03-Dec-2014/pak-china-economic-corridor-a-fate-changer-for-pakistan> (6 March 2015)

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# **PAKISTAN'S POLICE AND COUNTER TERRORISM: CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS IN THE BACKDROP OF INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY**

*Ms. Qurat-ul-Ain & Qamar Cheema*

## **Abstract**

*Terrorism continues to challenge stability of various states across the world including Pakistan. In many modern and especially democratic states, police plays a critical role in fighting terrorism, but Pakistan's police has not been empowered and resourced to fight against terrorists. Capacity of police in this arena is a major issue. States affected by terrorism have constructed counter terrorism policies to eliminate terrorism but Pakistan took quite a while to formulate its first National Internal Security Policy (NISP). Now, as it has been formulated, it is a remarkable achievement for Pakistan in terms of a clear roadmap to counter terrorism. However, it has strangely ignored to define role of police in this sphere. This paper discusses in detail that without an effective policing, countering terrorism may not be possible. Two variables which have been used in paper are absence of political will for countering terrorism, and lack of capacity building of police. Absence of these two ideas has prolonged war against terrorism which has resulted in huge loss in terms of property and lives of people. Political will is to be achieved by generating consensus among national political leadership. For capacity building of police, huge amount of funds are also required and political elite will have to think beyond traditional use of police.*

**Keywords:** *Terrorism, Police, Internal Security, Leadership*

## **Introduction**

Pakistan has been fighting 'protean enemy'<sup>1</sup> which is multifaceted and can change anytime. Nations around the globe have fought wars within their boundaries against different sorts of terrorist groups who had challenged writ of

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state. How other states have fought against such groups and how those who have not fought but built a mechanism to fight are important countries to seek lesson from Pakistan. Pakistan is among those countries which are fighting terrorism but **without any proper strategy. Pakistan's police, a very** important defence force against any attack on state are under-resourced, poorly trained, low in morale, under paid and highly politicized but still they are determined and full of resolve to fight for country. The successive years of deep politicization, improper institutional training, out-dated infrastructure and above all, lack of funds coupled with an inappropriate budget have brought humiliation to this institution. Attack on Karachi airport and Army Public School Peshawar in 2014 tell that it was the Special Services Group (SSG) of army who thwarted these assaults on airport and school. Had it just been left unto police and Airport Security Force, loss in terms of lives and assets may have increased manifold<sup>2</sup>.

Since the country has put its foot in this troubled and complex war, police has not been the focus of political leadership. So the war obviously is not in right direction where capacity building of police has been ignored. Inspector General (IG) Police of Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw (KP), a province which is frontline in this fight against terrorism, told media officials that KP police had not been trained and recruited for countering terrorism, and now with the efforts of present KP government, it is trained enough to handle the situation but still it would take some time to cope with the challenging situation.

After attack on Army Public School (APS) Peshawar in December, 2014 federal government initiated a plan to establish military courts under National Action Plan with the consent of all the political parties. For this 21<sup>st</sup> Amendment in constitution was introduced where military courts were considered as parallel to civil prosecution branch and would be established for two years for swift and speedy justice<sup>3</sup>.



National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) a body established by federal government for coordination among all federal and provincial agencies to fight against terrorism and extremism, was established in former Prime Minister Yousaf **Raza Gillani's tenure but could not get operationalized due to** lack of will by political administration<sup>4</sup>. Despite the fact that it got hefty funds from United States<sup>5</sup> and European Union<sup>6</sup> it somehow remained dysfunctional.

With first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP), drafted by Nawaz Sharif government in 2013, there was a chance that NACTA and police could get more attention. But institutional politics and favoritism created hurdles in giving a role to police in countering terrorism and allowing NACTA to operate freely<sup>7</sup>.

Intelligence sharing among security agencies is almost absent due to poor liaison among departments and because of **absence of NACTA's operationalization. The issue has been** addressed in NISP with full spectrum<sup>8</sup>. A new wave of **enthusiasm has penetrated into Pakistan's political elite to end** this mess after APS attack. Political government is supposed to lead this war but hesitation in the political quarters conveyed wrong signals to counter terrorism efforts, and morale of law enforcement agencies has surly been affected negatively by this phenomenon. Whereas in the recent past, right wing and center right political parties did not like to talk against any militant group but this time all have spoken with one voice to end this mess.

In short, political parties are showing will but in the longer run, they may change their policy if they feel they may be targeted and perceive that federal government is not serious to tackle this issue. Right wing Islamic political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) even abstained to vote for 21<sup>st</sup> Amendment. This may jeopardize NISP if national leadership does not show maturity and responsibility on internal security issues. Therefore, it is suitable time that capacity building of police must be on top

priority and politicians must have will for bringing stability through empowering police.

## **National Internal Security Policy: A Brief Overview**

NISP is a big milestone in the history of Pakistan. Being the first comprehensive internal security document, it draws a picture of safe and secure Pakistan. Document has been appreciated by all political quarters. It envisages freedom of rights; protection of life, property and fundamental rights. NISP also believes in promoting pluralism, democracy and culture of tolerance. It discusses the challenging internal security threats in transparent and accountable manner. In its policy framework, NISP has been divided into two sections, one is soft component which is supported by comprehensive response plan and it involves political process in bringing peace in society. Whereas, second is a hard component that would use security apparatus and intelligence sharing to be synched with all of the agencies. NISP has elements of dialogue, deterrence and isolation. NACTA would implement this doctrine by coordinating with all provincial and federal departments. Since police is actually responsible to take care of law enforcement in civilian areas, and to implement NISP as far as implementation is concerned. But unfortunately, police has been ignored in this doctrine. It has been mentioned in the initial document of NISP that capacity building of police would be carried out but nothing more beyond has been envisioned. Furthermore, neither funds have been allocated nor has the modus operandi been chalked out. So ignoring police may jeopardize the efforts for proper implementation of NISP. Therefore at this stage, what all is required, is the national effort by all concerned institutions for implementation of NISP.

## **Countering Terrorism: Issues and Concerns**

**International Practice:** While analyzing the evolution of state system, one observes that marginalized groups find themselves misfit in state structure and often try to impose their agenda through violent means. In return, state tries to

eliminate such groups or bring them in fold of state. In developed states, the method to curb such elements is evolved through parliamentary procedures as their civilian governments are strong enough to handle such issues. Democratic governments carry out capacity building of civilian law enforcement agencies like police and provide funds to empower them<sup>9</sup>.

This is a proven fact that countering terrorism is a job of police because armed forces are trained for defending external borders. Countries like United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey and many others have strong police departments who have managed to counter threats. A content analysis of various case studies reflects something really impressive in this regard. For example, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American wanted to detonate a car full of explosives in Times Square but could not do so because of active and vigilant policing and was imprisoned in New York for this act<sup>10</sup>. Almost, no major attack or incident has occurred in the United States mainland since 9/11 and so is with United Kingdom after 7/7 bombings of 2005. Saudi Arabian police has also thwarted many terrorist plans and plots because of active policing after rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). But still there were two unfortunate suicide bomb incidents happened in May 2015, killing and injuring many innocent people<sup>11</sup>. US, UK and many other countries are lucky that terrorism related catalyst have been removed due to effective implementing strategy based on cutting edge technology.

Above mentioned case studies clearly illustrate that, nowhere in the world, terrorism has been controlled effectively without strong police network. In this regard, a research work by Rand Corporation has been carried out, in which more than 238 organizations from across the globe have been taken as case study since 1968. Research found that more than 40% terrorist networks were eliminated by police and its intelligence agencies and just 7% cases were tackled by military, whereas in 43% cases terrorist organizations came in

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main stream politics due to political engagement with outlawed groups<sup>12</sup>.

Historically, in twentieth century, police had been involved in encountering terrorism. At present, this may be assumed that in twenty first century, nature of threat and tactics of enemy has changed so armed forces have also been trained and engaged to fight this non-conventional threat. In Pakistan, Police and Army both have been working together for elimination of terrorists networks. As police does more close to public so it has better understanding to tackle this issue.

If we look at the case of Great Britain, they managed insurgency in Malaya and Cyprus and both were done in different manner; one proved to be success and other was a failure. Cyprus was failure because of poor training and bad orientation to threat, whereas Malaya was success just by building strong police, giving them fine training and by recruiting on merit<sup>13</sup>. India has been fighting with Maoist rebel groups since 2002, called as Naxalites, to whom former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh termed single biggest internal security challenge. They are fighting for their rights because they are poor, unemployed, facing industrialization without rehabilitation and bad governance. Home Minister Rajnath Singh informed that he had drafted new counter Naxal doctrine and told police and Central paramilitary force to lead anti-Nexal operations<sup>14</sup>. Therefore India is fighting against terrorism with **effective policing not just in Modi's** government but earlier as well and is following international practices.

### **Pakistan's Strategy to Counter Terrorism**

How Pakistan is fighting terrorism is of serious concern as the entire debate of this paper is about how police is playing its role in countering terrorism. Which strategy police is going to adopt after new internal security policy? Whether police role will be acknowledged or not?

Since last many years, there has been severe negligence in policy making institutes on police capacity building and engaging police in counter terrorism. Meanwhile looking at weak infrastructure and capability of police, Pakistan Army has been given the task of fighting terrorism which was not their job even. Army started operation in two areas, one in Federally Administered Tribal Agency (FATA), area adjacent to Afghanistan ruled under Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, and second in Swat a city in KP that comes in Malakand division where operation has been completed but army is still there. Article 245 was invoked by government for operation in these two areas; therefore with reference to this army can be called in aid of civil power whenever it is needed<sup>15</sup>. Operation **started mainly due to military's strong capability**, as it had been managing afghan affairs since long and the region is bordered with Afghanistan. But as army was not trained for nonconventional warfare, it had to bear huge losses in terms of life and infrastructure at earlier stages in FATA. Figure tells that in 2009 army lost lives of 350 soldiers and with the passage of time it started knowing the war pattern, so loss of lives was reduced to 198 in 2013<sup>16</sup>.

Swat operation was named as operation Rah e Haq. It was the first operation launched by army against Tehreek e Nifaz e Shariat e Muhammadi (TNSM), an organization led by Sufi Muhammad which was a great success for army. Second operation launched by Pakistan Army was Rah e Haq2 to retake Shangla area. Initially, it was weakness of police to let terrorist operate but due to the sense of insecurity even police started joining ranks of local Taliban who were being led by Mullah Fazlullah, now chief of Tehreek-E-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, once operation was concluded it was the job of police forces to take over area, but because of poor resources police could not handle such a militarized area, for this army had to stay for an extended period.

Military operations in FATA and Swat were successful, but the approach raised some serious controversies. Army gained good reputation in public as people view army as ultimate saviour, but on the other hand few are not in favour of

**military's way of handling things and governance. In theory and practice where armed forces are involved in counter terrorism, they do not have powers of arrest and detention but in Pakistan's case this practice has put army on back foot.**

Police in Pakistan has been divided in federal and provincial levels. Since law and order is provincial subject, all the four provinces, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir have their own police departments and have different police laws. Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) has its own police. At federal level, there are civilian agencies also which have mandate to cooperate and work with provincial departments whenever it is needed, which are Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP). Apart from this, there are paramilitary forces which include Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Corps (FC) which work with police to maintain law and order. All the provinces have anti-terrorist force with different capabilities. Punjab has Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) which was established in 2010; earlier this department was working with the name of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) since 1995. A move was initiated by the Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, to have a separate counter terrorism force in province to work under IGP. 421 corporals including 16 women were trained by SSG and Turkish Police. Their job will be to participate only in operational activates and inquiring the cases on scientific bases<sup>17</sup>. Other provinces have yet to make such police force. KP police has developed structural framework in 2014 in which they have developed Counter Terrorism Department<sup>18</sup>. Baluchistan does not have Counter Terrorism Department whereas Sindh cabinet has agreed to establish Counter Terrorism Department<sup>19</sup>. CTD has been given powers by provincial authorities to fight all sort of terrorism.

Since the start of war against terrorism (WOT), police had not been trained and equipped for fighting terrorists other than the new police force recruited and trained in Punjab. Absence of political will has enhanced complexity of the situation. Apart from this absence of centralized authority to

solidify the law enforcement agencies and information sharing among them has created chaos. National Crises Management Centre (NCMC), a federal department was tasked to coordinate among federal and provincial departments but Interior Ministry shifted this task to NACTA<sup>20</sup>. That also created trust deficit among powerful governmental institutions

It is too late for a department like NACTA to get legitimacy from other concerned departments. NISP has been active with whom NACTA was empowered. In Swat and South Waziristan operations in 2009, it was NCMC working for liaison among civilian and military departments. But in operation Zarb i Azb, the job was given to Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. So NACTA is again away from operational activities<sup>21</sup>. Even Prime Minister took a step to establish Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) for synching civil- military contribution to fight the war but the efforts remained fruitless because CCNS has not been engaged regularly and decisions were taken bypassing institutional architecture<sup>22</sup>.

At strategic level there has been no policy decision to engage police in countering terrorism as discussed above. So in critical areas military has been put on alert and remains at a call away from civilian administration. Karachi airport attack paralyzed airport, whereas airport security force and police were unable to handle the situation, therefore Pakistan Army<sup>23</sup> was called to eliminate militants and clear the airport. More than 28 people were killed and numbers of people were injured. This tells that, Airport Security Force (ASF) and police were unable to thwart the attack.

Police is poorly equipped and untrained that it has failed to control the protestors of Pakistan Awami Tahreek (PAT) in June 2014, a party run by Dr Thair-UI-Qadri , a cleric who has modern credentials and has given decree against suicide bombings and terrorism. In this brawl more than 12 people were killed and dozens injured because of direct firing on protestors<sup>23</sup>. This negligence coupled with political manipulation made police more inefficient and exposed the

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vulnerabilities in terms of proficient mob handling techniques.

Police is yet to be capable of fighting terrorists by adopting new strategies like Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Since last one decade more than thirty three thousand IED explosions took place which killed more than 11000 people. Meanwhile there is no legislation regarding IED as a new threat to counter as police is not well trained to defuse IEDs<sup>24</sup>. Even knowing that Pakistan has to fight this mess, police capacity building has been ignored.

Pakistan Police is somewhat professional, despite being under resourced and politically manipulated. Intelligence skills of police are smart enough to gather information. Such tasks cannot be handled by Army because of their absence in civilian areas. Police intelligence was used enough to trace the attack on General Headquarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi in 2010<sup>25</sup>. Furthermore the performance of KP police in Bacha Khan University blast clearly shows that Pakistan police is capable enough to handle sensitive cases if properly funded and trained. Many other sensitive cases of information have been resolved by other departments through police intelligence. Tariq Khosa, a former officer of police service of Pakistan once **stated, "we can win this war against terrorism from capabilities of existing police force, but only if politicians stop micromanaging in their affairs and higher bureaucracy does not interfere in their official duties"**<sup>26</sup>. The statement by Mr. Khosa clearly reveals that police is capable enough, if modern training is provided and they are allowed to work independently. The police is always compared to one of the strongest institutions of Pakistan: the Pakistan Army. The comparison is abjectly based on non-conformity. The army is bestowed with foreign military aid, the biggest share of the **country's annual defence budget and a firm ground on the country's policymaking for decades. Despite all the impairments of small budgets, funds and political pressures, the police continue to struggle hard in keeping up with serving the people and fighting criminals thus has been laying their lives in the line of duty.**



Now situation is so worse because of poor capacity of police to control and manage counter terrorism as Rangers had taken control of Islamabad when operation Zarb-i-Azb started in North Waziristan, and situation is still the same even when the Zarb-i-Azb is about to be over. Earlier, the presence of Rangers in Islamabad was just for joint patrolling purposes in the city. Even now Rangers has been given charge for raids in Islamabad to arrest<sup>27</sup>. Since attack on Karachi and Peshawar airports in 2014, government has decided to handover major airports to Rangers and army to assist Airport Security Forces<sup>28</sup>.

This structural flaw has created problem in whole country where police has become almost irrelevant because of its incompetence to handle things. In August 2014, Army was called on to look after red zone in Islamabad, while two long marches of Imran Khan and Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri reached Capital and entered into red zone for pressurizing government **for their demands. Islamabad's police that is considered to be** well equipped and well-resourced was unable to handle this situation and government had to invoke section 245 of **Pakistan's constitution to hand over security to Army**<sup>29</sup>. This has further reduced confidence in police and brought anxiety among armed forces as they were over burdened with work pressure.

### **Police and Systemic Barriers in Countering Terrorism**

Systemic barrier means institutional discrimination through policies and practices, which may look neutral but have long term negative impressions on particular groups<sup>30</sup>. This means structural hurdles that come in the way of police to perform independently and professionally. So the idea that will lead the debate of systemic barriers is absence of political will. Now the question is why there is absence of political will? Looking at the socio- political and ethno- linguistic characteristics of Pakistan, one can divide argument of systemic barriers in three spheres, social, structural and

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historical reasons which are there to bring hurdle in having political will.

Society has deep links with patronage based politics<sup>31</sup> so they like to be engaged in a patron client relationship where they must get relief in police station. Under the circumstances, it gets tough for law makers to make drastic changes in police laws because by changing laws and making police more independent, it will jeopardize their political clout. They are obviously not in a mood to educate masses about institutional superiority.

Civil bureaucracy in Pakistan being important organ of state always helps and guides political elite. Formerly District Management Group (DMG) and now Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) have close connections with political elite and hardly give any sound advice to make police independent<sup>32</sup>. Attempt done in Pervez Musharraf era did not bring fine results where police were to bring under District level Political Administration<sup>33</sup>.

As NACTA got powers in constitution in a tough institutional tussle but it does not have anything in hand in real terms. Since the passage of ordinance in March 2013, not a single meeting was called but after APS Peshawar attack, its first meeting took place. NACTA Board of Governors is supposed to meet once in three months but it has not met so far. Prime Minister is its head whereas all Chief Ministers from four provinces and Gilgit Baltistan are its members. Other members include Prime Minister Azad Jammu Kashmir, Interior Minister, Defense Minister, Finance Minister, Director General Inter Service Intelligence (DG, ISI) Director General Intelligence Bureau (DG IB), Director General Military Intelligence (DG, MI), Director General Federal Investigation Agency (DG FIA), Inspector General of all provinces and Secretary Interior<sup>34</sup>. Implementation of NISP is dependent on decisions of NACTA. While NACTA, being ignored, is one of the main structural problems in countering terrorism through institutional framework.

In historical domain police has been drawing powers from law of 1861 that was product of British era which was orchestrated to deal with socio political situation of that time. Here in 21<sup>st</sup> century, Pakistan needs new laws according to prevailing situation. Politicians must pay full attention in bringing new laws of policing. All the provinces have different laws regarding police. Punjab and KP are enjoying amended versions of 2002 police order whereas Sindh and Baluchistan are still living under colonial era laws<sup>35</sup>. Absence of modern laws of policing has reduced the proportion of transparency and accountability for police. A move by KP and Sindh police to have option of online First Information Report (FIR) is a welcome step. Nation will have to introduce modern legislation and cutting edge technology for counter terrorism.

Highest ranking police officer, Inspector General Police (IGP) is not given free hand to perform independently. Politicians station their own blue eyed police officers to discharge duties. According to a report, IGP of each province has not been on his seat for more than eight months on average<sup>36</sup>. But now for some time highest police officials are discharging their duties especially in KP. Similarly lower police officials do not get enough time to implement policies. Stability of tenure is considered a yardstick for success of an officer. London Metropolitan Police Commissioner is appointed for five years under police Act 1996 of United Kingdom<sup>37</sup> so that uninterrupted tenure to be given to officer; this reduces chances of political manipulation because officer will feel secure by having fixed tenure. In Pakistan long term policies regarding countering terrorism can work only when police chief will have freedom to exercise his powers

## **New Internal Security Policy and Counter Terrorism**

**Pakistan's first internal security policy was drafted in 2014** by the present government of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Although one can debate why we could not have internal security policy earlier, that is a complex question to answer. Looking at the internal security environment, it is important to have such a comprehensive doctrine that would

be bible for internal security problems. Police has only been promised for capacity building but nothing concrete has been started for this<sup>38</sup>. About 32 billion rupees have been allocated for implementation of this doctrine but government has not released any amount in this context so far<sup>39</sup>. How can a police station operate on 10 litres of daily fuel that it is allotted to them, especially when it has multiple villages under its watch, some are many kilometers apart? Furthermore, how will the police produce criminals in court and collect evidence against them within such limited means?

How can a police officer with a moderate salary pursue any investigation diligently when he/she has to pay money from **his/her own pocket for FIR copies, criminal's medical certificates** and other proceedings because they are inadequately funded by the government?

The NISP has a serious flaw and that is of missing role of police in counter terrorism. Although the role of police has not been defined directly but entire counter terrorism efforts are needed to be through synchronization of security agencies. It is not possible for any single agency to look after security affairs. There is likely possibility that armed forces will lead counter terrorism operational activities. A surgical operation to weed out terrorist from urban centers was initiated after attack on APS Peshawar. Police is working in liaison with Army and Rangers but its activities are not independent. A recent incident that embodies the woes and shortcomings of the police is the Chotu gang operation. The small contingent of police that was sent into the operation was not even wearing bullet proof jackets. To make matters worse, their arms were out dated. But still, they resorted towards their undoubtedly suicide mission.

The recent campaigns of revamping the police by provincial governments are laudable steps to rejuvenate the system and abolishing the loathed **thanna** (prison) culture. But all this will be of no use if governments do not allocate required budgets and the police do not conform to the latest revamping campaigns. If this continues, the woes of this

department will persist because the police has no access to foreign aid, nor does it have a public relations department for image building<sup>40</sup>.

## **NISP and Daunting Challenges**

NISP being the first document of internal security has increased the expectations of Pakistanis. People find it a ray of hope for bringing peace back in the country. A great achievement of ruling party for making this document, but real problem is implementation of NISP. There are many challenges to be faced during implementation of this security policy. Terrorists operate at three major levels, physical, psychological and ideological levels<sup>41</sup>. For this, response strategy should be comprehensive. Since the counter terrorism efforts are to be done under umbrella of NACTA, so all law enforcement agencies are required to work with collaboration. Before APS incident, NACTA disseminated threat alert three days ago about the incident<sup>42</sup>. But poor liaison for operational activities has been source of many casualties otherwise such big incident could have been avoided.

NACTA met first time after APS Peshawar attack since it has been given space in constitution although it was supposed to meet after every three months. It happens that institutions get established but scheduled meetings are not held regularly and powerful officials within government institutions bypass such institution. This has generated a gap among stakeholders where weak institutions share grievances for not having role in decision making. In 2014-15, budget of NACTA was reduced to Rs 92 million from Rs 95 million where Rs 63 million are for salaries and related expenses and just Rs 21 million for operational expenses<sup>43</sup>. This shows non seriousness and lack of political will in government circles.

NISP has two components soft and hard to respond to **terrorist's modus opernadi. Soft component is Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP)** which talks about winning trust of public and engaging them as well in countering terrorism. Its

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main ingredients are building infrastructure, rehabilitating victims of terrorists, constructing national narrative for countering terrorism, reconciliation within state actors, reintegration and legal reforms<sup>44</sup>. All these issues are grave challenges and since last one decade these problems have not been addressed in a right manner. For their implementation, massive funds are needed and state is not prepared in any sense so far.

Absence of national narrative has brought unbearable loss to the country and its fabric. State has not used its capability to build and propagate its narrative. As a consequence, war has prolonged and counter measures have been tough and **lengthy. Meanwhile terrorist's narrative has been encouraged to penetrate. State actors have been at arm's length from each other on policy perspectives and national leadership has failed to congeal this difference.** Legal reforms are single most conflicting issue between executive and judiciary. Judiciary is blamed for releasing terrorist and judicial backlog. Moeed Yousaf, an America based Pakistani scholar stated in an interview that judiciary has its concerns where it feels vulnerable from non-state actors in case of verdicts against their men<sup>45</sup>. It also talks of absence of proper laws to convict terrorists. Military courts are given space for providing speedy justice that has its own structural problems. Parallel justice system can further weaken the civil justice system because there is a fear among masses that already weak justice system can be further ignored for two years<sup>46</sup>. So instead of introducing another system, already existing justice system must be strengthened.

The hard component is Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP), tells how the present security apparatus will deal with issue of terrorism and sectarianism. Where all law enforcement agencies are required to cooperate with each other. Police has not been singled out for any plan of action in response to terrorism but synchronization of actions by security agencies has been stressed. About 26 intelligence agencies are in the country but there is absence of coordination among those organizations. Since NACTA has been given a responsibility to

gather information and disseminate to concerned department for action, CDP will integrate all hard components of state power to combat national security threats. Police could have been at forefront but scope of activity of police or any other force has not been discussed. This leaves room for chaos among institutions and makes NISP a weak document that needs to be amended.

### **NISP and Options for Durable Security**

NACTA has emerged as leading organization in NISP due to its role of liaison among state agencies and other civil departments as well. Counter terrorism policies and strategies must be led by civil departments of state along with strong institutional support from armed forces. Following options will make counter terrorism efforts more active and result oriented:

- NISP should be revised in which police must be given concrete role in counter terrorism. Police must be given main role in leading counter terrorism operations along with support of Civil Armed Forces and Army.
- Funds must be immediately released for capacity building of police of all provinces, including Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. Gilgit police is exposed to sectarian attacks and Taliban so their capacity building is needed. Police has been ignored altogether in this **policy. It's been a year that funds were allocated in** NISP formula of capacity building of police but yet not released.
- A revised NISP must focus on special counter terrorism academies for police. Training must not be in already established training centers of police because a new infrastructure will enhance confidence of police involved in counter terrorism operations and will inject a sense of responsibility in them. Training Staff in special police academies must be catered from those countries where police has led counter terrorism operations and defeated terrorists so that they can share their practical experiences with our police force.

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- Political elites will have to show responsibility and maturity by generating consensus to fight against terrorism. Politicians should make police independent so that they can perform efficiently and for this purpose, legislation is needed so that police can feel protected while taking decisions.
- NISP must stress on new police force for countering terrorism because it is believed that existing police is politicized and unprofessional. Old police force which has professional young officers must be attached with new force so that they can make joint efforts for curbing and eliminating terrorism.
- There is a dire need for changing national narrative on counter terrorism. NISP has discussed new narrative building but nothing in reality has been chalked out in this regard. Police must be made aware of this new narrative because they are the ones who have to adopt it.
- Media must be effectively used and NISP should be discussed in talk shows, news channels, so that government must be pushed to implement the chalked formula.
- Morale of police must also be enhanced by encouraging them and enhancing their role in formulating counter terrorism policies.

## **Conclusion**

Throughout the entire debate above, it has been observed that police is facing grave challenges. Since 9/11, police in other countries as an institution has been made capable enough to fight with terrorists but in Pakistan, state has yet to achieve this goal. Police is fighting with terrorists without being trained and equipped properly. With rising terrorist infrastructure in country, ignoring police could be disastrous. Police need patronization of politicians in terms of political will to fight against terrorism and capacity building so that they can make themselves capable enough to fight against terrorism. Only these two variables, if properly utilized, can



bring end to this war. After huge losses, now time has come that nation must see a ray of hope to end this war.

## **Notes**

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## **FALL OF NAPOLEON PATHAN: ACADEMIC APPRAISAL**

*Lutfur Rehman*

### **Abstract**

*International politics is a very strange phenomenon. Some areas and people suffer heavily and others gain due to power politics. The great game in Afghanistan had badly affected Bajour, Chitral and Dir. The most popular ruler of Jandul and Dir, Umra Khan of Jandul lost his khanate due to the Durand Agreement. He opposed the British appeasement policy at the cost of Bajour and Dir. He resisted the British decision of accepting the Afghan occupation and annexation of Asmar, a small khanate of Bajour. The Indian government arranged a special force, the Chitral Relief Force to expel Umra Khan's men from Chitral. The British Commissioner in the Asmar Boundary Commission, Sir Richard Udny gave more areas of Bajour and Dir to Afghanistan while delimiting of the border. These areas are located on the southern side of Kunar River and now form part of Kunar province of Afghanistan. These include Asmar, Barikot, Narai and Dangam etc. In this way, the border in the vicinity of Bajour and Dir was pushed over 100 km towards the south. Bajour and Dir suffered enormous territorial losses due to the Durand Agreement and delimitation of the border. Dir and Jandul also lost a brilliant ruler, Umra Khan.*

**Key Words:** *Umra Khan, British government, Jandul and Dir, Durand Agreement*

### **Introduction**

The Durand Agreement and demarcation of the border by the Asmar Boundary Commission has left deep impressions on the history and geo-politics of Bajour, Chitral and Dir. The people of these areas were deprived of their land and merged in Afghanistan. Mortimer Durand acknowledged the Afghan sovereignty over Asmar which was occupied by Kabul in 1892.

Earlier, the Viceroy had sent a strong worded warning to Amir Abdur Rahman about the Afghan occupation and annexation of Asmar. Umra Khan of Jandul resisted the Afghan occupation and annexation Asmar. Therefore, he refused to cooperate with the Asmar Boundary Commission in the demarcation of the border in the vicinity of Jandul and Dir. In this way, the border in the vicinity of Bajour and Dir was pushed over 100 km towards the south. Bajour and Dir suffered enormous territorial losses due to the Durand Agreement and delimitation of the border. Dir and Jandul also lost a brilliant ruler, Umra Khan.

### **Umra Khan of Jandul**

Umra Khan is known, in Pathan history, as the Pathan Napoleon. The Gilgit based British Agent Dr. George Scott Robertson termed him as the brave and clever<sup>1</sup>. Some writers have termed him as **“a Khan of lion-like mind”**<sup>2</sup>. The Gilgit Agency Report of April 1890 speaks of him as **“the most important man between Chitral and Peshawar”**<sup>3</sup>. He was a **great warrior and spent his whole life in fighting**. **“The people of Dir proudly narrate his life story glorifying his personality through folk songs and poetry”**<sup>4</sup>.

Umra Khan was born in Summer Bagh, Jandul (Lower Dir) in 1860. He belonged to Mast Khel tribe living mainly in Lower Dir. Examining the family tree of Umra Khan reflects that Haya Nawaz, a resident of Astanbul (Turkish name of Constantinople), came to this region for the cause of **endorsing Islam and joined the troops of “Mehmood of Ghazni** in his expedition towards India especially in Bajour, Dir and **Swat”**<sup>5</sup>. Haya Nawaz impressed the people through his courage and bravery, they, therefore, gifted him a vast area in the north of Timergra, the headquarters of Lower Dir, later named as Haya Serai (the land of Haya Nawaz). Haya Nawaz did not reside in Haya Serai rather moved to Kandahar, Afghanistan for residing permanently. However, Mast Ali Khan, the grandson of Haya Nawaz shifted to Jandul and settled there. His descendants extended a clan known as Mast Khel. Ayub Khan, son of Mast Ali Khan also spent his whole

life in Jandul and won name and fame for the family through his character, passed his legacy to his grandson, Hayat Khan who became the ruler of Jandul in 1791. Hayat Khan died of natural death in 1820, having appointed his elder son, Abdul Ghafar Khan the ruler of Jandul. The death of Abdul Ghafar Khan created chaos within the ruling family because Faiz Talab Khan, a brother of Abdul Ghafar Khan wished to become ruler of Jandul. Faiz Talab Khan was confronted by Mahiddin Khan, son of Abdul Ghafar Khan and his nephew. Ultimately, Faiz Talab Khan won the race and became the ruler of the khanate of Jandul. He maintained an army of 10,000 men including 2,000 horse riders. He occupied Maidan and Barawal areas and annexed them with Jandul<sup>6</sup>.

Faiz Talab Khan put up a friendly posture to Afghanistan and dispatched a contingent to Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province during the 1<sup>st</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. Faiz Talab Khan also participated in Ambela campaign along with his several thousand soldiers. The campaign ended with the British burning of Malka (Buner) and Faiz Talab Khan returned to Jandul where he did not survive for long and died. Faiz Talab Khan was succeeded by his son, Aman Khan who, unlike his father, lacked in courage and character thus, was hated by the subject. Aman Khan had six sons ; Muhammad Zaman Khan, Mir Afzal Khan, Muhammad Shah Khan, Mir Hassan Khan, Umra Khan and Zainullah Khan<sup>7</sup>. Aman Khan during his life distributed his moveable and immovable property among his sons before his death in 1879<sup>8</sup>. Aman Khan was succeeded by Muhammad Zaman Khan but his **authority was challenged by Umra Khan's defiance, who** refused to recognize Muhammad Zaman Khan as the ruler of Jandul thus creating unrest in the area. When Umra Khan failed to dethrone Muhammad Zaman Khan, he left Jandul and moved to Swat. He came to Peshawar in 1881, purchased a rifle, went straight to Jandul and killed Muhammad Zaman Khan, He also snatched Tor and Munda from his brother, Mir Hassan Khan<sup>9</sup>. Umra Khan continued achieving unremitting victories. He defeated Muhammad Sharif Khan, the ruler of Dir who after the trounce, ran away to Swat and started living in Mingora in 1890. These victories made Umra Khan the

ruler of relatively bigger khanate spreading over a massive area from the northern side of Kunar River to Swat River in the south joining Chitral at Lowari top

**“Umra Khan was known as noble saviour of the borders,** ruled by right of moral superiority as much as by physical ability, a pent-up eagle of the mountains pining for a wider **scope of his activities**”<sup>10</sup>. Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan wanted to occupy Bajour, Jandul, Dir and Swat at every cost. **“In 1888 efforts were made by the Ameer [Amir] of** Afghanistan to extend his influence in Bajaur [Bajour], of which Jandul forms [it was not part of Lower Dir at that time] **a part**”<sup>11</sup>. He made all out efforts to create nuisance for Umra Khan. Amir Abdur Rehman directed his agent, Abu Bakkar **alias Makrani Mullah, to ruin Umra Khan’s reputation among** the local people by propagating that he (Umra Khan) was not ruling in accordance with the Islamic teachings<sup>12</sup>. Makrani Mullah was able to win the sympathy of the Khans of Nawagai and Pashat. The Khans waged a war against Umra Khan but they could not succeed in their plans, hence were defeated by him. Umra Khan arrested Makrani Mullah and deported him to Afghanistan.

### **Alliance with the British**

Umra Khan was aware of impending threats from Afghanistan therefore, he needed a strong ally to counter any eventuality. He contacted the British authorities in 1890 to fabricate cordial relations. Umra Khan sent his advisor, the Sahibzada of Hajiabad (located near Timergara) to Peshawar. The Sahibzada participated in the official Darbarin of Peshawar. Umra Khan sought help from the British authorities in case of any threat to his khanate from Afghanistan. The British Government accepted his request and warned Kabul of dire consequences in case of any interference in Bajour, Janduland or Swat. The British administration assured they would not allow the Amir of Afghanistan to intervene in the territory of Umra Khan<sup>13</sup>.



The two sides became allies, each one pursuing its own interests and agenda. Umra Khan required the British arms and ammunition to counter the Afghan designs against Bajour, Jandul and Dir. The British agreed to his demand and allowed him to procure arms and ammunition from Peshawar. **The British on the other hand wanted Umra Khan's help in** launching a postal service between Chitral and Peshawar via Dir. Umra Khan agreed to the British proposal and the postal service started in April 1892. Nine check posts were established in Dir, from Chakdara to Lowari Top to ensure smooth operation of the service. This service continued without any disruption till January 1895, when Umra Khan intended to levy tax on the British for this service. Alongside this development, there was an escalating tension in Chitral-Jandul relations. Umra Khan requested the Indian **government in 1890 to "mediate between him and Chitral with** regard to their respective claims to the land which, he subsequently captured after Mehtar, **Amir-ul-Mulk's death in 1892"**<sup>14</sup>.

### **The Asmar issue**

There were four khanates in Bajour including Asmar, Khaar, Nawagai and Pashat and the rulers of these khanates belonged to the same family (Ibrahim Khel) of Qamardin Khan of Nawagai<sup>15</sup>. **Asmar "was a small independent** principality, situated on the left bank of the Kunar river, between Jalalabad and Chitral, embracing an area of less than **500 square miles"**<sup>16</sup>. Afghanistan, for a long time, wanted to occupy Asmar, Bajour, Dir and Swat. Amir Sher Ali Khan made several abortive attempts to occupy Asmar and other surrounding areas. Besides, he gave 6,000 rupees to the chief of Asmar, Jandul, Nawagai and Khar and 80,000 rupees to Khan of Dir in 1878 and 1879<sup>17</sup>. But Sher Ali Khan did not succeed in his designs and lost power as a result of 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Afghan war. Amir Abdur Rahman continued to pursue his designs of capturing Asmar. He arranged the engagement of his son, Habibullah Khan with a girl from the ruling family of Asmar and waited for a appropriate time to capture Asmar.

When W.W. McNair visited Bashgal valley (Kafiristan) in 1883, Hazrat Ali was the ruler Asmar. He lost his life due to incidental firing in 1886 and was succeeded by his son, Tamash Khan who himself was assassinated in 1890<sup>18</sup>. With this, Amir Abdur Rahman accelerated his efforts to gain control over Asmar. The Amir pleaded that:

**“Timur Mirza Shah [Tamash Khan], the ruler of Asmar, gave me the oath of allegiance in 1887, and put himself as well as his country under my protection against any expected attack from his powerful enemy, [Omra]Umra Khan of Bajour; and he being killed by one of his slaves, General Ghulam Haidar Khan, my Commander-in-Chief, occupied Asmar in December 1891, which caused great indignation to the Indian Government, which had their eye on all these so-called neutral provinces: Yaghistan (Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner Dir, Chilas and Waziri: all these countries—were included in Yaghistan)”<sup>19</sup>.**

The Amir sent his Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan to Asmar taking the plea to escort the financier of Habibullah Khan to Kabul. His (Ghulam Haider Khan) main **task was to block the entry of Umra Khan’s troops in Asmar**<sup>20</sup>. Justifying the penetration of the Afghan troops in Asmar, **Amir Abdur Rahman remarked “the Sipah Salar [Commander-in-Chief] is proceeding with the troops to settle the frontier districts of the God-granted Government, everything will be properly arranged”<sup>21</sup>**. The Amir succeeded in occupying Asmar but this occupation was challenged by Umra Khan taking the stance that Asmar belonged to Bajour not Afghanistan in historical and geographical perspective. The British Foreign Secretary expressed annoyance over the **Afghan occupation of Asmar and said, “the Amir has taken Asmar, in spite of our prohibitions against meddling with Bajour”<sup>22</sup>**. Mortimer Durand wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary Punjab on June 28, 1892 asserting that Asmar was actually part of Bajaur [Bajour]. Asmar was certainly not

within the limits of Afghanistan, and so long as it continued to be occupied by an Afghan force, there could not be any security for peace upon this part of the frontier<sup>23</sup>. The Viceroy also wrote a letter to Amir Abdur Rahman complaining about the Afghan aggression in Bajour. The Viceroy asked Amir **Abdur Rahman “to withdraw his forces from Asmar without any delay as it has become evident that further conflict will be inevitable unless Afghan force retires from Asmar”**<sup>24</sup>. There was no reply on the part of Kabul and the Indian government had chalked out a plan to give Asmar to Umra Khan. Commissioner Peshawar **Division said, “..... Asmar might be made over to Umra Khan on the understanding that his somewhat indefinite relations with us would be maintained, whilst he in return for this concession might agree to give up his designs on Swat”**<sup>25</sup>.

In his negotiations with Mortimer Durand in October-November 1893, Amir Abdur Rahman asserted that his troops would not vacate Asmar and Mortimer Durand acceded to the **Amir’s stance. The acceptance of Afghan occupation and annexation of Amsar by Mortimer Durand badly damaged Umra Khan’s ties with the British. The British thought that Umra Khan would not go to such extent. The British did not regard of Umra Khan’s attitude as a matter of importance and hoped that “an understanding may arrive at with him in the course of the Afghan frontier delimitation...”**<sup>26</sup>. Umra Khan did not reconcile with the new situation and came forward with an open confrontation with the British. He boycotted proceedings of the Asmar Boundary Commission and turned a deaf ear to the repeated requests by Commissioner Peshawar Sir Richard Udny. The British in—vengeance gave extra territorial concessions to Afghanistan at the cost of Jandul. This further enraged Umra Khan and he planned to put the British in hot water by meddling in the affairs of Chitral where British officers were stationed to keep watch on the activities of Czarist Russia in the region.

On the other hand, Amir Abdur Rahman paid handsome amount to Mukhtar Shah Badshah of Kunarand Haji Mirzaman Khan, chief of Shamoza branch of Utman Khel

(Bajour) to promote the Afghan interests in the region including the Afghan occupation of Bajour and Mohmand. He tried to cement ties with Safdar Khan of Nawagai by offering him assistance. But Safdar Khan understood the Afghan plot and rejected the idea of accepting human or material help from Kabul. The Afghan Commander-in-Chief tried to trap Umra Khan by offering him 50, 000 rupees on annual basis if he handed over Jandul and Dir to Afghanistan. These Afghan steps were harbinger both for Safdar Khan and Umra Khan therefore, they pledged to work together in close coordination to foil the Afghan designs and protect their territory from their northern neighbour<sup>27</sup>. This enraged Amir Abdur Rahman and he put the entire state machinery of Afghanistan into top gear to occupy Bajour, Jandul and Dir through coercive means. The British authorities issued him a stern warning not to meddle in the affairs of Jandul, Dir and Swat and halt giving allowances to the people across the border (Bajour, Dir and Swat etc).

### **Siege of Chitral**

The Situation in Chitral deteriorated after the death of the Lott or Great Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulkon August 30, 1892<sup>28</sup>. His succession became the main reason of tension and turmoil in the royal family. Two successive Mehtars i.e. Afzal-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk were murdered in this struggle for power. First Mehtar, Afzal-ul-Mulk was killed by Sher Afzal, (brother of Aman-ul-Mulk) who was later ousted by Nizam-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by his younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk who after him became the Mehtar. He asked the Acting British Agent at Chitral, Lieut. Gurdon to grant him recognition but Lieut. responded that he would not recognize **Amir-ul-Mulk's administration without the consent of the Government of British India**. Lieut. Gurdon in order to engage Amir-ul-Mulk argued that the orders of the British Government must be waited for before any taking any action into consideration. This infuriated Amir-ul-Mulk, who along with his supporters put a siege dubbed as the minor siege or the siege of Chitral on Lieut. Gurdon and Indian soldiers under his command in the historic fort Chitral creating great

turbulence in the region. Amir-ul-Mulk requested Umra Khan for help at this critical juncture and got positive response in form of man power by **Umra Khan. Umra Khan's soldiers** crossed Lowari Top and occupied Chitrali fort at Drosh. Richard Udny, Commissioner Peshawar Division warned **Umra Khan that "the Government of India has never approved his interference in the affairs of Chitral"**<sup>29</sup>. Militia of Amir-ul-Mulk arrested two British officers Fowler and Lt. Edwardes and several other soldiers, handed them over to Umra Khan in Chitral, who took them to Jandul where they were treated with honor and dignity.

The British asked Umra Khan to withdraw his soldiers from Chitral by 1<sup>st</sup> April 1895 but he did not comply with. The British issued a proclamation asking the people of Swat and Bajour not to extend helping hand to Umra Khan. The proclamation said that the Government of India had no intention to permanently stay on any territory which its **soldiers needed to go through for reaching Chitral. "Safdar Khan of Nawagai, sent his brother to Peshawar to arrange terms on his behalf and accepted an offer of Rs. 12,600 per annum and 1,000 rifles on the condition that he would maintain order among the tribes furnished supplies and assistance to the troops"**<sup>30</sup>.

The British arranged a force (the Chitral Relief Force) to **expel Umra Khan's militia from Chitral and restore law and order** in the state. When Umra Khan came to know about this development, he returned to Jandul along with the two British officers and the Indian soldiers detained in Chitral. He deployed his soldiers at Malakand pass to block the entry of the British troops in the area. The Indian Government decided **"to threaten Morah [pass] and Shakot [pass], and make the main attack on Malakand"**<sup>31</sup>. British mobilization of force started on March 26, and within seven days, it concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera<sup>32</sup>. **"Not surprisingly, their advance was bitterly contested at every point where the natives could mount an ambush"**<sup>33</sup>. When the force reached Malakand, 12, 000 men hindered entry of British troops in the

area<sup>34</sup>. The locals fought bravely and this was even acknowledged by the British officers.

When the British troops reached Dargai, the ex-Khan of Dir, Muhammad Sharif Khan came there from Swat and met Major Dean offering his services. He was sent ahead of the British troops to prepare ground for their safety, entry and passage through Dir. The British troops constructed a temporary bridge at Swat River at Chakdara by using local timbers but it was soon replaced by a pontoon bridge. Twelve pontoons of the bridge were brought to Chakdara on elephants<sup>35</sup>. However, both the bridges did not work properly and were replaced by a suspension bridge which was opened for traffic on June 26, 1895. On their arrival in Chakdara, the **British troops tried to dismantle Umra Khan's fort at Ramora** by exploding explosive materials however, they failed as the fort stood as it was before, without any damage at all because forts of Umra Khan were very strong having wide walls and solid structure thus, made British artillery incapable of making any impression on his forts<sup>36</sup>.

As Kamrani Pass (3300 feet above sea level) was unfit for vehicular transport, therefore, the British troops marched along Panjkora River and reached Sado where they set up their headquarters<sup>37</sup>. They also constructed a bridge on Pajkora River near Sado so that they could easily penetrate into Jandul.

### **Release of British Prisoners**

It was difficult for Umra Khan to continue the war in Chitral because of two reasons firstly, it was impossible for him to fight the British troops in that state secondly; local population of Chitral did not like his presence in their territory and considered it interference in their matters, so he called back his militia (3,000 - 4,000 men) from Chitral. The General Officer Commanding Chitral Relief Force wrote to Umra Khan from his camp at Sado that Government troops had arrived at his boundaries and if he wished to save his life and property from being ruined, he should hand over the two

English officers and submit to whatever conditions the **government of India might impose. Umra Khan replied that “I have called back my forces from Chitral...On the strength of former services rendered by me, I have asked that the Government troops may go to Chitral by some other road, because Jandol [Jandul] is near to other tribes, and if anyone should show hostility I shall get into trouble”**<sup>38</sup>. Contrary to the Government expectations, Umra Khan treated the prisoners in a dignified manner and eventually released all of them without any harm<sup>39</sup>. Lieutenant Fowler and other prisoners reached Sado camp on April 16, 1895. Umra Khan replied to the letter that he had not only called back his forces from Chitral but also released the prisoners. However, the government informed him that the conditions laid down were cancelled owing to his delay in accepting them. Umra Khan **was told, that “he will best serve his own interests if he offers no opposition. If he chooses to surrender himself, he will be offered honourable asylum in India to himself, his family, and a reasonable number of his supporters”**<sup>40</sup>.

**The government told people of Jandul that “if they offer no further opposition, their villages and property will be spared. This does not preclude destruction of forts, towers, or anything necessary on military considerations”**<sup>41</sup>. Umra Khan was not in a position to face the British army, therefore decided to surrender.

### **Voyage to Afghanistan**

Feeling himself insecure in Jandul, Umra Khan went to Shahi on the night between 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> April from where he sneaked into Asmar along with his family members including his brothers Mir Hassan, Mir Afzal Khan, Zainullah Khan where they were provided with temporary accommodation. The Afghan Commander- in- Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan arrested all of them and sent them to Kabul, confiscated 250 rifles and 60 horses of Umra Khan. On his arrival in Kabul, Amir Abdur Rahman told Umra Khan that he (Umra Khan) would be given an annual allowance of 25,000 rupees and he would be considered as his (the Amir) servant in future but

Umra Khan declined to accept this offer. Umra Khan was not happy in Kabul but he was left with no other choice due to blunders he committed in the past like provoking a mighty neighbour, taking shelter with his arch rival, the Amir of Afghanistan and misadventure in Chitral.

The British deposed Amir-ul-Mulk and made Shuja-ul-Mulk as the new Mehtar of Chitral. The government presented rewards to all those who extended help in relief of Chitral. Some were conferred upon the title of Khan Bahadur, others were given lands, cash besides appointment of their sons and brothers in different departments.

The British also restored Dir to Muhammad Sharif Khan who was given 500 rifles, 25, 000 rupees in addition to an annual allowance of 10,000 rupees. He was given the title of Nawab by the British in June 1897. He not only got the whole of Dir but occupied Jandul also.

Muhammad Sharif Khan signed an agreement with the British authorities on December 5, 1898 at Thana, Malakand whereby the boundaries of Dir state were drawn. Article No. 5 of the agreement says, that **“My (the Nawab) boundary with the Amir of Kabul is that which has been fixed and determined by the Government”**<sup>42</sup>. The bank of Swat River was determined as the boundary with Swat and Lowari Top with Chitral state. The British established Malakand Agency comprising Dir, Swat and Chitral and H. A. Dean was posted as the Political Agent of the agency.

### **Arrival at Quetta**

With prior approval of the viceroy, Umra Khan arrived in Quetta in February 1896 on his way to perform Hajj, from there he went to Bombay and then to the holy land by sea. On his return from Hajj on July 27, he was treated as a guest and Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan J.A. Crawford invited him to have a meeting with him in Ziarat. He stayed in Ziarat from 13<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> August where he was told that the Government of India had cleared him of the blame in respect



to unpleasant events in Chitral and Bajour because he had extended generous and dignified attitude to English officers who were detained by him. Umra Khan requested that he should be restored on Jandul Chief ship to which J.A. Crawford did not agree. However, he said that the government was prepared to give him a liberal allowance, to enable him to live in security and comfort in Baluchistan but Umra Khan did **not accept the offer and replied, "If I am not allowed to return to Jandul, I will not live in India as a pensioner or on any term whatever. It is intolerable for me to accept such a position while my enemies rules in my own country"**<sup>43</sup>. The agent again requested Umra Khan to live at liberty and with complete comfort in Baluchistan. To this, Umra Khan replied that he had no such love of life and he needed a prize which is certainly very high.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1886, he returned to Quetta and stayed there for a night. Next morning, he went to Chaman and sent a messenger to the Afghan fort at Spin Boldak, to enquire whether any arrangements had been made for his onward journey, got reply in negative. He along with his party went to the border post and met Khairullah, an Afghan official who informed Umra Khan that no orders had been received about making arrangements for his journey towards Kabul. Umra Khan waited for several hours at the boundary, disconcerted and depressed at this treatment. His followers urged him to **return and accept the Government's offer but he replied that** he would have done so without hesitation if his family and money had not been left near Kabul. After much delay and in a very dejected state, Umra Khan and his party crossed the border. They had no horses or bedding; and they spent night outside the Spin Boldak fort. Next morning, instead of going to Kandahar, he took the other route (via Kalat-i-Ghilzai) to Kabul to evade the official escort. Umra Khan was very upset at the behaviour of Afghan government and wanted to come back to India but his family and a treasure of 20 lakh rupees stood as stumbling block in his way. After this unpleasant experience, he never returned to India, died in 1903 and was laid to rest at Waisalabad locality of Kabul. Dir and Bajour have so far failed to produce a man of his stature. Though he is

no more alive-yet he ruled over the heart of entire Malakand belt. He is always recalled with honour and dignity. George Younghusb **and says, "if he had chosen to be the friend of British, he might have become a despotic ruler of the whole country which lies between Chitral and Peshawar with complete support of the British Government"**<sup>44</sup>. Umra Khan knew the art of war very well but was not familiar with the art of international politics which proved vicious and lost everything as a result of the great game. The people Jandul and Dir lost a great ruler and a vast land due to the Durand Agreement.

## **Conclusion**

The Durand Agreement has left negative impacts on Bajour and Dir. If the Durand Agreement had not been signed, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan will have now been the southern side of Kunar River. Asmar which forms a portion of Kunar province would have also been included in Pakistan. But Bajour and Dir were deprived of these areas due to the agreement. The British having a vast Empire did not bother to protect the interests of the people of Dir and Bajour. Mortimer Durand accepted the request of Amir Abdur Rahman to include Asmar in his dominion. Actually Asmar was one of the four khanates of Bajour. The others are Nawagai, Khar and Pasht. The Afghan troops occupied Asmar in June 1892. This was resisted by Umra Khan. But his position became feeble when the British accepted the Afghan occupation and annexation of Asmar. The area was given in the control of Afghanistan under article 3 of the Durand Agreement. This annoyed Umra Khan who openly challenged the British for this injustice with his people. He attacked Chitral and arrested two British army officers and several soldiers and shifted them to Jandul. This was a declaration of war. The British arranged Chitral Relief Force. Being unable to fight the British army, Umra Khan fled to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Commissioner Peshawar Division, Sir Richard Udny who was a member of the Asmar Boundary Commission adopted pro-Afghan attitude and gave maximum concessions to Afghanistan. He agreed to the proposal of his Afghan

counterpart, Ghulam Haider Khan and further pushed the border towards the south. In this way, an area of about 200 km long and over 100 km wide was given to Afghanistan. It was due to the Durand Agreement that people of Dir and Bajour were deprived of their in addition to their popular ruler, Umra Khan of Jandul.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Directorate of Archives and Library Peshawar, File Ex-DD, Bundle No. 13, Serial No. 1389, 6.

<sup>2</sup>H. C. Thomson, *The Chitral Campaign: A Narrative of Events in Chitral, Swat, and Bajour* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1981), 63,

<sup>3</sup>Sir Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (London: Longmans, Greens, & Ltd., 1901), 19.

<sup>4</sup>Asad Munir, *Umra Khan of Jandul*, the Express Tribune, June 12, 2012.

<sup>5</sup>Lutfur Rehman, *Durand Agreement: Impacts on Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat* (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2012), 20.

<sup>6</sup>Macgregor, *Central Asia*, part 1 (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1871), 146.

<sup>7</sup>Who's who in the NWFP 1914 (Peshawar: Government Press, 1915), 164.

<sup>8</sup>Major Deane, *A Report on Chitral Relief Force* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1895), 1.

<sup>9</sup>A.H. McMahon and A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour Together with Utman-Khel and Sam Ranizai*, (Peshawar: Saeed Book Bank, 1981), 78.

<sup>10</sup>Thomas Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland: 1880-1900* (London: Methuen and Co., 1901), 246

<sup>11</sup>The New York Times, May 12, 1895.

<sup>12</sup>Holdich, *The Indian Borderland*, 84.

<sup>13</sup>Letter No. 154 sent by Chief Secretary Punjab, C. L. Tupper to Secretary Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1893, available in the File No. 7 (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1893), 9.

<sup>14</sup>Thomson, *The Chitral Campaign*, 27.

<sup>15</sup>C.R. Markam: *The Upper Basin of Kabul River*, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series, Vol.1, No.2. (Feb.1879), 113.

<sup>16</sup>A. L'E. Holmes, *Gazetteer of the North-West Frontier: From Bajaur and the Indus Kohistan on the north to the Mari Hills on the south*, Vol.1 (Simla: the Government Central Branch Press, 1887), 176.

<sup>17</sup>Henry George Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Baluchistan* (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1978), 2.

<sup>18</sup>Ludwig Adamec: *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Austria* Vol. 6 (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 43.

<sup>19</sup>Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed, *The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan*, Vol. 11 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980), 158-59.

- <sup>20</sup>McMahon and Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir*, 91.
- <sup>21</sup>Dean, *A Report on Chitral Relief Force*, (appendix 1, a), 3.
- <sup>22</sup>Sir Percy Sykes, *A Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1926), 202.
- <sup>23</sup>Letter No. 1258 F sent by Secretary to the Government of India on Foreign Affairs to the Chief Secretary of the Government of the Punjab, Simla, June 28, 1892.
- <sup>24</sup>Kharita (Letter) No. 91 P. O, Simla, 28<sup>th</sup> June 1892.
- <sup>25</sup>**Note 196 C; Relations with Umra Khan of Jandol** sent by Commissioner Peshawar to Foreign Department, June 18, 1893, 4.
- <sup>26</sup>**Correspondence Relating to Chitral** presented to [British] Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Ere and Spottiswoode, 1895), 32.
- <sup>27</sup>Extract from Peshawar Confidential Diary, No. 15 (Asmar), August 10, 1894.
- <sup>28</sup>Richard Udny, *Note on Chitral Affairs* (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1895), 1.
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- <sup>32</sup>H.C. Wyllie, *Tribes of Central Asia; from the Black Mountains to Waziristan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books PVT Ltd, 1996), 164.
- <sup>33</sup>Paul K. Davis, *Besieged: 100 Great Sieges from Jericho to Sarajevo* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 266.
- <sup>34</sup>Wyllie, *Tribes of Central Asia*, 166.
- <sup>35</sup>W. Malletson, *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India* Vol. 1, edit. (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979), 547.
- <sup>36</sup>G.J. Younghusband and Francis Younghusband, *The Relief of Chitral* (Rawalpindi: English Book House, 1976), 101. The book was first published in 1895.
- <sup>37</sup>Wyllie, *Tribes of Central Asia*, 170.
- <sup>38</sup>Telegram sent by General Commanding Officer Chitral Relief Force to Punjab on April 16, 1895.
- <sup>39</sup>**Correspondence Relating to Chitral**, 50.
- <sup>40</sup>Telegram sent from Simla to Lahore on April 17, 1895.
- <sup>41</sup>Telegram sent from Simla to Lahore on April 8, 1895.
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**ISSN:** 2073-0926

**Published by**  
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