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
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India-Pakistan Nuclear Equation: The Need for an Arms Control and Disarmament Regime

Muhammad Arshad*

A*bstract:* The endless efforts of India and Pakistan to enhance their nuclear and conventional military capabilities have heightened the risk of nuclear holocaust in the region besides putting increased stress on their meagre resources, which are crucially required for human security needs. Their efforts to up-grade their military capabilities have exacerbated each other's security dilemma and given rise to arms race. Accordingly, India's missile tests have invariably attracted response from Pakistan in the form of similar missile tests, which can only be explained by arms race model. From 1998 to July 2012, India and Pakistan conducted almost equal number of ballistic missile tests (60 and 55 respectively), which is not justifiable in the backdrop of asymmetry in their resources and threat perceptions. Pakistan's development of Nasr battlefield nuclear weapon system designed to upset India's Cold Start Doctrine contemplating offensive operations into Pakistan under nuclear overhang and flight test of Ababeel surface-to-surface ballistic missile using Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology as a reaction to India's decision to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence are two apt examples. The situation calls for institution of an arms control and disarmament (ACD) regime for India and Pakistan, which in the past has been non-existent. However, the dynamics of India-Pakistan equation being significantly different from those, which guided the ACD process of the Cold War era, South Asia requires a different model. The model must accommodate the unique security requirements of both countries including India's security calculus, which regards China as its main threat. Likewise, in view of the contemporary ground realities the scope of ACD will have to be expanded by including more types of weapons, technologies, issues (humanitarian, economic and governance), and actors (international organizations, and non-governmental actors).

Keywords: Security Dilemma, Socioeconomic Dynamics, Arms Race, Nuclear Posture, Arms Control and Disarmament.

Introduction

Pakistan and India are the only nuclear-capable neighbours in the world, which have historically remained locked in "enduring rivalry"¹ owing to unresolved disputes; the most complex one is Kashmir issue. Besides fighting three wars within the first twenty-four years of independence (1948, 1965 and 1971) and experiencing frequent military crises, including the small scale armed conflict of Kargil in 1999, they have remained engaged in endless security competition. Admittedly, their efforts to

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enhance nuclear and conventional military capabilities to address their perceived security vulnerabilities have heightened the risk of nuclear holocaust in the region and put increased stress on their meagre resources, which are crucially required for human security needs.

The hypothesis of this study is that both India and Pakistan, seized with perpetual security dilemma, are in a state of quasi-arms race and, thus, need an arms control and disarmament (ACD) regime. Using qualitative approach, the study evaluates the phenomenon of arms race between India and Pakistan and outlines salient features of an ACD model for South Asia. The questions intended to be investigated in the study are:

- a. To what extent can the India-Pakistan nuclear competition be termed as arms race and is there a need for ACD regime?
- b. What is the efficacy of a Cold War type ACD regime in South Asia?
- c. What should be the cardinal features of ACD regime designed to serve India-Pakistan framework?

Theoretical Framework

The notion of arms race is closely linked with that of security dilemma - the former being the direct consequence of the latter – which is the compelling factor pushing India and Pakistan into arms race. Security Dilemma is a structural concept in which, according to John Herz, “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, . . . tend to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.”² Worried about the “threat of being attacked, dominated, or annihilated” and “to escape from the impact of power of others”, states strive to improve their security against perceived threats, and tend to acquire more and more power.³ This in turn breeds a feeling of insecurity in others, who feel compelled to adopt measures, which upset the existing equilibrium and generate an endless reciprocal competition. Philip Cerny posits that as the most crucial dynamic of international relations, security dilemma has the potential to undermine power balance and to create a vicious circle of “ever increasing insecurity”.⁴ This phenomenon, also referred to as the “spiral model” leads to arms race.⁵

Arms race, in simple terms, is an on-going competition between two or more nations to acquire more potent military forces than the other(s).⁶ The phrase is mostly used to describe any competition with the relative goal of staying ahead of the other competitors. In the nuclear arms race experienced by the USSR and the USA during the Cold War, the quest to achieve superiority over the adversary led to

development of large military capabilities and stockpiles of nuclear arsenals on both sides, which, besides increasing the prospects of war with ancillary risks, entailed colossal economic cost. The Cold War adversaries, however, soon realized the ominous consequences of arms race and managed their situation by concluding ACD treaties and agreements.

Arms control is “an umbrella term for restrictions on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction” and aims at “mutual security between partners and overall stability”.⁷ In its literal sense, it means “managing, administering or steering military capacities”.⁸ It enforces restrictions on developing or acquiring new weapons, which differs from ‘disarmament’ seeking reduction and elimination of particular categories of weapons.⁹ It imposes limitations on the consenting states through treaties and agreements, although, it may also enforce restrictions upon a non-consenting country.¹⁰ Many scholars view arms control in a broader sense and associate it with promotion of “knowledge about military capacities through verification, inspection and monitoring”.¹¹ Fundamentally, the traditional arms control theory is envisaged to act as a means to promote national security and not to achieve reduction of arms *per se* as an end.¹² The basic condition for arms control to be successfully negotiated and implemented is that, notwithstanding political and ideological differences, the parties should share common interest in avoiding a devastating nuclear war and demonstrate readiness to cooperate to achieve that purpose without awaiting resolution of conflicts.

Socioeconomic and Security Dynamics of India and Pakistan

Burdened by problems of “poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and over-population”, both countries are deficient of resources crucially required for alleviation of sufferings of people.¹³ According to the UN Human Development Index, India and Pakistan ranked at 130 and 147 respectively among 188 countries in 2015.¹⁴ But, they are investing huge resources on military capabilities and nuclear weapons at the expense of human security needs. The severity of India’s troubles can be gauged from the fact that despite an impressive average economic growth of over 7 percent per year since 1997, it has not been able to address widespread poverty, inadequacy of physical and social infrastructure, scarce access of common citizen to quality education and high level of unemployment.¹⁵ According to a report, as many as 220 districts of India are currently affected by serious internal turmoil owing to socioeconomic disparities and asymmetrical economic growth, which has benefitted less than 20 percent population.¹⁶ On the other hand, Pakistan with low economic growth rate over the past few years (averaging less than 4 percent per year), high inflation, surge in food prices, crippling energy crisis, and high trade deficit, is

confronted by rising poverty, which stands at approximately 30 percent of the population.¹⁷ Equally unsatisfactory is its internal security scene with a simmering disturbance in Balochistan and ongoing counterterrorism operations in Karachi and North-Western region.

Conversely, the conflictual nature of India-Pakistan relationship has kept the two countries entangled in incessant military competition causing colossal strain on their fragile economic conditions. According to a report, India's military expenditure, which accounts for South Asia's 80 percent increased by 64 percent during the last decade in real terms, while that of Pakistan rose by 38 percent.¹⁸ To sustain its regional and global aspirations militarily, India has become the largest importer of arms in the world.¹⁹ In 2003, Rammanohar Reddy projected that at 1998-99 price level India's nuclear program would cost Rs. 700-800 billion per year (equalling US \$ 16-19 billion).²⁰ Pakistan's situation with its military expenditure of 3.6% of GDP being 50% higher than that of India is worse.²¹ Notwithstanding, disproportionately higher expenditures on defence than on human security needs, South Asia remains "the most endangered region" of the world.²² The only change the region has witnessed after nuclearization of India and Pakistan is that there has been no major war between the two. Contrarily, they have demonstrated no serious willingness in the past to engage in a formal conflict prevention arrangement like arms control, which by promoting transparency and increased understanding of the adversary's nuclear force and that of its strategic dynamics can lessen their burden of defence expenditures and reduce the risk of at least an inadvertent nuclear war.²³

Comparative Nuclear Postures

The details of nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have not been officially made public by either side. Therefore, the data on their nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems compiled by analysts is mostly based on conjecturing. According to some analysts, South Asia's current strategic situation can be termed as mutually destructive. In spite of the fact that both countries are reportedly already in possession of the requisite systems including support infrastructure needed for their declared nuclear policies, their efforts to up-grade their capabilities continue unabated, exacerbating each other's security dilemma. The latest inventory of nuclear warheads that India is believed to possess is approximately 80-100, whereas, Pakistan's inventory is estimated to be 90-110.²⁴ Although, by the US and Soviet standards nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan are limited in destructive capacity, they are considered to be quite powerful.

India, having acquired nuclear weapons technology, has been constantly up-grading its capability with missile tests, invariably attracting response from Pakistan in the form of similar missile tests. India has so far tested and operationalized short-

to-intermediate range nuclear-capable missiles, which include 150 km Prithvi-I, 250 km Prithvi-II, Naval-version Prithvi-III (Dhanush - 350 km), Sagarika submarine-launched SRBM, BrahMos cruise missile (300 km), Agni-I (1500 km), and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km).²⁵ Agni-III (3,500 km), Agni-IV (5,000 km) and Surya (10,000-12,000 km) are reportedly being developed.²⁶ Prahaar with 150 km range is the latest addition to Indian surface-to-surface short range capability.²⁷ The nuclear-capable aircraft on its inventory are “Mirage-2000H, Jaguar S(I), MiG-29 and SU-30K MKI”.²⁸ India has also made impressive strides in space technology by indigenously developing space launch vehicle (SLV) and launching satellites with military and civilian applications including unmanned missions to the moon and Mars.²⁹

On the other hand, the missiles on Pakistan’s inventory include Hatf-I (80-100 km range), Abdali (260-300 km), Ghaznavi (500-800 km), Shaheen-I (750 km), Ghauri-I (1,100-1,500 km), Ghauri-II (2,000 km), and Shaheen-II (2,400-2,500 km). Pakistan has also tested ground-launched Babur cruise missile (500 km) and air-launched Ra’ad cruise missile (300 km).³⁰ Pakistan is also reported to possess a limited stock of Chinese missiles M-9 (600 km) and M-11 (300 km). Ghauri-III with a range of 3,500 km and Shaheen-III with a similar range are currently under development. The introduction of *Nasr* battlefield nuclear weapon system by Pakistan recently has invited severe criticism from the international community and Indian circles as it upsets India’s Cold Start Doctrine, which envisages offensive operations into Pakistan under nuclear overhang. Additionally, approximately 120 aircraft of various types consisting of F-16, Mirage-III and Mirage-V are known to have been upgraded for delivery of nuclear weapons.³¹ However, Pakistan has not made a worthwhile progress in space technology as related to military applications.

India’s declared nuclear policy, termed as credible minimum deterrence (CMD), is primarily configured for the threat from China, which continues to drive the former’s unceasing quest for up-gradation of nuclear arsenal.³² Another motive behind India’s nuclearization is believed to be its quest to enhance its international status and prestige, which, according to Waltz, is “both a reason for and a consequence of developing nuclear weapons”.³³ Raja Menon describes Indian nuclear weapons less as security mechanism and more as instruments of international influence.³⁴ George Perkovich argues that in this context domestic factors have been as significant as external security considerations.³⁵

Contrarily, Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability is essentially designed to address its existential threat from nuclear-armed India.³⁶ Notwithstanding, India’s declaratory policy of No First Use, the Indian version of CMD “based on triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets” is considered existential threat to Pakistan.³⁷ Pakistani strategic community claims that the clause of India’s

CMD, which envisions an “effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive” nuclear force is meant to achieve “massive expansion of strategic and conventional forces”.³⁸

Are Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Developments Indicative of an Arms Race?

The notion of arms race is generally analysed with statistical models in which military expenditures and changes in stockpiles of particular categories of armaments of two countries are scrutinized. However, at times, the data of military expenditures and weapon stockpiles may not be either available or completely dependable. When accurate data is unavailable the analyses pertaining to nuclear weapon countries like India and Pakistan, according to Toby Dalton and Jaelyn Tandler, can be based on missile tests as these tests are comparatively more transparent and reveal additional evidence related to doctrines and postures.³⁹ However, Dalton and Tandler caution that the missile tests may not be a perfect indicator of arms racing.

Dalton and Tandler have concluded in a study that the pace of developments in Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs does not constitute arms race. They argue that the programs of both countries are “largely decoupled” and that they are not in a “tit-for-tat” competition.⁴⁰ According to them, both countries are pursuing “vastly different goals” and do not demonstrate behaviour pattern expected of those, who are engaged in a typical arms race. If comparisons are drawn strictly in accordance with the technical features and operational roles of systems being tested by both countries then the assertion of Dalton and Tandler apparently sounds valid. However, when subjected to close scrutiny their conclusion gets disproved.

This study avers that their conclusion is not the outcome of an objective analysis. Dalton and Tandler seem to have been influenced by official pronouncements. For example, Pakistani decision makers, like their Indian counterparts, have expressed from time to time their determination to avoid nuclear arms race. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar explicitly reiterated in 2000 that Pakistan’s policy of CMD shall not entail strategic arms race.⁴¹

Admittedly, the nuclear development objectives are governed by strategic considerations. Accordingly, with acute asymmetry in size, economic capacity, population and military strength, the strategies, strategic objectives and, hence, development goals of India and Pakistan ought to be different. Therefore, the patterns of development and tests may not necessarily coincide precisely. However, the patterns of development as evident from the data of missile tests of Pakistan and India (compiled by Dalton and Tandler and attached as Annex A⁴²) can only be explained by arms race model. From 1998 to July 2012, Pakistan and India

conducted almost equal number of ballistic missile tests (55 and 60 respectively), which is not justifiable in the backdrop of asymmetry in their resources and threat perceptions. Likewise, while India is known to have pursued cruise technology since 2001, Pakistan's interest in it surfaced for the first time with Babur's first test in 2005, which considering the lead time required for development of technology seems a direct reaction.

Pakistan's resolve to avoid arms race seems to have been adversely affected lately by various developments. The most significant development is the US-India Nuclear Deal, which serves India's interests in multiple ways: one, it has earned for India the recognition of a *de facto* nuclear weapon state; two, it has given India access into the international nuclear market and opened unlimited opportunities to acquire fuel for its nuclear energy program and advanced nuclear technology; three, the technology so acquired from advanced countries will naturally be available to India for both economic growth and military program alike; four, it will spare India's limited domestic fissile material reserves for military purposes.⁴³ All this will have the potential to destabilize the strategic equilibrium of South Asia and exacerbate Pakistan's existential threat.

The most profound change in South Asia's strategic landscape after 1998 has been brought about by India's declaration of Cold Start Doctrine under which it retains the option of fighting a limited conventional war against Pakistan in nuclear environment. This development has been a strong incentive for Pakistan to opt for battlefield nuclear weapon "Nasr", which perhaps for the reason of its costliness never figured in its earlier pronouncements. The expensiveness of the weapon system can be discerned from a study, which asserts that, whereas, one 15-KT weapon can destroy 55 tanks with a 100-meter spacing, for a tank spacing of 300-meter, eight such weapons would be needed.⁴⁴ Michael Krepon, who otherwise challenges the veracity of this calculation, has questioned the sustainability of battlefield nuclear weapon option for Pakistan.⁴⁵ In any case, "Nasr" has radically altered the conflict paradigm in South Asia. Another factor, which could also be considered highly provocative for Pakistan is the Indian hawks' rhetoric of "preemptive strikes" against Pakistan⁴⁶ as against its declared policy of No First Use. For Pakistan with its small geographic size and vulnerability to Indian preemptive strike, this rhetoric is hard to ignore.

Another development, which because of its potential to upset the strategic stability of South Asia, has affected Pakistan's resolve to avoid arms race is India's decision to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which is set to be launched soon.⁴⁷ Some scholars argue that India's plan to acquire BMD capability is linked with that of China, which in turn is coupled with the US National Missile Defence

(NMD) System and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in Asia-Pacific Region.⁴⁸ Pakistan's first flight test of *Ababeel* surface-to-surface ballistic missile, which is capable of delivery nuclear warhead using Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology is a direct reaction to India's decision to deploy.⁴⁹ According to Gregory Koblentz, India's efforts to build missile defence systems have prompted a new phase in the missile race in South Asia.⁵⁰

From the nuclear development efforts of Pakistan since 1998, Krepon infers that the requirements fixed by Pakistan for its deterrence have "expanded" over the years. To substantiate his viewpoint, he argues that the construction of Pakistan's fourth plutonium production reactor commenced in 2011 after the US-India Nuclear Deal. He avers that while it may have been included in the original plan, it is more probable that it materialized due to the "added Pakistani concerns over the US-India civil nuclear agreement, as well as heightened concerns about India's improved ties with the US".⁵¹ Consequently, instead of traditional phraseology of "credible minimum deterrence", and notions like "full spectrum deterrence" and deterrence "at all levels of the threat spectrum" have started to appear in official pronouncements of Pakistani strategic circles.⁵²

The India-Pakistan arms race can, thus, be largely attributed to India, because it is much bigger in size and power potential with respect to its neighbours. According to an Indian analyst, Monica Bhanot, South Asia's problems, pervasive hostility, and mutual distrust are mainly the "products of the contradictions in security perceptions of India" with respect to other countries of the region which it considers as an "integral part of [her] own security system".⁵³ This author concurs with Bhanot's assertion and considers the conclusion of many others including Peter Lavoy that Pakistan's nuclear developments are reflective of its attempt to address the "growing imbalance in conventional capability reinforced by Indian superiority in nuclear forces" as valid.⁵⁴

The Cold War Experience of ACD

The concept of arms control expounded during the 1950s and 1960s and adopted as a key element of national policy by the Cold War antagonists, was not a new phenomenon. The practice of seeking negotiated solutions to security predicaments on the part of adversaries had remained in vogue in the past. The risks of death and destruction associated with nuclear weapons, the increased fragility of strategic stability due to uncontrolled nuclear build-up, and staggering economic cost of nuclear competition prompted the policy makers of the USA and the USSR to rise above their political motivations and cooperate on arms control.⁵⁵ The experts on both sides re-evaluated defence and foreign policies and concluded that the post-war disarmament objective being pursued since 1945 on traditional pattern was not

achievable. They realized that instead of seeking general and complete disarmament as had been the approach earlier, there was a need to first consider “limited” and “partial measures”, which would ultimately promote confidence in cooperative security arrangements.⁵⁶

The earlier deliberations of arms control set three goals: “to reduce the risk of war”; “to reduce the destructiveness of war should it break out”; and “to redirect the resources devoted to armaments to other ends”.⁵⁷ Practically, however, the primary emphasis of arms control remained on reduction of the risk of war. After the Cuban missile crisis, there emerged a consensus between interlocutors that without ensuring crisis stability and addressing mutual fear of nuclear attack, the risk of war could not be reduced.⁵⁸ Consequently, these two concerns became the basis of arms control, which was basically intended for all states covering complete range of weapon systems. The scope of arms control gradually became rather narrow and it assumed the character of 'nuclear arms control' with its main focus restricted to the concept of security anchored on equilibrium of nuclear forces, that too between a few countries, i.e., the superpowers.⁵⁹

After the Cuban missile crisis, a number of international, regional and bilateral ACD treaties, agreements and cooperative arrangements were concluded, which according to some scholars failed to achieve stipulated objectives because of various reasons. Some of the oft-quoted failures in this context are: the failure of the 1972 ABM Treaty; the inability to achieve reduction of nuclear weapons of states other than the USA and Russia; the acquisition of nuclear weapon technology by countries like Pakistan, India and North Korea; refusal of certain countries including the USA to accept the CTBT; and the in-effectiveness of ACD treaties to abolish chemical and biological weapons. Michael A. Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon argue that arms control regimes have not been able to eliminate conflict in the developing countries or to significantly reduce the nuclear stockpiles and conventional forces of the superpowers.⁶⁰

Notwithstanding, the above criticism, the elimination of 20,000 nuclear weapons and approximately 60,000 conventional heavy weapons in Europe and former Central Asian Republics of the erstwhile USSR in the recent decades owing to arms control agreements, is not an insignificant achievement.⁶¹ As a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Soviet Union and the USA agreed to destroy 1,750 and 846 nuclear armed ballistic missiles respectively, establishing a rule that for the sake of strategic stability “asymmetrical reductions . . . were acceptable . . .”⁶² This agreement also created a highly intrusive verification regime. The ABM Treaty and many hotline agreements concluded by the USA and the USSR reduced the risk of crises escalating into potentially devastating nuclear

conflicts.⁶³ Likewise, the NPT prevented “runaway proliferation” during the first two decades of its enforcement.⁶⁴

Keith Krause and Andrew Latham have identified many normative dividends of arms control: first, it has provided a solid foundation for arms control and promoted international security by strengthening nuclear deterrence and preventing inadvertent nuclear conflagration; and second, it has introduced a new tradition of conflict management and resolution and contributed towards the maturity of the “science” of negotiation.⁶⁵ The most important achievement of arms control, according to Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, has been the universal recognition of the importance of “transparency” in military capabilities and of the associated concept of “confidence- (and security-) building measures (CSBMs)”.⁶⁶ The concept from its original narrow scope has grown into a comprehensive paradigm of measures meant to “regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit”⁶⁷ and has made valuable contribution toward the international security architecture.

In short, although much remains unachieved, the accomplishments of arms control during the last fifty years have not been insignificant and, hence, can be replicated in principle in future endeavours. Recent arms control treaties have incorporated stringent measures for enforcement as well as “verification”.⁶⁸ With a view to making arms control arrangements more effective, analysts suggest expansion of the framework to include political, economic, and military measures. Some of the suggestions in this regard, as proffered by scholars, are: the avoidance of radical changes in the structure; and continuation and supplementation of the processes that are still not complete.

Contours of a Possible South Asian Arms Control Regime

On the basis of evaluation of some of the measures taken by India and Pakistan in the past to address their mutual security and political concerns, and not pursued with seriousness, Bhumitra Chakma concludes that the prospects of success of arms control between the two countries at the moment are non-existent.⁶⁹ He equates the current situation of South Asia with the one that prevailed between the USA and the USSR in the 1950s and early 1960s. This is a rather narrow and negative view. India and Pakistan do not have to necessarily adopt the same learning curve as the two superpowers in the absence of any past precedents were constrained to follow. In the dark chapter of India-Pakistan antagonism, there is a silver-lining that foretells the prospects of success of a regional arms control arrangement. They have implemented many CSBMs in the past, which helped keep the temperatures cool even in intensely tension-driven moments. Dr. Tughral Yamin has compiled a list of

about 120 CSBMs⁷⁰ instituted by India and Pakistan, most of which were implemented fairly successfully. Some analysts feel that with their “comparable nuclear forces meant to contain each other”, like those of the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union, Pakistan and India are “well positioned to embark on a bilateral arms control”.⁷¹ Lately, a discernible desire to promote peace through increased people-to-people contact has been noticed at the civil society level in both countries, which has the potential to exert pressure on the governments to seriously pursue the cause of peace.

The dynamics of India-Pakistan equation being significantly different from those, which guided the ACD process of the Cold War era, South Asia requires a different model. As asserted earlier, because of the unresolved contentious issues South Asian environment is marked by historical antagonism, general lack of trust, divergence of political and ideological perceptions and frequent occurrence of crises and conflict situations. Neither have the two countries ever demonstrated any willingness to engage in arms control process in the past. The strategic considerations that propelled nuclear weapons programs of Pakistan and India are not identical. In the realm of conventional military capabilities, Pakistan and India are in a state of acute asymmetry, which in the nuclear paradigm has the potential to get further compounded. As highlighted earlier, in the strategic landscape of South Asia another significant player, which has a direct role in India-Pakistan nuclear equation, is China’s nuclear weapon capability, which figures prominently in Indian threat perception. On the other hand, China’s nuclear weapon program is also linked with the weapon capabilities of the USA and Russia. Therefore, any arms control arrangement for India and Pakistan must accommodate the unique security requirements of both countries.

Likewise, the objectives of ACD processes designed in the past, according to many analysts, are narrow and do not possess the requisite capacity to adequately address contemporary ground realities of South Asia. Some experts argue that the arms control agenda needs to be made more comprehensive by including “more types of weapons (small arms and light weapons), more types of equipment (non-lethal high technology), more issues (humanitarian issues, economic issues and governance issues), and more actors (international organizations, and non-governmental actors)”.⁷² They argue that the enlargement of the arms control scope is of overriding importance even at the cost of modifying or terminating the prevalent arrangements to spare means for the additional effort.

Conclusions

With India striving for maximization of power, and Pakistan maximizing its security in a bid to restore the balance,⁷³ the resultant security dilemma is causing an arms

race, which, for its nuclear overtones, is ominous for India and Pakistan. Another corollary of the arms race is disproportionately high military expenditures on both sides at the cost of crucial human security needs, which, in real terms, has made them more insecure.

As Indian missiles with ranges longer than that of Agni-I also affect, besides Pakistan, other regional countries and many more beyond the region, it is evident that Pakistan factor is not the sole factor of India's military development targets. The strategic panorama of South Asia is not simply the outcome of India-Pakistan nuclear competition and, instead, has complex multi-lateral linkages requiring intricate approach. With India's threat perception being China-specific and Pakistan's perception being India-specific, arms control arrangement will need to accommodate their mutually exclusive security concerns.

The lessons of Cold War arms control suggest that with numerous complex issues as those of India and Pakistan and to avert a nuclear holocaust in South Asia, the prior resolution of conflicts should not be made a prerequisite for initiation of dialogue on arms control. In view of the seriousness of the situation, a beginning needs to be made without awaiting the resolution of those conflicts.

The objectives of ACD processes designed in the past may not adequately address contemporary challenges of South Asia, which warrant a more comprehensive approach. There is a need for arms control scope to be expanded so as to include more types of weapon systems and equipment (non-lethal high technology), political and governance issues, social aspects including humanitarian issues, and economic initiatives with wider participation (international organizations, and non-state actors)".⁷⁴ It may be worthwhile to even consider military initiatives which can play a meaningful role during crises. Whereas, total nuclear disarmament may not be politically feasible option, an arms control regime on the lines of Cold War models can successfully prevent an arms race in the region and reduce the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe besides reducing financial burden on the parties. However, in view of the reduced credibility of the previous arms control related measures and CSBMs, any initiative on this account will require seriousness of purpose.

Figure 1: Missile Tests of Pakistan and India⁷⁵

Country	Date	Type	Missile
Pakistan	6 April 98	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
India	11 April 99	Ballistic	Agni-II
Pakistan	14 April 99	Ballistic	Ghauri-II
Pakistan	15 April 99	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
Pakistan	24 June 99	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
Pakistan	7 February 00	Ballistic	Hatf-1
India	11 April 00	Ballistic	Prithvi-III (Dhanush)
India	16 June 00	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
India	17 January 01	Ballistic	Agni-II
India	31 March 01	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
India	12 June 01	Cruise	BrahMos
India	12 June 01	Cruise	BrahMos
India	21 September 01	Ballistic	Prithvi-III (Dhanush)
India	13 December 01	Ballistic	Prithvi-II
India	25 January 02	Ballistic	Agni-I
India	28 April 02	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	25 May 02	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
Pakistan	26 May 02	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
Pakistan	28 May 02	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
Pakistan	4 October 02	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
India	9 January 03	Ballistic	Agni-I
India	12 February 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	26 March 03	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
Pakistan	26 March 03	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
India	29 April 03	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
Pakistan	3 October 03	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
Pakistan	8 October 03	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
Pakistan	13 October 03	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
India	29 October 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	29 October 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	9 November 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	9 November 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	23 November 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	23 November 03	Cruise	BrahMos
India	23 January 04	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
Pakistan	9 March 04	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
India	19 March 04	Ballistic	Prithvi-II
Pakistan	29 May 04	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
Pakistan	4 Jun 04	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
India	13 Jun 04	Cruise	BrahMos
India	4 Jul 04	Ballistic	Agni-I
India	29 Aug 04	Ballistic	Agni-II
Pakistan	12 Oct 04	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
India	27 Oct 04	Ballistic	Prithvi-III (Dhanush)

India-Pakistan Nuclear Equation

India	3 Nov 04	Cruise	BrahMos
India	7 Nov 04	Ballistic	Prithvi-III (Dhanush)
Pakistan	29 Nov 04	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
Pakistan	8 Dec 04	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
India	21 Dec 04	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	19 Mar 05	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
Pakistan	31 Mar 05	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
India	16 Apr 05	Cruise	BrahMos
India	12 May 05	Ballistic	Prithvi-I
Pakistan	11 Aug 05	Cruise	Babur
India	30 Nov 05	Cruise	BrahMos
India	1 Dec 05	Cruise	BrahMos
India	28 Dec 05	Ballistic	Prithvi-III (Dhanush)
Pakistan	21 Mar 06	Cruise	Babur
Pakistan	29 Apr 06	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
Pakistan	6 May 06	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
India	1 Jun 06	Cruise	BrahMos
India	11 Jun 06	Ballistic	Prithvi-II
India	9 Jul 06	Ballistic	Agni-III
Pakistan	16 Nov 06	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
India	19 Nov 06	Ballistic	Prithvi-II
India	27 Nov 06	Ballistic	Prithvi-II
Pakistan	29 Nov 06	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
Pakistan	9 Dec 06	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
India	5 Feb 07	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	23 Feb 07	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
Pakistan	3 Mar 07	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
Pakistan	22 Mar 07	Cruise	Babur
India	12 Apr 07	Ballistic	Agni-III
India	23 Apr 07	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	26 Jul 07	Cruise	Babur
Pakistan	25 Aug 07	Cruise	Ra'ad
Pakistan	11 Dec 07	Cruise	Babur
Pakistan	25 Jan 08	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
Pakistan	1 Feb 08	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
Pakistan	13 Feb 08	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
India	26 Febr 08	Ballistic	Sagarika
Pakistan	19 Apr 08	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
Pakistan	21 Apr 08	Ballistic	Hatf-6 (Shaheen-II)
India	7 May 08	Ballistic	Agni-III
Pakistan	8 May 08	Cruise	Ra'ad
India	12 Nov 08	Ballistic	Sagarika
India	18 Dec 08	Cruise	BrahMos
India	20 Jan 09	Cruise	BrahMos
India	5 Mar 09	Cruise	BrahMos
India	30 Mar 09	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	6 May 09	Cruise	Babur
India	30 Jul 09	Cruise	BrahMos
India	7 Feb 10	Ballistic	Agni-III

India	21 Mar 10	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	8 May 10	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
Pakistan	8 May 10	Ballistic	Hatf-4 (Shaheen-I)
India	6 Sep 10	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	21 Dec 10	Ballistic	Hatf-5 (Ghauri-I)
Pakistan	10 Feb 11	Cruise	Babur
Pakistan	11 Mar 11	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
Pakistan	19 Apr 11	Ballistic	Hatf-9 (Nasr)
Pakistan	29 Apr 11	Cruise	Ra'ad
India	21 Jul 11	Ballistic	Prahaar
Pakistan	28 Oct 11	Cruise	Babur
India	15 Nov 11	Ballistic	Agni-IV
India	2 Mar 12	Cruise	BrahMos
Pakistan	5 Mar 12	Ballistic	Hatf-2 (Abdali)
India	28 Mar 12	Cruise	BrahMos
India	19 Apr 12	Cruise	Agni-V
Pakistan	25 Apr 12	Ballistic	Shaheen 1A
Pakistan	10 May 12	Ballistic	Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)
Pakistan	29 May 12	Ballistic	Hatf-9 (Nasr)
Pakistan	31 May 12	Cruise	Ra'ad
Pakistan	5 Jun 12	Cruise	Babur
India	13 Jul 12	Ballistic	Agni-I

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Sovereign Development: Outline of a Grand Strategy for Pakistan

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Abstract: During 2005-2013, missiles fired from US drones led to verified deaths of some 80,000 Pakistanis (49,000 civilians); and associated domestic subversion and terrorism, to the estimated death of another 50,000. More have been dying since 2013. There is a need to defend the nation, better. To do so requires a grand strategy. While, there are objective limits to the scope for sovereign action, hostile information operations have sapped the will to resist of those, who take decisions and make public opinion, in Pakistan, leading to greater helplessness than is warranted. Identifying four emergent global trends, the article outlines a grand strategy—of sovereign development—which would provide an overall integrated approach to strategic communication, diplomacy, development, and defence. It concludes by identifying some constraints to implementation and suggesting ways to overcome them.

Keywords: War on Terror, National Security, Grand Strategy, Strategic Communication, Diplomacy.

Introduction

National power is based on four basic elements: military, economic, diplomatic, and informational. While, strategies are formulated for each, a grand strategy provides a unified vision for the coordinated deployment of these individual strategies toward the achievement of national objectives.¹ This article is based on the premise that Pakistan's security is compromised not only by heightened external threats, but also by the absence of an internal grand strategy.

The formulation of a grand strategy is a complex, iterative, long, collective affair, to which a short article cannot begin to do justice. This article merely seeks to initiate a discussion. It does so by approaching the task from an economic angle, to outline a grand strategy for sovereign development.² The concept of sovereign development re-imagines development as economic growth with national security. In our present predicament, this call for a change in our ways of thinking and action is not academic, our survival as a nation and as a country may depend on it.

The Ongoing War on Pakistan

Over the last decade or more, foreign military forces have been conducting clandestine, covert, special, information, and psychological operations in Pakistan. It

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is high time that we stop being passive recipients of this aggression and assume a more proactive, more sovereign posture in putting a stop to them and defending the nation. Unfortunately, exactly as intended, effective hostile propaganda has sapped our will to resist, and wisdom is seen to lie in blaming the victims rather than the aggressors, while making a virtue of necessity by seeking to profit from this war.³ In considering the article's proposals, the reader should not get bogged down in this blame game; instead the focus should be on feasible future conduct, guided by as objective, an assessment of present conditions, as possible, and only to the extent necessary by their proximate antecedents.

In this spirit, let us recall the key events in the short history of the twenty-first century. On the day following the death of some 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) threatened Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Musharraf to either assist the US in invading and occupying Afghanistan or prepare "to be bombed back to the Stone Age".⁴ On September 19, 2001, Musharraf announced to the nation that to save Pakistan and Islam, he had made the difficult choice to surrender to US demands and join the US War on Terror: "I am, at the moment, only worried about Pakistan. I am the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, and my main worry is the safety of Pakistan. The welfare of Pakistan is my main concern. We want to take a decision that is advantageous to the country. ... If, God forbid, any damage is done to the castle of Pakistan, then it would be a damage to Islam. My countrymen, have trust in me, the way you had trusted me, when I was going to Agra. Trust me now. I did not disappoint the nation on that occasion. I did not compromise the dignity of Pakistan. God willing, on this occasion also, I will not disappoint you."⁵

While, opinion will remain divided on whether the road not taken would have been better or worse,⁶ and whether the safety of Pakistan can be secured while ignoring the safety of our neighbours, few would deny that the 'dignity of Pakistan' (and much else) was 'compromised' in the years that followed. In particular, during 2005-2013, over 80,000 Pakistanis (including 49,000 civilians) were killed by US drones in Pakistan.⁷ By far the largest proportion of targets were 'religious buildings' (mosques and madrasas).⁸ In addition, the government estimates that 50,000 people were killed by domestic terrorism—a fallout of external subversion and domestic strife.⁹

This loss of lives is a failure primarily (though not exclusively) of defence strategy. What we have failed to appreciate is that there has been a tectonic change not just in the technology, but in the nature of war itself. Among other differences, the new war seeks to establish control over the mind of the enemy's decision-makers

to convince them to cooperate rather than resist, thus, “defeating the enemy without fighting.”¹⁰

As a result of highly effective information and psychological operations,¹¹ the US has been able to establish near-complete control over the civil and military leadership’s strategic thought, and effective dominance over key narratives in the communications media that shape public opinion, in Pakistan. This was revealed most graphically, when on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, the government—seeking to profit from the deaths of disenfranchised citizens—took out a tasteless full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, which asked Americans: “which country can do more for your peace? and informed them that: since 2001 a nation of 180 million has been fighting for the future of the world’s 7 billion, making sacrifices statistics cannot reflect.” And, then went on to cite the statistics; and answered its own question: “only Pakistan.”¹²

Naturally, no American was persuaded. But, we did end up supporting rather than contesting the narrative by which Pakistan has been damned globally that this war had nothing to do with securing Israel, and oil supplies in the Gulf; that those fighting against the invasion and occupation of sovereign nations—including on the knowingly false pretext of possession of weapons of mass destruction, as in Iraq, which threatened Israel not the US—were ‘terrorists’ (until then, the Israeli term for Palestinians); and that these terrorists threatened the lives of not just those, who kill them and take their lands and resources, but of 7 billion people around the globe.

The central point of this article is to contest this assessment of our capabilities and potential courses of action. It argues that our helplessness is in our minds. In reality, even though the scope for sovereign action is not unlimited, we can do a better job of defending the nation—in part by formulating and projecting a narrative that supports and not undermines our national security.

Anticipated Challenges: Four Emerging Global Trends

In assessing future outlook, four emerging global trends are notable: (1) the rise of racism in the West; (2) the new central battlefield of narrative; (3) the emergence of Sino-Russian Eurasia; and (4) of militant extremism in India.

The Re-Birth of Racism, Fascism, and Nationalism in the West

Although, Western analysts are reluctant to use the word fascism, the rise in racism—called nationalism—reflected in the UK (Brexit), the US (Trump), and Europe is widely recognised; as is the fact that liberalism, the dominant post-War ideology of the West, is fighting for survival. As a result, the West is now divided—internally, and across governments—into beleaguered liberals, with a global

inclusive outlook, and ascendant nationalists, whose views are eerily close to those of Hitler and Mussolini. Also as a result, globalism—the vision of sovereign equal nations with free flows of goods, services, and perhaps even labour—is dead.

Consequently, the United Nations (UN) and international law may continue to be weakened; and it is not clear whether the nationalists will (or will not) be less active militarily in the world. Closer to home: Pakistan may be of lesser military priority, reducing violence, but also aid flows; India will be the US surrogate in South Asia (like Israel in the Middle East); Strong anti-Muslim bias may lead to continued instability in Iraq; while joint US-Russia action may well bring greater stability in Syria and Yemen.

The Primary Battlefield - Narrative

Second, a revolution in military technology and practice has been underway, in which control of the narrative—the new name for an expanded conception of propaganda—is no longer merely in aid of battle, but is the high ground to seize and hold by perpetual operations across all theatres.

Once again, it is instructive to recall the facts that the terrorism narrative has successfully masked. Under the Nixon doctrine, the US provided Saudi Arabia and Iran with billions of dollars of weapons.¹³ In return, they ensured the flow of Gulf oil to the US and the West. On January 16, 1979, however, the Shah of Iran was deposed, and Ayatollah Khomeini took over, creating panic in the West. Seven days later, on January 23, 1979, US President Carter announced that the US itself will police the Gulf—enunciating the so-called Carter doctrine (drafted by his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski): “Let our position be absolutely clear; an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

It is important not to forget—as public narrative in Pakistan does—that this was (11 months) before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 24, 1979). Second, as revealed some two decades later, it was at the secret US initiative that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were co-opted to aid the Afghan mujahedeen, not vice versa, and that this began as early as July 1979, again before the Soviet invasion.¹⁴ In sum, it was US reaction to the Islamic revolution in Iran, raising American fears for the safety of Israel and of access to Gulf oil, and not the Taliban (whom the US was supporting in Afghanistan, well before the Soviet invasion), that brought this war to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the two countries eventually morphing into one (“AfPak”) theatre of American military operations.¹⁵

The main aim of the US war in Pakistan today is to control the state apparatus, and through control of media and psychological and information operations, the public narrative. Like Israel, the US now seeks ‘total security’ (a state in which all potential enemies are disarmed), and has been engaged in ‘total war’ (war across all—civil and military—fronts, by all available means). “Since the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11, ... US national-security policy increasingly conforms to patterns of behaviour pioneered by the Jewish state. This ‘Israelification’ of US policy may prove beneficial for Israel. Based on the available evidence, it is not likely to be good for the United States.”¹⁶ In short, the Israel-Palestine model has been globalised, against an enemy—Islam and Muslims—constructed in the image of America’s twentieth-century enemies.¹⁷

The narrative crafted, by which this war has been sold to a Vietnam-weary US public has evolved over time. For its latest form let us quote retired US Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the designated US National Security Adviser (NSA) in the new administration: “Islam is a political ideology based on a religion. So, this is a political system that we are facing, and we must defeat this political system. ... We are in a war. It is a war declared by our enemy [!] ... Radical Islamists, and radical Islamism. You know, -isms that we faced over the last 75 years, you know, Nazism, fascism, communism—you know, now it’s radical Islamism. It is a cancerous, barbaric, vicious form of element with inside [sic.] of the Islamic system. Islam is a political ideology based on a religion. So, this is a political system that we are facing and we must defeat this political system, the cancerous form of this political system, which is this radical Islam.”¹⁸

Unless Pakistan—and the Muslim world—contest this narrative, effectively, we will be isolated diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Within the frame of this narrative, no case based on facts or logic alone will have any chance of prevailing. While not official, a private study published in 2016 by the Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College forecasts that: “The CIA will have extensive evidence of Pakistani Army support to the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and one of the first challenges for the next US President taking office in January 2017 will be deciding how to deal with this provocation.”¹⁹

The study also holds that: “Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, and South Sudan all exist today because a unified Pakistan, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Sudan were never going to be nations within their existing colonial maps. It is heresy to the State Department, which has always fought against it, but sometimes the best way to solve a problem is to draw a new map.” Accordingly, it calls for a bifurcated (North, South) Afghanistan, following US withdrawal: “Pakistan may consider half of Afghanistan sufficient strategic depth, although some scholars believe Pakistan’s fear of the old

dream of a Pashtunistan will drive Pakistani resistance to partition, as it could be a precursor to a Pashtun national independence movement.”²⁰

None of this bodes well for Pakistan’s relations with the new US administration. In addition to NSA Flynn, Trump has designated a like-minded Deputy NSA (from Fox News, who will head the huge US government inter-agency propaganda complex), and an educated Secretary of Defence, albeit with similar biases. As of this writing, the number of ex-military cabinet appointments by Trump is raising concerns in the US. Irrespective, an important determinant of future US conduct would be the outcome of the expected contest between the entrenched members of the defence and foreign policy establishment and the new political appointees.

The Emergence of Sino-Soviet Eurasia

The third trend is the emergence of Sino-Russian Eurasia, a joint effort by China and Russia to build a unified North Eurasian economic zone.²¹ As part of a grand “China Dream”, China has conceived the “One Belt One Road” project, that seeks to link Asia-Pacific with Europe: overland by rail and road (called “the Belt”), and across water by the Maritime Road (called “the Road”). The Belt is envisaged to have 4 spurs going South (to the ports of Singapore, Kolkata, Gwadar, and Istanbul), as well as two spurs to the Northwest, across Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

The Chinese initiative is coordinated with Russia, which has been engaged in its own efforts to promote greater cooperation between members of the former Soviet Union; in particular, the effort to create a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

The Rise of Militant Extremism in India

Finally, the rise of Militant Extremism in India is a noteworthy trend with global implications. Since, these are well known, the article confines itself to a few brief remarks on the rise of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in India, and the emergence of what is being called a Modi Doctrine:

- Moving from non-alignment to multiple-alignments; to establish India’s position as a global great power.²²
- Moving, as befits a regional hegemon, from a vision of regional cooperation (the so-called Gujral doctrine), to a more militarised approach; in pursuit of the eventual achievement of ‘Undivided India’ (Akhand Bharat).²³
- Making the “Five T’s” (trade, tourism, talent, technology, and tradition) the basis of India’s relations with all countries other than Pakistan.

In the last 8 elections to the Lok Sabha, the BJP has returned a stable core with a rising trend, while, the Congress party’s share has declined progressively. What this

holds for the future is anybody's guess—but the global trend toward authoritarian nationalism should favour BJP. This is reflected in a shift in Indian strategic thought from a neoliberal vision of peace based on trade and commerce—some in India call it the Saudāgar strategy—toward a more coercive offensive realism—or the Subēdār strategy. This is reflected in military developments also, and is consistent with India's late 2016 belligerence.

Proposed Response: Sovereign Development

In terms of response, the article proposes a programme of four key initiatives: An urgent rebuttal of the debilitating propaganda against Pakistan, that requires an intellectual response; and the formulation and implementation of an integrated strategy of diplomacy, development, and defence.

A Joint Civil-Military Counter-Propaganda Initiative

It is critically important that first priority should be given to putting together a joint civil-military counter-propaganda initiative, so that the efficacy of our diplomatic efforts can be restored and strengthened. After due deliberation, the government should establish a permanent high-level, inter-ministry, inter-agency body for strategic communication and public diplomacy. Only a permanent arrangement would be able to meet the 24/7 hostile propaganda that Pakistan and the Muslim world face and can expect to face, and to advance our viewpoint.

Instead of perpetually contesting, unsuccessfully, the terrorism narrative, by saying that we are doing more, and more, we must expand the agenda of global discussions (from a one-point focus on terrorism, to include Israel, oil, racism, and imperialism), and change its frame by developing and promoting a suitable narrative to counter this anti-Pakistan anti-Muslim propaganda. This narrative should: (1) Present an innovative national ideology of tolerance, justice, and charity, with safeguards for all vulnerable groups; (2) Expose the racism (Zionism) and imperialism, in which terrorists, who fight the Soviet Union were called freedom fighters, but when they fought imperial powers, they became insurgents and terrorists; (3) Outline the lies behind the unlawful invasions and occupations of the US-led wars; and (4) Narrate Pakistan's vision of peace and prosperity for all mankind, based on a pluralist philosophy of co-existence. As this requires brains, not brawn or money, civil society institutions of higher education should be enlisted in this task.

Initiatives in Sovereign Diplomacy

In the face of a severely adverse balance of power, prospects of a weaker UN and less effective global peace-keeping institutions, and rising anti-Muslim belligerence of newly emergent nationalist governments in the Atlantic alliance, diplomacy has to be

our first line of defence. Unfortunately, since the early 1950s, the almost overriding purpose of statecraft in Pakistan has been to maximise military and economic assistance. In this, the military and economic establishments have worked directly with their counterparts, bypassing the foreign ministry. As a result, Pakistan's diplomacy has been transactional and reactive and has seldom been integrated with any higher purpose. This should change.

While a platitude, diplomacy should aim to consolidate friends, build alliances, keep neutrals neutral, and isolate enemies. Within these overall aims, there may be a need to give greater attention to some countries that may not have received the degree of attention they deserve. In these, Iran, Russia, and Germany (the new leader, for at least 4 years, of liberal democracy in the West) merit special attention. Obviously, China should be accorded the pride of place in Pakistan's foreign relations; but there may be a need to keep expectations reasonable, and avoid falling into the deeply ingrained habit of seeking client-patron relationships.

Initiatives in Building a Sovereign Economy

Like diplomacy, the economy should also be seen and developed as an element of national power. A study of forty countries, over 1870-1950, found a 'quantitatively strong positive' relationship between sovereignty ("the power of the state to advance, in the long run, the interests of indigenous factors in opposition to the interests of foreign factors") and economic growth.²⁴ Sovereign development should be imagined not just as the pursuit of growth, but as the security-oriented competition for protection of domestic, and capture of foreign markets. This is not to advocate autarky. Instead, it is a call to protect our weaknesses and press our advantages, on a case-by-case basis, in an increasingly nationalist, neo-mercantilist, world.

In terms of openness, we should integrate with the world economy selectively, in line with domestic comparative advantage; and review, accordingly, our external trade and payments regime, especially on capital transactions. Internally, we should attach top priority to employment (where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, project may afford major opportunities); pursue an eclectic sector strategy; and reconsider all ideological commitments—especially in the balance between privatization and public-sector enterprise management. Finally, financial sector reforms seem to have enriched banks and promoted inefficiency, both at public expense, and merit reconsideration.

Initiatives in Sovereign Defence

While, defence is a specialised and sensitive area, two things seem obvious: first, with the new US-India military alliance, Pakistan must reassess contingent threats to

its national security; and second, that achievement of greater unity between civil and military loci of power, can only strengthen national security.

Table 1. Balance of Power, ca. 2015

Country	Potential Power		Actual Power		
	GDP	Population	Armed Forces	No. of Nuclear Warheads	
	(US\$ 2015)	b, (mln, 2015)	('000, 2014)	Deployed	Total
US	17,947	321	1,381	1,930	7,000
UK	2,849	65	155	120	215
France	2,422	67	312	280	300
Germany	3,356	81	179	Non-Nuclear Country	
Russia	1,326	144	1,287	1,790	7,290
Korea, D.P.R.	..	25	1,379	–	(10)
China	10,866	1,371	2,993	–	260
India	2,074	1,311	2,750	–	100-120
Pakistan	270	189	926	–	110-130
Iran	..	79	563	Non-Nuclear Country	
Israel	296	8	185	–	80

Note: All nuclear countries and Germany and Iran are included. Because of the high shares of agriculture in GDP for China, India, and Pakistan, their latent power in relation to other countries is overstated. Also, GDP is at current prices; the balance of power would be different at purchasing power parity (PPP) prices.

Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>, accessed November 20, 2016, series: NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, SP.POP.TOTL, and MS.MIL.TOTL.P1); Number of nuclear warheads (estimates, as of Jan. 2016): *IPRI Yearbook*, 2016 (Summary, p. 23).

A review of the latest statistics on balance of power among all declared and selected undeclared nuclear powers in the world (Table 1) shows that the Americans have much to be anxious about. In military terms, a Sino-Russian alliance is nearly at par with the US in nuclear weapons, and considerably ahead in conventional forces. In economic terms, China remains behind, but is fast catching up. Significantly, China also holds over US\$1,100 billion of US debt (that the US borrowed to finance the war). This explains the urgent intensity of the US desire for a comprehensive alliance with India. Pakistan should not see US actions in terms of loyalty or betrayal, as some are wont to do, but as a rational action in present circumstances.

Similarly, rational state behaviour on our part demands that we now treat the US (and occupied Afghanistan) at par with India, among potential sources of military threats, in our defence planning. Naturally, Pakistan should always be willing to establish close friendly relations with all countries, who wish to do so—including India and the US—on the basis of mutual respect, and sovereign equality, as and when they are ready.

Secondly, as the US seeks full-spectrum dominance, we must also put together a full-spectrum defence. Unfortunately, this is impeded by the state of civil-military relations in Pakistan, which undermine national security.²⁵ The report of the Abbottabad Commission (leaked to Al-Jazeera) provides a disturbing picture of our defence capabilities, especially against unconventional warfare. To remedy the situation, the Ministry of Defence might consider taking the lead in:

- Finding a *modus vivendi*, by isolating contentious areas from those that are mutually agreed to be of vital national security, on which cooperation—including in formulating integrated civil-military strategies—could be organised and pursued, under the aegis of the Ministry.
- Working with the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) to revise, reflecting the new realities, the Defence Plans (2004), the Joint Strategic Directive (2007), Standard Operating Procedures, the Blue Book, etc.
- Reviewing and rationalising as necessary the remit of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), who is the principal advisor to the government on all defence matters, but does not have oversight of the three services, and the service chiefs report directly to government.
- Gearing up counter-intelligence as part of a major reorganisation of intelligence agencies, to meet the subversion operations being carried out in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The problem, of course, is of leadership: A grand strategy requires a grand strategist. The bureaucracy is not, and should not be, the source of leadership. What is needed is a body that enjoys the full confidence of both the civil and the military establishment. One (and not the only) solution can be to upgrade the Planning Commission, and charge it with responsibility for the national grand strategy, with a small secretariat; this would mean divesting it of its responsibilities for project portfolio management and macroeconomic planning (and hence, of the Planning Division, which should be allocated to the Ministry Finance). Finally, reform of budget and financial management may also be warranted.

The scope for sovereign action by government is limited. Even so, there is space for some recovery of lost sovereignty. The people expect their leaders to claim this space and lead them to a life of freedom and dignity, not of new servitude.

Endnotes

¹ While other formulations are possible, this follows US military thought: “The United States relies for its security on the complementary application of the basic instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guided by national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces of the United States shape and employ the military instrument to advance and defend national security interests and objectives.” And: “The fundamental of unity of effort demands that all undertakings be directed toward achievement of common aims. Unity of effort is first achieved at the national level when the President develops national security strategy (otherwise known as ‘national’ or ‘grand strategy’).” U.S. Department of Defense. 2000. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication 1 (JP-1, 14 November), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press.

² For a comprehensive study, from a diplomatic angle, see Husain, Javid. 2016. *Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

³ Quoting testimony by the Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, the Abbottabad Commission reports: “the reality for Pakistan was not defined by the might of the US. It was defined by the fact that ‘we are a very weak state and also a very scared state. We will take anything and not respond. It all boils down to corrupt and low-grade governance.’ ... There was ‘apathy at every level; in every sector of national life.’ Pakistani society was ‘deeply penetrated.’ The media was ‘practically bought up’ and nearly ‘every one of our elite was purchasable.’” Al Jazeera Investigative Unit. 2013. “Document: Pakistan’s Bin Laden Dossier.” *Al Jazeera*. 8 July. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/2013/07/201378143927822246.html>.

⁴ Musharraf, Pervez. 2006. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. London: Simon & Schuster.

⁵ The original Urdu speech does not seem to be available on the Internet. The English translation cited (slightly edited to improve syntax) is from C-SPAN (2001).

⁶ For some current appraisals, see Brig. (Retd.) T. Yamin and H. Khan’s report “Strategic Decision Making: Pakistan’s Support to the US War on Terror” that was published in January 2016, in Islamabad. (January 2016), (2013). Also check Khan Hidayat report “Strategic Decision Making: Pakistan’s Support to the US War on Terror” that was published in *IPRI Journal*; 2013 page no 37-56.

⁷ According to Professor Neta Crawford, Boston University; adding journalists (45), militants (26,862), and security forces (5,498), “It can be suggested that at least 80,000 Pakistanis (insurgents, security forces, civilians) have been killed, with twice as many civilians killed than insurgent fighters.” IPPNW. 2015. *Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” (Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan)*. Translated by Ali Fathollah-Nejad. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

⁸ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent not-for-profit organisation in the UK <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/>, accessed on November 18, 2016. As of that date, the most recent strike reported was on May 21, 2016. Since May 2011, when Pakistan-U.S. relations soured (in the wake of the Abbottabad incursion), U.S. drones were expelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan. For a recent review, see Woods, Chris. 2015. *Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars*. London: Hurst Publishers.

⁹ Woods, Chris. 2015. *Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars*. London: Hurst Publishers.

¹⁰ Rejecting Clausewitz, a U.S. Army Field Manual quotes Sun Tzu as being “more relevant today; although battles should be won, ‘winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’ There is more than one way to compel an enemy.” U.S. Department of Defense. 2008. *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.130, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

¹¹ In years to come, the successful Islamabad-is-about-to-fall-to-the-Taliban operation (late April/May 2009), leading to Operation Rāh-e-Rāst, may well go down in military history as an all-time classic among PSYOPS ever executed. Although referenced by Khan, Khurshid. 2014. “Understanding information warfare and its relevance to Pakistan.” *Strategic Studies* 138-159, citing Shah, Farzana. 2011. “Propaganda & Warfare in Cyber World.” *PakTribune: Pakistan News Service*. 2 August. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://paktribune.com/articles/Propaganda-%5E-Warfare-in-Cyber-World-242277.html>, a full analysis of the operation is yet to be conducted.

¹² The advertisement is reproduced in: IPPNW. 2015. *Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” (Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan)*. Translated by Ali Fathollah-Nejad. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

¹³ Under the U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), Israel was supplied with the next generation of whatever weapon systems were provided to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

¹⁴ Gates, Robert Michael. 1996. *From the Shadow: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. New York: Simon & Schuster; corroborated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an interview, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France). 1998. “Brzezinski Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ... ».” *VoltaireNet*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>. “According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahideen [sic.] began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” English translation by St. Clair, Jeffrey, and Alexander Cockburn. 1998. “How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen.” *Counterpunch*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.counterpunch.org/1998/01/15/how-jimmy-carter-and-i-started-the-mujahideen/>.

¹⁵ Bacevich, Andrew J. 2016. *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York: Random House. *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France). 1998. “Brzezinski: « Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ... ».” *VoltaireNet*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>.

¹⁶ Bacevich, Andrew J. 2016. *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York: Random House.

¹⁷ Qureshi, Emran, and Michael A. Sells. 2003. “Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy.” In *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, 1-50. New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁸ Interview to Business Insider, July 11, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9Ab_46Nx6o, accessed December 10, 2016.

¹⁹ Mason, M. Chris. 2015. *The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. In his book, NSA-designate Flynn, Michel T., and Michael Ledeen. 2016. *The Field of Fight: How we can win the global war against radical Islam and its allies*. New York: St. Martin's Press. had also warned that: "Countries like Pakistan need to be told that we will not tolerate the existence of training camps and safe havens for Taliban, Haqqani, and al Qaeda forces on their territory, nor will we permit their banks and other financial institutions to move illicit funds for the terror network. They are going to have to choose, and if they continue to help the jihadis, we are going to treat them harshly, cutting them off from American assistance, and operating against enemy safe havens."

²⁰ Mason, M. Chris. 2015. *The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. Mason follows in the footsteps of Peters, Ralph. June 2006. "Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look." *Armed Forces Journal*. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/> (Map: <http://armedforcesjournal.com/peters-blood-borders-map/>), who had redrawn the map of the Middle East in which: "Pakistan's Northwest Frontier tribes would be reunited with their Afghan brethren... Pakistan, another unnatural state, would also lose its Baluch territory to Free Baluchistan. The remaining 'natural' Pakistan would lie entirely east of the Indus, except for a westward spur near Karachi."

²¹ The main document is People's Republic of China. 2015. "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road." *National Development and Reform Commission*. 28 March. Accessed December 10, 2016. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html; for Russian President Putin's vision of EAEU (on the pattern of the EU), see his article in *Izvestia*; Putin, Vladimir. 2011. "Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня (A new integration project for Eurasia - the future is born today)." *Izvestia*. 3 October. <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761> (tr. Google).

²² Narayanan, M. K. 2016. "Non-alignment to multi-alignment." *The Hindu*. 5 January. <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indian-diplomacy-nonalignment-to-multialignment/article8065319.ece>.

²³ Gujral, Inder Kumar. 2003. *Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Macmillan.; *The Hindu*. 2015. "India, Pakistan, Bangladesh will reunite to form Akhand Bharat: Ram Madhav." *The Hindu*. 26 December. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/akhand-bharat-india-pakistan-bangladesh-will-reunite-one-day-says-ram-madhav/article8031920.ece>; and Yadav, Shyamlal. 2016. "RSS and the idea of Akhand Bharat." *The Indian Express*. 4 January. <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/rss-akhand-bharat/>.

²⁴ Alam, M. Shahid. 1999. "Does sovereignty matter for economic growth? An analysis of growth rates between 1870 and 1950." In *Economic Growth and Change: National and Regional Patterns of Convergence and Divergence*, edited by John Adams and Francesco Pigliaru. Aldershot, UK: Elgar. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=952428>., italics in original.

²⁵ For a review, see Haq, Noor ul. 2012. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan." *IPRI Journal* XII (2): 110-116; and Aziz, Mazhar. 2008. *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*. New York: Routledge.

Kashmir Uprising: Indian Approach and Regional Stability

*Muhammad Tehsin and Adnan Bukhari **

Abstract: *The Kashmir dispute has been termed as the core issue between two nuclear arch-rivals of South Asia, India and Pakistan, for the last seven decades. This conflict has hampered political, economic and social development not only of Pakistan and India, but has also impaired the chances of political and economic integration of the South Asian region. Indian policies and laws in Kashmir, causing massive human rights violations and defiance of the UN resolutions, have exacerbated the security situation of Kashmir in particular and South Asia in general. Despite several proposals to settle the dispute including the UN resolutions, the issue remains still unresolved. The Kashmiri indigenous uprising erupted in 1987 and has been rejuvenated after the killing of Burhan Wani, a 22-year-old Kashmiri by Indian forces in July 2016. This paper attempts to examine multiple dimensions of the Kashmir issue to explore its implications for Indo-Pakistan relations. The article has been divided into three broad sections. The first section provides a theoretical framework by applying realist theory in India-Pakistan relations, Edward Azar's theory of protracted conflicts and John Rawls' theory of justice. The second section delineates policies adopted by both states on Kashmir. The article also discusses the recent developments in Indo-Pakistan relations including crisis management. The final section proposes a conflict resolution mechanism that will include ceasefire, managing cross border issues and other CBMs as the way forward towards resolving the dispute.*

Keywords: Kashmir, Culture, Identity, Justice, Plebiscite.

Introduction

The Kashmir dispute has been a permanent source of tension between two major nuclear arch-rivals, India and Pakistan, since partition. This issue has its roots in colonial divide in South Asia that was based on unjustified territorial partition of Kashmir. The basic assumption of accession of princely states was that ruling princes would decide to accede to any of the newly established two states, India or Pakistan, considering two-pronged criteria, geographical contiguity and popular aspirations.

The controversy started, when the Hindu ruling prince of Kashmir, *Maharaja Hari Singh* acceded to India without taking into account people's aspirations as the majority of Kashmiris consisted of Muslims. India in connivance with the *Maharaja* attacked Kashmir in 1948 and seized possession of a major portion of Kashmir.

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Conversely, it also took forceful control of Hyderabad and Junagarh on account of their Hindu majority population despite the fact that the *Nizam* of Hyderabad had chosen to stay autonomous and the *Nawab* of Junagarh had signed an instrument of accession with Pakistan. According to one view, India occupied the Kashmir region with the intent of trying to validate its action by forcing the *Maharaja* to sign papers of accession.¹ In such a scenario, Kashmir's struggle for self-determination started against the Indian invasion of the valley.

The Kashmir movement is nearly a century-old now being started prior to the departure of the British in 1947. It has been seventy years since Kashmir's movement of self-determination is on the agenda of the United Nations (UN). The Kashmiri people perceive Indian injustices and violence as a threat to their survival. Almost a hundred thousand Kashmiris have laid down their lives in this fight for self-determination. The current uprising of Kashmir is galvanized by the murder of Burhan Wani, a Kashmiri freedom fighter in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Wani's assassination by Indian forces turned him into an icon for another wave of uprisings. India has been trying to suppress the uprising by trying to divert international attention by blaming Pakistan for terrorist attacks in Kashmir including an attack on the defence base of Uri in September 2016. Pakistan, however, has remained committed to highlighting the Kashmir issue and human rights violation by India in IOK.

There is, at least, one common perspective in India and Pakistan on the issue as they blame Britain for incomplete partition agenda of Kashmir. The unresolved issue of Kashmir has been viewed by India as a policy of 'divide and rule' of the British. Many Pakistanis remain convinced that Lord Mountbatten and Radcliff supported India during the territorial division.² This narrative received credence, when the former British Prime Minister, David Cameron stated in 2011 that, "we are responsible for the (Kashmir) issue in the first place."³ He suggested that Britain was responsible for the political deprivation and socio-cultural injustices faced by the Kashmiris.⁴ An author opined that, "the British, through their divide-and-rule administration, hammered the first cracks into the relations of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, and in Kashmir in particular ... in the process of their withdrawal, the British granted the important decision of Kashmir's fate to one man, which essentially created the possibility of the Muslim dominated Kashmir joining the Hindu-majority India. This is because the responsibility of making the critical decision was bestowed upon *Maharaja* Hari Singh, who leaned towards India. As such, the British were responsible for the fallout from the instrument of accession."⁵

The history of the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan is marked by three full-fledged wars including 1948, 1965 and 1971, a low intensity conflict in

1999, many incidents of cross border firing and several border stand-offs. However, peace process also made certain strides, which includes, signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, Shimla Agreement in 1972, many Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in 1999, and composite dialogue in 2004. Kashmir is considered a bone of contention between the two states. There is increasing need to resolve this issue through a process that is practical and agreeable to three major stakeholders, India, Pakistan and Kashmiris.

The changing regional dynamics and national postures in India and Pakistan have resulted in a situation, where it is not clear as to which party is revisionist and which side is pro-status quo. A revisionist state seeks to change the current distribution of power, e.g., national territorial boundaries. A status quo posture would seek to maintain existing borders and relative power between states. Both India and Pakistan remain locked in cross border firing across the working boundary and line of control. In the nuclearized context, an escalation of tension and conflict is dangerous for regional strategic stability. This necessitates resorting to conflict resolution by initiating dialogue among three players, India, Pakistan and Kashmiris to resolve long-standing Kashmir issue. This approach should include elements of transparency, reconciliation, openness and above all, inclusiveness of Kashmiris.

Theoretical Framework

Theoretically, the crux of Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan lies in 'power-centric' approach, which entails conflict and violence. India has stationed about 700,000 troops in IOK and is accused of human rights violations. Pakistan has also deployed troops in Azad Kashmir to avert any possible aggression by India. Realpolitik and power maximization have been adopted by both states to compete in anarchic international order. This has led both states towards conventional and strategic arms race along with evolution of different warfighting strategies. Kashmir issue has been proven to be a point of attrition, which results in escalation of tensions. A narrowly focused realistic approach by both countries has converted South Asia into a troubled region with uncertain security situation. Consequently, people of both states suffer from conflict and violence.

The Culturalist Theory provides an effective conceptual lens to understand Kashmir's indigenous struggle for self-determination. This theory bases its premise on cultural identity as a dominant feature in understanding the nature of the Kashmir issue. The people are viewed as unit of analysis in such a scenario. This is also related to identity politics. Edward E. Azar explored the concept of conflict resolution, i.e., the Theory of Protracted Social Conflicts. According to Azar, protracted social conflicts are the result of deprivation experienced by communities on account of their unique cultural identity. This collective deprivation of a

community is caused both by the state concerned as well as the international community that directly or indirectly supports the oppressive state.⁶

The Kashmir issue can be categorized as 'protracted social conflict' because of deprivation of political, social and ethnic identity of Kashmiris, based on *Kashmiriyaat*. If any group of people qualifies to be termed as 'one nation', it is the Kashmiri speaking people of the Kashmir valley. Kashmiri adolescents express their distinctive cultural identity through drawings and visual depictions.⁷ Azar substantiated 'protracted social conflicts' as a combat situation between state and victimized group coupled with injustice and economic disparities. He posited that a protracted social conflict is the fallout of three main factors:

- a. Non-acceptance of separate identity and denial of political rights,
- b. Insecurity about ethnic, religious and cultural values, and
- c. Ineffective political participation of people due to trust deficit and non-remedial behaviour of concerned state.

The Kashmir issue has been transformed into a protracted social conflict because of denial of cultural identity of Kashmiris, insecurity in their community due to the killing of thousands of innocent Kashmiris by Indian forces and ineffective political setup, which snubbed their right to self-determination. Kashmir struggle is an epic example of identity based political, social, religious, communal and ethnic conflict. It is an indigenous struggle for the Kashmiri right of self-determination rather than a planned strategy backed by Pakistan, as India often claims. Kashmir is facing multi-dimensional and multi-layered sources of conflict, in a complex security situation. To deal with social protracted conflict, an innovative procedure, with amalgamation of the Justice Theory and Owen Dixon's Plan, should be applied. John Rawls' Justice Theory holds that the most effective way to manage a protracted social conflict is provision of justice to the affected community. The Rawlsian theory postulates that justice is fundamental to social institutions and is of primary importance in political participation.⁸ This theory can be applied for the purpose of peace restoration in valley, through social and political amelioration.

Through the perspective provided by Rawls' and Azar's theories, certain CBMs can be identified including ceasefire, observing human rights, and curtailing cross border firing. The problems of inequality at societal and political level should be replaced with equality, liberty and freedom. The UN observer group and other NGOs should be allowed access to the people and to record truth about human rights abuses. Achieving stability, through crisis management, is an intense, difficult and time-consuming process that involves several backchannel meetings. Pakistan and India need to change the shape of clash - conflict transformation - and ultimately

strive for resolution of Kashmir issue.⁹ The peace process should be consolidated with CBMs, comprehensive negotiations and people-to-people contact. Negative public perceptions, hatred, mutual suspicion and distrust should be eliminated. Both countries have inherited a legacy of distorted and complicated history. It promotes the negative image of each state, leading towards abhorrence. History should be written on the basis of archaeological facts and accurate events.¹⁰ This would require verification of facts, transparency and openness. Conceptually, many of the above-mentioned measures can be categorized by applying the theoretical framework provided in this paper:

- a. Adoption of John Rawls' theory of justice, i.e., manage conflict through dispensing justice by symbolic recognition of Kashmiri right to determine their future. Economic and trade activities should be encouraged. Draconian laws¹¹, such as, POTA, TADA, AFSPA and PSA should be withdrawn and all political prisoners (except hardcore terrorists), captured under this law should be released to initiate an inclusive political setup.
- b. Recognition of the Kashmir dispute as a protracted social conflict as per Edward Azar's definition. Furthermore, joint approach vis-à-vis conventional and strategic CBMs should be taken by India and Pakistan to sustain strategic stability of the region.
- c. Adhering to Owen Dixon formula of 'demilitarization', i.e., mutual demilitarization of forces from disputed region by both states in a phased manner as a starting point to set the grounds for future plebiscite. Fencing should be removed from the line of control (LoC) and the boundary should be softened so that people should be allowed to move freely.

The power of dialogue and negotiation in peace process cannot be underestimated. The nature of Kashmir conflict is political; therefore, long lasting solution can only be achieved through serious political and diplomatic efforts.¹² New Delhi and Islamabad should negotiate to formulate an extensive, workable and step-by-step de-escalation, conflict management and interactive conflict resolution mechanism, which should also include Kashmiris as stakeholders.

The next section analyses Indian policies towards Kashmir. It finds that Indian policies have been ineffective and proved a failure to achieve an enduring peace in the valley. Subsequently, this paper will discuss Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue.

Indian Policies toward Kashmir: From Status Quo To Revisionism?¹³

The conventional Indian approach to Kashmir issue rests on the assumption that the decision of *Maharaja* to sign a paper of accession with India is absolute and unchallengeable. Recently, a revisionist posture has been adopted by India as declared by the Narendra Modi-led BJP government that the unfinished agenda of partition pertains to the disputed part of Kashmir 'occupied' by Pakistan, which needs to be resolved through bilateral talks.¹⁴ This Indian position is revisionist since it rejects the status quo that currently prevails between India and Pakistan including the status of Kashmir. India negates the option of plebiscite in the valley on the account that Pakistan has not withdrawn its troops from its 'illegally occupied' part of the valley. India envisages for itself a hegemonic and expansionist role in South Asia.

India claims that Pakistan has forfeited the moral grounds to file any petition in case of Kashmir. For Indian strategists, the only problem confronting Kashmiri people is Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. While, strategic and political narrative of Pakistan is based on Muslim brotherhood and its principled stance on illicit accession of Kashmir to Indian Union. India has divided its policy to deal with this enduring crisis at three levels; local, bilateral, and international.

At the local level, India is trying to suppress the resistance of Kashmiris, fighting for their right of self-determination since 1948. For this purpose, India is using callous state power. In the process, Rawlsian concept of justice remains neglected amidst the massive human rights violations. Furthermore, Indian government is trying to manipulate the demographic realities. It is trying to alter the ethnic, religious and geographic realities of the valley by governmental action. This approach needs careful attention in view of India's professed policy of secularism.

At bilateral level, India avoids to discuss Kashmir in bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. Instead of the adoption of Owen Dixon's Formula, which still remains an equitable and practicable option, India is applying delaying tactics through intermittent engagement and dialogue with Pakistan to strengthen its control over the valley. India appears content to maintain a brutal control over a major portion of Jammu and Kashmir; is desirous to designate the LoC as a permanent international border, and has recently expanded the conflict to include the Pakistani portion of Kashmir.¹⁵

At international level, India denies the cultural rights and identity of the Kashmiri people, which fuels popular unrest, as per Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict. India is pursuing three objectives; first, it is trying to divert international concerns over Kashmir; second, it strives to diminish Pakistan's efforts

to highlight the issue of human-rights violations by India; and third, it is denying Pakistan's standpoint that Jammu and Kashmir are unresolved territory and needs resolution. India also excludes any third-party involvement in resolving Kashmir issue on the pretext of Shimla agreement, which called for resolving all outstanding issues bilaterally.

Denial of Rawlsian Justice: Indian Laws in Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir retain special autonomous status according to Article 370 of the constitution of India. This provision was initially temporary and later became a permanent feature of the Indian constitution, when Kashmir's Constituent Assembly dissolved itself. However, the Central Government of India has been chipping away at Kashmir's autonomous status and the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government led by Narendra Modi has openly talked of revoking Article 370, which affirms Kashmir's unique cultural identity.¹⁶ This policy is in line with the Indian approach of denial of justice to the Kashmiri people. According to Rawls, denial of justice is the crux of protracted social conflicts. Coupled with social discrimination, there are human rights violations, which highlight the gap between the Indian policies in Kashmir and the Rawlsian criteria of social justice.

India is providing impunity to law enforcement agencies from any legal action under various obscure acts, including POTA, TADA, PSA and AFSPA. The Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) provides military with excessive power to arrest without any warrants from court. The Disturbed Area Act (TADA) is a Presidential Act, which provides safety to police officer and magistrate of 'troubled area' even if they are involved in killing of local unarmed people. The Public Safety Act (PSA) allows law enforcement agencies to arrest any individual on charges of creating 'unrest' in the valley. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002, any person can be jailed for 180 days on suspicion of any terrorist activity, without any evidence. Kashmiri people are subjected to illegal detention and torture under these laws. International human rights organizations routinely express serious concerns over gross violations of human rights in Kashmir by India. These organizations include UNHCR, European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Defiance of the UN Resolutions: Indian Approach to Owen Dixon Plan

Ironically, India raised the Kashmir issue in the UN in January 1948, but later defied the UN resolutions by not holding plebiscite in the valley. An appraisal of some important resolutions calling for holding plebiscite provides interesting insight into the genesis of the Kashmir issue. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) adopted a resolution on August 13, 1948, which stated that both

governments should agree to a truce and then consult with the commission for creation of suitable environment for a plebiscite.¹⁷ The UNSC Resolution of January 5, 1949 highlighted the need for a vote to determine the will of the Kashmiris.¹⁸

In 1950, UN mediator Sir Owen Dixon proposed regional plebiscite to provide a solution to the Kashmir dispute. He identified three issues in conducting the plebiscite. First was identification of regions in Jammu and Kashmir; second was the issue of demilitarization; and third was the nature of status to be accorded to the territories. Owen Dixon noted that these differences originated from sharply different views of both states over the meanings of the Kashmir dispute. The Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh acknowledged this difference in perceptions about Kashmir in an interview, "India can wait indefinitely on Kashmir, while Pakistan cannot wait."¹⁹

The UNSC reaffirmed the principle of self-determination for Kashmiris through various resolutions in 1951 and 1957.²⁰ Two UN resolutions passed on March 30, 1951 and January 24, 1957, both re-emphasized the centrality of a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiris in deciding their political fate and cultural preservation.²¹ Pakistan has repeatedly called for implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir.²² If India is sincere in resolving the dispute, it is need of the hour to implement the UN resolutions to conduct plebiscite. This can be accomplished in an equitable and practical manner by adoption of the Owen Dixon Formula. India's defiance of the UN resolution has exacerbated the situation and increased regional hostility.

Kashmir Uprisings: A Consequence of Protracted Conflict

The protracted conflict between India and Pakistan mainly because of Kashmir dispute has resulted in three wars, i.e., 1948, 1965 and 1971, and a small-scale conflict in 1999. A significant separatist uprising started in 1987 within the valley. From 1987 to-date, Kashmir has been facing intermittent uprisings. The persistent India denial of Kashmiri rights and identity led to the 1987 uprising begun in post-1987 elections in Indian held Kashmir, when the Muslim United Front claimed that the elections were rigged.²³ As predicted by Edward Azar, the deprived Kashmiri community rose up in protest in anti-India demonstrations, followed by police firing and curfews. Bomb blasts and kidnappings marked the uprising. India also claimed that Pakistan sent *Mujahedeen* to support the Kashmir movement. The killing of more than 100 protesters by Indian forces on Gaw Kadal Bridge in January 1990 sparked a wave of fury among the entire population of Kashmir. Subsequently, around 100 people were killed during the funeral procession of the slain leader Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq. Yasin Malik representing a faction of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) announced unilateral ceasefire in 1994.²⁴

After 1995, there was some involvement of certain organizations, such as, *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)*, *Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen* and *Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen*, however, they had a separate existence under the umbrella of the United Jihadi Council (UJC).²⁵ Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a Kashmiri leader, maintains that the Kashmir movement is “purely indigenous, purely Kashmiri” and a militant strand has appeared since 1989 that remains on the sidelines.²⁶ A report, appeared in *BBC* in 2011, stated that 2,156 bodies were found concealed in forty unmarked graves over the past twenty years.²⁷ Such heinous violations of human rights characterize the Kashmir uprising providing evidence of a separate Kashmiri identity within Indian society and polity, and the repressive denial of this Kashmiri identity by the Indian state and government institutions.

Burhan Wani: A New Spirit of Freedom Struggle

The recent wave of uprising in Kashmir was triggered, when a 22-year-old Kashmiri, Burhan Muzaffar Wani was assassinated by Indian security agencies on July 8, 2016. India professed that Wani had links to militant outfit, *Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen*. He was popular because of his active use of social media, where he advocated resistance against Indian rule in Kashmir.²⁸ His video messages contained the topics of Indian injustice and oppression, which would often go viral in Kashmir. He exhorted the Kashmiri youth to resist Indian occupation.²⁹ The killing of Wani has given a new spirit to indigenous freedom struggle of Kashmiris.³⁰ Shujaat Bukhari, a Srinagar based journalist, stated that a new political discourse was emerging and militancy was gaining political legitimacy in a vacuum where genuine political activities were muffled. He raised a pertinent question about the popularity of Wani attributing it to the ideology, he promoted.³¹

In the aftermath of killing of Wani, India adopted a hard-line approach to deal with the situation of social unrest.³² Popular protests were witnessed as a consequence of the assassination. Indian law enforcement agencies employed brutal methods to control the popular protests.³³ More than 104 people died and over 12,500 people were injured as of September 2016.³⁴ All districts of IOK were placed under curfew for 53 consecutive days,³⁵ in a brutal demonstration of ‘collective punishment’. The Kashmiri lives and liberties have, since then, been subjected to intense disruption and turmoil at the hands of Indian law enforcement agencies.

Pakistan showed solidarity with Kashmiris and provided them moral and diplomatic support. On July 20, 2016, a black-day was observed in Pakistan against the atrocities of India in Kashmir.³⁶ The Pakistan’s Parliament, the National Assembly, adopted unanimous resolution against human rights violations in Kashmir by India and called for sending UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to the region to investigate the issue.³⁷ Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, Muhammad

Nawaz Sharif highlighted the ongoing Kashmir activism in the 71st UN General Assembly session in September 2016. His speech referred to the murder of Burhan Wani by Indian forces. Mr. Sharif demanded a UN fact-finding mission to investigate the cases of extra-judicial killings and other atrocities committed by the Indian occupying forces.³⁸

Pakistan's Policy Toward Kashmir

While, India proclaims Kashmir as its integral part, the historical approach of Pakistan over Kashmir is that *Maharaja* acceded to India, because he could not sustain pressure of the Indian army and government. The British Viceroy also supported India at that crucial moment. Pakistan claims that Kashmir has been a disputed territory on the forum of UNSC since 1948. It was the time, when India agreed that Kashmir accession was controversial and promised to conduct a plebiscite to determine the opinion of Kashmiris about their political future. These resolutions are still on the agenda of the UNSC, and any party to conflict cannot marginalize it unilaterally.³⁹ Pakistan's Kashmir policy has three aspects:

- a. Pakistan has been reiterating that the issue of Kashmir is disputed and unresolved. It calls for India to initiate dialogue. This approach serves two purposes; one, the issue of Kashmir stays alive; and two, it strives to protect the inherent right of self-determination of Kashmiris.
- b. Pakistan has been calling for conducting plebiscite under the supervision of the UN so that aspirations of the Kashmiris could be determined.
- c. Pakistan encourages the involvement of Kashmiri leaders to find out a solution through talks held in continuation of the Shimla Agreement, Agra and Lahore summits.

In spite of the above-mentioned facts, in practical terms, Pakistan's repeated recourse to diplomatic means for resolving the conflict shows that Pakistan is ready to make compromises for peace with possible acceptance of a solution resembling status quo.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Indian belligerence and the Modi-government's reference to those Kashmiri areas, which currently form part of Pakistan, demonstrates India's increasingly revisionist posturing towards the Kashmir dispute.

Different solutions have been proposed for the management of this conflict during last seven decades. At the first instance, violations of human rights should be stopped to create a feasible milieu as stipulated in Rawlsian theory of justice. A phased demilitarization of the region in line with Owen Dixon's formula would be a second significant CBM and most importantly, the fundamental right of local people

to participate in dialogue and negotiation should be ensured as pointed out by Edward Azar's theory, signifying the provision of cultural rights to resolve protracted social conflicts.⁴¹

Towards Conflict Resolution: Crisis Management in Nuclear Context

The threat perceptions in both India and Pakistan derive from the asymmetrical power structure in South Asia.⁴² This imbalance owes itself to the larger size of India, grater human resource and expansionist military objectives. However, both countries are equipped with nuclear arsenal and any strategic adventure can lead towards the nuclear flashpoint.⁴³ The crisis of Uri in September 2016 was caused by a militant attack on an Indian Army base in the Baramulla District of IOK killing seventeen Indian Army soldiers and injuring eighteen others. India accused Pakistan for this incident by claiming that the weapons and equipment that was used in Uri attack had Pakistani markings.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Pakistan declared this attack as 'self-generated' and called Indian allegations as 'long-time habit'.⁴⁵

The cross-border firing by India and Pakistan in the post-Uri incident has caused further deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations. The current tension between the two nuclear rivals is dangerous for regional strategic stability. India's blame-game towards Pakistan for holding it responsible for every terrorist attacks needs to cease. India's so-called surgical strike in late September 2016 in post-Uri incident further exacerbated the crisis. India claimed that it carried out a commando operation to demolish several transit hideouts of militants, who were operating against India by entering several kilometres inside Pakistan's territory.⁴⁶

India's two-pronged strategy of isolating Pakistan and threatening to abrogate Indus Water Treaty contains dangerous strategic dimensions. It should be kept in view that the annulment of treaty unilaterally would be considered illegal under Article 12(4) of Indus Water Treaty, to which both the countries agreed upon 66 years ago.⁴⁷ Pakistan is a lower riparian country and dependent on 80 percent of water of rivers, coming from Kashmir. The hydro-politics in Kashmir also necessitates resolving this issue amicably.

The recent developments including killing of Burhan Wani, augmenting of Kashmir uprising, Uri incident, and post-Uri so-called 'surgical strikes' have caused escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan. Further, trust deficit, clashing religious ideologies and different security perceptions have caused excessive damage to the Indo-Pakistan relationship.⁴⁸ The escalation of tension necessitates managing the conflict under the nuclearized context. This needs an

effective conflict resolution mechanism by referral to Azar's concept of identity as a basic human need and Rawls theory of justice. For this, there should be realization in India that its hard-line and heavy-handed approach during last seventy years has failed in Kashmir that is leading to a snowball effect of greater freedom struggle in Kashmir. If this conflict has to be managed and curtailed, an inclusive framework for resolution should be initiated, involving Kashmiris, Pakistan and India. All three parties need to work together to form a consensual approach for a peaceful and stable valley that could be divided for a peaceful and stable region.

The ceasefire should be revived and a renewed spirit should be shown by both India and Pakistan. There is a need to stop the violent activities of non-state actors. Pakistan and India should formulate a joint working mechanism to curb the menace of terrorism. This requires greater transparency, openness and above all political will in order to fulfil the Rawlsian criteria for provision of social justice. India should stop human rights violations in Kashmir and provide space for Kashmiris for talks. The use of pellet guns and tear gas should be banned. Providing space for political and economic activity to Kashmiris will create conducive environment to negotiate final-status issues.

According to the Owen Dixon Formula, both India and Pakistan should seek mutual and simultaneous demilitarization from Kashmir in phased manner. The demilitarization will serve as a major CBM not only between India and Pakistan, but also for Kashmiris. This will show sincerity of both states in resolving this seven-decade-old problem. Whatever the proposed solution might be either it be holding plebiscite, establishing self-governance with a joint management, or making the existing border permanent, Kashmiris should be involved in the peace process. The inclusiveness of Kashmiris in resolving Kashmir issue is a pre-requisite to achieve a long-term solution.

Conclusion

The issue of Kashmir has entered its seventy-first year and no major breakthrough has been achieved so far despite several policy options and solutions proposed by Kashmiris, Pakistan and the UN. The Kashmiri indigenous uprising for self-determination, which started in 1987 and rejuvenated after the killing of Burhan Wani in July 2016, has entered into a crucial phase because of the long-standing politico-economic deprivation of the people of Kashmir. India has been trying to crush this insurgency by adopting a coercive approach that is failing by all means. Moreover, its approach of isolating Pakistan diplomatically is dangerous, because Pakistan's presence in the region cannot be ignored. The Kashmir issue between the two countries has remained a bone of contention since their independence. Both

countries fought three wars against each other and a low intensity conflict goes on. Many cross-border firing incidents have yet achieved nothing. A general war in nuclearized context would be catastrophic. Any conventional or non-conventional confrontation will prove suicidal for both countries.

The erstwhile approach of pitting blame on the British should be shunned. India and Pakistan should both display statesmanship by opening up to 'out-of-the-box' solutions – including constructive third-party role – in dealing with this intractable problem. It is imperative for conflict resolution that both states realize the miseries of the Kashmiri community. The only way to move forward is to be engaged in interactive conflict management talks, and constructive dialogue. This dialogue should not only be 'inter' (between India and Pakistan) but also 'intra' (among Kashmiris, Pakistan and India). This dialogue should be inclusive, mutual and 'Kashmir-centric'. The Kashmiris have their own identity, history and culture. Only dispensation of justice (in form of giving the right of self-determination to Kashmiris) will address the protracted conflict between the two states. The resolution of this core dispute will not only fulfil the longstanding Kashmiri dream of freedom, but also prove to be a catalyst for strategic stability in South Asia.

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Drivers of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan

*Musarat Amin and Rizwan Naseer **

Abstract: This paper pinpoints the narrative that Pakistani masses and policy makers have developed because of the flawed policies of the United States (US) towards Pakistan and also highlights deep-rooted mistrust that impedes cooperation even on strategic issues. US policies remained unpopular in Pakistan as ruling junta always blamed the former to manipulate this situation in her favour. This could not bring two nations and their leaders closer as the strategic cooperation between both countries is sine qua non to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan and normalize relations with India. This paper underscores the historical participation of Pakistan to US-sponsored security pacts (SEATO and CENTO) and Pakistan's expectations from the US as a result. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has equally hurt Pakistan's strategic, economic and political interests in the region as well at global level. International community has been declaring Pakistan a fragile state and more prone to failure because of US annoyance. There are few questions that radical anti-Americans need to ponder over that why does the US need relationship with Pakistan and what strategic benefits can Pakistan offer to the US in contemporary times? This paper suggests that hating America and blaming her will not generate any solution to policy problems, but to reinvigorate Pakistan's diplomacy, empower state institutions and vibrant strategy of counter-terrorism.

Keywords: Anti-Americanism, Diplomacy, Counterterrorism, Relationship, Mistrust.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The major problem that the US faces in the execution of its foreign policy in Pakistan is the anti-Americanism sentiment.¹ US policies despite benignity do not enjoy support by masses in Pakistan. Popularly known Keohane and Katzenstein, distinguish between various types of anti-American sentiments, but the most notable among them are the Liberal Anti-Americanism and Radical Anti-Americanism.² Liberal Anti-Americanism is common among postmodern democracies that share common values of "the American creed". Despite being the allies of the US, those liberal democracies overtly criticize Uncle Sam for not adhering to values of American creed. On the contrary, Radical Anti-Americanism is abhorrent sentiments for American liberal values; people who are Radical Anti-

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Americans believe that the US is a source of all evils and its ruination would end up the problems in the world.³

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan can be categorized into violent anti-Americanism and non-violent anti-Americanism. Violent anti-Americanism is quite visible among illiterate or less educated class, while non-violent anti-Americanism is seeable among educated class.⁴ Most of the Islamic states also experience Radical Anti-Americanism because of the US unpopular policies of Unilateralism.⁵ This paper deals with narratives of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Narrative of anti-Americanism is still built upon US policies during the cold war, post-cold war and post-9/11 era. Neither US nor Pakistani government has ever made serious attempts to change this narrative, which is fallaciously built. US flawed policies towards South Asia have contributed towards impeding US interests rather achieving them. Based on this narrative, which is a determining factor in achieving common strategic and socio-economic goals, both countries failed to evolve mutual trust. If this narrative of anti-Americanism is altered, then Pakistan-US strategic relationship would have massive potential to fix the ailments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, even South Asia would experience more stability. Achieving cooperation with Pakistan on the war against terrorism, stability of South Asia requires acknowledgement of Pakistan's unrelenting efforts. Coercive diplomacy to deal with Pakistan would rather deteriorate mutual relations.

History Matters in Case of Pakistan

The commonly built narrative and which goes viral among Pakistani masses is that Pakistan has been under constant threat from Indian aggression since 1947, which ultimately disintegrated East-Pakistan in 1971. On the other side, the US remained tilted towards India despite Indian neutralist posture during early phase of the cold war. The US first extended invitation to Indian Prime Minister Nehru to pay official visit to the US. Truman's administration wondered that how the policy of containment in South Asia was possible without inclusion of India, whereas, Sir William Barton and Sir Olaf Caroe argue that Pakistan and not India was the key to West Asian defence.⁶ To send very friendly gesture to the US, Pakistan also extended candid support to the *San Francisco Peace Treaty* with Japan and out rightly supported the United Nations by condemning North Korean aggression.⁷

The striking question that pops in the minds of majority of Pakistanis that why did the US choose Pakistan as an ally during the cold war era? Well, the US had grand designs of containing communism, John Foster Dulles an architect of massive retaliation unriddled that Pakistan and other "Northern Tier States" (Turkey, Iran and Iraq) could effectively foster US security in Asia, therefore, Pentagon hastily endorsed Dulles' plan of regional defence without casting any doubts. Eisenhower

administration agreed to arm and equip five and half divisions of the Pakistan Army with a total cost of US \$ 500 million from 1956 through December, 1959.⁸ Eisenhower was increasingly worried about his decision and lamented in a Nation Security Council meeting in 1957 by saying “terrible error” of investment on such a weak ally.⁹ But, Pakistani policymakers seldom acknowledge this huge contribution of the US to equip Pakistan’s armed forces during crucial times of the cold war. Pakistan’s security was not sufficiently strong without US military aid during that time. Leicester Webb argues that though these pacts (SEATO, CENTO) were beneficial for Pakistan in terms of military and economic aid, but “Pakistan made it embarrassingly plain that she was doing so primarily to strengthen her position against India”¹⁰ as Pakistan’s greatest fear was Indian aggression.

Markey’s *No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Troubled Relationship with Islamabad* brings out that the problem with Pakistan-US relations is that both sides failed to value mutual relationship. The US used Pakistan as pawn in broader geopolitical chess game, which included the containment of communism, opening secret talks with Beijing and arming Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.¹¹ He also categorizes anti-Americanism in Pakistan as Liberal Anti-Americanism, Nationalist Anti-Americanism and Violent Anti-Americanism.¹² To him, Liberal Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is based on baffled feeling of those educated people, who see the US positively, but agitate, when the US extends support to military dictators in Pakistan. Nationalist Anti-American strand is based on the feelings that the US breached promises and remained a *fair-weather-friend*, whereas, Violent Anti-Americanism is ingrained among Jihadist forces, who aspire of seizing control of the area.¹³ These radicals plot attacks against the US, because they perceive US as a threat to their norms, values, religion and culture. By exercising soft power of economic aid and diplomatic manoeuvres, the US has waged multiple attempts to reduce radical anti-Americanism, but these efforts majorly went unaccomplished.

Bruce Reidel in his *What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan 1979-89* pens that “it was a conflict between democracy and communism that shaped the history of millions of people across the globe, and the modern US national security institutions like the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency was fashioned to fight it”.¹⁴ The cold war has been the greatest threat to the US-led system and ideology. Whereas, in practice, no ally of the US directly got into war as Pakistan did. Washington was quite aware that Pakistan became signatory of US-sponsored Security Pacts not to combat communism, but to aggrandize its own security arrangements by obtaining military, economic and diplomatic support from the US and its European allies.

Pakistan as a Pawn in Afghanistan-Soviet War (1979-89)

Pakistanis express their grievances towards the US that Pakistan was ensnared into Afghan-Soviet war and the latter paid a huge price for alliance with the US. Afghan-Soviet war was designed to stop Soviet expansion towards other strategically significant countries of Middle East. Pakistan was urged by the US to join the war. Pakistan's sacrifices, as a consequence of war, were not extolled at international forums. Pakistan did not get any strategic or security gains from the war, but multiple futuristic security challenges. Influx of Afghan refugees, who came and settled in Pakistan and did not go back, on average every month about 44,118 refugees fled Pakistan to seek shelter.¹⁵ Other agencies of international development (UNHCR, ILO, ICRC, WFP, WHO and UNICEF) assisted in this regard, but major burden was borne by Pakistan alone.¹⁶ Drug trade by smugglers devastated 8.6 millions of Pakistani youth.¹⁷ The US accepted the demand of local groups, i.e., drug trafficking.¹⁸ Wave of extremism in Pakistan, assassinations, bomb blasts, attack on mosques, a brutal and bloody war between Sunni-Shia groups and other off-shoots divided the nation and enervated the nationalism among Pakistanis.

The US backed Afghan war against red troops, otherwise Afghanistan was not in a position to even give a tough time to well-equipped Soviet forces. Whatever was planned for Soviets, later on ravaged Pakistan and Afghanistan. CIA trained 12,500 foreigners (1985-1992) in urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage and bomb making. Later, these rebels used the same techniques of terror against Pakistan. Another blunder that the US made was disbursement of aid (military and economic) to least effective fighter groups.¹⁹ These groups later turned against the US and eventually plotted and executed terrorist attacks against both the nations creating a Frankenstein's monster like situation. These are the primary challenges that Pakistan faced as a result of Afghan-Soviet war.

US Afghan policy went awry as Washington's sneaky exit from Afghanistan without reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas did great damage to regional peace as it left a power vacuum for local warlords to gain grounds in Afghanistan. Prolonged civil war in Afghanistan also affected Pakistan's peace. Pakistan's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were termed as interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan. That perception still persists in the minds of Afghan youth and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are still not much smooth as they ought to be. There is a strongly built narrative in Pakistan that no Pakistani or pro-Pakistani can oppose Pakistan's nuclear weapons, because Pakistan's nuclear weapons are aimed at India and India is an arch rival of Pakistan. Washington's imposition of sanctions against Islamabad's nuclear program infuriated Pakistan's government and people alike. Washington was fearful of Pakistan's F-16 jets as potential vehicle for the

delivery of nuclear weapons against India, therefore, decision of delivering F-16 jets was regressed. The US invoked Pressler Amendment to deter Pakistan from going nuclear. Pakistani masses cite this US perfidy to underscore that the US proved an unfaithful partner.

C. Christine Fair in her article published in *Foreign Policy* magazine also admitted that “of course, Pakistan’s complaints are not entirely unfounded: the US did abandon the region once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and delivered US \$ 5.6 billion aid, of which US \$ 3.5 billion was military assistance.”²⁰ Whereas, Pakistan was a frontline state through Afghanistan war and whatever cache of military aid Pakistan received, was utilized in Afghanistan. Being US ally, Pakistan antagonized Soviet Union and received threats as a consequence of U-2 incident and had never friendly ties with the USSR; it also played critical role in Sino-US rapprochement. Compared to India, Pakistan’s contribution in the cold war was never acknowledged overtly that frustrates Pakistan.

Organized Hypocrisy?

There is an intriguing variable of anti-Americanism among common Pakistanis particularly the uneducated class, who even do not know where the US is situated, but hate America. They hold the US responsible for every *actus reus* in Pakistan even the matters of poor governance, resurgence of terrorists and bad debts are associated to US policies, which they believe are aimed at enfeebling Islamic states in general and Pakistan in particular. On the other hand, Pakistani politicians find it convenient to criminate the US than confessing their own flaws and venal aspirations to stick to power. Anti-American politicians gain momentous popularity and wield the same tool in their election campaign. From Z.A Bhutto to Imran Khan, all democratic leaders used anti-Americanism as a tool to curry public favor and blamed America for supporting dictators and derailing democracy in Pakistan. Stephen D. Krasner defines ‘organized hypocrisy’ as the frequent violation of longstanding norms in international politics.²¹ A large number of educated Pakistanis believe that Pakistan could not catch up other developing countries, because of the elongated dictatorial regimes. Unfortunately, the truth is that despite making wars for promotion of democracy, the US also backed dictatorship where it got a convenience of her foreign policy. Ayub Khan trode on fledgling democracy of Pakistan by introducing the Elected Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO), which charged politicians under security and martial law regulations. This highly authoritarian order barred politicians from waging their struggle for democracy. But, US President Johnson congratulated Ayub Khan for rapid economic progress, whereas, Robert S. McNamara (former US Secretary of Defense) went further by

saying that “it is one of the greatest successes in development in the world”.²² The US extolled Ayub’s reforms, but no condemnation came against a dictatorial tyranny.

Nixon administration became a major supporter of General Yahya, who proclaimed 1969 martial law in Pakistan. Zia overthrew democratically elected Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto and seized power in 1977. General Zia introduced Islamic Law in the country by systematically dismantling civil society.²³ The US rather condemning it supported Zia’s doctrine, because the US had its own vested interests to support him against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, military and economic aid dramatically increased towards Pakistan. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan did not pose any significant security threat to Pakistan as Pakistan was signatory of SEATO and CENTO, therefore, it was obligatory for the US to come for Pakistan’s assistance. But, Washington played smarter by promoting slogan of *Jihad* against atheists (Soviet Union). Pakistan was ensnared to become part of this war. As a result of Afghan war, Pakistan also had to shoulder the heavy burden of refugees, who were about 8 million.²⁴

At the beginning of Carter’s administration (1977), Pakistan’s significance on US policy horizon loomed fairly small, because the US had levelled substantially good ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The US was also trying to negotiate with Soviet Union directly and Sino-US rapprochement underrated Pakistan’s importance for Washington. Only the geographical location of Pakistan was of some importance.²⁵ Though a SEATO, CENTO ally, but when it came to religious desecration, Pakistan’s masses even attacked US embassy. Former CIA official, Bruce Reidel pinpoints that on November 21, 1979 US embassies in several countries were severely attacked, however, the worst incident occurred in Islamabad, when student demonstrators from nearby Quaid-i-Azam University stormed into US embassy, ransacked and stoke fire. Ambassador Hummel kept asking for help from Pakistani authorities, but of no use. Consequently, one Marine guard was killed and 137 employees of the embassy barricaded themselves in a secure vault to avoid hostage taking.²⁶ The point is that there are also widespread anti-Indian sentiments among Pakistanis, but no such attack has happened on Indian embassy in Islamabad. Such an act was an overt violation of the Vienna Convention (1961) on diplomatic relations and these rules are almost universally adopted as 179 states are party to it.²⁷ Legally, the US could shut down its diplomatic mission in Pakistan. Despite US restraint diplomacy such violent anti-Americanism in Pakistan did not dwindle away even in the years to come.²⁸

Opposing Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets

The US has thoroughly been concerned about proliferation of nuclear weapons to other developing and underdeveloped states. Lewis Dunn argues “a proliferated

world is likely to be nasty and dangerous place, entailing threats to the security and domestic well-being of virtually all nations and posing a serious possibility of long-term decay of global political order.”²⁹ But, the matter of security becomes more serious for a nation, when its neighbour tests a nuclear weapon and gets insuperable strategic advantage and may have an option to bully it whenever needed. Pakistan’s security came under serious threat again, when India tested first nuclear weapon “Smiling Buddha” on May, 1974. To counterpoise Indian nuclear superiority was pretty rational, logical and strategically sufficient for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. Pakistan being an ally of US-sponsored security pacts and was not anticipating that the US would treat Pakistan like a threatening state. By invoking the *Nuclear Non-proliferation Act* of 1977 and the *Glenn and Symington Amendments* were used to deter Pakistan from going nuclear.

The Glenn Amendment (1978) terminated aid to Pakistan and even French-aided project to assist nuclear arsenal was also terminated, but the Symington Amendment dealt with enrichment and was even more restrictive than Glenn.³⁰ After dismemberment of East-Pakistan, military establishment was mindful of the security threats, therefore, acquisition of nuclear bomb was attached to national integrity of Pakistan. Any opposition to Pakistan’s nukes met with stringent reaction from the government and masses. US sanction on Pakistan intensified anti-American feeling among civil and military establishment.³¹ Pakistan had acquired atomic bomb during 1980s according to Dr. A.Q. Khan and was ready for tests, but Pakistan was waiting for ripe time to declare as nuclear power state. US sanctions on Pakistan did not work because of the popular public support for the bomb and passionate politics of Z.A. Bhutto.³² Imposition of sanctions on Pakistan was perceived as blocking Pakistan’s nuclear program. No matter how many times Washington clarifies of protecting NPT regime, but US sanctions were termed as contravention to Pakistan’s national interest.

Extremist and Terrorist Outfits

Zia’s doctrine was devastating for Pakistan, even in 2016; Pakistan is facing serious security threats from Taliban and other extremist and terrorist organizations, which established sanctuaries in Pakistan during his era. Because of the exceedingly porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drug trade, narco-trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, religious seminaries and sectarianism came to Pakistan with Jihadist culture. Zia’s prolonged dictatorship perished in a plane crash along with US ambassador Arnold Raphel and core supporters of his regime in August 1988. President Reagan expressed his deep sorrow and eulogized the dictator as “a statesman of world stature” and praising his “dedication to regional peace and reconstruction.”³³ After Zia, Pakistan returned to frail democracy, but democracy

could not work long. General Pervez Musharraf, once again came into power by imposing Martial Law in the country.

US ties have mostly been predicated on personal ties with Pakistani rulers and totally neglected public opinion. After tragic event of 9/11, the US was desperately determined to launch war against terrorism in Afghanistan and there was public outrage against this planned offensive. There were nationwide protests, masses were furious over US decision to initiate a war in Afghanistan with complete backing of Pakistan. Washington counted on Musharraf's assurance and ignored simmering public outrage. Most of the Pakistanis believed that the US was reinforcing Musharraf opposed to the aspirations of the common people, who wanted to restore civilian government, that's why Musharraf's rule sustained crisis. Backing of Musharraf regime was so irksome for the US as it flared widespread anti-American sentiments among people. They clearly opposed military operation in FATA under US pressures,³⁴ because they viewed it as an overt violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.

Pakistanis always termed Musharraf as a strong military dictator, who wrested power from democratically elected regime, but the statement of US outgoing Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan C. Crocker that "although Musharraf was an army officer but he was not a dictator," was a conspicuous paradox of US commitment to promote democracy. Such duplicity outrages Pakistani masses towards the US. Importantly, failure of US military operation in the wake of war against terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be attributed to anti-American sentiments among people as they were not supporting this war, US strategy failed to evolve national consensus in Pakistan. NATO supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan were attacked, ransacked and disrupted multiple times, which clearly reflected violent anti-Americanism among locals in Baluchistan, FATA, KP, Punjab and Sindh.³⁵

George Bush's Preemptive Doctrine and Repercussions

Fareed Zakaria in his article *Hating America* argues that the US faces identical levels of anti-Americanism in India, Pakistan and Turkey, because none of these are rich, pacifist and postmodern. On the contrary, Israel and Britain are exceptionally pro-American.³⁶ Whereas, anti-Americanism is largely based on the feelings that the US interferes into Pakistan's internal affairs and majority of the uneducated or less educated population thinks that the US wants to westernize Pakistani society through electronic media. Musharraf was bashed by religious scholars for his "Enlightened Moderation". Zakaria holds President George W. Bush's hawkish policies responsible for waves of intense anti-Americanism. While citing the case of Indonesia that is more liberal and progressive Muslim state, he says that in the year 2000 about 75 percent of Indonesians populace was pro-American and after Bush more than 80 percent are hostile to Uncle Sam.³⁷ This brings out that Bush doctrine

earned him and the US ill-fame and distorted US image particularly among Islamic countries because of his unnecessary war as propounded by John J. Mearsheimer.³⁸

John Maszka in his *Terrorism and Bush Doctrine*, outlines catastrophic and consequential policy of President Bush to combat terrorism. Bush doctrine was based on unilateralism, preemption and military hegemony. His overt declaration of preemptive doctrine that “We cannot let our enemies strike first...we’ll not hesitate to act alone...we must build and maintain our defence beyond given challenges”, perturbed Muslim states. International relations scholars highly criticized Bush doctrine of preemption and declared it as catastrophic and counterproductive. Wilhelmsen and Flikke (2005) wrote that if the US can justify its policy of unilateralism and preemption then why can’t other nations do that? He goes on to say that suppose if India justifies its policy of nuclear doctrine against Pakistan, then similar scenario can be imagined on the part of Pakistan as well.³⁹ Though, not very strong, but there exists a fragile bond of Muslim brotherhood among Muslim states and Pakistan’s public expresses its solidarity with the people of Palestine, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan disowns Israel as a nation-state in the world by expressing its support for Palestinian cause by writing on the passports of every Pakistani “this passport is valid for all countries of the world except Israel”.⁴⁰ There have been public protests in Islamic countries condemning US combative policies in these countries. Bush and US scholars labelled Iran, Iraq and Libya as rogue states, therefore, invasion of Afghanistan followed by Iraq and then Libya and Syria made people of Pakistan feel that only Muslim states are the target of US military wrath.

Markey traces deep-rooted anti-Americanism among Pakistanis that even for internal governance problems whether they are suicide bombings, corruption and electricity blackouts, the US takes the share of the blame. That is the reason US policies even benign (economic aid, soft loans) are not well received in Pakistan and causes hiccups in Pakistan-US relations. Pakistanis feel that the US might have attached strings of demands to economic aid and loans. If an alliance endures or dissolves then there are certain reasons behind. Stephen M. Walt pens that membership to any alliance implicates some costs, it also undermines state’s autonomy. If the alliance does not serve the interests of that nation, it would be reluctant to bear those costs and eventually alliance collapses.⁴¹ Zhirkov (2014) employs cross-national survey data to empirically present instances of anti-Americanism at various levels. Zhirkov’s findings are based on the conception that anti-Americanism is persistent phenomena in international public opinion.⁴² He argues by citing data that aggregated anti-Americanism is relatively stable across time, whereas, on individual level, anti-American demonstrates considerably

internal consistency.⁴³ The US has been wielding soft power to build alliances in post-cold war era.

The US tried to address intense anti-Americanism in Pakistan through economic aid and military aid, but these efforts largely failed because of deep ingrained anti-Americanism. US public is no different from Pakistani public. US nationals perceive Pakistan as unreliable partner in bilateral relations. Some of the US congressmen do not have favourable opinion for Pakistan despite Pakistan's sacrifices in US-led war against terrorism. Gary Ackerman, a domestic congressman from New York, said it in May, 2012 that "Pakistan is like a black hole for American aid. Our tax dollars go in, our diplomats go in, sometimes. Our aid professionals go in, sometimes. Our hopes go in. Our prayers go in. Nothing good ever comes out."⁴⁴ Following table of US aid to Pakistan reflects that how the volume of aid drastically increased, but the US policies could not gain legitimacy in Pakistan.

Summary of US Aid to Pakistan (2000-2010)

Year	Economic Assistance, Total	Economic Assistance (through USAID)	Military Assistance, Total	Coalition Support Funds
2000	45.72	0.00	0.00	-
2001	228.02	0.54	0.00	-
2002	937.34	744.74	1,739.70	1,386.06
2003	377.93	284.81	1,760.23	1,450.98
2004	406.12	316.56	891.39	794.11
2005	490.42	374.04	1,397.06	1,050.15
2006	689.43	488.46	1,246.10	916.13
2007	688.62	498.91	1,079.72	755.74
2008	614.48	392.05	1,378.32	1,014.90
2009	1,353.65	1,076.25	1,114.26	685.00
2010	1,867.13	1,529.53	2,524.61	1,220.50

Note: All figures are in US \$ (millions). Figures are adjusted for inflation and presented in 2009 constant dollars

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan> (This table has been edited for this research)

Total US economic aid from 2000 onwards towards Pakistan increased over the period of a decade. Table of US economic assistance shows that Pakistan kept receiving huge sums of aid as a support to wage efficient war against terrorism. This aid continued even beyond 2010, but US started making vociferous demands that Pakistan needs to do more against Haqqani network and other terrorist networks operating in the region, which further dissipates Pakistan's ties with the US in the years to come.

When media telecasts speeches of the US congressmen or senators like Gary Ackerman discussed in previous paragraph, it literally hurts the feelings of majority of the Pakistanis as they believe that Pakistan's leadership (democratic or undemocratic) has been serving US interest at the cost of their (Pakistan) own betterment. From cold war alliances till non-NATO ally in war against terrorism, Pakistanis believe they got nothing, but a blame that Pakistan is a failing nuclear states and harbouring terrorist elements.⁴⁵ Despite US insistence of cracking down against terrorists and Taliban fighters in North Waziristan, there has been a rationale behind lingering operation because of the starkly divided public opinion on it. When those outlaws renounced any talks with the state and government of Pakistan had exhausted diplomatic channels then operation was indispensable. Now majority of the Pakistanis support military operation against militants and Pakistan has achieved stability in tumultuous areas.

US approach to reduce anti-Americanism has been frail because of infamous policies of interference into internal matters of Pakistan. Washington could not bring refined balance between hard power and soft power in Pakistan. US contribution towards multiple sectors in Pakistan has been appreciable, but was not highlighted much. US aid has contributed to improve Pakistan's energy, education and health sectors and have urged better governance and gender equality in Pakistan. It also had increased capacity of law enforcement by imparting training and better equipment.⁴⁶ Despite these contributions, US could not soften its image in the eyes of common Pakistanis. The US suffered huge loss in war against terrorism because of not having public support from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Breaching Pakistan's Sovereignty: Covert Operations

Sovereignty is very sacred concept in Pakistan and it means that Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam (Two-nation Theory) and no such law, which is in direct contravention of Quran and Sunnah, be formulated in Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan also validates this notion. Second strand of sovereignty is the independent decision-making free from external pressure. Thirdly, no foreign troops would be tolerated on Pakistan's soil. Therefore, drone strikes, though against militant hideouts, could not gain legitimacy in Pakistan.

US bade contract of reconstruction or security of its personnel to private security agencies as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq. The controversy over 'Blackwater' stems from its secret operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US contractor, Blackwater also operated in Pakistan at Shamsi Airbase from where CIA had been launching drone strikes. After Baghdad square shooting, which claimed lives of 17 innocent people, this private security contractor rebranded as 'Xe Services' to improve its image. Mr. Leon Panetta (former CIA director) during his term clarified

that many contracts with Blackwater be terminated. Pakistani media showed the images of alleged Blackwater houses in Islamabad, while print media also published numerous stories, which even branded US journalists and officials as Blackwater Operatives.⁴⁷

Raymond Allen Davis, once a private soldier for Blackwater and now a undercover CIA operative, gunned down two Pakistanis and was arrested by police on the charges of murder. His cell phone had surreptitiously taken photos of Pakistan's important military installations and strategic sites. A CIA Director denied that Davis had any connection with CIA and declared him as diplomat. Even President Obama appealed for the release of their diplomat.⁴⁸ But, Pakistan's government, under public pressure refused to release him. Though, it seems to be a small incident, but it became a national issue in Pakistan because of abhorrence of People towards him.

Controversial Drone Strikes

There has been huge hue and cry over drone strikes in Pakistan as they caused intensive collateral damage. Pakistan's government did not halt CIA's drone strikes, but, under public pressure, blamed the US to save their own face. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently rejected the argument that Predator drone strikes in Pakistan are strategically counterproductive and should be drastically curtailed.⁴⁹ Drones have been counterproductive in destroying terrorists' safe havens because of the collateral damage inflicted by them. Even nation-wide protests against drone strikes could not halt this. Being hawkish, Bush was highly unpopular in Pakistan as he started drone attacks to hunt down terrorists, but surprisingly, Mr. Obama mounted up air strikes against suspected terrorists. According to statistics presented by the South Asian Terrorism Portal, between 2005 to early 2016, there have been total 321 incidents of drone strikes and it killed 2806 people and injured more than 354.⁵⁰ It was devastating for infrastructure as well. Though, CIA claimed that they successfully killed high profiles of al-Qaida, but it also resulted in dozens of unintended deaths.

Rachel Stohl of the Stimson Center, a Washington research foundation, said that "these are exact weapons. The disappointment is in the knowledge about who it is that we are slaughtering". To calm down the public outrage as a result of drone deaths, Mr. Obama, in 2013, announced that no strike is launched without "close sureness that no regular people will be murdered or harmed." Unfortunately, independent investigation of the strikes unfolded that there were far more civilian casualties than officials admit. Imprecision in targets might be the result of poor coordination of intelligence provided by Pakistani government and CIA. Therefore, they have been targeting based on an imperfect best guess. In a speech on drone

attacks in 2013, Mr. Obama declared that no strike was taken without “near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.” He also admitted that “it is a hard fact that US drones have caused many civilian deaths and these deaths will haunt us as long as we live.” The expansion of drone warfare from Pakistan to Yemen gave it a sinister reputation in these countries and provoked people against US policies. It drastically increased anti-Americanism in these countries. Mr. Obama strived to restore US reputation in Islamic countries in particular and world in general.⁵¹ Unpopular policies such as drone strikes tarnished US soft image.

The ‘Operation Neptune Spear’ that resulted in killing of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad by US SEALs (Sea, Air and Land) on May 1-2, 2011,⁵² brought Pakistan’s security under serious threat. How come, the military operation conducted by the US Naval Special Warfare Development Group, was done without informing Pakistan out rightly breached Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Mr. Hersh’s version favours Pakistan as it says that there was a close coordination between US and Pakistani intelligence and the operation was conducted with Pakistan Army’s permission and knowledge.⁵³ But, CIA challenges this view and claims that Pakistan’s top brass was not aware of it.⁵⁴ Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani in a statement warned the US not to contemplate such operation in future as it was a clear violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.⁵⁵ As a consequence of US adventure at Abbottabad, there was a wave of anger among military, politicians and public as well. According to the Pew Global Survey, widespread opposition disapproved drone strikes, but it did limited damage to US image in global realm.

Widespread Opposition to Drones

Country	Approve	Disapprove
Pakistan	3	66
India	28	36
China	35	52
US	52	41

Source: Global Pew Survey⁵⁶ (Table had been edited for the paper)

Pakistan and China disapproved more to drone strikes than the US and India. The primary reason for Indian approval for drone strikes was that India never experienced any drone strike from the US.

Empowering India

Amongst the primary factors that stoke anti-Americanism in Pakistan, is the equipping of India militarily. Though, the US enjoys strategic partnership with India, but Pakistan has also been a crucial cold war ally. The heavy price of antagonizing USSR that Pakistan paid to align with the US, masses think, has not been paid back yet. The US strategizes to contain the rise of China and that is only possible through empowering India. A powerful India may prove a stumbling block for China's peaceful rise. Kevin Rudd (former Australian Prime Minister and an expert on China) claimed that China is utterly convinced that the US is pursuing a policy of containment. He summarized Beijing's perception of US goals in five bullet points in a recent Harvard study, i.e., to isolate China, contain it, diminish it, internally divide it and sabotage its political leadership.⁵⁷ For that purpose, empowering India militarily cautions Pakistan's security. But, Washington has never maintained a balance between Islamabad and New Delhi as the former has served Washington's interests more than the latter during the cold war, post-cold war and post-9/11 eras.

As far as execution of US foreign policy is concerned, the US is undeniably the most dominant actor in international politics. Its primary national interest is to check the rise of a challenger to avert threats to US hegemony for an indefinite period. The US has outmanoeuvred the Soviet Union in the cold war and rising challenger in the coming years is China. The US would certainly make all possible arrangements to contain China too. This argument reflects that the US had grand strategy, which addresses gigantic challenges, because great powers have potential to undermine the US at the UNSC, G8 and various other forums of great powers, whereas, a country like Pakistan may not threaten the US and its interests in the region. However, the US always tried to maintain normal ties with Pakistan, but based on historical incidents, radical anti-Americanism has always been an impediment to smooth sailing of Pakistan-US strategic ties. It is worthy to mention once again that the US executes its foreign policy in blatant manner. But, increased anti-Americanism among masses hampers US policy, even it is in the mutual interest, because of deep-rooted mistrust. Common masses view the US as imperial power, who always wants to treat small actors like satellite states. Ayub Khan, the first President and former Chief of Army Staff, had expressed in his memoirs that People of third world countries need friends not masters.

Some of the scholars are of the view that anti-Americanism in Pakistan has not hurt its interests, policies and security, whereas, Pakistan has suffered a serious blowback on diplomatic front. With the proactive support of the US, Pakistan was entitled to enjoy the same status of non-NATO ally as the other members like

Australia, Egypt, Israel, South Korea and Japan. Pakistan could get a civil nuclear deal similar to India-US nuclear deal (2005). That milestone could pave the way for Pakistan to enter into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and on later stage, not in near future, Pakistan could become a candidate for the UNSC permanent membership as India is eying for. The argument of the scholars that anti-Americanism in Pakistan did not affect its policies, security and interests stands invalid. Pakistan suffered a lot at economic front, security domain, technological prowess and diplomatic prestige.

The US is the leading donor to Pakistan in terms of aid and grants, and it has waged multiple attempts to minimize anti-Americanism in Pakistan through aid and diplomatic channels to improve US image in Pakistan.⁵⁸ The intermittent US aid towards Pakistan makes people think that the US is not a reliable partner. After successful military operation against terrorists in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), John Kerry acknowledged Pakistan's efforts and sacrifices that Pakistani troops made in war against terrorists. To further uplift Pakistan's military capacity, the US announced selling of F-16 jets to Pakistan. Indian lobby and US Senator (R) Bob Corker virulently opposed this deal to Pakistan.⁵⁹ Now, the US has attached conditions to the deal such as release of Shakil Afridi and ramping up of action against Haqqani network.⁶⁰ Pakistan is much concerned over this diplomatic lax of Washington. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Aizaz Chaudhary on May 7, 2016 stated that no conditions should be attached to the sale of F-16s, because Pakistan plans to wield the jets only against terrorists.⁶¹

Later, Lockheed Martin Corp. announced to manufacture F-16 jets at India. That is ipso facto, a mega deal for India as compared to eensy-weensy sale of eight F-16 fighter jets. Johnny Whitaker, Director of International Communications at Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, admitted that India would be able to benefit from the knowledge of F-16 manufacturing indigenously.⁶² Another factor that undermines Pakistan's interest is Washington's emphatic support for India's inclusion into World's most powerful elite club (UNSC) as a permanent member. US President Obama and Indian Premier Mr. Modi, in a joint statement issued at the conclusion of Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the Headquarters of the State Department, said that "the US side reaffirmed its support for a reformed UNSC with India as a permanent member".⁶³ Pakistan's Prime Minister made it clear upon the US in a telephonic conversation to Mr. Obama that Pakistan would never accept India as a permanent member to the UNSC because of its non-compliance to UN resolutions passed on Kashmir issue.⁶⁴ The US should be cautious in its dealing with South Asian nuclear rivals.

US tilt towards India would frustrate Pakistan and it would seek similar capability from some other countries (China or Russia). Arif Rafique, *President*

of *Vizier Consulting, LLC*, pens that “as the US-India embrace tightens, former cold war foes Pakistan and Russia are bolstering ties with one another”.⁶⁵ As US role in Afghanistan dwindles, Russia sees Pakistan as a critical factor of stability in its backyard. Pakistan’s growing ties with all permanent members of UNSC and regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey) make it a ‘pivot state’ in the region. Therefore, ignoring Pakistan and favouring India, would be disastrous for regional peace and stability.⁶⁶ Additionally, US interests in the region would seriously be undermined as well. US-led war against terrorism is still seeking logical end because of the restrained support from Pakistan. Pakistani governments have been under tremendous pressures from the US to launch operations in North Waziristan, which lately was done. But, coercive diplomacy increased rather addressed anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s current narrative of anti-Americanism had developed around the loops of historical events mostly from cold war times, when the US was obsessed with the threat of Soviet Union. US disengagement from the region allowed Taliban and other transnational terrorists to establish safe havens in Afghanistan and in post-9/11 era, coercing Pakistan to fight against al-Qaida and Taliban increased anti-Americanism even amongst educated class. There was a common thinking in Pakistan that why we were dragged into war? Not ignoring the fact that, anti-American narrative got vibrancy and the US could not achieve desired objectives in Afghanistan. US lawmakers still make allegations against Pakistan that the latter is involved in supporting Haqqani network in Afghanistan. Such statements always proved counterproductive in waging common war against terrorism. Following recommendations provide roadmap to deal with a nuclear armed Pakistan.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Following recommendations can help in appeasing Pakistan’s grievances towards the US and may prop up mutual cooperation on strategic issues:

- The paradox of US support for dictators in Pakistan and appeal for promoting democracy earned her disrepute. Pakistani people expect that the US should take a firm stand against corrupt politicians and dictators. If the US is really serious to promote democracy then should come up with a clear stance that “It will never support any dictator in Pakistan in future”. Though, this is a hard pill to swallow, but would not leave any space for the commoners to hate America for its organized hypocrisy.
- Indian inclusion into the UNSC would give India insurmountable leverage over Pakistan, If, the US wants to stabilize the region (South Asia), then Pakistan should also be considered for the same slot or Indian backing should be dropped.

- Terming Pakistan a 'fragile state' or a 'failing state' or a sponsor of terrorists distorts Pakistan's image globally, whereas, Pakistanis believe that if Pakistan is failing state or a victim of terrorism, it is because of US cold war designs and their outcome. Pakistan needs politico-strategic support to grapple with this gigantic challenge. The US should provide that support without casting doubts about the intentions and capabilities of Pakistan's military and political establishment.
- Despite nuclear deterrence between both the nuclear armed rivals, India is still viewed as the most potential threat to Pakistan's security. Empowering India in military realms undermines Pakistan's security directly, therefore, both the countries should be treated alike. If India is applauded for its economic growth and efficient democratic institutions then Pakistan cannot be blamed for being less democratic and stagnant in economic circles. It served throughout the cold war, post-cold war and post-9/11 as American ally. Pakistan's status as Non-NATO ally should be acknowledged by providing benefits that it is entitled to. That would necessarily boost Pakistan's capability in combating terror and contribute for regional and global peace as a responsible stakeholder.
- Pakistan's partnership in combating war against terrorism and assisting the US for her vested interests in the region should be acknowledged.
- Sneaky exit from the region as was the scenario at the end of the cold war would be a major policy blunder. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pakistan and Afghanistan's devastated areas should be the priority.

Pakistan is a pivot state in the region concerning Chinese and US strategic and commercial interests. Because of the intense anti-Americanism among Pakistanis, the US could not achieve desired results in the war against terrorism. Pakistan also went unstable because of the errant terrorist activities. Whatever policies (economic or political) US formulated; Pakistanis refuted them. Common interest of eradicating terrorism, alleviating poverty, promoting trade and development went astray because of the deep-rooted mistrust. There is a need to build new narrative that does not portray the US as imperialist state rather a benevolent Superpower. The US should take people's aspiration into account rather government's spoof plans. Until this goal is achieved, all the efforts, resources and policies are futile to achieve common interests in the region.

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Terror Financing and Growth of Terrorist Groups: A Case Study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

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Abstract: Since the inception of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as an organized terrorist organization, it is widely discussed among scholars, whether terrorist organizations are financed by local or international sources in Pakistan. It is argued that some locals from FATA and KP regions did provide financial and manpower assistance to TTP's objectives by assuming as defensive jihad against Pakistan Army and for the enforcement of Sharia (Islamic law) in the country. In this perspective, other local militant outfits in Pak-Afghan border-areas significantly participated in the formation of the TTP challenging the writ of the state. In FATA and KP regions, the TTP was enthusiastically supported by the local people and militant outfits, because the political vacuum created after the annulment of PATA in 1994, created socio-political grievances among people. In this campaign, regional and International players specifically provided assistance in order to promote militancy in Pakistan. With the collaboration of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-Mohammedi (TNSM) and other militant outfits, the TTP strengthened its organizational and operational structure within and beyond Pakistani borders. This paper addresses the strategies adopted by the TTP to sustain financially, and maintain fundraising and administrative affairs within dominated areas of Pakistan.

Keywords: Terrorism Funding, Taliban, Pakistan, Violence.

Introduction

Terrorist organizations have evolved over the time in motivations, size, operational strategies, recruitments and capabilities, but the strategies to raise, move and utilized funds have remained largely the same.¹ However, terrorist funding is not specifically fixed to provide funds to terrorist operations, but to manage organizational expenses for maintaining a favourable environment essential to prolong militancy in a particular area or society.² Terrorist organizations cannot survive on ideology alone, but have to maintain strong financing and operational structure to be more operational and violent. Hence, these organizations have to show adaptability and opportunism to meet their financial requirements. To understand financing mechanisms, utilized by the terrorist organizations for their survival and activities, there has been a limited success in highlighting the responsible sources used by them. In order to fill this critical gap, further exploration of the issue is required.

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Upon its formation in December 2007, the TTP significantly declared itself to be an extension of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, though, Afghan Taliban leadership never owned the TTP. Later, it claimed for three primary goals, such as, the enforcement of *sharia* (Islamic Rule) in Pakistan, unity against coalition forces and *defensive jihad* against the US in Afghanistan, and the Pakistan Army in Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).³ The TTP was initially welcomed and supported by the local tribes and agencies of these areas, who were not in favour of Pakistan's alliance with the US and NATO. Consequently, the TTP also altered public opinion by justifying its goals and strategies against Pakistan security forces in FATA and KP regions. These justifications also helped developed a strong bridge for TTP's local and international financial assistance with manpower.

The TTP also managed funding from variety of activities ranging from low-level crimes to organized crimes, such as, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies, exploitation of natural resources in FATA and KP, drugs trafficking via Pak-Afghan border, control on archaeological sites and funds collection through religious institutions.⁴ Similarly, the smooth flow of TTP's financial assistance became more fluent, when it started to receive foreign charity-based funding and assistance. TTP leadership also divided each tribal area and agency of FATA and KP regions into administrative zones for revenue collection.⁵ In this perspective, local and International militant syndicates, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-Mohammedi (TNSM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and al-Qaida, supported TTP's agenda, and enhanced finance generating circle within and beyond the borders of Pakistan.

The TTP decided to attract people by promoting the concept of *sharia* and declared the democratic system in Pakistan as an anti-Islamic and Western practices. This particular message helped the TTP spread its message and convinced local people by interpreting violent activities as a defensive "*jihad*" against the Pakistan Army and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Given this background, this paper endeavours to explore financial sources of the TTP by addressing the questions mentioned below:

- What types of strategies were used by the TTP and what kind of initial response, it received from the local people of FATA and KP regions?
- Did the TTP exploit the political vacuum created after the annulment of Provincially Administrative Tribal Areas (PATA-1975) regulations by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1994?

- What were the tactics used by the TTP's leadership to convince local people, and established a smooth flow of local and international financial assistance?
- What were the consequences on Pakistan's socio-political system?

This study is about a systematic and a purposeful effort to unveil the methods and techniques adopted by this terrorist group.

Terrorist Financing and Management Strategies: Conceptual Understanding

Terrorist financing refers to those activities and strategies, which are helpful in fundraising process for terrorist activities. It may be from various sources, for instance, private assistance and profits from businesses, fundraising from charitable organizations, drugs trafficking, weapons smuggling, fraud, kidnapping for ransom and extortion. The primary objective of terrorist financing is to empower a terrorist network for intimidating a population or coerce a government to be involved in killing, harming, endangering or causing substantial property damage; or seriously interfering in essential services and systems.⁶

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) broadly defined the term 'financing of terrorism' as financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in it.⁷ The need to track the sources of funding for terrorism was realized as far back as 1986, when the UN General Assembly drafted the first UN Convention against recruitment, use, finance, and training of mercenaries. This convention was adopted on 4th December 1989. Furthermore, in 1994, the UN General Assembly called attention to the growing connection between drug traffickers and mercenaries. In light of these resolutions, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9th December 1999.⁸

Terrorist financing is not a new phenomenon; however, management strategies varies in order to maintain consistency in fund raising campaigns. In this context, whatever the motives, purposes or objectives of a terrorist organization or group are, like other militant organizations, they must have to maintain necessary skills, acquire, shift, accumulate and eventually utilize the required financial resources to fulfil the objectives.⁹ As al-Qaeda's financial chief Sa'id Al-Masri argued that "without money, jihad stops."¹⁰ Similarly, terrorist groups in South Asia, such as, al-Qaeda, TTP, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Lashkar-Tayyiba (LeT), Jammatt-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Maoist groups in India, all came forward with different ideologies based on religious, separatist and nationalistic views to operationalize their activities, but generally fundraising techniques and

strategies were more or less similar.¹¹ One of the most sophisticated and effective ways, utilized by these organizations, is a network of international Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), which facilitate militants to generate and move finances easily in any part of the world through a systematic channel.

Interestingly, these NPOs act as effective fronts and also helpful to gain legitimacy of funds movement. Normally, this deliberate movement of funds occurs from well-developed and more regulated economies to developing and under-developing countries.¹² In Muslim countries, governments often overlook the regulation of charities and *madrassas* that include registration criteria, record-keeping procedures, monitoring financial inflows and outflows, and security checking systems. The militant organizations take the advantage of the situation. In societies like Pakistan, where philanthropy is part of religious obligations, the extremist organizations usually engage in charity and welfare work, and collect amounts, which are normally used for recruitment, propaganda and terrorist operations.¹³

Mechanism for Financial Support

Terrorists financing ranges from low-level crimes to high-level organized criminal activities. Similarly, the TTP followed the same pattern to deepen its roots in FATA and KP. In this process, structural factors like social, economic and historical transformations, made environment more conducive for TTP's growth in these areas. It is a fact that reducing the financial strength of militant groups is a crucial part of counterinsurgency strategy. The insurgency is not monolithic factor to counter, but also include leadership, goals, ideologies and means of finance generation.¹⁴

Fazal Ullah, the son-in-law of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, and head of the TNSM in Swat valley, was appointed as the leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS) in 2009. The TTS also divided the whole KP province into 37 administrative zones and appointed a commander to each to set-up judicial and financial services system.¹⁵ The separate zones aimed to collect intelligence, maintaining law and order and monopoly over the natural resources in Swat division. Prior to the advent of the TTP, majority of the local militant groups had already been confronting the Pakistan Army in various areas of FATA and KP. Later, these groups made allegiance to the TTP. Fazal Ullah, was also known as "Mullah Radio" due to excessive use of local FM radio stations to disseminate TTP's messages and to urge the people for financial assistance, He disseminated three messages to the people of FATA and KP: religious piety, education and jobs for the boys, and resolution for the disputed lands. He was also granted reasonable funds to construct a large madrassa for religious education and training to students.¹⁶ Other sources in which online *jihadi* literature, songs,

magazines and an easy access to FM radio significantly boosted up TTP's realm of recruitment and sympathy within these areas.

Seven tribal agencies of FATA (geographical areas), and different districts of KP including Swat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand, appeared more fertile areas in terms of recruitments and financial assistance for the TTP.¹⁷

Local Financial Sources of the TPP

Generally, terrorist financing is directly linked with operational capabilities of terrorist organizations. To ensure and maintain stable fundraising streams, these organizations have to show adaptability with prevailing environment of the area, where they are anticipating in continuing their violent activities. Therefore, the TTP followed the same patterns and maintained financing stream by utilizing the local sources with help of local people and terrorist organizations.¹⁸

Initially, the TTP received a response from KP districts, particularly from Swat valley, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Mardan, Kohat, Kohistan, Bunner and Malakand division. However, it did not limit itself within the boundaries of FATA and KP regions; it extended its existence in other provinces gradually. In August 2008, Pakistani law enforcement agencies disrupted the finance generating circle, which was operating in Karachi with the help of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ) and other militant outfits.¹⁹ TTP's militant wing in Punjab received logistical, financial and manpower assistance from different sectarian outfits such as the SSP, LeJ and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).²⁰ In Karachi, three different offshoots of the TTP from Swat valley, Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan and Mohmand Agency, were actively running their networks for fundraising and finance collection with association of Karachi-based Afghan/Pashtun traders and transporters since many years.²¹

In December 2010, a report suggested that some TTP members had links with political parties, which could not be continued for a long time, yet still many members of the TTP were in contacts with religious-political parties of Pakistan, particularly with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI).²² As a result, political affiliation gave strength to the militant groups in Pakistan.

Drugs Smuggling/Trafficking

Drugs smuggling/trafficking is one of the productive sources of terror financing, which enables to raise and accumulate reasonable amount to meet their requirements. The TTP also took the benefits of Afghan drugs trafficking and adopted it as a more viable finance generating source in Pakistan. As it has systematically dominated the areas adjacent to Pak-Afghan border, the TTP also

exported drugs to foreign countries via Karachi.²³ On 24th August 2009, terrorists belonging to the LeJ and TTP were arrested in Karachi and bluntly confessed that heroin exported to different countries, such as, Singapore, China, Malaysia, the UAE, Europe, Africa and the US. They further revealed that capital from the heroine-exporting was provided to Taliban leaders in Baluchistan and FATA and to the families of arrested and imprisoned militants of Jundullah and the TTP.²⁴

Monopoly over Natural Resources in FATA and KP

Militant-dominated areas of Pakistan, especially, FATA and KP regions are enriched with natural resources, such as, rare wood, fine quality precious and semi-precious gemstones, and quality marbles used for floors and walls in construction. Unfortunately, these natural resources became feasible finance producing source of terrorist outfits on both ends of the border.²⁵ In April 2008, the TTP gained control over the marble mine in Mohmand Agency. Similarly, on 25th March 2009, Taliban extended their control towards emerald mines in Swat valley and started mining for smuggling via Afghanistan to different countries of the World. Previously, Shamozaï and Gujjar Killi (Swat) mines had been occupied, and excavation and trading processes initiated by the TTP.²⁶ The spokesperson of Taliban in Swat, Muslim Khan, justified the exploitation of natural resources as “all the minerals and natural resources have been created by Allah for the benefits of His creatures.” Thus, the TTP took huge benefits from the exploitation of the coal mines in Orakzai Agency of FATA.²⁷

In addition, militants were involved in stealing and exploiting the archaeological sites in the KP region. They maintained strong relations with Swat’s timber mafia to generate more capital through selling wood in the market. The hills of Swat valley were once covered with Pine forests and presented an attractive view, but militant outfits and the timber mafia ruined the natural beauty for their interests. According to the survey conducted by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy, Peshawar, it was estimated that the transportation of rare woods (Pine, Oak and Olive) including timber and gemstones generated US\$100 million for Pakistani Taliban.²⁸

Donations Collection and Fund-Raising Campaign through Religious Institutions

In Muslim countries like Pakistan, it is quite easy for Islamic charities to convince people to pay *zakat*, which is compulsory (2.5% of the wealth) and donations to their groups. Such fundraising was no longer restricted for the welfare of the poor in a society or state.²⁹ Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman Khaleel and Jammāt-ul-Furqan, commanded by Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar, two

banned militant organizations associated with the TTP and al-Qaeda set up fundraising networks through donations and charities from their supporters and sympathizers with new names Ansar-ul-Ummah and Tehrik-e-Ghalba-e-Islam.³⁰

Small boxes for donation are placed on jewellery shops, pharmacies (medical stores), railway and bus stations, outside mosques and other public places in Pakistani small towns and urban areas with Islamic messages for sympathizers and donors to drop spare change and money to finance and help different Islamic centres and organizations. Women were convinced by Taliban in Swat to contribute their jewelry and wealthy men with money and lands for the developments of these organizations.³¹

Kidnapping for Ransom

Kidnapping for ransom was also one of the rapidly growing sources of revenue generating for terrorist groups and organizations. Each ransom relatively produces roughly 50% revenue for a terrorist group's total annual expenses, but it depends on factors, such as, the structure of the group and economic situation of the region of operations.³² The organized criminal and terrorist organizations, both are engaged in such activities throughout the world. Terrorist organizations frequently justify this practice by proclaiming that "the holy warriors who detain a foreign soldier, journalist or worker have the right to ask for money or exchange him/her for Taliban prisoners."³³ As TTP's spokesman declared, "though we condemn kidnapping for ransom, but if it is meant for the promotion of the Islamic cause, then it's very much fair."³⁴ After the death of Bait Ullah Mehsud in August 2009, the TTP potentially increased the practice of kidnapping for ransom in Pakistan, especially in major cities, such as, Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta.³⁵

Pakistani militants hired "Commando Squad" to kidnap NGOs workers, local businessmen, security personnel and government officials for ransom in Pakistan. In June 2007, the militants kidnapped a government employee and an NGO worker and a bank manager from the Bannu district and demanded for ransom of amount Rs.1.2 million, which was later paid by their families.³⁶ Similarly, businessmen and wealthy personalities had been particular target of the TTP, as a captured militant in Swat reportedly confessed that 'we kidnapped Najeeb Ullah Afghani, the owner of a cement transporting company in Hayatabad and Peshawar, and received Rs. 10 million as ransom for his release."³⁷

Consequently, army personals and government employees were regularly targeted by the TTP for ransom in different areas of Pakistan. In August 2007, the TTP demanded for Rs. 60 million for the release of 280 kidnapped soldiers. On 11th February 2008, the Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Aziz Uddin, was

kidnapped by the TTP and then released after receiving ransom of US \$2.5 million. Likewise, militants also demanded Rs. 25 million ransoms for the release of Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Khaliq.³⁸ In Karachi, it was long argued that TTP militants were involved in rapidly growing element of kidnapping for ransom. On 5th December 2011, Karachi police successfully rescued a kidnapped local industrialist, Riaz Chinoy, when three militants belonging to group of the TTP, including its Karachi head Qari Shahid, were killed in this rescue operation. According to Media reports, militants demanded Rs. 70 million as a ransom.³⁹ According to police officials, al-Mukhtar group, an outfit of the TTP, was deployed in Karachi for extortion money, bank robberies and kidnapping for ransom.⁴⁰ In October 2008, a prominent Pakistani filmmaker, Satish Anand, was kidnapped by Pakistani Taliban from Karachi and then released in March 2009 from North Waziristan after receiving a ransom of Rs. 16 million from his family.⁴¹

Illegal Taxes, Penalties and Extortion from the Local People

In tribal areas, the central and provincial governments never exerted their real control to regulate the rule of law. Therefore, illegal tax mafia and terrorist maintained their monopoly over the local areas of FATA and KP regions particularly. The movement of transports through the tribal and border areas, had to pay US \$6 per month for small vehicles, while for large vehicles including passenger buses have to pay US \$30 per month.⁴² In the Bajur Agency, gas stations were required to provide free fuel to TTP members for transportation in the region. Similarly, Taliban commanders also collected US \$1.25 per month from every house in Waziristan agency. Same practices have also been extended to settled urban areas of Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad and Quetta, where business community, civil servants, and merchants were harassed by local Taliban and criminals to pay monthly dues as extortion or illegal taxes.⁴³

In Waziristan, the leadership of TTP divided tribal areas for funds and information collection. In North Waziristan, Taliban imposed 'toll tax' on transport movement, for instance, ten-wheel truck entering in the area was required to pay Rs. 1,500 for 'safe' road access for six months.⁴⁴ The TTP also charged smugglers and mafias for the 'safe passage' of illegal shipments from Afghanistan to FATA, KP and Baluchistan. Consequently, minorities had to pay extortion money for their protection as *Jiziya*. Accordingly, in April 2009, the Sikh community in FATA was coerced by Taliban to pay Rs. 20 million to the militants as *Jiziya*.⁴⁵

In Karachi, transporters, who belong to tribal agencies of FATA and North-South Waziristan, had paid billion of rupees to secure their families and release of relatives from the detention of Taliban during the last 5 years.⁴⁶ The Pashtun and Afghan business community linked with the heavy transport industry, particularly

trucks carrying NATO's oil supply to Afghanistan, regularly paid millions of rupees to the Taliban based in Karachi. The TTP also demanded billions of rupees as extortion from different large business centres, especially from real estate and mobile phone companies in the city.⁴⁷ Similarly, Mehsud group occupied the structural bodies of heavy-duty vehicles, local trucks and mini-bus services of Sohrab Goth, and imposed illegal taxes on traders and transporters associations.⁴⁸ TTP leadership regularly supervised the audit of extortion money and transparency in funds allocation for different projects within and beyond the borders of Pakistan. Intelligence reports indicated that the TTP had appointed six chartered accountants in the Sindh province including Karachi to regulate the funds and transparency in accumulated capital.⁴⁹

External Financial Sources of the TTP: Foreign Charity-Based Aid or Funds

Foreign charity-based funding or financing is one of the prominent factors, which facilitate the terrorist organizations significantly. The nature of such fundraising campaigns is always more complex in highlighting the actual flow of money. Therefore, it is widely perceived that aid or donation money generally diverts towards militant organizations under the shadow of social welfare. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a separate investigation process to highlight the responsible factors involved in the diversion of funds. The US Inspector General, Dona Dinkler, investigated the hurdles that diverted US funds to Afghanistan. The US Inspector General acknowledged that "investigators faced many complications and it is very hard to highlight the factors, but as a challenge we accepted, but it doesn't mean that we stop trying."⁵⁰

Financial Support from Afghan/Pashtun Diaspora

Financial support from diaspora plays a significant role in strengthening the operational and organizational structure of a terrorist organization. After US attack on Afghanistan and operational initiative in Pakistan's tribal areas, majority of militants moved in various nearby countries especially in Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. This migration has also generated widespread implications for the international community in its efforts to eliminate terror financing. In this context, funds raised through diaspora communities have become a viable source of terrorist financing in the region.⁵¹ Financial support for the TTP from Afghan or Pashtun diaspora was also another reliable source in finance generating sources. A political activist in Pakistan, Dr. Said Alam Mehsud, remarked that wealthy Afghan and Pashtun traders had also donated more than US \$100,000 during fundraising campaigns initiated by Taliban and banned militant groups in 2009.⁵²

TTP-Afghan NDS Nexus

Despite repeated requests from Pakistani side to the Afghan government, little or no action was taken to target TTP militants hiding in Afghan area. The long stay of TTP former chief Fazal Ullah in Afghanistan, who ran across the border after the Swat operation, raised many questions. Pakistan has long urged Afghanistan to eliminate what it calls 'safe havens' of the TTP in North-eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Pakistan sought Fazal Ullah's extradition from Afghanistan, but Kabul was not forthcoming to such a demand.⁵³ The sanctuaries of TTP in Afghanistan helped them to regroup and aimed to disrupt operation Zarb-e-Azab right under the nose of Afghan security agency. The reports published during 2014 and 2016 repeatedly mentioned the emerging nexus between RAW and Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) using TTP militants against Pakistan. Nangarhar, Kunar, Nooristan, Paktia and Paktika situated at Pak-Afghan border are known for anti-Pakistan activities by various TTP groups.

NDS network reportedly expanded its reach in Baluchistan. In 2016, six operatives of NDS, including a serving army officer was captured by the country's premier intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during different operations in Balochistan. Balochistan Home Minister Sarfraz Bugti, shared the details and a confessional video statements of these six operatives in which they admitted that they were getting instructions from two serving Major Generals of the Afghan Army and a retired army officer.⁵⁴ Such news get credibility, when Pakistani security initiatives are met with negative response from the Afghan side. According to the *Guardian*, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the security agencies of Pakistan and Afghanistan to train Afghan intelligence officers, but section of Afghan media and politicians resisted this move. Afghan Intelligence Chief, Rahmatullah Nabil was against the MoU and refused to sign, which was then signed by the Deputy Chief.⁵⁵ The differences within the Afghan government on relations with Pakistan are an open secret now. Several initiatives by the Pakistan government to improve relations and increase security cooperation could not be materialized due to trust deficit and reluctance on Afghan side.

The India Factor

Training and financing the militant groups in other countries is not a new phenomenon for India. Long before the Taliban in Pakistan, Indian intelligence agency RAW is accused of financing and training the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers causing havoc in Sri Lanka. Pakistan became its new target, when Indian intelligence community bluntly declared the need for covert operations in Pakistan. Given the nature of relationship between two countries, India never misses any chance to contribute towards instability in Pakistan by using different proxies. The TTP

provided a golden opportunity to do their bidding. The Indian funding is usually routed through different places, such as, Dubai, Doha, Jeddah, Kabul, Kuala Lumpur, London and New York. This is done either in the garb of official monetary transactions by cut-out multinational companies (mostly import-export firms) with a presence in Pakistan or via *Hawala/Hundi* transfers to their local assets. These companies or individuals (RAW assets), then in turn, transfer the money to the militants, vis-a-vis their local contacts.

The sudden outbreak of sophisticated planned terror attacks on civil and military institutions, point towards a sustained financial support system. Pakistan's security establishment mentioned time and again the strong link between the Indian security and intelligence establishment and anti-state militant groups, particularly the TTP. Indian media came up with reports citing their intelligence community hinting towards "covert actions" against Pakistan.⁵⁶ The appointment of former intelligence officer, Ajit Doval as national security advisor, having significant experience inside Pakistan, is indicative of the intentions and planning in this regard. Vikram Sood, a former chief of RAW, has been writing on strategies to "punish" Pakistan. He writes, "The response to terror is not always reciprocal terror nor is launching a conventional response. The best response is to make the sponsor pay a price he cannot afford. So far, in our national reactions, we are like a bamboo forest that bends with the wind, but when enraged we burn fiercely. The embers, however, cool fast enough. Instead, we need cold rage and not looking over our shoulders all the time. In our actions all these years, we kept wanting to look good and seek international approbation instead of pursuing our national interest, more single mindedly. Finally, the response has to be long term strangulation of the disease, not dramatic gestures."⁵⁷

Indians have demonstrated that they have the strong motives and the means to hurt Pakistan. They have established a powerful presence in Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan and deployed significant resources to carry out a very violent covert war inside Pakistan. Christian Fair of Georgetown University, known for her anti-Pakistan rant, was quoted in the news, "I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan's apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India." She had then said, and noted, "Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity. Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the (*Pak-Afghan*) border." Fair also went on to claim, "Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Balochistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organization to

build sensitive parts of the Rind Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security."⁵⁸

Laura Rozen in her article in Foreign Policy Magazine wrote, "The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan." The former (US) intelligence official, who served in both countries said, "The same anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there."⁵⁹

Counter Response against TTP's Financial Sources

After 9/11, military campaign conducted by the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan scattered the nexus of Taliban and al-Qaeda, which ultimately directed Taliban insurgents in border regions of Pakistan especially FATA and KP. In March 2013, both the Senate (Upper House) and the National Assembly (lower house) of the Parliament of Pakistan passed the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill – 2013, which deals with particular offenses related to terrorist financing. The bill, which the National Assembly adopted and a majority in the Senate unanimously allows the government to act against elements involved in taking the financing of terrorism in the country, and provides in, among other things, the seizure of assets of those involved in such activities. This final bill is an update of the former Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill – 2010, which was introduced in the Senate, with modifications to the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) introduced in 1997.

The APS attack on 16th December 2014, led the Government of Pakistan to adopt a strict policy to terminate fundraising campaigns and strategies of terrorist organizations. The state initiated an organized military operation against terrorist groups in Pakistan.⁶⁰ In order to dismantle nexus of terrorists, the Pakistan Army launched a military operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' in June 2014 in North Waziristan. Similarly, in December 2014, the Government of Pakistan responded to the APS attack and devised a counterterrorism policy consisting on 20-point, which is known as the National Action Plan (NAP).⁶¹ In order to break down terrorist financial networks, the NAP authorizes Pakistani foreign, finance, interior and other ministerial departments to inform friendly Muslim countries for containment policies against the investors of sectarian and terrorist networks operating against Pakistan.⁶² The NAP also authorizes the law enforcement agencies to cut all local and international financial sources of terrorist organizations. It also prohibits internet, social, print and electronic media to show terrorists messages, pictures or videos within and beyond the country.⁶³ In order to punish terrorist financiers, supporters, sympathizers and activists, establishment of military courts are significant point of the NAP.

After the induction of the NAP, the Prime Minister of Pakistan lifted the moratorium on death penalty and empowered the special military courts.⁶⁴ Similarly, civil and intelligence agencies arrested 150 people involved in terrorist assistance campaign. In addition, on 25th March 2015, the Pakistan Finance Ministry ceased accounts with estimated amount of Rs.10.2 billion cash for terror financing.⁶⁵ Under the UNSC Resolution 1267, Pakistan banned many groups and individuals and also blacklisted to curb the terrorism in the country. Efforts to regulate madrassa system, curb hate speeches, *jihadi* literature and block terrorist financing have been in practice.⁶⁶

Conclusion

Financial sources and fundraising campaigns are life blood of terrorist organizations in every part of the world and dismantling these activities is an essential dimension of counterterrorism strategy. In countries like Pakistan, where societies always appear to be more fertile for religious, extremist, sectarian and terrorist organizations, containment of such organizations becomes more challenging, whether a number of counter-strategies and policies would be in practice. Therefore, the TTP initiated terrorist activities by utilizing social, economic and political weaknesses of Pakistan, especially in FATA and KP regions, where the central and provincial governments had less control. By examining the financial sources of the TTP, it has been concluded that both local and international factors significantly financed terrorism in the country. On the basis of strong organizational and financial structure, the TTP became a lethal terrorist organization, which urged the people to participate defensive *jihad* against Pakistan and the US/NATO forces, and bluntly negated the democratic structure, and demanded for the enforcement of *sharia* in the country.

A combination of efforts through the National Internal Security Policy (NISIP), the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and the National Action Plan (NAP) for the containment of terrorists' networks and financial sources is required. Similarly, media as a fourth significant pillar of a state should condemn and highlight the factors involving in terrorism and terror-financing. In order to culminate terrorism, there is a need of cooperative framework among all institutions in the country. The government should also address the social, economic and political grievances of the population in FATA and KP. Therefore, Pakistan should transform counterterrorism policy from reactive to proactive, which could produce more satisfactory results for the peaceful future of Pakistan.

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Indian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for Pakistan's Security

Sobia Hanif*

Abstract: *The Indian strategic mindset has traditionally remained preoccupied with continental defence owing to the exigencies on its land; hence, the Indian Navy received little attention beyond providing coastal defence. As its economy has improved and the international milieu has turned favourable towards India in face of a rising China; its maritime ambitions have also expanded. These will have far reaching implications for regional peace and security. In the short span of about a decade, the outlook of the Indian Navy has changed considerably, while holding steadfast to the basic tenets that determine its strategic priorities in the maritime domain. The Indian maritime strategy has come a long way since the first maritime doctrine was issued in 2004. Subsequently, the Indian maritime doctrines 2009 and 2015 highlight a significant role for the Navy in the Indian Ocean and also point towards India's increased interest in the Western Pacific. This paper aims at analysing the salient features of these maritime doctrines and the corresponding roles that the Indian Navy has envisioned for itself. It also seeks to highlight the extent of India's maritime interests, the likely course that it is expected to take in the future and the ensuing implications at regional and global level besides Pakistan.*

Keywords: Naval Doctrine, Maritime Strategy, Indian Ocean, Pacific, Geostrategic.

Indian Navy's Maritime Orientation

Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India's geostrategic location thrusts it into a wedge-like extension into the Indian Ocean. While, the Indian Ocean is clearly not India's Ocean; a close look at the evolution of the Indian maritime doctrine suggests that in all its intentions, India looks towards maximizing its role in the Indian Ocean and beyond into the Western Pacific. India has a coastline that stretches for 7516.6 km and over 3 million square km Exclusive Economic Zone.¹ It shares its maritime boundary with seven states including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Sri Lanka. Owing to its geostrategic location and its ambitions to play a more influential role in world affairs, India has embarked upon a strategy to increase its influence in the maritime domain. This is likely to raise anxiety among regional states that do not view India's intentions of regional hegemony favourably. Moreover, India's trade with the rest of the world is heavily

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dependent upon the seas. More than 90 percent of its trade by volume and 70 percent by value is transported over the seas.² In 2014, India was the fourth highest oil consumer in the world after the US, China and Japan, however, as of June 2016, it became the third largest consumer of oil bypassing Japan according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy,³ therefore, ensuring energy security has become a core national interest.⁴ These figures not only indicate the importance of the maritime realm for India, but also suggest that India's reliance on the sea routes is likely to increase in the future.

Likewise, the Indian Ocean has acquired a strategic significance for virtually every state that relies on seaborne trade owing to its geostrategic location. Oil shipments are transported from Southwest Asia to the thriving economies of South and East Asia. In addition, an approximate one-third of the world's population lives in or near the Indian Ocean Littoral, including most Muslims and virtually all Hindus.⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, acknowledging the importance of the Indian Ocean, asserts that "It is my contention that the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian Plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one."⁶

Undeniably, the importance of the Indian Ocean has increased manifold owing to the changes in the global repositioning of economic and military power. As the "shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific" takes place, India aligns its maritime strategy with that of the great American naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. He asserted that "whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia; the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters."⁷ This is particularly true in the context of the struggle for gaining maritime influence in the region. The latest Indian Maritime Doctrine 2015, entitled "Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy" aims to highlight India's contemporary maritime security considerations and reflect the incontrovertible link between secure seas and India's resurgence in the 21st century.⁸ Utilizing the advantage of its geostrategic location, India aspires to become the leading Indian Ocean power based upon the principles of Alfred Mahan's concept of sea power. In spite of India's aspirations to become the leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean, its aggressive posturing towards neighbouring states is likely to draw the region into a complex security dilemma, thereby, threatening regional peace and security.

The Indian Ocean's primary importance derives from the interest generated by the emerging and existing great powers. The Indian Ocean is increasingly being recognized as the realm of great power rivalry. The United States (US) maintains its status as predominant power in the Indian Ocean, however, due to the emergence of

a modernized blue water Chinese Navy, the need to ensure the balance of power in the region has prompted a loose coalition of the willing led by the US that seeks to offset the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and surrounding waters. In recent years, India has also shown interest in the maritime affairs of the Western Pacific. In particular, it has been vocal about raising the issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China's growing vigor in the South China Sea is looked upon worryingly by the littoral states as well as the US. Despite accusations of land reclamation, China has made deliberate efforts to resolve the matter peacefully with other claimant states and asked extra regional states to refrain from interfering in the dispute. On the contrary, since October 2015, the US has engaged in freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to challenge China's assertions in the region. India is gradually but surely establishing a strategic foothold in the South China Sea and its littoral, however, the engagement so far has been deliberately kept low profile in order to avoid getting directly entangled in the US-China altercation on the South China Sea issue.

Indian Foreign Policy and its Impact on the Indian Naval Doctrine

The evolution of India's naval doctrine cannot be understood comprehensively without drawing reference to the development of its defence and foreign policy. During post-independence era, Nehru foresaw Indian role premised upon the principles of non-alignment, and for that India escaped from entrapment of the Cold War. Nehru's vision for India was embedded in his staunch nationalism, anti-colonialism and pan-Asianism. Some would argue that his thoughts were idealistic in nature, yet the converse also appears to be true. Two hundred years of colonialism have never escaped the Indian psyche and, therefore, no single state has ever captured the complete confidence of the Indian polity. The 1954-Panchsheel Agreement with China did not last long and soon after both states were locked in a war that would leave lasting impressions on the Indian mindset for many decades to come. The war shifted India's foreign policy to power politics and set into pace the development of a military strategy that aimed at overseeing the development and modernization of Indian armed forces.

Prior to 1962, due to financial constraints of the new state and also the presence of the British Navy in the Indian Ocean, India under Nehru assumed that Indian security would be ensured and it would not have an urgency to develop its own naval force. At such time, India focused more heavily on developing its industrial capabilities which in due course would provide the impetus to strengthen its navy. While Nehru's estimates resulted in a debilitating defeat for India, Indian maritime strategy was further affected by the British withdrawal East of the Suez in the 1960s. Since India did not have the economic resources or the military capacity

to act more influentially in the Indian Ocean, it proposed that it should be declared a 'zone of peace'; this was in effect a calculated move by the Indian leadership to prevent other states from developing ambitions within the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the scope of India's own maritime operations underwent an expansion, when in 1974 the *INS Godavari* was deployed to evacuate Indian nationals from Yemen.⁹

The Indian Ocean littoral continued to dominate the Indian mindset with the result that it deployed its peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka and sent troops to reverse the coup in the Maldives in 1988. Over time, India has shown the propensity to expand its sphere of security and demonstrated that the government is more willing to use military force in order to achieve political objectives. India's maritime security interests that had remained limited to coastal security and sea lines of communication until the early 1970s were now expanding into the vast Indian Ocean and its littoral. It was only until December 1991, when the international structure underwent a structural change with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and India was left with no choice but to open up to new partners with its Look East policy that India liberalized its economy and for the very first time in over 25 years resumed naval exercises with Western and South-East Asian Navies. As the character of a state's foreign policy is indicative of its power capabilities at any point in time, the modernization of its naval forces presented a new dimension to India's external relations.

India's Maritime Doctrines (2004 to 2009)

After considerable debate and discussion, the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004 was issued by the Indian Navy. The doctrine aimed at transforming India's brown-water coastal defence force into a blue-water Navy with extended outreach. Technically, a blue water Navy has the capacity to operate 200 nautical miles from its sea shore into the deep sea for extended durations.¹⁰ While, the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 is considered a milestone in laying out the future role and task of the Indian Navy, the process had remained underway since the late 1980s. It went further and in 1998, India released "The Maritime Dimension- A Naval Vision".¹¹ The Indian Maritime Doctrine-2004 lays emphasis on the control of important chokepoints and routes in the Indian Ocean. It delineates the extent of Indian interest by stating that "the Indian maritime vision for the first quarter of the 21st century must look at the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest".¹² Moreover, this doctrine identifies four types of roles for the Indian Navy to include military, economic, constabulary and benign. These roles are meant to secure India's interests in the face of rising traditional and non-traditional threats. The doctrine seeks to ensure that India's core security and economic interests are safeguarded

especially through the strategically located chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and the Malacca Straits.

Four years later, the Indian Maritime Strategy-2007 was also issued. It draws a striking balance between India's response to potential threats and its peacetime orientation. Whereas, in previous maritime plans, the inability to deal with strategic exigencies triggered by extra-regional naval forces in the Indian Ocean remained less evident, it was aptly accounted for in the 2007 maritime strategy. Declared by Indian Naval Chief, in its foreword, India seeks to assure the stability of its surrounding environment which would allow the country to attain its 'manifest destiny'. He also reiterated the need to 'provide insulation from external interference' within the Indian Ocean so as to cultivate the right conditions for economic growth and the defence of the country's national security."¹³

It is worth noting that the emphasis on "India's need to maintain isolation from external interference" is a striking pronouncement and gives insight into the Indian maritime strategy taking inspiration from the Monroe Doctrine of the United States of the early 1820s. Nevertheless, the doctrine does not out rightly point towards the states that India would preferably see restricted in the Indian Ocean. In addition, India's cautious approach took into account the overall gambit of its relations with China since the early 2000s, which had witnessed a major improvement in the aggregate with the result that while China was recognized as a competitor, India sought carefully not to overstate Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean.¹⁴

According to the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2009, the Indian government assigned the Indian Navy the role and task to provide for coastal security and bringing both the State Coastal Police and Coast Guard under its wing and emphasized the coordination aspect of the maritime security strategy.¹⁵ In addition, the 2009 doctrine was also significant in that it went ahead by defining the primary and secondary areas of interest for the Indian Navy. The former included the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal as well as the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Channel. Its secondary areas of interest included the South China Sea and other areas of the Western Pacific based on considerations of diaspora and overseas investments although these areas were not classified further.¹⁶

According to the Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan-2025, the status of India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands is being upgraded to that of a strategic center that would be the nucleus of India's activities within the Indian Ocean and simultaneously provide an edge in the expansion of its influence east of the Malacca Strait.¹⁷ The islands command was set up in October 2001. The tri-service command serves as the fulcrum of India's naval interactions with the Southeast Asian navies.

India coordinates with the navies of Thailand and Indonesia for coordinated patrols as well as carrying out coordinated exercises with Singapore under the SIMBEX. It is also engaged in MILAN, which are multilateral naval exercises.¹⁸ The Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan–2025¹⁹ aims at developing India's island territories and there is strong possibility that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands could soon be turned into a strategic fulcrum of India's maritime ambitions.

Indian Maritime Strategy-2015

For many years, the Indian strategic and political community strongly believed that there was a need to focus on developing an expansive naval strategy, however, lack of consensus on the nature and direction of the Indian strategy prevented concrete progress in this regard. The debate centred on whether India should pursue a sea-denial strategy or one that stressed the development of a blue-water Navy. Since India did not want to sound alarmist for any of the neighbouring states as well as the major powers, it opted for the latter, whereas, "sea control still remained a central priority in Indian maritime strategy."²⁰ This approach was founded on the basis that a less aggressive approach would invite little resistance and remonstrations from other Indian Ocean littoral states, whereas, in time India would gradually come to dominate the IOR through its naval expansion.

The latest maritime doctrine issued by the Indian Navy is entitled "Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy."²¹ The previous edition issued in 2007 was entitled "Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy,"²² The name in itself indicates a change in the priority for the Indian Navy. While, the earlier document stressed the need to have freedom of navigation in the high seas, the subsequent document places a greater emphasis on the role that the Indian Navy can perform in ensuring that such standards are met. The document adds a more active role for the Indian Navy, which is commensurate to its growing naval capabilities. As per the available sources, the latest Maritime Doctrine-2015 marks a vivid departure from previous editions in a number of significant ways, which are discussed ahead.

The Indo-Pacific Discourse

Firstly, the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2015 draws reference to the concept of the Indo-Pacific; a term, which has begun to gain traction in political rhetoric within states, such as, the United States, Australia, Indonesia and Japan. It has also become evident in the discourse of Indian military and political leadership. The 'use of the Indo-Pacific' concept was first made in an article by Gurpreet S Khurana; an Indian naval officer, who has written extensively for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (IDSA).²³ Khurana specializes in Indian's maritime strategy and has an

influential voice on issues relating to India's role in the Indo-Pacific region. While, defining the Indo-Pacific region, he refers to it as the 'maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific'. Officially, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe used the term of Indo-Pacific during his first term in office. He spoke about the 'dynamic coupling' of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Australian government went so far as declaring that the Indo-Pacific strategic arc is the country's official region in its Defence White Paper 2013.²⁴ Indian Chief of Naval Staff R. K. Dhowan, while, underpinning the need to revise the 2007 maritime strategy, stated that, "The shift in worldview from a *Euro-Atlantic* to an *Indo-Pacific* focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India's maritime environment in tangible ways."²⁵ Whereas, the idea of the Indo-Pacific is gaining greater acceptability especially in Indian strategic circles, there is an underlying assumption that while the Indo-Pacific serves to legitimize India's role in the concept of coupling the Indian and Pacific Oceans together, it is operationally difficult to accomplish due to the vastness of the maritime area under question.

Primary and Secondary Areas of Interest

The Indian Maritime Doctrine-2015 indicates that its primary and secondary areas of interest are expanding. According to the Maritime Doctrine of 2009, the Red Sea is identified for the Indian Navy as a primary area of interest. Moreover, "the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden and their littoral regions, the Southwest Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein and East Coast of Africa littoral regions"²⁶ have been recognized to fall into India's primary interest areas. While, some regions were previously identified as of secondary importance such as Africa and its surroundings, certain other areas were altogether omitted in the Maritime Doctrine, which included the Gulf of Oman, Aden and the South-West Indian Ocean.²⁷ The secondary area too has expanded to include the "Southeast Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral regions in the vicinity, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Coast of Africa, and their littoral regions."²⁸

Also, included within secondary areas of interest is the South China Sea, which in previous Maritime Doctrines remained at the same position, but interestingly, the scope of the secondary areas of interest was expanded to include the "East China Sea, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions."²⁹ The expansion of interest in these areas indicates the intent and willingness of the Indian Navy to operate effectively in these areas based on priority of interests and its capability to operate in such waters. The new maritime strategy provides insight into India's new role in the Indian Ocean with a set of expanded responsibilities. The document not only

comprehensively revises the previous maritime doctrine, but adds new dimensions into the roles that the Indian navy is expected to play in the coming ten years. In addition, the Indian Maritime Strategy-2015 goes beyond the core areas and choke points of interest to India as previously highlighted to include two additional choke-points: the Mozambique Channel and Ombai-Wetar Straits, which are strategically located at the far end of the South-Western and South-Eastern Indian Ocean respectively.

India as Net Security Provider

The most important aspect of the new maritime doctrine has been the identification of India's role as a net security provider in the region, but leaves open the geographic extent of the region, where it aspires to perform such a role. The term 'Net Security Provider' in the Indian context was first introduced by the United States. While, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2009, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, argued that "we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond."³⁰ Within the 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review, the phrase was once again reiterated and predicted that "as its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond."³¹

Within India, the concept of a 'Net Security Provider' was originally presented during the tenure of Manmohan Singh and later incorporated into the Indian Maritime Doctrine-2015 indicating that it has found support in both the Congress and BJP governments. The role of India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean highlights two major points. Firstly, India has exhibited the intent to take upon itself the responsibilities that accompany the role of a net security provider; and secondly, this role has been clarified by the Maritime Strategy-2015, which was previously ambiguous. The document defines the concept as "...the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these."³²

Towards realizing the goal of becoming a net security provider, India under the Modi Government is reaching out to the Indian Ocean islands. During his visit to Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Seychelles, the Indian Prime Minister outlined a framework for cooperation, which was based on four parts that included defence of Indian maritime interests, enhancing and promoting economic cooperation, establishing a system of collective defence and joint efforts towards sustainable development.³³ India has signed agreements with Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Mauritius to install radar systems for the purpose of coastal defence. The proposed project includes the installation of eight surveillance radars in Mauritius, six in Sri

Lanka and 10in the Maldives. All these radar systems are then planned to be connected to the Information Management and Analysis Centre, which has been recently established. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are responsible for jointly running the centre.³⁴ In addition, since July 2013, India is deepening its maritime security ties with Sri Lanka and Maldives by taking initiatives to share intelligence on issues such as counterterrorism and other illegal activities in the maritime realm. This trilateral maritime security agreement could be expanded by the inclusion of Mauritius and Seychelles.³⁵ The Indian government looks towards increasing security cooperation with the smaller islands in the Indian Ocean as an effort to legitimize and gain greater acceptance for its role as a net security provider in the larger Indian Ocean region.

The latest developments in the Indian Maritime Strategy are a cause of anxiety for regional states including Pakistan. There is a possibility that the civilian facilities may in time be upgraded and used as military posts aimed at carrying out surveillance and disruptive activities against Pakistan's interests in the Indian Ocean. This apparently benign and collective approach towards security by engaging the smaller island states within the Indian Ocean could, in future, lead to a more assertive Indian role within the Indian Ocean aimed at ensuring the security of India and its partners, while excluding and threatening the security of rival states such as Pakistan and China.

China's Strategy for the Indian Ocean

India is closely monitoring the changes in the Chinese strategy for the Indian Ocean. China has genuine interests in the Indian Ocean that include the shipment of vast quantities of crude oil from the oil rich Persian Gulf region across the Indian and Pacific Oceans before reaching China's coastal areas. Piracy remains one of the biggest threats within the Indian Ocean and the PLAN has gradually improved upon the quality of its ships used for antipiracy activities and increased the frequency of its submarine visits. The 21st Escort Task Force was deployed in the Gulf of Aden in August 2015 which included two Type 054A guided-missile frigates, equipped with advanced weapons like the YJ-83 anti-ships missiles.³⁶

In a recent development, China has started the construction of facilities in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa in order to satisfy its logistical needs in the Indian Ocean. It is the first of its kind since China does not have any naval bases elsewhere. It is noteworthy that Djibouti has the largest American military base in Africa and other states including Japan and France also launch operation from the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport.³⁷ China has been particularly active in deploying ships in the Gulf of Eden since 2008 to conduct anti-piracy drills. The sheer size of these operations that include 21st Task Force totalling 60 naval vessels, places the

PLAN in a position to not only extend its operations into the distant parts of the Indian Ocean, but also acquaint itself with active naval operations, such as, those that include contingencies affecting freedom of navigation in and around the Persian Gulf. While, China's presence in Djibouti has raised some concerns about the possibility of establishing military bases in the region, China has categorically denied that it has any such intentions.³⁸ At the other end of the spectrum, there are also those within the Indian strategic community, who argue for a cooperative maritime approach with China based upon the experience of joint Sino-Indian efforts at counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. In 2014, INS Shivalik paid a visit to Qingdao for a multilateral naval exercise and India also extended an invitation to the PLAN for participation in the International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam in February 2016. Since the increased activity of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean waters and greater engagement with Indian Ocean littoral states, India is in the process of recalibrating its maritime strategy.

India's approach towards the Indian Ocean has been to cooperate and coordinate with smaller Indian Ocean states as well as to conduct anti-piracy and disaster relief operations with the major states including the United States, Japan, Indonesia and Australia.³⁹ This allows for greater coordination and interoperability between the Navies of the afore-stated countries and could also become the basis of a joint response to any state-led effort to control or block the sea lanes of communication. In order to promote the aspect of interoperability in the Indian Ocean with the United States and Japan, India is in the process of upgrading its naval hardware. India bought P-8I maritime patrol aircraft from the United States and is negotiating to buy Japanese-made US-2 maritime reconnaissance aircraft.⁴⁰ In February 2016, India hosted the International Fleet Review in Vishakhapatnam, India. It was attended by more than 100 warships from 50 countries, including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea and Australia. It is the second time that India has ever organized the International Fleet Review; the first being in 2000 and was attended by 29 states.⁴¹ While, the theme of the International Fleet Review was "United through the Oceans", it was conspicuous that the event marked a show of Indian naval prowess; a sign that India is likely to play a far greater role in the affairs of the Indian Ocean and surrounding waters.

Implications for Pakistan

The implications of Indian naval strategy are evident at both the regional and global levels. As followers of Alfred Mahan's philosophy of the control of the seas; India aims to establish itself as the predominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean. India's own version of the Monroe Doctrine, which strongly detests extra regional involvements in South Asia and beyond, into the Indian Ocean appears to have been

relaxed for the United States for the time being due to the strategic leveraging that is a product of this cooperation, but looks upon China as a credible and potential threat. Nevertheless, in the long term, India expects that the US power will also wither away just as Britain's did⁴²; thereby, making way for India to establish its overarching influence in the Indian Ocean region.

India through an apparent 'benign maritime presence' aims to gain control over key choke points and SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, especially in areas surrounding the Strait of Malacca. Such control could potentially become a key factor in strengthening India's ability to bargain with China, with which it has an outstanding territorial border dispute.⁴³ India also considers its areas of strategic interest across the entire Indian Ocean and further into the South China Sea, which is already a source of contention between the other six claimants including China. India's efforts to control the strategically located choke points and sea lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean and its interest in the affairs of the Western Pacific are likely to generate greater anxiety on the part of China and could increase the spectre of conflict between the two Asian states.

Pakistan's traditional rivalry with India that often resulted in confrontation on land has also played out into the maritime domain. The lack of agreement on the demarcation of the Sir Creek estuary, a portion of sea boundary located at the mouth of Rann of Kutch, and Pakistan's bitter experience of 1971, once it was cut into half by India after effective naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal⁴⁴, has only served to escalate the two sides' apprehensions regarding each other. Since, Pakistan also witnessed a second attempt to block Karachi Port during the Kargil crisis, the country cannot cast aside the implications of India's increasing maritime footprint in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan's strategic partnership with China has acquired a new salience in the context of recalibrated Indo-US relations, which are viewed as undermining Pakistan's core security interests. The US is not only assisting India in the build-up of its naval fleet, it is also enhancing interoperability with India, which requires high levels of maritime coordination between the two countries. As the US maintains a robust fortified presence in the Indian Ocean, it would consequently lead to the expansion of Indian maritime prowess especially in the aftermath of the signing of the Logistical Exchange Memorandum of Understanding between the two sides. Under the terms of the agreement, India would subsequently acquire aircraft carrier technology, surveillance drones, patrol aircrafts, helicopters and anti-submarine equipment. It would also provide the two countries access to refuelling and refurbishing supplies at each other's bases. India by assuming the role of a net

security provider seeks in effect to become a 'regional policeman' at the behest of the US, thereby, upsetting the regional strategic balance at the cost of Pakistan.

Whereas, the Indo-US strategic cooperation is primarily aimed at countering China's growing influence within the Indian Ocean, it will also undermine and threaten Pakistan's security. An area in which Indo-US maritime cooperation is set to grow in future, is in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Both the US and India are apprehensive about China's increased submarine activities in the Indian Ocean. In context of the Malabar exercises, the two states operate the P-8 Surveillance aircrafts. In a first, the Indian Navy in November 2015 inducted its P-81 aircrafts, which are equipped with US designed anti-sub technology, and US weapons systems including the Harpoon Block-II missiles, MK-54 lightweight torpedoes, rockets, and *Mark 82* depth charges.⁴⁵ In addition to this, the induction of India's indigenously built the INS Arihant into the Indian Navy is also bound to raise the spectre of conflict within the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has the option to respond by deploying its Hatf-VII/Baber nuclear capable cruise missile that is launchable from aircrafts and conventional submarines to counter India's moves.⁴⁶

India has expressed its reservation towards China's proposed OBOR of which the maritime Silk Road is an integral component. Considering it as a systemic expansion of Chinese maritime power into the Indian Ocean, its opposition to the Chinese involvement in Gwadar port is reflective of its own deep-seated insecurities. Viewing the port as an emblem of Pak-China strategic cooperation, India views the proximity of the port to the strait of Hormuz as a potential threat to India's energy and trade security leading some Indian strategists to even describing it as 'India's Hormuz Dilemma'. This security deficit coupled by loftier designs to convert the Indian Ocean into 'India's Lake' has prompted the country to embark on military modernization aimed at strengthening India's presence at sea.

Given that approximately 95 percent of Pakistan's trade and a major share of its energy imports are dependent on transshipment across the Indian Ocean; this presents a disquieting situation for the country. However, today, Pakistan's Karachi, Bin Qasim, Pasni, Ormara and Gwadar Ports could thwart Indian concentrated efforts to impose a naval blockade. Furthermore, China's investments in CPEC and consequently in Gwadar have also made it a stake holder in Pakistan's security. However, given the fact that Pakistan has not permitted the establishment of the PLAN bases at Gwadar, it could pose an operational challenge to defending the ports in case of a military exigency.

Conclusion

As Indian interests continue to increase over time within the maritime domain, the Indian Ocean remains the center of the Indian naval strategic planning. Nevertheless, its areas of primary and secondary interest are expanding with each passing day. India is now cooperating with the US Navy and other regional Navies to establish what it terms a 'benign' presence in the Indian Ocean aimed at countering threats emanating from piracy, terrorism and natural catastrophes; but such a presence can be used to support military missions against rival naval forces, such as, for the purpose of interdiction of the strategically important choke points and sea lanes of communication, if the need arises.

India has increased the frequency and scope of its maritime exercises alongside making investments in the upgradation of its naval fleet. It aspires to build a strong naval fleet of around 200 ships within the next decade. Discourse of India's role in the Indo-Pacific has also generated interest within the wider strategic community with the recognition that such a construct aims to legitimize India as a key player within both the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The South China Sea continues to remain a secondary area of interest, but India has upped the ante by raising the issue of freedom of navigation on several occasions. Despite such proclamations, it is likely to steer clear of any direct confrontation with China and concentrate on strengthening its presence in its primary areas of interest. India is undoubtedly looking towards the aggrandizement of its naval footprint in the Indian Ocean and surrounding waters. Apart from others, this Indian naval build-up and dominance in Indian Ocean will have serious implications for Pakistan and China, especially in the context of China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

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Role of Traditional vs. Digital Media in Determining Psychological Nationalism and Patriotism among Pakistani Youth

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Abstract: The current study explores the role of different types of media and their psychosocial impact in determining nationalism and patriotism. This has been only a decade's back narration to include patriotism and nationalism in Psychological jargon. With the inclusion of digital innovations, the psychosocial role of traditional vs. social media in the promotion of nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani youth has become inevitable to be studied. Nationalism and patriotism among university students has become a topic of concern as there is massive trend of brain drain, wherein, the university students strive to move abroad in pursuits of better opportunities, thereby, leaving their homeland as they receive some higher education degree. Thus, brain-drain from Pakistan has been looming as an imminent threat and there is a dire need to examine the underlying dimensions that reduce nationalism and patriotism among youth. This study is, therefore, designed with the main goal of studying the impact of traditional vs. digital media in promoting nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani youth. This is hypothesized that psychosocial impact of media types is likely to be related with promotion of nationalism and patriotism. Employing cross-sectional research design, a detailed questionnaire with significant psychometric strength (entailing significant validation and reliability coefficient) is devised. The sample, comprised of 300 respondents, selected through purposive sampling strategy. The findings, both descriptive and inferential, reveal that digital media are more significant in raising awareness regarding global identity and are a bigger challenge in developing nationalism and patriotism in youth.

Keywords: Nationalism, Patriotism, Pakistani Youth, Digital Media, Traditional Media.

Introduction

Traditional media mainly consists of TV and newspapers that have relied on a one-to-many paradigm. These traditional mediums have been the avenues that involved minimal interaction among media stakeholders. The media houses are prolific grounds for devising and spreading national agendas. They create a message that is transmitted to the masses at large through the systematic process of broadcast,

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print, radio, or signage, and therefore, their responsibility in promoting nationalists' messages increases multi-fold. The reciprocal communication or dynamic communication in terms of consumers' feedback has been minimal in traditional media, though, their significance in terms of impact on consumers is widely established. Therefore, traditional media have largely been regarded as somehow stagnant, steady and one-way mode of communication system that does not lead to build any sense of engagement in consumers.

Traditional media have been concisely termed as prompting the promotion of word of mouth. In contrast, social networking based media target the goal of active involvement of media consumers, thereby, catering a dynamic platform of communication and interaction. There is reciprocity of reactions not only among media consumers, but among key media stakeholders. Digital media have, in fact, introduced a wider new realm of influences as their distinctive role of reciprocity inherently delves onto a two-way communication system that empowers the consumer. There is no blind array of messages that one may receive; rather there are well-defined and differentiated messages confronted by media consumers. On such digital platforms, friends prompt recommendations in the form of re-sharing and endorsing posts, which decommercializes brand communication. Decommmercialization is, in fact, an important facet in communication and this involves a set of broad messages that no longer carry patina of the brand; rather they reflect the endorsement of public, acquaintances, or mostly from the friends.¹

Psychological Nationalism

The concept of nationalism can probably be traced back to century's old origin, but the recent focus in this construct somehow descends it to the level of psychological nationalism. Thus, psychological nationalism, being recent phenomenon, has scanty literature. There are, still, some theoretical illustrations that help in differentiating it from patriotism. Psychological vocabulary and jargon has used nationalism as formal construct, requiring formal inquiry, and investigation. Active contribution in this domain has been manifested by Social and Political Psychology domains. Latin Americans are usually regarded as the chief originator of this term. They illustrated this as combination of passion and notions; entailing the concepts of nation-state, ideology, and national identity. Nationalism overlaps main elements of patriotism. Psychological Nationalism has been illustrated as the adherence of national ideology, notions, identity in such a manner that an individual's thoughts and actions are amalgamated in its behaviour.

In the current research venture, nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani youth are examined in an effort to understand the evidential declaration by youth as becoming less patriotic and nationalists. There have been multifarious theoretical

illustrations mainly in the Social Psychology domain based on the theories of social representation, i.e., Social Cognition Theory and Attitudinal theories that extend theoretical clarity of nationalism among youth. Today is an era of divisive political ideologies. There is a concept of global culture due to high speed internet-based communications. In this prevalent perspective, contemporary nationalism markedly differs from the nineteenth and early twentieth-century concept of nationalism. Though, nationalism is rooted deeply in different political cultures yet the very idea of nationalism has been belied, and biased out, somehow, by the journalists and media organizations. They tend to select and portray the news stories about national-collective-identities and the national-“others as out groups”. Therefore, this deeply held ethnocentric approach has been deviated in the current investigation and a systematic shift towards a polycentric approach has been adopted for the sake of current investigation.

Habermas’s concept of Constitutional Patriotism is a recent step or phase in evolution of psychological patriotism. Habermas has been significant figure in developing, contextualizing and spreading the notion of statutory and legitimate patriotism. By legitimate or sometimes referred by him as constitutional patriotism, he referred patriotism as the potential of getting interpreted in a variety of ways, thus, providing a range of positions within a larger group. On one end, there are stances that the individual is a novel being carrying identification to a supranational entity; while, on the other hand, there is a focus on understanding that the attachment in terms of freedom over ethnicity could be relied.²

The dissection of the spirit of nationalism in chronicles of evolution, leads us to construe it as an evolutionary outgrowth of our natural historically maintained tribal passions. These rationalities were inherited from our ancestors as pivotal element of human repertoires from millions of years, and somehow or the other, they have stayed largely imprinted in the human psyche. Humans have largely maintained figurative thought in which they faced central challenges of ensuring the social association and cooperation within the group. This social association facet safeguarded the communal well-being and ensured the survival of the group. This also helped in promoting cooperation and sacrifice in them. Among humans, this association and cooperation have been partially accomplished by mixing progressed and primate behaviours. Moreover, the role of cultural adaptations in the realm of religions, ideologies, and cultures cannot be negated at all.³

Nationalism and patriotism are such intriguingly overlapping concepts that they are most often used interchangeably; but their deeper delayering implies that they carry different connotations. Nationalism involves much deeper, profound and systematic patterns of loyalty towards a broad social group. With this broad social

group, one tends to share not only physical features, but also the culture, ideology and cherished common symbols.⁴ The concept further encompasses within it the deeper desire for a common, national state in which one could make survival and growth in befitting manner. Patriotism, on the other hand, is not only the involvement or attachment to a country rather this is an entity that includes both social group and existing norms and institutions, which are the underpinning for the existing state.⁵

Identity Theories and Nationalism

Nationalism can be viewed as construal illustration of identity theories from socio-political paradigm. In this tradition, nationalism is interpreted as inherent identity, shared culture, celebrated traditions, and state possessing, the most powerful container of politics. Nationalism is an identity related construct that can aptly be regarded as more contorted and complex; a multidimensional concept that may include sharing of mutual identification. It's another dimension is civic nationalism or more precisely termed as liberal nationalism, which is operationalized as an attachment of people towards their nation by dint of their ancestral association and cognitive arbitration. The ideology of nationalism has been propagated as a deeper feeling of belongingness that exists and gets nurtured among the individuals of a nation. It has its roots deeply entwined within the roots of religion, language, and ethnic origins.

In Pakistan, the ideology of nationalism was initiated as freedom movement led to its liberation; an idea that was triggered from Islam as being the unified and single religion.⁶ With this initiating spirit, nationalism was brought forward as platform under which the nation stood unified to achieve its goals. In fact, this had been viewed as spirit by dint of which the nation upheld itself as together under a single ideology irrespective of cast and creed.⁷ Historians have maintained that Islamic ideology carried psychological and emotional dimensions and stances of nationalism, thus, formed and unified all Pakistanis as one nation. Similarly, this has been observed that government and media in Pakistan have continuously attempted to spread the values of nationalism among Pakistani citizens.⁸

Viability of Nationalism and Digital World

The viability of nationalism is under major debate as this has been realized with inclusion of digital media that the impact of globalization is likely to change the psychological patriotism and national identity panorama among youth. The academic examination of cultural collision due to social networking media reveals that hybridity is the only solution available for the resolution of phenomenon. While, this may surge as organic and peaceful, it can also pose colossal threat to nationalism

and patriotism. This research investigation has primarily focused on empirical analysis of media types in order to evaluate their contribution in determining the spirit of nationalism and patriotism. Thus, the solutions of homogenization or heterogenization are considered, and the psychological adjustment of the phenomenon known as assimilation and hybridity of national identity is speculated.⁹

Nationalism and patriotism are overtly xenophobic and violent forms, but in actual context, they are the dissemination of unconsciously replicating stereotypes and do not necessarily equate fundamentalism. One of the largest bodies of literature has reviewed the relationship between the psychological identity and nationalism, and the involvement of mass media in determining or enhancing it.¹⁰ This has been evident that much of the empirical investigation, in this regard, has stressed the traditional role of mass communication, which mainly ranges from press to television; although, some studies have emphatically addressed the role of digital or Internet communication.¹¹

Some of the empirical investigations regarding psychosocial role of media on nationalism and patriotism have been insightful in directing the line of direction of current research. Manne has illustrated that media is assumed as one of the most elemental force with its diverse facets to contribute its role in promoting nationalism in Pakistan.¹² Traditional media, such as, Television and radio is assumed as prominent sources that influence the spirit of nationalism. Since nationalism and patriotisms have features of group evaluation and pride, they are mostly associated positively in term of their conceptual foundations and in their empirical implications.¹³

A quantitative survey research on elements of patriotism and nationalism, conducted during a period of 1-week in late September 2001 with two respondent groups, revealed that the social identity is one's sense of belonging to one's own country, i.e., national identity. The samples-one in this investigation belonged to the Ohio State University, and the other sample group hailed from a small community group from Columbus, Ohio.¹⁴

National Identity

Cook defines national identity as the individual's feeling of belonging, attachment, love, and loyalty to a national community.¹⁵ Therefore, it raises the understanding of the responsibilities and duties of being a citizen of that nation. For instance, Moskalenko et al. measured the level of college students' identification with five different groups (country, family, ethnic group, religious group, university) before and after the 9/11 attacks.¹⁶ They found that, after 9/11 attacks, students' social identity as American became strongly activated and momentarily salient compared

to other group identities. Furthermore, participants rated significantly higher on the importance of country right after 9/11 than before or 18 months later.¹⁷ This result verifies the assertion that social cues can lead to the activation of a specific social identity in one's mind. Smith et al. found a significant effect of diverse emotions on behaviours, but feelings of anger towards out-group or positive feelings shared by in-group emerged as two of the strongest predictors for group actions. Specifically, the positive emotion raised by identifying oneself as Americans, significantly increased one's desire to support their nation.¹⁸

An experimental study, conducted by Lee and Aaker, deepens understanding that builds appropriate message strategies and media planning on national event and psychological mechanism toward patriotic advertising and media contents covered in the media environment incorporating the concept of social identity activation, intergroup emotion and nationalist-regulatory fit. Furthermore, this research provides a better understanding of how different types of shared emotion raised by nationality works with regulatory focus.¹⁹

Cultivation Theory and Nationalism

The Theory of Cultivation by Gerbner and Gross provides the theoretical framework for current investigation. The Cultivation Theory suggests that contents on nationalism and patriotism can be an important factor in promoting solidarity and integrity among the media consumers and is likely to help in influencing the behaviour of the individuals, who spend significant amount of time on digital media.²⁰ The Social Identity Theory, developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979, also provides the theoretical perspective to current investigation. This theory was originally developed in order to determine the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination.

According to this theory, one tends to categorize objects in order to understand, classify and identify them. Belonging to a specific category, in fact, enables people to make their environment comprehensive and adaptive so much so that their lives start becoming predictable and smooth. In order to illustrate this phenomenon, example of social categories, such as, black, white, Australian, Christian, Muslim, student, and bus driver, can be taken, because these social roles based categories enable us to differentiate people from one another. In the second stage of nationalism gaining, the social identification dominates and people tend to carry the identity of the group to which one has categorized itself to be belonging to.²¹ For instance, if one has categorized itself as an army official, the chances are there that one would be adopting the identity of an army official and would begin to feel and act in a way that one believes an ideal army official must act (and conform to the norms of the group).²² There will always be latent, yet deeply felt and sensed

emotional significance to the one's identified within a group, and this would lead to inflate one's self-esteem. This inflated self-esteem is termed to be the result of belonging to a group.²³

Psychosocial Role of Media in Nationalism

The conceptual ideology of nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century had been quite different from present-day concept of nationalism. These days, there is rapid and deeply penetrating influence of the recent influx of technologies in communication. This has led to the disruptive nationalist ideologies in wake of transition involving globalization.²⁴ Now-a-days, it has been observed that nationalism is wedged phenomenon and this gets amplified by reciprocated irreconcilability between local and global world. Mainly, traditional and social media are attributed as key factor in determining this irreconcilability. This has been observed that through different posts and feeds, social media have the potential to promote the concept of nationalism and patriotism among its users, a strategic hack that has been neglected widely so far.²⁵ The psychosocial role of media, in this instance, for upholding the national integrity and solidarity is very critical. Pakistan is passing through a phase of transition in terms of socio-politics and there is greater influx of new and traditional media in the country than it used to be few decades back.

National integrity and solidarity have been the core national issues of Pakistan and by the advent of technologies and proliferation of social media, these issues have emerged as challenging threats. Therefore, there is a dire need for generating the public awareness on such pivotal concerns.²⁶ However, this has been observed that Pakistani electronic and digital media has long been missing its place to make significant influence to create national values. There has been an ideological setup in Pakistan that has survived for many decades with amalgam of varied trends of ethnicity, culture and religion. At the wake of all these challenges, the state has ventured much harder to sustain its integrity. Yet, it has been observed by various key stakeholders that media have not been playing its significant role and have been under the direct influence of government. Pakistani government has never succeeded in devising a consistent promotional policy for endorsing and perpetuating nationalism and patriotism, though; in other countries such policies have proved efficacious.²⁷

Objectives of the Study

Following objectives were investigated in the current research: to explore the role of media in promoting nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani students; to cross-validate and juxtapose the role of traditional and digital media in the promotion of

nationalism and patriotism among students; to highlight the role of media in integrating the society through the promotion of nationalism; and to explore the changes as induced by digital media in determining the nationalistic and patriotic behaviours of the respondents.

Hypotheses

Following hypotheses were investigated in the current research: Traditional and digital media are likely to carry significant role in promoting nationalism and patriotism. Reported levels of patriotism and nationalism are likely to vary across male and females. Demographics are likely to be significant predictors of nationalism and patriotism.

Method

Research Design

A quantitative, cross-sectional research design was employed through survey strategy in order to investigate the role of traditional media and digital media in promoting nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani youth.

Sample and Sampling Strategy

Non-probability purposive sampling strategy was used in order to draw out sample. The respondents within age, ranges from 17 to 25 years, were taken. Likewise, those, enrolled in regular universities' programs, were included. The sample size of the present research comprised of 300 respondents from both gender groups, taken from government sector universities of Lahore.

Measures

Following measures were incorporated for data collection in the current investigation:

Demographic Information Sheet

In order to collect the demographic elements of the participants, an indigenous demographic information sheet was formulated.

Traditional and Digital Media Consumption Scales

These scales comprised of patterns, intensity and frequency of digital media usage.

Nationalism Scale

This scale was developed by following the factor-structure format in order to determine the nationalism among the respondents. Nationalism has been operationalized in this investigation as consistent loyalty and devotion to one's own

nation; specifically, in terms of a sense of national consciousness. The sentiments and behaviour of an individual targeted at exalting a nation above all others, and main goals of laying primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations. The scale comprised of three dimensions of the construct by entailing into it the elements of psychological, affective and behavioural components.

Patriotism Scale

Patriotism, however, has more to do with belongingness. This is, in fact, an attachment to one's own homeland that can be viewed in terms of different topographies related to the country. These topographies may include ethnic, social, cultural, political or historical features. The major elements of patriotism may include blind patriotism and constructive patriotism.

Traditional Media

Traditional media refer to the orthodox conventional media that are conveying information from many decades, like television channels.

Digital Media

Social media have been elaborated and operationalized as the computer-mediated tools that let people create, exchange and share the information, interests, ideas, etc., in modes of virtual communications. Thus, such virtual communities and networks act as active platforms of messages promotion. These channels also enjoy the liberty of being more open, unrestricted and participatory in nature.

Procedure

The permission and authority letter was sorted from the Research Approval Committee in order to fulfil the ethical guidelines of the Advance Research Board. The data was accessed after the formal permission was granted. The research topic was introduced to the participants one-by-one, and measures were individually administered. All ethical research requisites were fulfilled. The participants were ensured on anonymity and confidentiality. It was also ascertained that research participants could withdraw, if he or she felt uncomfortable. The average time consumed in completing the questionnaire was 25 to 30 minutes. All measures were administered on one-to-one basis.

Statistical Analysis

The data was analysed by using SPSS version 24.00. Descriptive and inferential analyses were executed.

Results

Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables (N = 300)

Characteristics	f	%age
Age Groups		
17-20	150	50
21-25	150	50
Education Level		
MA/MSc	125	41
MPhil	50	18
BS (Hons)	125	41
Urban/Rural		
Urban	150	50
Rural	150	50

Table 1.2: Reliability Coefficients of the Scales used in the Present Study (N=300)

Variables	M	SD	K	α
NATIONALISM SCALE	82.11	13.92	60	.81
Psychological	17.76	5.43	20	.73
Affective	18.25	6.34	20	.79
Behavioural	16.25	3.02	20	.68
PATRIOTISM SCALE	19.93	4.19	6	.72
Blind Patriotism	18.65	4.10	6	.71
Constructive Patriotism	18.14	5.10	6	.64
DMCS	76.23	13.11	20	.73
TMCS	68.25	7.23	20	.69

Note: K = No of Items; α = Cronbach’s Alpha; M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; DMCS = Digital Media Consumption Scale; and TMCS=Traditional Media Consumption Scale.

Table 1.3: Pearson Product Moment Correlations showing the Relationship in the Study Variables (n=300)

Study Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nationalism Scale							
Psychological		.76**					
Affective			.67**	.56	.66**	.73**	.67
Behavioral			.78**	.82**	.56	.34**	.52**
Patriotism Scale				.34	.72**	.53**	.56
Blind Patriotism					.43	.56	.46**
Constructive Patriotism						.67**	.76
DMCS							.56
TMCS							

Note: **=P<.05

Table 1.4: Independent Samples t-test and Gender Groups (N=300)

Variables	Boys (n=150)		Girls (n=150)		t (174)	P	95% CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Nationalism Scale									
Psychological	89.43	4.25	21.06	4.01	.58	.53	-.86	1.69	0.07
Affective	19.98	4.03	29.88	4.36	.16	.01	- 1.14	1.44	0.08
Behavioural	18.52	4.24	21.78	3.98	-.42	.54	- 1.48	.97	0.17
Patriotism Scale	17.78	4.15	21.50	5.91	-.92	.43	- 2.23	.93	0.13
Blind Patriotism	19.43	4.25	21.11	4.01	.58	.45	-.86	1.45	0.05
Constructive Patriotism	19.98	4.03	22.13	4.36	.16	.00	- 1.14	1.43	0.06
DMCS	19.52	4.24	21.78	3.98	-.42	.63	- 1.48	.87	0.19
TMCS	18.43	4.15	22.12	5.91	-.92	.32	- 2.23	.78	0.17

Table 1.5: Independent Samples t-test with Reference to Regional Affiliation Groups (N=300)

Variables	Urban (n=150)		Rural (n=150)		t (174)	P	95% CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Nationalism Scale									
Psychological	19.43	4.25	22.16	2.01	.45	.43	-.65	1.43	0.08
Affective	19.98	4.03	24.12	0.23	.24	.00	- 1.03	1.23	0.09
Behavioural	18.52	4.24	20.11	2.23	-.32	.34	- 1.18	.67	0.16
Patriotism Scale	17.78	4.15	20.15	2.64	-.67	.44	- 1.04	.76	0.14
Blind Patriotism	19.43	4.25	19.06	1.03	.45	.66	-.77	1.32	0.08
Constructive Patriotism	19.98	4.03	29.88	1.03	.34	.00	- 1.12	1.12	0.09
DMCS	18.52	4.24	22.14	1.67	-.34	.72	- 1.13	.78	0.16
TMCS	17.78	4.15	23.65	2.41	-.71	.65	- 2.03	.73	0.14

Discussion

The current study was designed to explore the role of traditional media and social media in the promotion of nationalism and patriotism. A detailed literature review was carried out to witness all sorts of programs and coverage given to the issue. Moreover, for the current study, a detailed survey instrument was prepared with enriched psychometric strength in order to collect the data from respondents, who get exposed to the contents of social media and traditional media.

This research targeted its first hypothesis that it is more likely that traditional media play significant role in promoting nationalism and patriotism among Pakistani university students. Digital media emerged significantly in determining its role in psychological, affective and behavioural nationalism, while, it had no significant relationship with blind patriotism. Constructive patriotism was positively and significantly related with digital media consumption. Findings of the study fully support this hypothesis, which is also in lines with what Akhtar indicated that media can be considered as one of the most essential source playing its key role in the nationalism of Pakistan in different aspects.²⁸

This finding also leads to derive that there are potent options for using material symbols of nationhood in order to persuade some country's nationals towards patriotic and nationalists' spirits. There are multifarious sources available to any state to develop and promote such narrative through the stronger media forums to create narratives and circulate images favourable to its preferred national story. The systematic affinity towards state is mostly reflected by the national anthem and the flag and these symbols and emblems stay significantly resourceful in persuading its nationals towards patriotism and nationalism.

Media, in its traditional or digital form, can be easily sued to promote this message. This is because of the fact that, whenever, media consumers reflect of media messages, they usually perceived televised public service more as affective message than the one involving their cognitive involvement. Just like so many of the political parties that involve and engage their follower by suggesting and inducing them the rhetoric messages and leading them to contemplate the least for certain issues. This mutually determined dialogue happens to be pertinent and significant. Mass media have long been used to persuade the masses at large. Out of many modern persuasive techniques, emotion appeal and transfer appeal work out as successful. Not just negative propaganda can be woven out, but also the positive one; the one having patriotism and nationalism messages. There are widely prevalent options of filter bubbles in digital media due to which this has become so easy to drive the nationalistic spirit and patriotism and the above stated findings are very much in alignment of these findings.²⁹

Independent samples t-test was conducted to find the difference for nationalism and patriotism across boys and girls (i.e., university students). The findings revealed that girls outperformed on the scales of patriotism and nationalism, exhibiting significantly higher dimensions on patriotism and nationalism. Cohen's *d* showed that there is significant effect size of all elements of patriotism and nationalism, which means that there are systematic differences across two age groups. Girls-group has been found to be standing significantly higher in terms of their mean scores on all dimensions of patriotism and nationalism. These findings are substantially getting corroborated from various empirical findings.³⁰ This difference, indigenously interpreted, is probably attributable to the relative socially determined female role in Pakistani society; boys getting exposed to practical economic challenges, somehow, tend to harbor less nationalist and patriotic elements than girls. Furthermore, it is also not in line with the research findings of the Li and Brewer; the social identity of interest, in this study, is one's sense of belonging to one's own country: national identity. Therefore, it can be concluded from the findings that male or female students of the University of Sargodha (Lahore Campus) are both equally patriotic.³¹

Nations, these days, are assumed as sub-groups of ideologies and shared cultures or more precisely termed as imaginary communities at the wake of real challenges. The symbolic signifiers tend to act differently on members of different gender groups. Just as McClintock explains that an "organic unity of interests" (original emphasis) tends to promote a sense of horizontal community in a sharing group. Historical analysis reflects that the emergence of modern conceptualizations of the nation was infused with bourgeois concerns over respectability and that this resulted in the celebration of heterosexuality as the bedrock of the nation. The phenomenon of nationalism and patriotism was also explored for diverse regional affiliation that divulges clearly that students hailing from rustic or rural setups, or specifically stating the respondents from rural affiliation region, demonstrated statistically significant and empirically higher mean scores on nationalism and patriotism. This can be justified through the perspective that articulated, materially judged and reciprocally evaluated cognitive mindsets are less likely to be found among students from rural setups as established by some of the researches.

This is hard to establish some unified media consumer these days due to the fact that same consumer is indulging in a lot many transient sorts of media.³² Modern consumers have wider options to traverse various means of digital communications in the spur of moments due to which they get massively exposed to global messages that can change their perceived ideologies patterns. The digital media happen to offer a broader, flexible and more receptive two-way communication platform, thus, ensuring that messages also get generated by other

consumers, and that are likely to persuade and influence other consumers; although this cannot be ignored that the phenomenon of subjectivity supersedes here. Digital Nationalism, therefore, is likely to contribute to our thoughtful nationalism spirits in this information age. These dynamics of public discourse in an emergent power are likely to play dynamic role for new generations of digital world. It is implicated to show how ICTs can develop as effective vehicles for nationalism, and how countenance can be manipulated in order to build a sense of community. This may outgrow at the expense of diversity and intercultural acceptance.³³

Conclusion

This research gives insight that media, may it be traditional or social media (new media), play significant role in the promotion of nationalism and patriotism among the consumers or its users. Male and female population of universities significantly varies in reports of patriotism and nationalism. Furthermore, in order to gain a complete understanding of the role of media in promotion of nationalism and patriotism, it is necessary to conduct a qualitative in-depth study that could examine all aspects of nationalism and patriotism. Patriotic consumerism is the approach that this finding draws towards, so that citizen and nationals of any country could be made much more patriotic, infused with nationalist spirits. Certain limitations are being observed in the current research, but not limited to few aspects being covered and with small sample size. Still the findings carry significant insightful contribution for media policymakers, politicians, administrators, educationists and leaders alike in determining the beneficial and befitting use of various media types in promoting nationalism and patriotism.

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Af-Pak Strategy: An Emerging Challenge for Pakistan's Security Paradigm

*Lubna Sunawar**

Abstract: *The US-led coalition has been heavily involved in political, economic, and military sectors of Afghanistan for more than a decade, which is termed as one of the largest US commitments to South Asia. Af-Pak strategy under the Obama administration could not achieve the required objectives. The Trump's stance on South Asia also remained ambiguous throughout his election campaign, but it is very much clear that the present Pak-US relations mainly entrenched in post-9/11 Af-Pak issues. The US fight against terrorism in the region has remained an unfinished agenda. Taliban are again gaining ground in Afghanistan, slowly and gradually. The US, today, is not only fighting against al-Qaeda, but Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also poses a serious threat to the stability of the region. These militant organizations have developed strong foothold in Afghanistan and trying to gain grounds in border areas of Pakistan as well. The Trump administration needs Pakistan's cooperation to weed out these militants, but with new strategies. The previous tactics that the US have been applying on Pakistan, i.e., to do more rhetoric, sanctions, reduction of coalition support fund, and drone attacks, are now proved to be counterproductive. This strategy has only strained the already complicated Pak-US relations and has played an important role in intensifying prevalent anti-Americanism in various parts of Pakistan.*

Keywords: Afghanistan, Terrorism, Taliban, al-Qaeda, Af-Pak.

Introduction

The Af-Pak policy was first proposed by the US President Obama in March 2009. Af-Pak strategy was later redefined in December 2009 upon feedback, which President Obama received from his military leadership. The strategy concisely outlines the overall objective of the US towards Pakistan and Afghanistan in the region, that is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent their return to either country in the future.¹ Today, the Taliban along with Islamic State's militants in Afghanistan are a potent force and they have been assisted by political, social, and ethnic sections of the society. A decade-long war has finally proved to be a disaster, not more than a costly impasse for the US-led European allies, as the growing militancy pose a serious threat to the country in general and foreign forces in particular. Since the launch of ongoing military 'Operation Zarb-e-Azb' in June 2014, there is a sharp decline in the terrorist violence all across Pakistan, and targets are not easily accessible for militants as it used to be before 2014.²

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The 2016-US presidential elections created lot much anxiety and confusion not only in the US, but across the globe and this has been the most controversial elections in the history with regard to the US foreign policy especially in the region, where the US military is heavily engaged in terms of combat military operations. The Trump administration is in the limelight and has received particular attention as it inherited the longest ongoing foreign military campaigns in the history of this country from its predecessor President Obama.³ General John W. Nicholson, who led coalition forces in Afghanistan, has already signalled a harsher policy toward Pakistan under Trump's administration. During a session of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, General Nicholson told that ties with Pakistan would be a top most priority in his discussions with the US Defence Secretary, James Mattis and the White House, which has already given little details on its strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴

So far, President Trump is in favour of aid policy towards Pakistan, but on the other hand, he wants India to play a prominent role in the region in order to deter the threat of terrorism. President Trump has strictly opposed the ongoing activities of the ISIS in Afghanistan, but on the other hand, he has not revealed any clear strategy to defeat the Taliban and ISIS militants in border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Time and again, President Trump has been criticizing the Obama administration on social media as he is of the view that President Obama exposed his cards too early regarding military operations in Afghanistan, including the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. If, the Trump administration has any viable, convincing and different strategy to tackle with the quagmire in Afghanistan, it still remains to be seen.⁵ Surprisingly, President Trump barely highlighted Afghanistan in his election campaign.

This research addresses separate, but yet inter-related arguments regarding Afghanistan. First section looks at the challenges ahead for the Trump administration and a decision-making scenario; second section entails what choices and options are available in hand for the Trump administration; and third section offers conclusions and policy recommendations.

President Trump's Af-Pak Policy: Possible Scenario

President Trump's position on the ongoing US-led military coalition in Afghanistan, is deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan along with the increasing influence of the Islamic State as it has gained momentum and *jihadists'* attacks on government installations and foreign troops are all time high, where government does not exercise its writ. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration will have to find a viable strategy in dealing with the Taliban and *jihadists* of Islamic State. There are many issues before the Trump administration regarding South Asia that needs

serious attention. The most important question, in this regard, is how he will identify the ongoing Islamist militant movement as a terrorist movement and what will be his strategy for the negotiation process. Will he allow terrorist groups to join peace negotiation for the stability and reconciliation of Afghanistan? In this context, there is a question regarding Pakistan's role as a potential negotiator. Moreover, how will the US formulate its' relations with the National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan, which is currently known for its inability to deal with domestic security situations under the authoritarian style of the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani. Will the Trump administration work in close collaboration with New Delhi to assign it a new powerful and asserting role in Afghanistan especially with regard to growing defence collaboration between Kabul and New Delhi? In addition to this, how will President Trump reduce the growing influence of China as an emerging regional actor in the Af-Pak region and in Kashmir as well, which have been the most outstanding issue and now the flashpoint between two regional powers, i.e., Pakistan and India in South Asia.⁶

The Trump administration is going to face serious challenges regarding terrorism, deterioration of Pakistan-India relations, Indian aggression across Line of Control (LoC), New Delhi's increasing protest against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, and the growing influence of Moscow in the region. These are some of the issues that the Trump administration will confront within South Asia. It is also expected that the Trump administration will likely follow the same policies and strategies towards the region that are already set by his predecessor, President Obama.⁷

The Trump administration has recognized Taliban and Islamic State elements as the most potential threat to the US-led coalition interests in Afghanistan, but the decision to engage them with neighbouring Pakistan regarding peace talks and reconstruction of Afghanistan, is the most decisive and crucial one. In addition, the disillusion of any constructive role of Pakistan in case of the last attempt to engage Taliban and the Afghan government in peace talks will most likely to continue.⁸ The Trump administration seeks to explore more avenues in the search of peace. This refers to a process, which was revived in Doha, where Taliban maintains its 'political liaison office'. Being known for having not much passion and knowledge about the regional policy of South Asia, President Trump would likely to continue with the Afghan peace process and he has already emphasized bilateral negotiation between the Afghan government and Taliban. The US itself will play the role of an observer for the major developments that will take place in the region.⁹

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is stronger than yester years. The Afghan government cannot sustain alone and it is heavily relied on the foreign

assistance particularly from the US for its military, economic and political sectors. Afghanistan would be an easy target for Taliban and ISIS militants in the absence of US-led coalition forces, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country would only strengthen militants' position in the region.¹⁰ In contrast, President Trump might maintain Washington's interests in the region and continue to promote the current robust (offensive) mandate of the contemporary US military mission in Afghanistan.¹¹ Moreover, the new US administration like his predecessor, President Obama, would likely to rely on air power than using ground forces against Islamic State's militants and Taliban forces in border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Trump administration has already given a signal to use drone strikes as major instrument against *jihadists* and militants in order to eliminate and dismantle their networks on both sides of the Durand Line, the actual Pak-Afghan border. The Trump administration has put Pakistan in a more difficult position by increasing pressure on the Pakistan government to end their so-called support to militants and *jihadists* in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and render unconditional support to the US-led coalition forces;¹² while, ignoring New Delhi's agenda of intervention and aggression towards neighbouring states, i.e., so called surgical strikes beyond the LoC in Pakistani territory, atrocities in Indian held Kashmir, propaganda to malign the image of Pakistan at regional and international levels, etc. The Trump administration is more inclined to follow "India first policy" in the region, which they have been pursuing from time to time in order to promote their interests, and to contain China's influence in the region.

The Pakistani establishment has viewed close defence collaboration between Kabul and New Delhi with great suspicion. Likewise, India has never accepted Islamabad's influence in Afghanistan, rather created proxies in the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan to maximize its hold. Although, there is an impression in the Western world that Islamabad would not abandon its support to Taliban, but the Trump administration would never want to lose the support of Islamabad in the region, in the first place, due to two main reasons: first, Pakistan is vital to US interests in the region in order to combat terrorism; and second, the growing influence of China in the region mainly due to the CPEC, definitely persuades the Trump administration to keep smooth and steady terms with Islamabad in the long run.

In order to get desired results, the Trump administration seeks the support of the NUG, because the distance from Kabul only creates more opportunities for China and Pakistan to gain political leverage in Kabul. As a result, the Trump administration does not have much room to manoeuvre, when it comes to the current relations between his administration and the NUG.¹³ The Trump

administration has experienced new security challenges with regard to the Af-Pak region with the presence of Islamic State's militants in Afghanistan.

The Trump administration has inherited an under-resourced mess and unfinished agenda initiated by its predecessors in the form of so-called War against Terrorism in Afghanistan after assuming office. It is evident from the fact that Afghanistan remains the most troublesome country, which has not posed serious security threat to regional countries only but has invited great powers intervention in the form of financial aid, troops, and war equipment. The previous administration of President Obama failed to give a clear roadmap for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country that took place in 2014. In addition to this, it has miserably failed to prepare Afghan security forces to tackle security challenges despite pouring billions of dollars in terms of financial, humanitarian, and economic aid.

The US even after the drawdown will continue to maintain its influence in Afghanistan because of its strategic interests in this country. Al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State's presence along with the Af-Pak region has invited unending US intervention in the region. India, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia have a long history of supporting a mix of Afghan central government forces, sub-state militant and *jihadi* groups. Finally, al-Qaeda and other related terrorist groups would likely view the withdrawal of US troops as a sign of triumph.¹⁴

The purpose of US surge of 2010-2012 was two-fold: first, to provide shield against devastating blow of the Taliban and other associated networks; second, to drive these militants out from main areas.¹⁵ At the same time, the basic objectives remains to train and equip the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) with modern technology and to combat Taliban and other *jihadi* groups. It seems that the surge did not accomplish the required goals. Moreover, training and advising foreign security forces in a short span of time was a difficult and unattainable task to achieve.¹⁶ The ANSF has turned out to be a failure, which is unable to defend and protect national interests of the country. The War against Terrorism will most likely continue as long as donors finance the ANSF.¹⁷ Therefore, "What is clear, is that the burden of the ANSF development will fall heavily on the US and those of its allies that can and do provide effective support."¹⁸ It is worth mentioning that no other sub-region of the world have such a dangerous interaction of fundamental ideologies, conflicting interests, and regional nuclear resources.¹⁹

This analysis indicates that Afghan forces cannot do without US-led coalition continuous logistic and financial support regarding training mission. The Trump administration needs a new US strategy different from the Obama administration for every institution of Afghan society especially for the military sector. The US strategy in the region can only be effective, if it shifts attention from

setting a specific deadline for withdrawal and to provide continuous flow of aid for the reconstruction of a war-torn country's infrastructure and training of its armed forces in order to strengthen its local institutions.²⁰ It is, therefore, very much expected from the Trump administration that under his tenure, the US would weigh its choices more carefully and wisely.

Trump's Regional or Transnational Approach for Afghanistan

The US has many other strategic priorities across the globe, where it is entrenched heavily with its military. Afghanistan does not currently pose a direct security threat to the US in this context. The Trump administration seems more interested to leave the unfinished agenda in Afghanistan in the form of War against Terrorism for other regional countries to manage. In coming years, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian States are going to play a central role in Afghanistan. In the present situation, the Trump administration wants the Afghan government to take the responsibility of managing its political, security, and economic affairs much without US and other great powers intervention.

If there is no regional consensus over how to settle the Taliban issue before US-led coalition forces withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is a great danger of a proxy war in Afghanistan, where regional powers would try to attain maximum gain by promoting diverse ethnic or religious groups in quest of their own national interests.²¹ Such a fight would drag both India and Pakistan into the struggle for control of Afghanistan. If such like situation erupts, it is likely that other regional powers would also jump in and support their likeminded groups. It would not only be destructive for Afghanistan, but this would bring serious repercussions for regional security and prosperity. It would also lead to ethnic and sectarian ferocity across the region with proxy groups being used to attain self-vested interests along cultural and denominational identities.²² Moreover, such a regionally sponsored conflict in Afghanistan has already created a power vacuum in the aftermath of the drawdown and blocks any progress towards prosperity, economic integration, nuclear proliferation, water sharing, energy and trade.²³

The Trump administration inherited a despondent and deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which is a direct outcome of its predecessor's eight years of mismanagement and mishandling. The Obama administration eventually came up with the formula of intensifying US and NATO exertions in Afghanistan and Pakistan by increasing US troops to more than 100,000 and civilian workforces to 1,000²⁴ in order to control the deteriorating security situation. NATO-ISAF forces have also increased to 40,400 from 28,250 during this time.²⁵ The Obama administration was also given approval for military funding of Afghanistan's security forces and it increased non-military assistance. All this assistance, which was being

provided to Afghanistan on military and non-military basis, came out as a financial disaster that goes beyond many billion dollars, out of which much is believed to be lost in corruption.²⁶ The Trump administration prefers to use transnational approach in South Asia, “a transnational relationship, where you get what you pay, pressure, or threaten for.”²⁷ President Trump is likely to use all options on the table against Pakistan that include: sanctions, carrot and stick policy, cutting aid, threats, tilting to India or India first policy, use of unilateral actions in form of drone attacks, etc.

‘Un-presidential’ was one of the many labels assigned to Donald Trump throughout his election campaign. He failed to convince the world in general and the American public in particular because of very little knowledge about foreign policy matters. But, the recent results of US elections surprised everyone not just Americans but the world at large. The ‘Trump card’ is now on the table and the world wait with bated breath for the ‘Donald Doctrine’ and his approach to many challenging issues confronting South Asia, particularly with regard to his foreign policy with Pakistan.²⁸ It is to be sure that “the trend lines towards Pakistan established during the last ten years are too deeply entrenched to change over the course of the new President. There may, however, be differences in degree rather than any course corrections.”²⁹ Pakistan has already been facing immense pressure from the US administrations time and again to improve its counterterrorism policy and ban a number of militant organizations, who have been accused of playing somewhat active role in carrying out attacks in neighbouring Afghanistan.

The US geostrategic objectives will remain the same without any fundamental and drastic changes. Pakistan will remain an important ally in the War against Terrorism in years to come. A general perception prevails in Pakistan that President Trump may receive a negative input from his intelligence agencies and policy makers in Washington D.C. about Pakistan as a distrustful ally in South Asia, which has played a double game with the Washington by securing its own strategic objectives in the region. President Trump “will likely continue with a transnational approach to bilateral engagements, and Pakistan could secure targeted military assistance in exchange for specific counterterrorism initiatives, for example, against the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). For all practical purposes, Pakistan should not expect anything new to emerge with Trump in the White House.”³⁰

The Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani wants President Trump to put more pressure on Pakistan to end its’ support to militants and *jihadists*, who carry out attacks in Afghanistan. In other words, ‘do more’ policy is going to be the course of action from Washington under the Trump administration.³¹ It is also visible from President Trump’s message on twitter about Pakistan: “Get it straight: Pakistan is not our friend. We have given billions and billions of dollars. What we get

in return is betrayal and disrespect and much worse.”³² Such twitter-statements by President Trump make things more worse and uncontrollable than to resolve the longstanding Afghan issue in a serious way. Recently, the Pakistan Army Chief has denied such allegations and asked the world to do more as Pakistan has already done a lot in this regard. Nonetheless, the Trump administration compels the Afghan government to take control of its affairs and it is much expected that the time to offer blank cheques to Afghanistan for financial and economic assistance without considering the process of transparent accountability is finally over. Under the Trump administration, President Ghani is facing pressure to eradicate corruption and to strengthen domestic institution, especially law enforcement agencies.

By early 2012, Washington started restructuring its overall security partnership with Islamabad. It became obvious, when the Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, during his visit to Afghanistan and India in June 2012, issued Washington’s starkest criticism by pointedly stating that “Washington was reaching the limits of [its] patience with Islamabad’s refusal to crack-down on terrorist safe havens operating in its territory.”³³ Secretary Panetta not only appreciated New Delhi’s contributions toward Afghanistan’s economic and commercial sectors in form of aid, but also expressed his full endorsement for Delhi’s initiative for providing training to Afghanistan’s armed forces and exhilarated it to continue with this training mission. He also acknowledged that New Delhi has much more to offer to Kabul than Islamabad in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Pakistan is the only country, which has paid the heaviest price being a neighbouring country of Afghanistan in the region. The ongoing war against terrorism is not only confined to Afghanistan, but entered into the border areas and today Pakistan armed forces are fighting against militants and *jihadists* in settled areas of the country. Apart from being a frontline state with the US on external front, today Pakistan is confronting with many domestic problems including sectarian conflicts, extremism, discontent in the provinces, militancy, and growing violence, which has dragged the country into social, political and economic quagmire. The Western world in general and the US in particular consider Pakistan as a ‘game spoiler’ in the region. They accuse Islamabad for protecting its own interests by giving safe asylum to many terrorists, who in turn pose a great threat to US-led coalition forces across the Durand Line. This perilous situation has given these terrorists a free hand to exploit already failing condition and they can successfully generate obnoxious propaganda on the basis of a narrative of government’s failure to provide stability and prosperity to the underprivileged people of the region.³⁴

On the other hand, the ground realities are totally different. Since Pakistan has been a key ally of Washington, it has contributed more than any other coalition

partner in the region including sacrifices of its own military personnel and civilians. Islamabad not only banned militant terrorist organizations, but it also acted in a swift manner in detaining thousands of extremists from its territory. It arrested many high-value and most-wanted al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and handed over to US law enforcement agencies. The US is very much mindful of the fact they could not have killed and captured terrorists without the cooperation and support of Pakistani intelligence agencies. Since 9/11, Washington and Islamabad have different perceptions and strategies to combat terrorism with outstanding differences on both ends, but somehow, both unequal partners in the War against Terrorism have tried to manage their ties. This has been a difficult and complex process for both countries. Certainly, the most important and serious concern from the Pakistani military perspective has been the US untrustworthy role in the War against Terrorism and the way it has been showing its mistrust regarding Pakistan's military toils to fight terrorism.³⁵

President Obama made some conclusive changes to the Afghan policy it inherited from the Bush administration. "Most significantly, in its first year in office, it devoted to a 250 percent rise in the American force on ground (adding 51,000 troops to the 34,000 in Afghanistan when Mr. Obama took office) and urged to secure increases in non-US coalition forces."³⁶ The Obama's administration also encouraged Kabul to raise its own security forces "strong enough to prevent a takeover by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other radical Islamic group; and to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda (which, of course, is not achievable in Afghanistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan alone). The third pillar of the policy that put a greater emphasis on the need for a regional approach."³⁷ However, this regional policy remains ambiguous for the Trump administration in practice as it does not clearly indicate what Trump administration actually intends to do. A strong military action to eliminate terrorists' networks that are based in border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan or a joint military, economic, and commercial collaboration between regional states and great powers in order to enhance the level of cooperation and generate economic activity.

Conclusion

The Pakistan Parliament has unanimously passed a resolution calling on the government to consider suspending supply lines to the US-led NATO mission in neighbouring Afghanistan in response to recent US accusations that the country is harbouring armed groups. "The National Assembly takes President [Donald] Trump's and General [John] Nicholson's [the top US military commander in Afghanistan] statements on Pakistan as hostile and threatening."³⁸ The resolution also urged the government to review all cooperation with the US, including the use

of air and ground supply routes by NATO troops in Afghanistan. While the US-led military alliance has developed alternative supply routes to Afghanistan, the bulk of its logistical and military supplies are still routed through Pakistan. The document also called on the government to consider the postponement of any visits by US delegations to Pakistan or by Pakistani delegations/officials to the US.

On August 21, 2017, in a speech announcing the US strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia under the new administration, Trump singled Pakistan out for particular criticism. The US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson told reporters that Washington would consider cutting aid to Pakistan, increasing the use of drone attacks within its territory and stripping the South Asian country of its status as a major non-NATO US ally. US General Nicholson also alleged that Afghan Taliban leaders were being given sanctuary in the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar. Pakistan denies that it offers sanctuary to any armed groups, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, and the government and military have rejected Trump's strategy in earlier statements. The government, in turn, has demanded that US and Afghan forces take action against Pakistani Taliban groups, it claims, are operating from Afghan territory.³⁹

Islamabad showed deep reservation over Af-Pak strategy, which considered Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas as a single zone pertaining to military operations. There are considerable differences regarding US approach of considering Pakistan and Afghanistan on the same level, when it comes to fight terrorism. Pakistan had already showed resentment regarding Obama Administration's linkage of Pakistan and Afghanistan under a single strategy. In an interview with the *Financial Times*, President Asif Ali Zardari clearly mentioned that Afghanistan and Pakistan are two different countries of South Asia with different political history and cannot be associated together in a same framework for any reason.

Pakistan is an established democracy and a country of more than 180 million people, it possesses one of the best professional military that is nuclear capable, and has an influential middle class with relatively better economy along with influential print and electronic media exercising at local, provincial, and state level. On the other hand, Afghanistan is a war-torn state with a poor democratic record, a country where drug trafficking is common with poor law and order situation and no writ of the government exists outside its capital, Kabul. The only common factor is terrorism, which is a blatant threat to their security and survival. Thus, the Government of Pakistan disapproved Af-Pak strategy. If, the US links Pakistan and Afghanistan together and it takes action within Pakistani territory to contain Taliban and al-Qaeda, then this would undermine Pak-US strategic relationship in this region. The Trump administration is more interested in looking at Af-Pak policy as a

regional strategy that requires a wide-ranging military and civilian approach, where the US can work with Pakistan and other regional countries including China, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs). The peace in Afghanistan cannot prevail until and unless two neighbours, Pakistan and India, resolve their outstanding issues. Pakistanis consider peace in Afghanistan is directly related to Islamabad and Delhi working out their differences, whether in relation to Kashmir or over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan.

It is expected that the Trump administration will play a responsible role leading towards a balanced policy for Islamabad and New Delhi. If present trends persist between Islamabad and Washington in form of distrust, putting pressure to do more, blaming each other for past failures; then this will not serve any party's interests, but will bring more anarchy, political instability, and chaos to the region.

Endnotes

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Reporting Taliban Conflict: Analysis of Pakistani Journalists' Attitude Towards National Security

Sidra Agha and Shabir Hussain *

A*bstract:* This study is mainly designed to explore the attitude-change among journalists towards national security after being embedded with armed forces. While conducting interviews of journalists, researchers found that embedding with military troops was an effective tool to report on Taliban conflict, which was otherwise inaccessible to media people. The Pakistani reporters, in this regard, are highly sensitive about national security and would not allow their profession tinkering with it. They believed that as Pakistan was fighting this war for maintaining its territorial sovereignty, they needed to be patriotic, nationalist and work side by side with armed forces. Media should be free and realistic, but in state of war, media should cooperate in terms of national security cause. They considered Taliban as enemy of the State, who challenged the national sovereignty of the country, whereas, they believed in glorifying the security forces of the country, specifically in war against terror.

Keywords: Embedded Journalism, National Security, Patriotism, Conflict, Journalistic Responsibility.

Introduction

National security is a complex term that not only involves military concerns, but also other aspects of political, socio-economic, environmental and human rights. The UN considers national security as a condition that facilitates states with no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic tension. Walter Lippmann (1943) defines national security an environment in which a state does not need to sacrifice its values to avoid or to confront any critical situation.¹ Similarly, Arnold Wolfers (1960) defines national security in the simplest perspective of 'absence of threats and fears that a country feels about sacrificing its values'. National security is not only about military concerns, but it is a strong combination of economic and environmental security.² However, Charles Maier (1990) defines national security through the perspective of national power, explaining it in the context of a power to control those national and international conditions that the public opinion of a given society considers indispensable to experience its own self-determination or sovereignty, prosperity and safety.³

Pakistan is one of those countries that have been going through external and internal crises, where the most essential concern is national security. As Pakistan has

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been fighting a war against terrorism, the growing terrorist attacks have raised serious questions about the security structure of the State. According to Ahmad Faruqi (2003), national security is a broader term than defence.⁴ National security has much to do with the socio-economic activities of the State. Along with the military, several different organizations especially media, need to join hands in support of national security. "Media consider itself as a genuine national institution and have to prove its credentials, when security of the state is in question."⁵ The military-media relationship has been subsisting since centuries, when it comes to war reporting. Sometimes, it is on fine grounds, and at times, it is hate and love relationship. Warfare is a critical situation that makes both military and media dependent on each other in order to spread war words and to earn support of the general public. Thus, embedded journalism was practiced officially during war in Iraq (2003). It provided new perspectives to war reporting with different shades.

In Pakistan, the idea of embedded journalism is still vague, as very less journalists are allowed to enter the battlefield. Through, this study, the effectiveness of embedded journalism, is highlighted along with the role embedded journalism can play in ongoing war on terror with its contribution towards national security paradigm. The key objective of this study is to identify the factors that influence journalists' attitudes towards national security after being embedded, and to look for ways and means to ensure constructive reporting of the Taliban conflict. This would help understand the various dimensions of embedded journalism and military strategy during an armed conflict. The research also helps to understand the realities of war and its media coverage accordingly. While, understanding the attitude of journalists being embedded with the military troops, the military public relations department may refine their policies for media to cover future conflicts, if any, keeping the importance of national security in mind.

Embedded Journalism

It is widely accepted that embedding process has been highly lauded by both journalists as well as media critics, and also the press and government officials have shown interest in employing the process in future conflicts.⁶ However, media embedment with military troops laid emphasis on the news content.⁷ The available literature on the subject is full of debates related to embedded policies vs. unilateral practices. A number of studies found that there were noticeable differences between both embedded and non-embedded reporting.⁸ For example, one study is showing the weak side of Iraqi forces and other is highlighting the resentment of Iraqi civilians towards the Allied Forces. These studies discussed that embedded reporters were reporting from the actual battlefield, whereas, unilateral journalists were highly inspired by newsroom culture. Furthermore, the main theme of attention that

compelled critics to accuse embedding system was one-coverage that relates to the threat caused to journalistic objectivity.⁹

These studies also suggested that embedded reporters produced different stories than non-embedded reporters.¹⁰ With the help of embedded system, American public could view a different face of warfare. Being embedded with military troops, embedded reporters collected raw information from which they made their stories. This act of attachment with troops laid emphasis on the news content. However, it was also found that embeds did not mean in bed. The objectivity of embedded reports was examined and it was found that journalists took extra pain to be objective in their reporting. Whereas, it was also showed that critics' accusations of Soda Straw reporting about embedded system, were justified as they had to see events with a microscope, not binoculars. Non-embedded journalists had enough time to put the different pieces of embedded reporting together, analyse them and complete their stories in detail by adding more information available from other sources.

Amy LeBlanc (2013) suggested that besides playing the role of watchdog for actions of coalition and anti-occupation forces, embedded reporting offered a unique viewpoint on warfare that a unilateral reporter could never provide.¹¹ Both embedded and unilateral coverage provided different, but mutually favourable perspectives on human rights issues, such as civilian casualties in the battlefield. Shahira Fahmy and Thomas J. Johnson (2005) found embedded reporting a bit narrow, but overall embedded journalists showed a positive attitude towards their work.¹² Rather making guesses and assumptions, embedded reporting opened venues for real-time experience. It is not about how journalists report events without witnessing what actually happened, it is about reporting what is seen with open eyes. Along with the study of the embeds, attitude of the soldiers was also probed in, because it is of greater significance to know how soldiers view media regarding reporting of their battlefield stories, which is the core to better military and media relationship.¹³

Alicia C. Shepard (2004) laid emphasis on different conferences about military-media relations during Iraq war and also sought differences in their relationship along with the impact these differences had on reporting the general public.¹⁴ She appraised the success of media from the angle of American public mindset. It improved the self-esteem within the US military. She suggested that embedded system is overstressed and it is not the only way to cover future conflicts. Facilitating unilateral reporters could be a better option too. Yet, changes are necessary for better coverage in the future.

In order to judge war reporting, there are always three perspectives, i.e., journalists, combatants and public opinion. In any issue of the State, public opinion is deemed prudent, because they are the actual critic to the truth and objectivity. Studies and researches done to examine the impact of embedded journalism in shaping public opinion, revealed that public opinion shifted dramatically in favor of US military after embedded reporters started sending in the stories and bringing live coverage of the war from the actual battlefield. Thus, the concept of embedding was welcomed by both military and media. Many researchers probed in the framing of war through the lens of both embedded and unilateral journalists.¹⁵ If embedded reporting was valued, the need of unilateral coverage was also taken into consideration. Embedded system has changed the way media eye up the war and same is the case with military response to media.¹⁶ Studies also depicted that the military-media relationship was the centrepiece to the martial conflicts.¹⁷

This study is designed to analyse journalists' opinion towards national security before and after going to the conflict zone being embedded. The study also looks into the limitations for journalists, while reporting on Taliban conflict. Also, it probes how journalists see the strategy of embedded journalism to report on Taliban conflict. For this purpose, as many as 20 journalists were interviewed for this study, who were embedded with the military.¹⁸ The researchers travelled to their offices and conducted interviews in the reporters' offices. Written notes and audio recordings were taken to collect data for the study wherein thematic analysis had been utilized to analyse the collected data. In Pakistan, the term embedded journalism is not very well received and so it was a bit difficult to persuade them for interviews. However, once the interviews started, they fully cooperated and addressed all the questions. Two of them seemed a bit hesitant to openly talk about their reporting or to appraise military policy on embedded journalism. Also, there were few limitations of the study. Since a limited number of journalists were embedded with the military to cover Taliban conflict, therefore, partial data was acquired. Second limitation was the risk journalists felt to talk about embedment owing to the sensitive nature of the Taliban conflict. It required enough efforts to convince few journalists to be a part of the research.

Journalists' Attitude towards National Security

Almost all journalists found change in their attitude towards national security being embedded, because being on ground, journalist pinpoints different aspects that may impact his vision, work and attitude towards national security. When journalists witness their military fighting against enemies, they stand by them through their thoughts, concerns and writings. It makes them realize that how difficult is the challenge and what actual sacrifice is given by the military, described by a foreign

media correspondent Fakhar-ur-Rahman during his personal interview. During research, it was identified that being embedded journalists got to learn that military and political leadership have taken this issue on serious grounds, while making practical measures to eradicate this menace. As the government has clearly defined the national security policy, being a journalist, it is necessary to report ground realities, despite reporting something that might be under pressure by militants. Additionally, another factor for this change in attitude is several workshops organized by military. For example, National Media Workshop and National Security Workshop were conducted by military that made journalists realize different frontline issues and difficulties military and the State have been facing to secure Pakistan.

Consequently, those media persons, who do not know these realities, they could not understand the complexities of conflicts, instead they criticize. Laeeq-ur-Rahman, a senior correspondent, explained that after visiting different affected areas and meeting with the locals he got the real picture about the atrocities and religion based black mailing of TTP. Journalists believed that the element of patriotism is always dominant over them, where national security is of prime concern. Another media executive, Gauhar Zahid Malik stated that “National territorial and ideological security is uncompromising”. Largely, every media practitioner believed, when a journalist is embedded and he witnesses things on ground, it becomes easier for him to assess things. It ultimately impacts journalists’ thinking, understanding and reporting.

Question of Impartiality

Since the embedment of US media in Iraq war, the partiality in reporting has evoked several scholars to debate over the term “media is in bed with the military”.¹⁹ The same concern is questioned in this research, while considering Taliban reporting to the fore. Being in bed with the military is almost negated by media practitioners that relates to their impartiality to report conflicts, but the negation carries different reasons. The military-media interpretation is believed wrong, because previously media used to report everything (i.e. events were covered in such a way that used to go against public interest for causing terror in public mindset) and nothing (i.e. media had no information on military sacrifices so they used to give minimal coverage to military while naming militants Jihadist). Also, foreign outlets had an open access to the restricted places, from where they used to find surprising reports that were a question to the national interest of the country. Now, media is under check and is brought into a straight line. There are things media may observe, but must not report them, because reporting of such events is not in the interest of country. Whereas, there is nothing wrong, if media is in bed with the military,

because securing the country should be prioritized. Sincerity with national security is the supreme concern, therefore, media relation with military is quite understandable.

There are several incidents, when media has also reported against military or blamed security forces, for instance during Swat operation military was being blamed for killing their own Muslim brothers. There are several incidents when journalists interviewed Taliban that provided them a free platform to communicate their words in public. Asim Rana, a senior journalist, stated that they are not in bed with the Indian military. In Pakistan, there is very weak regulatory supervision of the State over media and there are many things that cannot be controlled, if media reports them. At times, media attacks the government and the State. Therefore, it depends how things are moving on. Once a journalist is assured that military is fighting against terrorists then he should support national cause. In this regard, a journalist, Khalid Jameel, during his interview, clearly stated that “it is no more tribal concern, but Pakistan’s”. Journalists assented that professional journalism is justified even being with the military, because journalists can see what is actually happening.

Journalists’ Attitude towards Taliban

Journalists believed that militants are enemies of the country, but this perspective never impacted them. It is a conflict that must be reported accordingly. There should be in-depth information to analyse things and report them owing to their complex nature. Journalists affirmed that as militants are anti-Pakistan, therefore, there is no if and but to report against them. Previously, media used to portray militants’ perspective, but after their terrorist activities, things changed. Their violence has confirmed them as enemies of Pakistan. In this regard, a defence reporter, Muhammad Asghar stated that, “we cannot correct their perspective, we cannot glorify them”. Journalists reasoned that media persons can report impartially, no matter, if they have a firm belief that militants are terrorists, because media men have a clear direction of factual information. Also, after many incidents, media got to single out things in which military and State perspective started dominating.

Journalists suggested that without knowing actual facts and figures, they must not make conclusion. They should verify things instead of fabricating stories. It is obligatory to use logic, detect both sides and report objectively. Since, it was believed by all media persons that a journalist is a movement; a movement for the righteousness and justice. It is always a part of debate whether to give media access to such people that may endanger civilians. Ahmed Qureshi, a media practitioner stressed that “there comes a time, when survival of the state and its citizens become

important than basic rights”. However, it was also reasoned that a journalist can never be neutral; patriotism and nationalism is there. Javed Bhatti, a senior journalist, categorized it as, “idealism does not work out”. Journalists emphasized that an article analysis is different than news reporting, where one cannot put his personal views. A journalist should view national security with a broader vision despite one subject of militants. Moreover, it is a job of a journalist to dig out facts behind militants’ anti-national cause. Equally, media needs to work professionally. Ahmed Mansoor, a defence reporter explained it as, “in the name of free journalism, we play on the expense of our own State”.

Journalists Attitude towards Military

Journalists stressed that they follow the ethics and norms of reporting. They report according to the nature of incident along with its impact and end result. Since, all journalists largely believed that journalism is all about what is right; there is no question of taking a side of a terrorist. On the other hand, no journalist can report pro-militant owing to their policy. Besides, anti-Taliban or pro-military reporting is based on journalists’ channel policy and somehow on their own frame of mind. Journalists accentuated that a reporter should be a thorough professional. He should not propagate terrorists’ words in media as that version will go into the side of extremism and may spread the same thing in the society.²⁰ However, Ahmed Qureshi explained that there is no free and fair journalism, because being a human being one can never be neutral and in electronic media, opinionated journalism makes more business than any boring and neutral journalism. He further detailed that, “I think it is a very beautiful, wonderful abstract, idealistic thing, we can aspire to which as a media, but it does not exist”.

Other Alternatives to Embedment

In a reply to other alternatives to report on Taliban activities apart from embedding, journalists suggested several ways to learn the environment of militancy as well as its background. Such as, social media and radio should be used to make people aware of militancy. Public can be informed in advance than anything coming out as a surprise. “That is why, you see, people coming out on the roads in immediate reactions, burning cars and everything back and forth”, stated by a foreign media correspondent, Hamza Ameer. Anticipatory measures may help a lot to ensure national security. Those terrorists, who are captured, should be investigated in terms of their psyche and the reasons behind their terrorism, whether it is poverty, social injustice, exploiting Islam and whatsoever it is; security forces and investigation departments should make reports on such things that should be shared with media as well as lawmakers and policymakers.

Moreover, journalists stressed that it should be a part of National Action Plan²¹ by all means. There are law and order issues in the country that need political engagement to help resolve these. A committee comprising government and military officials should be constituted to brief media on different security related issues. Film and cinema should also be utilized to promote military's narrative. There are many forms of embedding for which better media management is required. But, one of the journalists considered that embedding happens in much smarter, much sharper way; we unfortunately in Pakistan are not good at it. Also, a cultural reporter and an economic affairs reporter may portray many things relating to terrorism. Cultural damage of Pakistan can be reported as a result of terrorism. In a question to key limitations for journalists covering Taliban conflict, the researchers explored following factors: Issues faced by journalists being embedded with military, information through embedding, military-media relationship, and major communication issue between the Inter Services Public Relations(ISPR) and media persons.

Issues faced by Journalists being Embedded with Military

In every conflict reporting, a journalist has to face some issues, but the nature of issues depends upon the conflict scenario. However, the researchers found that security is the main concern for journalists. They go in a military helicopter or in a military vehicle, and they feel equally vulnerable to be attacked by the enemy. Journalists are also threatened by militants for not covering their viewpoint. Along with security concerns, restriction to free reporting and limited access to conflict areas are also identified. Journalists highlighted that access to affected areas, limited freedom to reporting, dependency on military, and short time to collect information, are the main concerns for them. Since, day long visit is not enough for a journalist. Also, military people do not understand their requirements, because they do not have media exposure. Some journalists want to cover the other side of the story too, but if they do so they are claimed at wrong side. Also, journalists underlined that embedded journalists are taken as military agent. Consequently, people do not trust them. A senior journalist accentuated that if they go in the conflict zone with the security forces, the same people of Pakistan, they are not ready to believe them.

Information through Embedding

In this research, three main elements of information were questioned as if journalists obtain correct, extensive and timely news through embedding. Majority of the media persons stated they do not get timely information owing to the level of framework and lack of coordination. Information is released through a process that takes time. It is not released immediately and sometimes it is not extensive. It lacks

details. However, it is always factual. Besides, it depends upon the mental level of journalists that how they understand things. While, embedding system educates a journalist; without embedding, a journalist cannot report to that level of authenticity. Nothing is hidden in this era, so journalists get foremost information through embedment. It is one of the tools that media use to reveal the reality, because once a journalist is embedded, he gets to find different stories of the war zone that how soldiers are fighting there, under what conditions, what are the difficulties they face, what are the threats and so on. If embedded journalism is not implemented then people will not be getting this kind of information in national media as such.

Military-Media Relationship

The military-media relationship is not considered as friendly, but of interdependent. Journalists drew attention for better military-media relation. Media is considered as the fourth pillar of a state; therefore, they should be welcomed despite directing them. Media should go out in the field and report situations responsibly that needs active coordination based on friendly grounds. There is lack of trust on both sides. Once, trust deficit is decreased, things get better. Open communication helps to educate people in a better way that must be understood especially in terms of militants' conflict. Media persons laid emphasis on the responsibility of the military to guide journalists, to train them about different terms and aspects of military and conflicts. There is no education about the paradigm shifts and ideological changes in media. Journalists have access issues and military does not rely on journalists. Journalists concurred that media persons should report things responsibly in this regard. Everything should not be reported.

Military-media relation is very limited. Journalists do not have enough access to military department, for instance, the way they can easily access other departments. Additionally, military is about secrecy, whereas, media is about openness. They both need to understand each other's nature of job. Journalists should understand and respect military, that is in the state of war. Sensitive information is not only accessible to own people, but, it can also available to the enemy. Putting critical questions to military is a journalistic methodology, but putting allegations on military, while working on some agenda is something dangerous. Generally, the relationship between both institutions should be improved and liaison with defence journalists should be increased. Journalists suggested that media persons should be educated on different matters of warfare. There should be detailed briefing on issues, whereas, media should not show a speculative attitude in return. Journalists should change their viewpoint about military. There should be a balance between both sides. Journalists should be

responsible towards their work that will not harm national cause. While, military should tolerate media criticism, if it happens constructively.

Major Communication Issues between the ISPR and Journalists

Lack of communication and limited information provided by army are the major issues between military and media. Since, military personnel keep rotating due to the nature of their job, therefore, communication does not remain consistent between them. Also, human communication has been decreased owing to the usage of other communication ways, such as, Twitter and email that does not help in understanding the conflict in its true perspective. At least, once or twice in a month there should be an interaction, especially when a war against terror is going on. Journalists also pointed out the non-availability of footage, another major drawback that creates problems for broadcast media. Journalists' queries should be addressed in time, whereas, journalists should understand why they are given limited access. Previously, journalism was usually based on principles, but now it is more about commercialism. To be in media, a journalist has to compromise one way or the other. However, overall communication has been improved somehow. Military tries to respond and facilitate journalists as much as they can.

Embedded journalism in Pakistan is not fully implemented like other countries of the world. While, interviewing media persons, it was found that Print media journalists are not taken to conflict zone to that extent like broadcast media persons have been given enough opportunities. But, what has been achieved so far under the shadow of this journalism is probed within following terms: Embeds contribution to national security, embedded journalism as a good choice, framing of Taliban conflict by embedded journalists and suggestions for a successful embedding policy.

Journalists Contribution to National Security being Embedded with the Military

Journalists considered embedded journalism as an important tool to cover Taliban conflict, that significantly contributes towards national security. It may help portraying national security policies to the world, because using any medium, electronic or print, a journalist has a better understanding of the issue, and should be reported in such a way that it does not harm country's national security. Embedment's framework helps ensure national security especially for a country like Pakistan. It helps to know military point of view towards national security, and it also helps to understand different angles of things that a journalist cannot find in routine reporting.²²

Journalists believed that embedded journalism, in war against terror, is of great magnitude to counter militants' propaganda against the State. Embedding system is very much important for national security that has been compromised owing to the terrorized situations being prevailed in different areas of the country. Before being embedded, journalists never knew how militants terrorize people. Embedment helps making public opinion as it enlightens the realities of warfare, where security forces are fighting for their national cause. It helps to create a counter narrative against militants' perspective. Without embedding journalists, it would be tough to portray hidden facts to inform the public. Being embedded, a journalist brings the entire nation under one umbrella, while reflecting war through different angles; what is happening on ground with military forces. Journalists drew attention to the need of embeds in terms of national security owing to the current scenario of the country. Private broadcast media is not playing its due role, despite they work on their own agenda. In embedding system, a journalist gets training that helps the perspective of national security. Conversely, few journalists took it as a propaganda of some institutions that does not contribute to national security.

Embedded Journalism as a Good Choice

During personal communication, journalists gave enough prominence to the practice of embedment for both the government and military, because without embedment, how can a journalist report true picture of an issue. A journalist may find different aspects of an issue but can never understand the reality without embedment. Atif Khan, a defence reporter, pointed out that "without being embedded, actual details of a war cannot be found, and possibility is there that it might ignore the successes, military achieves". Journalists proposed that through embedding system, success stories of military can be published that may boost the morale of the military.²³ Journalists stressed repeatedly that embedment helps them to find answers of those questions that they have been answering by their own.²⁴ They assumed that the application of embedded journalism in war against terror is the need of time. It is a powerful tool in a war of narratives.

Framing Taliban Conflict by Journalists

Journalists identifies difference between embedded and non-embedded information. Embedded reports are more valued than non-embedded in terms of Taliban conflict, because embedment is based on facts and proofs that cannot rely on unconfirmed reports. An embedded report is credible enough to be rechecked, whereas, non-embedded information can be false or fabricated. Embedded reports are more authentic, more objective, more authoritative and closer to the facts. Journalists pointed out that Taliban reporting depends upon the level of exposure, a journalist has, because those journalists, who do not have enough exposure, their

reporting differs in many ways. Additionally, embedded reports are always detailed owing to their access to the affected area, whereas, non-embedded reports are based on theoretical, analytical and untrustworthy sources; such reports are written, while, sitting in office.²⁵ In fact, embedded information comes with a perspective, which is very important for the public to know about an issue, and also get primed about the measures taken by the State in this regard.

Besides, non-embeds highlight militants' perspective and also glorify them, which is wrong, because militants are not legitimate source. Journalists stressed that non-embeds should keep supreme national interest in view, while reporting about militants. Non-embeds should also report on those soldiers, who sacrifice their lives for the sake of nation, whereas, they only highlight terrorists.²⁶ But, in contrast, an independent journalist can report more freely and more truly. Additionally, it depends on the credibility of a reporter how he reports.

Suggestions for a Successful Embedding Policy

For a successful embedding policy, there should be a proper policy guideline. Journalists should be provided trainings to understand hostile environments of the war and learn different tactics to protect themselves. They are not even trained enough to cover a bomb blast. Journalists need to learn about government policies and military objectives regarding different issues. There should be open and better in-depth communication between military and journalists, because they have limited access to conflict zones owing to security concerns. However, they should be given access to those areas, which have been cleared by security forces and where IDPs have been returned.

Furthermore, media ethics and code of conduct should be reformed; media persons must know what is right and what is wrong. The ISPR department should give briefings and orientations to journalists and also educate them in war-reporting. Mock practices may help journalists understand war in a real-time situation. In Pakistan, embedding is not utilized to a better extent.²⁷ Journalists should be given access to conflict zone and should be allowed to report with their own angle under protected arrangements. Journalists believed that they can report fairly without compromising the national interest and nobody can question their report as a fabricated story. Additionally, government should not keep information hidden, because when things are covered, curiosity increases and journalists make assumptions that ultimately fume the speculations. It is also recommended that workshops and seminars should be conducted at national level. Sideeq Sajid, a defence journalist, emphasized that "the closer we come, the more information is exchanged, the more trust will be preserved". On the other hand, few journalists viewed embedding system as the need of the situation, it is not about making a

policy, but if any situation demands embedment then it should be implemented, otherwise it must not be imposed.

Conclusion

Embedded journalism is not employed in Pakistan up to that level as it has been adopted by other countries to cover conflicts, especially during Iraq War. In Pakistan, embedment is at an initial stage with many of the journalists not even knowing the term. This embedment seems to be a refined form of the pool system implied by Americans during Operation Grenada and Operation Panama. Embedded journalism brings a significant variation in the journalists' attitude. Before embedded journalism, journalists used to get news through their own sources, whose credibility always remained questionable. They had no idea about the battlefield, what actually happened in conflict zones, and how war terrain looked like.

Since, its large-scale implementation in Iraq War, embedded journalism is also under strict criticism. The reasons vary, such as, being embedded media is in bed with the military, or being embedded with their own security forces, journalists already have a clear definition of enemies. In this way, they report one sided stories whether in favour of security forces or against enemies. As a result, these elements hinder impartiality in reporting conflict. The military-media interpretation of being in bed is considered wrong by journalists because during conflicts, affected areas are not accessible without the help of military or on the contrary without the support of militants. If an embedded journalist is said to be in bed with security forces then non-embedded journalists can also be assumed to be in bed with militants. Thus, it is better to get embedded with military, because the information, they provide, may not breach national security. Moreover, having known their enemies does not mean journalism can be partial, standards of journalism should be followed that means news reporting is different than news analysis. A conflict should be reported as a conflict unless it goes against national security perspective. On the other hand, neutral approach seems a myth during conflicts. Working on one-sided approach affects the balance of reporting. But, then again, disseminating terrorists' words in media may go into the side of extremism that may spread the wrong picture in the society. Media should also be controlled to a degree that may not go against national cause, because, there comes a time when survival of the State and security of the citizen become essential.

Every media channel has set certain rules and regulations to follow. But, somehow, journalists' personal attitude is reflected in their reports. However, it is necessary for a journalist to be exposed to conflicts that may add to his knowledge and experiences that is ultimately mirrored in his reports. Social media, film and

cinema may also be used to make public mindset, whether in favour of military operations or against militancy. In fact, embedment has no alternative for war reporting. Regarding limitations pertaining to militancy reporting, security threats and limited access to conflict areas are the most common issues. Threats from militants are much common since media has started condemning militants and portraying military perspective. It has increased journalists' dependency on military, being on ground, for factual reporting. On the other hand, lack of coordination and direct communication between media and military, keeps a tight rein on conflict reporting. Military may understand the nature of media persons, who need facts and information in a timely manner. Besides this, journalists should also practice self-censorship. Therefore, both, military and media, need to understand that everything should not be reported as well as everything should not be censored.

Embedding system not only helps journalists to contribute to national security, but it also educates journalists to know military's perspective in this regard. Since embedment is taken as a propaganda tool working for the State institutions, therefore, it should be properly used in support of achieving national security objectives.

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²¹ The government of Pakistan established a 20-point action plan in January 2015 to put concentrated efforts on countering terrorism in the country and extending the ongoing anti-terrorist efforts in North-Western Pakistan.

²² In a personal interview, Ahmed Qureshi from NEO TV stated that “no amount of reading and no amount of research can answer some questions, and those questions always remain ambiguous and because of that ambiguity, there is always a chance you might misreport certain things or you become harsher than necessary”.

²³ Rana Asim, a senior correspondent from Samaa TV, discussed in a personal interview that “Media has a key role in such kind of scenario to boost the morale of the country men, and to boost the morale of the armed forces as well”.

²⁴ In a personal interview, a foreign media correspondent, Hamza Ameer said that “I think embedment is very important and it needs to be implemented with a clear direction, clear direction of dos and don’ts for journalists because still now we don’t have that”.

²⁵ While discussing the framing of media reports being embedded, Hamza Ameer highlighted that “now it is much better being embedded; now you have a guideline. You have certain limits, not defined limits but certain limits that I cannot fake a news. Black sheep in the vicinity are now no more in comfortable grounds because of embedded journalism”.

²⁶ Atif Khan from the Nation told about non-embedded journalists that “they have different agendas to follow whether to demoralize military or to create the bad image of Taliban”.

²⁷ While discussing embedment with military Haroon Rashid from BBC said that “It is not being used as a good propaganda tool”.

Lessons for Strategists

Chinese Policy, Strategy and Decision Making in Korean War (1950 – 1953)

*Lieutenant General Zahid Latif Mirza**

A*bstract:* Korean Peninsula remained epicentre of power politics amongst its three neighbouring powers, China, Japan and Russia, due to its geographical linkage as conduit to the Asian heartland from Japanese archipelago. This struggle had impacted socio-political and socio-economic outlook of the peninsula, yet its rulers managed to maintain its distinct culture throughout the ages. The Korean War of 1950 is an ideal case study for policy makers and strategists due to its complexity in terms of policy and war strategies, wherein the US, USSR and China pursued their divergent national objectives. This article focuses on the analysis of Chinese foreign policy, strategy and decision-making during Korean War (1950-1953), applying different theoretical lens and models.

Keywords: International Politics, Foreign Policy Formulation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy and Decision Making.

Introduction

Korean Peninsula remained epicentre of power politics amongst its three neighbouring powers, China, Japan and Russia, due to its geographical linkage as conduit to the Asian heartland from Japanese archipelago. This struggle had impacted socio-political and socio-economic outlook of the peninsula, yet its rulers managed to maintain its distinct culture throughout the ages. In the 19th century, the Western powers attempted to gain access to the region; fearing dilution of their culture and values, its rulers resisted by isolating themselves. This paved the way for occupation by Japanese (started at the end of the Joseon dynastic monarchy in Korea in 1910 and ended at the conclusion of World War II in 1945),¹ its exploitation and weakening to an extent that it was unable to cope with the challenges that post-World War period posed to it.

With the onset of Cold War era, the Korean Peninsula, due to its geostrategic location and socio-political landscape became the first contesting ground between capitalism and Marxist-socialism. The fall out resulted into emergence of North and South Korea, having opposing ideologies.

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The Korean conflict (1950-1953) is an ideal case study for foreign policy analysis as it signifies a paradigm policy shift in the post-Second World War era; wherein, the US, USSR and China aimed at keeping the war limited to the Korean Peninsula. The belligerents applied military power in pursuance of their foreign policy objectives and managed conflict under nuclear overhang. The United Nations (UN) with the US and Western support, sanctioned military action in support of South Korea. Chinese bold entry to the Korean Peninsula to support the DPRK against the US/UN troops turned war into a Chinese-American conflict with festering insecurity in the Korean Peninsula even today. The war re-invigorated proxies that were to become a key characteristic of the Cold War for coming decades.²

Historical Perspective

The Korean Peninsula was a conduit for access to Asian heartland from the Pacific. Chinese and Japanese, thus, contested for influence with Russians getting attracted to it in the mid-17th century. Centuries of struggle established trends for competing powers to exercise influence over the region through various leverages.

Korea Under Japanese Colonialism

Korea had long been a Chinese protectorate before Japanese occupation.³ In the late nineteenth century, the Korean Peninsula, as a whole, witnessed contested influences of China, Russia, and Japan. Rapidly industrializing Japan especially after Sino-Japanese's War (1895) was eyeing on Korea and Manchuria for its industrial and agricultural expansion. Japanese influence over Korea was cultivated after Russian defeat in 1905 by Japanese. Japan successfully took control of Korea in 1910 and renamed it as Chosen.

Japanese occupation of Korea lasted until 1945, when they were finally defeated in the World War II. From 1910 to 1945, Koreans bore the brunt of Japanese atrocities and struggled to maintain their culture. Japanese colonial rule remained exacting and ambivalent for Koreans. Till 1920, Japanese military ruthlessly crushed dissenting ideas in Korean masses. However, it was early 1919, when after a nationwide protest against Japanese colonialism, a limited degree of freedom of speech was allowed for Koreans. Despite the oppressive Japanese rule, Korean society grew considerably as Japanese toiled to enrich Japan for fighting wars in China and the Pacific. Urbanization, commerce growth, development of mass communication and Industrial development became widespread.

Post-World War I to World War II

Korean nationalists attempted to gain independence from the Japanese Colonial rule at the peace conference in Paris (1919). In Seoul and Shanghai, shadow governments

were established, but no success was achieved. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia inspired Korean Communist Movement in Manchuria and Eastern Serbia, where thousands of Koreans were living in exile. The provisional government in Shanghai attempted to gain independence, but the exiled community was too scattered to achieve any meaningful impact.

During the pre-Second World War, Koreans were divided into two political factions with confronting ideologies; the leftists influenced by Marxism-Leninism (Russian and Chinese Communists) and the rightists influenced by Western Liberal ideas. Within each political thought, there were numerous factions, but the significant ones were those associated with Russians and Chinese, the Liberalist exiled government in the US under Syngman Rhee and communists exiled government in Shanghai.⁴

During the World War II, Japan reintroduced harsh measures. Koreans were subjected to forced labour in Japanese factories and were sent to different war fronts, as soldiers. An estimated 2 million Koreans served Japan during the war, of which 1,340,000 were repatriated after the war.⁵ Following Cairo Conference (December, 1943), it was decided that Japan would be expelled from Korea and with its independence restored.⁶ It was also concluded that Chinese territories under Japanese occupation would be restored and that China would have a pre-eminent role in the post-war Asia.⁷ With the establishment of a Chinese Nationalist Government aided by the US in Taiwan, the decision of Cairo Conference became a source of concern for Mao as it threatened to place the Nationalists in Korea. At the Yalta Conference, in return for favours in China and outer Mongolia, Stalin promised President Roosevelt that he would not support Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the internal conflict of China.⁸ This severely offended Mao and the CCP.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviets declared war on Japan followed by amphibious landing by Soviet troops. The US feared Soviet occupation of whole of Korea and proposed the 38th Parallel to demarcate zones of occupation between Soviets and Americans.⁹ The Soviet Union immediately accepted the division and an agreement was incorporated into the General Order for surrender of Japan. On 27 December 1945, at Moscow Conference, a trusteeship in respective zones across the 38th Parallel for a period of five years, was established. This was to function till such time that Koreans formed their own unified government.¹⁰ The Soviets and Americans failed to reach an agreement on a unified Korean government, and in 1948, two separate governments were established, each claiming to be the legitimate government of all Korea; the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Seoul, in the American Zone, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Pyongyang, in the Soviet Zone.¹¹

Social-political Dynamics (North Korea)

The Japanese colonial rule established in 1905, forced thousands of Koreans to migrate to Russia and China (primarily from north due to its geographical contiguity to China and Russia), where they not only got politically indoctrinated, but also participated in the Revolution. This indoctrination affected the political landscape of Korea, making it easy for establishment of a communist regime in North Korea, very quickly. The Soviets successfully articulated North Korea and ensured that Communist Party retained Leninist communism and remained closely attached to Moscow. Soviet Union strengthened Kim Il Sung regime, 1948 onward.

Kim prompted unification by force, which Stalin did not agree, considering possibility of US intervention. Kim fermented a communist movement in South Korea, while demanding withdrawal of foreign troops from the Peninsula, which was accomplished by January 1950.¹² Despite enjoying ideological affinities and revolutionary bondages with China, Kim did not confide to Mao for his plans for unification unless endorsed by Stalin as he never wanted increased influence of Mao. Instead, Kim was even weary of communist sympathizers of CCP in his government and kept resisting Chinese assistance unless overwhelmed by UN forces.

Social-political Dynamics (South Korea)

The common people of Korea were subjected to a long period of oppression, both by ruling elite of Chosen Dynasty and Japanese colonial powers. After Soviet acceptance of the 38th Parallel and forming of trusteeship for Korea, US forces landed at Inchon on September 8, 1945 and a military government was established in South Korea. Liberalist ideas and American modernist social values appealed to the elite significantly and they were quick to absorb the new-found independence. Nevertheless, under ill experienced Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the US military had no knowledge of the language, culture or political situation. Thus, many of their policies had unintended destabilizing effects. Deadlocked between the Soviet Union and the US over the issue of establishing a national government for Korea prolonged and in September 1947, with no solution in sight, the US submitted the Korean question to the UN General Assembly.

The UN General Assembly called for an UN-supervised general election in Korea, but due to North's refusal, general election for a Constitutional Assembly took place only in the South, during May 1948, ending up establishing a Presidential form of government in South Korea.

Syngman Rhee, a man with dubious loyalty branded as candidate of elite was appointed as head of the Government, which caused frustration and resentment amongst lower classes. Social, political and economic injustice by the Rhee

Administration gave credence to communist ideas being implemented in the North, thereby, establishing a strong communist undercurrent. Political and economic chaos arising from a variety of causes plagued South Korea in this period and these systemic weaknesses became pivotal in facilitating invasion by North Korea.

Post-World War II (Foreign Policy Perspective)

Foreign policy perspective of key stakeholders, pre-Korean War era, can be perceived by capturing the prevailing global and regional environment of that time in the immediate aftermath of World War II. It was the beginning of a long struggle between communist revolutionaries and the Western Capitalist World. Many of the popular thesis projecting a prolonged stint of relative peace, demise of large scale conventional conflicts and unchallengeable invincibility of US military might after nuking Japan, were also to be proven fallacious, sooner than expected. Far East was to witness the first limited war and one of the bloodiest manifestations of the Cold War on Korean Peninsula.

The United States (USA)

After Second World War, once the US under President Truman was committed in post-war recovery of European countries, the influence of communism with the USSR, establishing governments across Eastern Europe including Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, was growing exponentially. China, North Korea, Vietnam, Malaya, and other countries also witnessed rise of communist movements. Reciprocally, in 1947, US President launched 'Truman Doctrine' expressing US commitment to render politico-military and economic assistance to all democratic nations against external or internal threats. Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented the US foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the US to the one with built-in possibility of intervention in far-away conflicts. With Russian influence getting more pronounced, NATO alliance was established extending security umbrella to allies in Europe.¹³ Serious confrontation between the US and the Soviets led to the partition of Germany into Eastern and Western halves.

The National Security Policy document-1950 of the US, highlighted formidable power of the USSR and termed the Soviet-system as a serious threat with dangerous potentialities for weakening relative position of the US, and disrupting its traditional institutions by means, short of war.¹⁴ In Eurasia, the US resorted to containment of Soviet domination through armed aggression or by political and subversive means. In the Pacific region, after disbanding the Imperial Army of Japan, the US was maintaining significant military presence. US monolithic view of all communist

movements denied Mao's desire to develop relations with the US; rather US administration continued to support Kuomintang.¹⁵

Some of the US policy objectives (as perceived from available data) bearing direct relevance to Korea and Far East are:

- Global containment of communism (saving the next domino) by extending assistance to forces of freedom pursuing the Western democratic ideals.¹⁶
- Protection of US strategic and economic interests in the Far East.
- Drawing a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, capitalizing on existing divergences and fault lines.¹⁷

The Soviet Union (USSR)

The USSR, being a major stable player, was influencing geo-strategic developments in Eastern as well as Western Europe by converting coalition governments of East European states into Communist regimes.¹⁸ The Soviet conquest of Germany coupled with overall victory over axis powers bolstered Russian nationalism and their dislike for the US hegemonic and capitalist designs.

Stalin sought refinement of internal issues by using external threat as means of exerting control over party affairs internally. Rallying under leadership of Stalin, Soviet military emerged more powerful and, thus, acted as a deterrent against centrifugal forces. Development of nuclear weapons further allowed the USSR to extend influence over other countries. The Soviet Union wanted to limit powers of Japan, creating conditions for it to remain so in the Pacific theatre.¹⁹ The Chinese revolutionary struggle was successfully expanding communist influence in Asia; however, Stalin was suspicious of Mao and feared China becoming a US ally²⁰ or Mao becoming Tito.

The ultimate political aim of the USSR can be inferred as establishment of Soviet dominance in South-East Asia, promoting communism and exploiting regional resources for economic recovery. Nevertheless, Soviets were not seen seeking confrontation with the US instead preferred using political means accompanied by calibrated use of military intimidation for pursuing national security interests.²¹ It was, not as late as December 1945, when, Stalin realized that in prevalent environment, controlling Pusan, Inchon and Cheju Island was not possible; and hostility of right-wing South Koreans and politically dominant elite of South Korea, due to their economic advantages, barricaded possibility of installing a unified pro-Russian Government. Soviet objectives were modified from seeking to establish friendly government in Korea to installing a friendly government "North of the 38th Parallel." Russian leadership appeared pursuing following policy in the Far East:

- Avoiding physical intervention leading to direct confrontation with the US, while extending political, diplomatic, financial and military hardware support to communist revolutionaries worldwide.
- Enhancing Soviet influence over China and North Korea pre-eminently playing a trusteeship role over Korea.²²
- Sponsoring communist uprising for establishing physical control over Pusan, Inchon and Cheju Island.²³
- Dissuading Chinese from forcible integration of Taiwan, reducing possibility of armed intervention by the US in Taiwan/China.²⁴
- Liquidation of political and economic interests of West and Japan in Korean Peninsula.

North Korea

The North Korean Communist regime had a historic association with CPC with its leader Kim II Sung having fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria during the WW II. A large number of ethnic Koreans also fought as part of PLA during Chinese civil war. As the threat of American direct intervention in Chinese civil war began to recede in the 2nd half of 1949, an estimated 50,000-70,000²⁵ ethnic Korean PLA soldiers returned to North Korea in the fall of 1949 and spring of 1950, on the request of Kim II Sung. By January 1950, North Korean military strength with assistance of the USSR and China rose to 10 Divisions (including T-34 tanks and 122 mm Guns), 200 aircraft and a navy with amphibious and battleships.²⁶ Mao favoured establishment of Communist rule in a unified Korea,²⁷ but was, somehow, ambivalent about intimacy of Kim's Soviet connection.²⁸ Mao was also not initially keen for Chinese military intervention in the Korean conflict, unless occupation of complete Korean peninsula by Americans was seemingly unavoidable. Kim's envisaged policy parameters for Korean War were:

- Unification of the Korean Peninsula under the Communist regime, led by Kim-II Sung, capitalizing over prevailing disillusionment of masses in South Korea from Syngman Rhee's corrupt regime with assured Sino-Soviet political, moral and military support.
- Application of military instrument for serving political aim of unification, exploiting favourable regional environment (in the aftermath of communist victory in neighbouring China and presence of strong communist undercurrent in South Korea), and seizing the opportunity through application of superior military strength (further bolstered by repatriation of over 70,000 Korean veterans with arms and ammunition on Kim's request) in a relative vacuum in South after departure of US contingent.

South Korea

Being low at US strategic priority, the US rendered limited military support to South Korea.²⁹ As of 25 June 1950, the ROK Army had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks, and a small air force comprising 22 airplanes. There were no large foreign military garrisons in Korea at the time of the invasion, but there were large US garrisons and air forces in Japan.³⁰ In the absence of assured protection, in case of an attack on the lines of NATO, South Korea became vulnerable to invasion. Moreover, the South Korean Army was extensively involved in counter insurgency operations against communists and lacked combat preparation and training to fight conventional battles.

Brief Account of Korean War

Strategic Geography of Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula protrudes out and splits the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea and contains a complex geographic environment involving nations and resources from the whole region. The Yalu River separates the Korean Peninsula from China in the Northwest, and the Duman River separates Korea from China and Russia in the Northeast. The Korean Strait in South always served as the doorway for the invading forces. This creates a significant strategic vulnerability for China. Chinese 1000-mile long border with Korea would turn insecure in presence of hostile forces in the peninsula, thus, a strategic concern for China.

Korea's rivers and mountains have served as a lifeline and deathbeds for millions, who sought to use the physical landscape for war. Korea's climatic and geographic conditions are a nightmare for military planning, thus, a good military strategy and tactical brilliance are pre-requisites for success.

Politico-Military Objectives and Opposing Strategies of Belligerents

North Korea

The unification of entire Korean Peninsula under the Communist regime was espoused by North. It was clear to the North Korean regime that their political aim is not achievable without massive application of military instrument to dislodge South's government and liberalist forces with the already consented Sino-Soviet assistance. The strategy was:

- Employment of superior forces for speedy Southwards advance on multiple axes, overwhelming South Korean responses culminating operations, capturing Pusan, destroying maximum possible South Korean armed forces in the process.

- Inciting Communist-sponsored internal uprising (estimated strength 200,000) to embroil South Korean forces in depth.
- Capture airports of Seoul and Pohang to deny landing of foreign forces.
- Completing the military operation swiftly before foreign intervention.

United States' Politico-Military Objectives

Initially, the US entered the war with limited politico-military objectives³¹ of restoring authority of the Republic of Korea and project US credibility as guarantor against the Communist expansionist drive sponsored by Sino-Soviet alliance.³² Subsequently, after a spectacular success of military campaign, the US enlarged its politico-military objectives for complete dislodging of Communist foothold from the Korean Peninsula and eliminating perennially looming threat to ROK permanently, by securing a buffer, North of the 38th Parallel. The US politico-military objectives were premised on following strategic assumptions:

- Major Chinese or Soviet forces are not present in North Korea.
- There is no announced intention of entry or threat of countering military operations by the UN forces in North Korea by the Chinese or Soviet forces.

The US faced altogether a new war after Chinese intervention triggered by unimpeded development of UN/US operations continued North of the 38th Parallel till, the Yalu River disregarding Chinese concerns and repeated warnings. Thereon, the US recalibrated its politico-military objectives for third time in the Korean War and wanted to retain its military gains North of the 38th Parallel avoiding further escalation of hostilities and expansion of war into Chinese territory across the Yalu River contrary to MacArthur's desire for strategic bombing of Manchuria. The military strategy can be defined in following phases:

- **Phase-I (Operations for Restoration of the 38th Parallel)**
 - Undertaking amphibious landing in sufficient depth inflicting strategic military surprise.
 - Rapid expansion of beach head, re-capturing Seoul (ROK's capital), severing North-South strategic communication, cutting North Korea's logistics and routes of withdrawal.
 - Undertake swift and bold enveloping manoeuvre and destroying maximum possible North Korean forces by linking up with ROK/US forces in Pusan perimeter.
 - Destruction of all DPRK forces and elimination of communist sympathizers, thus, securing area till the 38th Parallel.

- **Phase-II (Operations North of the 38th Parallel)**
 - Continue manoeuvre of exploitation in pursuit of withdrawing DPRK forces North of the 38th Parallel, endeavouring complete destruction of any residential military potential of North Korea.
 - Dislodging the North's Communist regime by occupying Pyongyang and securing area till the Yalu River as buffer zone.
- **Phase-III (Operations Post Chinese Intervention)**
 - Retention of military gains without expanding the war any further.
 - Deterring PRC from further expanding military operations against US forces and allies by interposing 7th Fleet in Taiwan Strait (between Taiwan and mainland).
 - Maximum possible attrition of joint Sino-Korean forces, adroitly using superior airpower, artillery and armour firepower.
- **Limitations.** While giving liberty of action to the Pacific Commander, following limitations were laid down:³³
 - The UN/US forces will not cross into Manchuria or the USSR.
 - No non-Korean forces will be utilized close to Sino-Soviet borders.
 - Air action against Manchuria or the USSR will not be conducted.

Chinese Politico-military Objectives

Mao was not keen to seek military intervention in Korea confronting the UN/US forces with known superiority in hi-tech airpower, firepower and above all nuclear weapons. China entered the war with limited politico-military objectives of restoring the North Korean control till pre-war boundary at the 38th Parallel, thereby, securing the lost buffer between mainland China and US forces, and deterring the US for expanding the conflict any further. The officially issued order to the Chinese People Volunteers by Mao directed “to support the Korean People’s liberation war and resist American imperialists’ aggression in order to protect the common interests of Korean people, Chinese people and all peoples of the East; the Chinese People Volunteers to enter Korea immediately. They should assist the Korean comrades fight the war against the invaders and strive for glorious victory”.³⁴

Nevertheless, after successfully pushing back the UN forces, South of the 38th Parallel, China expanded its politico-military objectives (rejecting international calls for ceasefire) and aimed for total elimination of the ROK forces and UN footprint (especially US forces) from the Korean Peninsula as a national security imperative. Being unable to overwhelm the UN forces despite repeated large-scale offensives, spread over the years, Chinese re-calibrated their politico-military objectives to retain control of area North of the 38th Parallel (pre-war boundary), while

endeavouring to aggressively inflict casualties on the UN forces till final signing of armistice. The military strategy includes:

- All assaulting forces (Chinese People's Volunteers)³⁵ to cross the River Yalu, before crossing sites are destroyed by UN/US airpower.
- Lure in maximum possible allied forces in pre-selected killing zones and annihilate by well-coordinated encircling manoeuvre mostly during night, capitalizing on superior knowledge of terrain and offensive spirit.
- Conducting operations with maximum possible speed against ROK Army's Divisions and UN forces with overwhelming numbers and with maximum possible momentum for total elimination to annihilate them and compensate for lack of firepower.
- Taking requisite safe guards against superior UN/US airpower, resorting to unconventional tactics at night (where possible) capitalizing superior knowledge of terrain.
- Encouraging uprising among Korean People against Imperialist Forces.
- Remaining close to Imperialist forces precluding possibility of employing nuclear weapons.
- Inflicting maximum possible casualties by continuous probing and aggressive actions to erode enemy's will to fight and making this war unviable for UN/US in cost benefit equation.

War South of the 38th Parallel

On 25 June 1950, North Korean massive offensive was unleashed across the 38th Parallel, leading to routing out defenders at each thrust line. On 27 June 1950, the North Korean forces captured Seoul, and by 4th July 1950, line Suwon - Samchok was secured, inflicting heavy losses to the South Korean forces. Failing in mounting coherent defensive effort, the South Korean forces and government offices fell back to Pusan. President Truman ordered US air and naval forces (present in Japan) to assist South Korea on 27 June 1950. Some elements of the US 24th Infantry Division were transported from Japan in a haste, which posed some delay to advancing forces, while withdrawing to Pusan. By 14th of July 1950, Taejon - Yongju, and 25th of July 1950, Kwangju - Hamchang had capitulated. Insignificant impact from Communist guerrilla and stretched logistics gradually slowed down the



North Korean advance. Depleted the 24th US Infantry Division and remainder of the South Korean forces gradually fell to Pusan and perimeter defence was taken up. Meanwhile, forces from the 8th Army and some allied troops kept pouring into Pusan strengthening the foothold. A concerted effort by North Koreans to take Pusan perimeter by 10 September 1950, failed. Air interdiction of North Korean logistics continued and took a heavy toll.

Restoration of the 38th Parallel by UN/US Forces

On outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950, the US took the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC in Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950, recommended that “member states render such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security.”³⁶ The resolution also called for the North Korean Army to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th Parallel. The USSR had boycotted the UN since January 1950, hence, could not veto the resolution.

Following North Korean offensive, President Truman came under tremendous pressure to act decisively against the Communism. Inaction would have been damaging internationally as well as domestically.³⁷ General MacArthur successfully executed a risky amphibious landing on 15 September 1950, and by 17 September 1950, Inchon was captured. Surprised landing, successful air interdiction of logistics of the North Korean forces by US air arm caused heavy attrition on the North Korean Forces.³⁸ By 22 September 1950, the 8th US Army alongside UN forces commenced the pursuit of withdrawing North Korean forces. Meanwhile, US marines began their assault on Seoul, which fell by 28 September 1950, and by 29 September 1950, the 38th Parallel had been restored.

War North of the 38th Parallel


Capitalizing on quick military success in the restoration of 38th Parallel, the US also expanded its war aims to end the Korean crisis, while maximizing gained military advantage. MacArthur had envisioned crossing the 38th Parallel to destroy the North Korean forces, if required. NSC 81/1, issued after NSC 81, allowed conduct of operations North of the 38th Parallel, however, put caution on ground-commanders from getting involved in a war with China or the Soviet Union.³⁹ On 2 October 1950, the UN/US forces pushed North of the 38th Parallel. On



19 October 1950, Pyongyang fell and by 31 October 1950, the advancing forces had reached the Yalu River.

Chinese Intervention

The US ambitious pursuit of military victory and continued advance till the Yalu River (getting in a position to directly threatening Chinese Manchuria), despite repeated Chinese warnings, triggered Chinese entry into the Korean War as a strategic compulsion⁴⁰ In a deceptive and concealed move, the Chinese forces closed in and started probing attacks from 25 October to 7 November 1950, to ascertain enemy weaknesses and strengths.⁴¹ Chinese attacks were crippling, as they were executed in the cover of darkness with overwhelming numbers. Chinese successfully re-captured Pyongyang in first week of December and subsequently, pushed the US/UN forces South of the 38th Parallel. Under growing pressure from allies, Americans



approached the UN for a ceasefire, which was rejected by the Chinese, since it did not call for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. On New Year's Eve, the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) commenced offensive and captured the area up to 37th Parallel by first week of January 1951. Extended line of logistic, massive counter attacks by the UN/US forces, and mounting casualties of the Chinese forces compelled China to abandon plan to unify Korea by force. By March 1951, the situation stabilized and hostilities were ceased. Despite Chinese resource constraints and military weakness vis-à-vis US-led coalition, negation of ceasefire offers prolonged the war for over 2 years; adding to the number of casualties and finally, ending it into a stalemate with contested notion of victory (nevertheless, even achievement of stalemate has universally been acknowledged a victory for the weaker side and Chinese in this case) with final signing of Armistice, generally, at pre-war position on 27 July, 1953.⁴²



Appraisal of Mao's China Foreign Policy Perspective

A comprehensive foreign policy analysis with a diverse geo-economic, civilizational and ideological linkages emanating out of the Cold War legacy may require a voluminous study by itself; thus, not being endeavoured. Instead, only some of the Chinese Foreign Policy objectives and their contextual understanding bearing direct relevance to the Korean War (as perceived from available material and scholarly understanding of the subject), are the focus of deliberations in ensuing paragraphs.

Fundamental Considerations/Factors for Framing Post-1949 Chinese Foreign Policy

Foreign policy of any state is the ultimate reflection of national ideals and aspirations, hence; pursuit of revolutionary ideals was a strategic priority for the CCP leadership. After military victory and consolidation of Communist-hold through establishment of formal governmental structures or state institutions, classic manifestation of socialist system was envisaged. Needless to say, that all this was in utter defiance of Western ideals of the Capitalist world.

The unprecedented exuberance of geo-economic integration, being pursued by today's China without discrimination of West or East, was simply unthinkable and beyond the realms of possibility for the CCP leadership of pre-Korean war years. Instead, a deep-rooted sense of mistrust and insecurity thriving on Chinese exploitation by the Western Imperialists, and Japanese was the currency of the day. The Chinese foreign policy decision-making was predicated on disdainful West led by the US, breeding perennial insecurity for the Communist revolutionary regimes all over the globe.

The Chinese Revolution was considered as great victory against the Imperialist world, and a source of inspiration for others; hence, it was considered an obligation for China to support all such struggles across the globe. By supporting revolutionaries, in fact, Mao and the CCP leadership envisaged emergence of a more balanced world order in the long run. Henceforth, Mao's strategic alignment with the Soviet Union was the only rationale choice from Communist perspective (experience of national humiliation stood at the centre of Chinese political culture and became a major factor for attracting Chinese youth towards Communism in the early 20th century).

Deeply influenced by dialectic Chinese strategic culture, defining crisis as a combination of danger and opportunity, Mao treated the Korean crisis as an opportunity as well as a challenge (test case), from the very beginning. Mao simply viewed handling of the Korean crisis with CCP's ability to rule China, while safeguarding its prestige and national interests.⁴³

On the eve of Communist victory, Mao personally formulated the three main components of foreign policy of new regime. Although, five-men CCP-secretariat, which was equivalent to the present-day Standing Committee of Politburo, held discussions over new policy orientation; however, its true role was lend legitimacy to major policy decisions made by Mao. After experiencing difficulties in handling foreign affairs, Mao appointed Zhou Enlai as his manager. Zhou Enlai helped bridge gap between Mao (who never travelled abroad before this trip to Moscow) and Stalin, and negotiated the Treaty of Sino-Soviet Alliance.⁴⁴ In nutshell, Mao, being a revolutionary leader, strongly believed that he needed to maintain the momentum of his revolution by mobilizing masses; hence, adoption of a revolutionary foreign policy, had a great relevance.⁴⁵

Chinese Perceived Foreign Policy Framework

The Chinese foreign policy preceding, during the Korean War, is to be essentially understood with Mao's three-pronged diplomatic strategy. His strategic orientation, publicly expressed in his famous speech at the 2nd Plenum Party Congress on 30 June, 1949, reads as: "Externally unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world, which treat us as an equal and unite with peoples of all countries. That is ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the people's democracies, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an International United Front ... We must lean to one side."⁴⁶ Other two principles, not made public, were: Starting a new kitchen (Ling qi luzao); and cleaning up the house before inviting guests (Dasao ganjing fangzi zai qingke).⁴⁷ The perceived Chinese foreign policy objectives are:

- Creation of favourable regional environment for fulfilment of domestic agenda of the CCP, envisioned in the immediate aftermath of successful revolutionary struggle was as under:
 - Further strengthen Communist's position in China; consolidation of Chinese revolutionary success by elimination of reactionaries, remnants of US sponsored/inspired sympathizers of nationalists, countering anti-Communist elements, and landlords with large land holdings.
 - Unification of China including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
 - Establishment of Communist political infrastructure and institutions for efficient governmental functioning and undertaking socialist reforms at mass scale.
 - Economic reconstruction of China.
- Exporting revolution to neighbouring regions and extending assistance to communist revolutionaries, especially in Taiwan, neighbouring Indo-China,

and subsequently, to Laos, Philippines, Myanmar, Malaya, Nepal and even India. Mao strongly believed that spread of Communism beyond China's frontiers would contribute towards enhanced security of China.⁴⁸

- Emergence as a beacon of revolutionary struggles against Western values under the overall auspices of the Soviet Union, challenging Western democratic ideals and capitalistic imperialism. Mao, in fact, repeatedly and unambiguously termed Western Capitalist World led by the US as imperialists and the Soviet Union as an undisputed leader of anti-imperialist forces of the free world.⁴⁹
- Claiming the rightful place of China internationally, dispelling impressions about a weak and stagnant society.
- Deterring and avoiding military confrontation with any of its neighbours, regional or extra regional power, unless vital national interests are threatened and use of force becomes unavoidable.⁵⁰
- Reflecting aspirations of domestic populace, dominated by CCP's domestic agenda and Communist's world view.
- The Chinese foreign policy was, primarily, anti-imperialist with no respect for the US or Western democratic and capitalistic ideals, thus, the ideological conflict with the West was inevitably ingrained in the very nature of the Chinese Foreign Policy, right from the start considering the US⁵¹ as epicentre of threats, emanating from Western hemisphere.

In nutshell, Chinese foreign policy orientation towards Korea was anchored in safety of Sino-Korean border, promoting CCP's authority and credibility at home and enhancing China's prestige at international scene.⁵²

Evaluation of Chinese Foreign Policy During Korean War

From 1949 to 1976, Mao, as the Chairman of CPC and CMC and till 1958, as State President, dominated China's foreign policy formulation and decisions. Mao's role in key decisions that determined the fundamental orientation of the Chinese Foreign Policy, that propelled China into wars or military confrontations with foreign power, are clearly illustrative of the centralized and personalized nature of these decisions.⁵³

As a result of the Chinese Civil War, the Communist Party of China came into power without any outside support, and sought unification of China.⁵⁴ With the baggage of humiliation (exploitation of Chinese by Western imperialists) in hindsight, the US continued support to Nationalists was seen by Mao as interference in China's internal affairs. Despite brewing complexity of ideological, geo-political and socio-economic challenges, Mao's China exercised great autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. This initially autonomous foundation was to become the

bedrock of independent foreign policy endeavours of Chinese leadership earning them universal respect.

Despite, Stalin's betrayal,⁵⁵ the Chinese leadership displayed a lot of maturity in keeping Soviets engaged for provision of military hardware and advice being the only source. Any discernible friction in Sino-Soviet relations during the Korean crisis could have greatly embolden the US and curtailed Chinese freedom of action at geopolitical and strategic-cum-operation levels. Despite some ripples in Sino-Soviet alliance, China maintained a constructive relationship with the USSR even in the aftermath, nevertheless, suboptimal Soviet support in the Korean War did sow the seeds of discord (which was to materialize a few years later with both getting further distanced from each other).

After outbreak of hostilities, the CCP leadership quickly decided to postpone the PLA's Taiwan campaign plan to focus on Korea.⁵⁶ On 2 October 1950, Mao called an emergency meeting to conclude decision of intervention into the war. Mao in a telegraph informed Stalin about CCP decision of sending troops to fight the US in Korea and to aid Chinese Korean comrades. Mao rightfully identified it as a necessary step and a compulsion⁵⁷ as he believed that in case of US victory, Americans would adopt unfavourable policy to the whole East.

Notwithstanding Mao's revolutionary character traits, Chinese top decision-making in the Korean crisis fits well into rational actor model. Realizing the inevitability of military confrontation with the US, Chinese leadership astutely opted for the Korean Peninsula to fight the superior enemy at the venue of own choice (out of available choices – Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam). By giving repeated ultimatums to US-led coalition for stopping at the 38th Parallel, Chinese successfully garnered much desired domestic support (including consensus in middle and lower tiers of communist elite). Chinese military intervention was legitimately projected as a purely defensive action from moral high ground for a just cause, serving vital national security interests albeit with a limited international appeal.⁵⁸ In the absence of assured Soviet support, Chinese military intervention into Taiwan or Vietnam at that point of time could have been branded as continuation of Soviet inspired row of Communist conquest and an unprovoked aggression by China with the greater possibility of the US declaring war on China in the absence of assured Soviet support. Hence, Mao's strategic choices for military engagement in Taiwan, Vietnam and South Korea, based on deeper understanding of volatile regional developments, were very clearly and convincingly defined at policy tier.⁵⁹

Being fully cognizant of US naval and air superiority vis-à-vis Chinese logistics and operational limitations, military intervention coloured into a just defensive response with North Koreans fighting in first ranks and Chinese volunteers

supporting them with pledged Soviet support. Fighting in Korea was much facilitated as compared to anywhere else, because of terrain familiarization, geographical contiguity, socio-cultural similarities, racial affinities and logistic ease. Subsequent developments vindicated pragmatism of this rational choice.⁶⁰

MacArthur or the US government decision to cross the 38th Parallel and occupying spaces South of the Yalu River, with American military presence right on Chinese border, created an extreme vulnerability for China. Hence, remaining aloof from such a consequential development on its Eastern border was not an option for China anymore. As it was pre-determined by US administration that Sino-Soviet alliance is behind Kim's aggression on ROK and US fleet was already moved to participate in the Korean War as well as interpose in Taiwan Strait.⁶¹ Hence, the argument that China lost chance for unification of Taiwan due to unwarranted military intervention in Korean conflict does not stand ground.

Above, notwithstanding, some Western scholars identify multiple reasons for Chinese entry (with a grand strategic agenda)⁶² into the Korean War. Michael Hunt is certainly right, when he argues that "any effort to pin down the exact motive behind Mao's decision to intervene must enter a mind as complicated as the crisis it wrestled with."⁶³ However, the CCP core, with its own world's view, and Mao in command could not rightly grasp the American resolve, strategic interests and compulsions. The CCP leadership underestimated US commitment in Far East, primarily overplaying some assumptions as under:⁶⁴

- The US has committed itself to Europe, Asia and everywhere in the world; it could not hold all fronts.
- The US being located halfway across the earth from East in Western hemisphere would find it extremely difficult to logistically and operationally sustain military campaign in the Korean Peninsula.
- The US had limited human resource to fight in such remote foreign land of Korea. Chinese estimated that out of 1.45 million US serving soldiers, around 2/3rd are either inexperienced or non-combatants.
- The US had no support of allies, since Japan and Germany had not been rearmed and Britain, France and Italy were no longer great military powers.

Swayed by preconceived US flawed constraints the CCP leadership embarked on an endeavour to administer a comprehensive defeat to the US,⁶⁵ and further overlooked three crucial factors⁶⁶ and highly consequential realities relating to the US East-Asian policy: Intimate US ties with Syngman Rhee government warranted saving an ally as well as salvaging US credibility; Truman's administration was already being criticized for its failure to maintain non-Communist China and further

appeasement to North Korea would have been political suicide; and the US East-Asian policy underwent a major change after CCP's victory in China and Soviet passion for atomic bomb.

Chinese leadership was convinced that the diplomatic relations are to be established on the basis of mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial integrity, hence, new regime would not be in a rush to establish diplomatic relations with imperialist countries before its power was well consolidated.⁶⁷ Though, a morally upright standpoint, but pushed China towards further isolation from the US and the West. Chinese embryonic state already disdainful of the US got into a perennial conflict with the superpower, hence, access to Western markets, trade and commerce and hi-tech remained limited (and China remained unrecognized) for decades. During this period, Chinese dependence on the USSR became inescapable despite Soviet betrayals/riddles, thus, Mao's dream of economic reconstruction and socio-economic uplift suffered setbacks.

It is perceptible that the CCP leadership persuaded by Mao (for military intervention in Korea) initially entered the war for ensuring physical security of Chinese borders and reclaiming some buffer zone in North Korea at best. But, subsequently, the CCP leadership started pursuing a glorious military victory against UN coalition with complete elimination of Western footprint from the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁸ Being on a winning trajectory, Chinese envisioned a new international order in East Asia with balance of power out rightly tilting in Communist's favour (in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War); however, this dream remains seriously challenged by the US till to date.⁶⁹

Efficacy of Chinese Military Strategy in Serving Ends of Policy

Despite serious constraints in military hardware, access to hi-tech, domestic challenges, absence of air force and tangible air defence capability (with serious mismatch between ends and means) served the ends of policy in multiple ways. Consequently, PLA military commander, Marshal Peng Dehuai was elevated to the post of Defence Minister and entrusted with the sacred responsibility of revamping of PLA war machine on modern footings based on the experiences of the Korean War. Some of the vital policy objectives achieved through successful application of military instrument are being highlighted here.

The principle definition of war by Clausewitz clearly describes war as a continuation of policy by other means. With un-shattered determination, PLA pushed back, the UN forces South of the 38th Parallel in a rout, inflicting heavy casualties and taking a significant number of prisoners. Chinese military was successful in breaking the myth of US invincibility and unassailability (even in the

absence of Soviet support).⁷⁰ With successful culmination of the Korean War, the CCP leadership claimed universal respect and became self-assured in consolidating its position to power by deeply penetrating and mobilizing Chinese society in pursuit of communist ideals. In net cost-benefit equation, post-war strategic environment yielded a greater stability and security for the mainland China domestically as well as regionally in the near absence of directly conceivable military threats (introducing deterrence with conventional military means) with a road for pursuing vital national security objectives and nuclear deterrence wide open (materialized a decade later in 1964) under a favourable and enabling domestic and regional environment.

Through a crafty application of military instrument, North Korea was liberated. Chinese military instrument successfully and permanently secured their Eastern frontier and Manchurian industrial zone by reclaiming geographical buffer between Chinese and the UN/US forces post Armistice (1953). US intervention in North Korea and installing hostile government was simply not acceptable to China as this would warrant guarding of a 1000-mile-long boundary⁷¹ with constant threat of invasion.⁷² Moreover, possibility of re-emergence of Japanese influence in Korean Peninsula compounded the threat to the Chinese. In accordance with Mao's long-term philosophy of "striving for the best, while preparing for the worst", the CCP leadership wargamed all possible outcomes:⁷³

- North Korean victory ending in favourable outcome for China.
- Stalemate with complex implications for China.
- US victory and North Korean defeat with UN forces advancing towards Yalu was considered as the most dangerous possibility requiring immediate action by China.

Chinese leadership successfully demonstrated their ability to use military instrument for political ends, mastered during revolutionary struggle. Despite being inferior to UN coalition in many ways, superior Troop to Space Ratio (TSR) with desired concentration at the point of decision was achieved. Limitations of Chinese system of forces were compensated with tactical and operational skills and innovations. Finally, an adroit balancing of ends, ways and means paradigm with superior articulation of defensive and offensive operation cycles, carried the day for Chinese (barring a few odd overambitious endeavours). Chinese successfully articulated synergetic application of all elements of national power for addressing perceptible incompatibility between policy objectives vis-à-vis available means. Unprecedented resolve in pursuing vital national security interests despite suffering massive casualties was universally acclaimed.⁷⁴ The Korean War greatly elevated the Chinese stature (obliterating the baggage of humiliation and opium wars) as a challenger to US uncontested hegemony in the East (established after nuking

Japan), only to be humbled down further during the Vietnam War, subsequently. China with increased geo-political clout, emerged stronger, self-assured and stable. On balance, synchronized application of military instrument in harmony with the policy objectives resulted in creation of desired effects.

Above, notwithstanding, similar to world wars (primarily fought in pursuit of Clausewitzian maxims akin to Napoleonic manoeuvre warfare), pursuit of total victory as espoused by Clausewitz⁷⁵ did result in policy placing demands (albeit selectively) on military strategy, which at times were ambitious and unrealistic.⁷⁶ The pursuit of total military victory by defeating US political commitment and resolve for the containment of Communism through application of relatively far weaker Sino-Korean military instrument, was unrealistic and in conflict with (tantamount to challenging) the post-World War-II regional and global strategic construct.

Furthermore, asking Chinese volunteers to continue their offensive further South of the 37th Parallel, hastened the culmination point of offensive (violation of Carl Von Clausewitz's famous dictum).⁷⁷ Defying requests by the Military Commander, Marshal Peng Dehuai, for logistic pause (consolidation) and repeatedly forcing military to resume offensive against hardened enemy defensive positions under adverse air environment and highly unfavourable artillery firepower ratios, were a few odd ambitiously modified policy objectives, which were not militarily achievable. Moreover, repeated international requests for ceasefire were turned down by Chinese leadership (due to deep rooted suspicion and mistrust against the US) despite being on moral high ground and winning trajectory, believing it to be an ignominious peace.⁷⁸

In a great complexity and a set of strategic constraints including US nuclear pre-eminence, Mao and his comrades aptly manifested their appreciable understanding of using military means for political ends (military strategy successfully served foreign policy) throughout the Korean conflict, barring a few exceptions, where ambition (pursuit of military victory) prevailed over objective ground realities.⁷⁹

Policy Analysis (Individual Level)

The individual level of analysis focuses on leaders and decision makers in an effort to explain foreign policy. According to this model, the individual, not the state or the system, is the principal decision makers. It assumes that individuals shape the course of history, because it is their choice and decision that drive the course of events. The analysis of individuals might focus on either their personalities or on their perceptions; how they make sense of their world and the events occurring within it. Following three elements tell us how leaders generally respond to foreign

policy crisis: There is a high threat to something that is valued and important; leaders perceive that they have a short time to make decisions; and occurrence of the threatening situation takes the decision makers by surprise.

Mao Zedong

Based on available open sources of information, published material and some declassified Soviet documents explaining Chinese decision-making processes, it can be safely concluded that in early years of China, Mao allowed only very limited participation⁸⁰ in foreign policy decision-making and major decisions such as 'Lean on One Side' and military intervention in Korea, were purely taken by Mao himself only to be endorsed by Politburo as a *fait accompli*.⁸¹ Due to highly centralized character of state functioning, the Chinese Foreign Policy, in general, was the reflection of Mao's thought process and resolve against established world order. Mao, being a revolutionary leader, had his own world's view predicated on baggage of century of humiliation and Western imperialism. Being a revolutionary ideologue, he always believed that China, due to its size and industrial potential, could survive at its own without recognition or integration with the Imperialist World. Instead, he was also obsessed with dream of Sino-Centric world order and revival of 'Middle Kingdom'.⁸²

Some scholars follow neorealism approach and describe Mao's reluctance in going into the Korean War as matter of choice. Even, US intelligence estimated the same that China would rather prefer building economy rather than a military conflict. Some scholars belittle Mao by projecting that China was sucked into the Korean War as choreographed by Stalin and Kim Il-sung for a direct confrontation between Beijing and the US as *fait accompli*.⁸³ Nevertheless, this argument does not stand ground once seen with the personality of Mao as a revolutionary leader.⁸⁴ Seemingly, Mao's aggressive interventionist policy in Korea (despite opposition from some senior CPC leaders), flew out of his utter aspiration as revolutionary leader of "all oppressed peoples of the East."⁸⁵ Mao always believed in the inevitability of war with the US and proactively intervened in Korea. Mao consented Kim's proposal of attacking South and stood by his commitment adding to his stature and credibility. After collapse of Kim Il-Sung's army and US landing at Inchon, Mao took considerable pause in decision-making in sending Chinese troops into Korea, thinking through even the possibilities of stalemate, defeat or the US going nuclear. Here, Mao was also seen as an ultra-nationalist, who was looking through prism of China's national interests. Tentative decision-making of Mao and delaying in military intervention is primarily attributable to Stalin's reluctance in providing air support to North Korean and the Chinese forces. Here, some scholars do argue that Chinese timely entry might have deterred the US crossing of the 38th Parallel,

because US decision to advance North was based on perception that the Chinese would not enter the war in Korea.⁸⁶

Mao switched from defensive strategy to aggressive offensive strategy pursuing total victory in the battlefield. He refused to accept any negotiated settlement with the US, thus, rejecting the UNSC cease-fire proposal in January 1951. Mao also refused his Generals' request for operational pause⁸⁷ to recuperate and resupply before they crossed the 38th Parallel. Acceptance of the UN ceasefire proposal would have granted much needed breathing space to the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). Wavering between limited war aims with re-establishing Kim's regime North of the 38th Parallel to suddenly aiming for total victory requiring eviction of forces South of the 38th Parallel for unifying Korea, had negative impact on outcome of conflict. His insistence to continue advance Southward, while negating ground realities (low tech and primitive military hardware versus US high technology) proved fatal for Chinese troops⁸⁸ and led to reverses. In June 1951, Mao opted for settlement of conflict through negotiation, but by then, the position of strength was lost. Nonetheless, at the end of war, even Mao's comrades of Politburo got convinced that Mao had a much greater vision than them.⁸⁹

Mao was able to achieve most of the foreign policy objectives through successful application of military instrument in Korea. North Korea completely occupied by the US with her Western allies was reclaimed with its Communist regime fully dependent on China in the aftermath of Korean War. Manchuria especially Liaoning, an industrial zone, was successfully guarded from the South Koreans and the US, Mao was able to successfully establishing strategic buffer zone, thus, avoiding huge military spending for guarding Sino-Korean border futuristically. It can be unanimously concluded that without Mao at the helm of affairs, Chinese response to the Korean crisis could have been dramatically different.⁹⁰

Joseph Stalin

Amongst all his counterparts and players involved in the Korean conflict, Stalin appeared craftier as without entering into direct military conflict with the US, he was able to achieve two of his espoused strategic objectives right in the initial years of Cold War. Firstly, he was able to keep his buffer zone in the East effectively secured. Secondly, by approving Kim's Southward offensive, Stalin almost robbed off Mao with any of the options for militarily integrating Taiwan with mainland, and instead, sowed the seeds for a perennial Sino-US/Sino-West confrontation, pushing China towards further isolation, hence, increased dependence on the Soviet Union for economic, industrial and defence assistance.⁹¹

Notwithstanding, the personality differences between Stalin and Mao, Stalin was correctly able to identify the requirement of strategic interdependency. Mao was in love and hate relationship, obsessed with revolutionary zeal with Soviets, whereas, Stalin was more apt in realpolitik with greater understanding of grand strategy and wholesome view of global dynamics. Stalin placed Soviet strategic aim and national interests above everything else and after permitting Kim offensive against South Korea, successfully avoided direct confrontation with the US. It is with this in mind that in April 1950, Stalin asked Kim for getting his plan endorsed by Mao, thereby, engineering a guaranteed Chinese support.⁹²

Harry S. Truman

Truman was the 33rd President of the US, who came in office in April 1945. Most of the scholar grant Truman the credit of ending the World War-II by opting nuclear strikes against Japan, thus, saving lives of about 2,00,000 US troops, which could have been lost in conventional invasion of Japan.⁹³ Truman always hoped for amicable relations with the Soviet Union, but once, Polish Communist-dominated government was established in Poland in spring 1945, threat of Soviet expansionism in entire Europe grew. The Cold War began under Truman's watch, as the President came to believe that he must take a hard stance to contain the expansionistic tendencies of the Soviet Union. The 'Truman Doctrine', committed the US to a policy of supporting foes of Communism everywhere in the world, argued that the US had a duty to support free peoples against attempted subjugation.

Truman remained less successful in shaping China's political landscape and installing a coalition government in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war (with a compromise between Jiang Jieshi supporters and forces of Mao Zedong). Losing any prospects for saving Jiang, he focused on Europe. On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the founding of the People's Republic of China and in early 1950, Mao and Stalin signed a mutual defence treaty. Truman was adversely criticized by Republicans in the Congress, for losing China.⁹⁴

North Korean Invasion of South Korea surprised US administration. Truman authorized military intervention and stalemated restoration of the 38th Parallel was achieved, albeit after bloody and useless fighting for over 2 years, triggered by MacArthur's disregard for Chinese warnings and ultimatums. Truman found the prospect to defend a non-Communist government from invasion by the forces of Communism. Truman was determined neither to "lose" another state to Communism and nor damaging his anti-Communist credentials for failure to act against spread of Sino-Soviet proxies throughout Asia. He declared that the invasion was "very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union" and gave the US a convincing reason to commit large scale forces in a secondary 'theatre of war' vis-à-vis Europe.

Policy Analysis (State Level)

The state level of analysis focuses on factors internal to the state as those compel states to engage in specific foreign policy behaviours. This level of analysis explains the way in which leaders are embedded in the institution of government. This model also helps in understanding US arrogance⁹⁵ in denying rightful place to Mao's China and also Mao's revolutionary mind-set not taking into consideration the realpolitik.

Groupthink Model

Suboptimal foreign policy practice of key players during the Korean War can be aptly studied by applying the 'Groupthink theory' at state level, as more specifically, Groupthink theory addresses defective decision-making on the part of a cohesive decision-making group in which loyalty to real or perceived group norms takes precedence over independent and critical judgment.

In Chinese decision-making, senior members, sometimes, may be able to persuade a dissenting member depending upon their respective relationship with him; junior members generally would refrain from voicing a different opinion once the opinion of the most authoritative person is known. During the Mao era, all decision-making bodies were reduced to rubber stamps.⁹⁶ Instead respecting judgement by senior military leadership dealing with the live situation on ground pleading for logistic pause (highlighting inadequacies and lack of capacity to continue offensive any further), Chinese top leadership insisted on fateful decision for continued offensive beyond the 37th Parallel, which ultimately reached its culmination point and fizzled out with heavy losses to Chinese side.

US inept perception about Chinese intervention into the war, despite several indicators suggests defective decision-making. The presence of several antecedent conditions and groupthink symptoms vindicate actualization of groupthink. While, making critical decision about the Korean Peninsula, planners in the US could not factor in the objective reality and impact of history and cultural amenities of Chinese and Korean people. Chinese influence on North Koreans was immense, while the Japanese rule was scorned. The North was more inclined to China and Russia due to their proximity to Manchuria and Siberia, thus, the 38th Parallel quickly became the dividing line between two ideologies. In 1949-50, the US was more concerned about a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. A physical involvement in Korea was neither expected nor factored into operational plans. Moreover, after withdrawal of US forces, South Korea was even excluded from US national security parameters, which encouraged Kim II Sung to proceed further for aggression.⁹⁷ Soviet and Chinese warnings and probes in the month of October were not taken seriously as the Truman Administration assessed that the Communists did not want to risk war.

While, assessments linked seriousness of the Chinese threat of intervention to ideological linkages with Russia, they failed to see that the Chinese could have nationalist reasons for choosing to go to war as well.

Although, strategically the US wanted to avoid any direct confrontation with Sino-Soviet alliance in Far East at this stage (in the immediate aftermath of the World War-II), however, analogically Korean War got lumped with Munich (Hitler's invasion of Europe and Berlin Blockade by the USSR) and US planners wanted to avoid being branded as the biggest appeaser of all time. This deep driven groupthink mentality of policy-making circles was successfully encashed by arrogant US military commanders. Relentless pursuits of hawkish policy un-calibrated exploitation of Inchon success, though, militarily brilliant, brought Chinese into the Korean conflict for next 2 years, costing dearly in terms of life and finances.⁹⁸ Final Armistice was signed, virtually on pre-June 1950 disposition of forces around the 38th Parallel.

Bureaucratic Model

This is yet another helpful model to understand the bureaucratic politics approach, whereby, organizations choose strategies and policy goals based on different ideas of what outcomes will best serve their organizational interests. From this perspective, the Chinese foreign policy decision-making was driven by singleness of purpose to consolidate CCP hold over China in a post-1949 political environment. As foreign policy of any state is also the direct reflection of internal dynamics (including internal security concerns), all the decisions of Mao's cabinet during the Korean crisis do seem to serve CCP's political objectives. Needless to say, that the Chinese foreign policy objectives were finely calibrated and synchronized to become synonymous with CCP's world's view.

Normative Theories of Rationality provide a model for rational behaviour and judge actual behaviour in light of that model. The model postulates the process by which decisions should be made; confronted with a situation that entails a decision, leaders define that situation, ascertain their goals, investigate their options, weigh the advantages and disadvantages of their options and decide on the option that achieves the goal best and at the lowest cost.⁹⁹ Empirical Theories of Rationality are less interested in judging the decision than in understanding how leaders arrived at it. It is important to understand how and why policy makers arrived at their decision as a first step to suggesting ways in which decision making can be improved.¹⁰⁰ Instead following the empirical rationality, Chinese revolutionary leadership led by Mao practiced normative reality with their own preconceived world's view and ideological leaning and disregard for the US-led Western Imperialism as by then, post-independence institutionalized decision-making processes had not taken roots in China. Mao's efforts to establish communication with the US were not positively

responded. Thus, Mao had to rely on Stalin, an equation that was not very warm, but by large served the purpose.

Policy Analysis (System Level)

This approach describes that single person or group of actors do not execute the things the way these happen, rather decisions and events as the outcome of the world system. The System-Level Analysis assumes that a balance between various actors of system exists and there also exists an inherent ability of restoration of balance after it has been upset. This phenomenon compels states or individuals into making particular decisions without bringing rationality into account at some instances with willingness of totalitarian regimes for getting into confrontation mode leading to war. Therefore, due to the pressure, the international system places on the actors, the best or most rational decisions are not always made. With no sovereign power existing in the international system, the individual states must take whatever action necessary to maintain the balance of power or attempt to tilt the balance in their favour.

Perennial conflict between two opposing poles was intrinsic in the very nature of bi-polar world, where each and every action by opposing camp was seen with the ideological prism of normative rationality and deep rooted mistrust feeding on Communist hysteria and Western Imperialism.¹⁰¹ Hence, on one side, the aggression of Kim II Sung was interpreted by the West as a deliberately crafted strategy for global conquest by the Communists, led by Stalin with Eastern hemisphere outsourced to Mao as his vicegerent.¹⁰² While, on the other hand, US engineered UN action in South Korea was seen as the US pioneered effort for permanent mustering of military resources in Communist backyard for power projection at opportune time. MacArthur's unnecessary venture North of the 38th Parallel fiddled with the volatile and finely hung balance, forcing Chinese intervention and prolonging hostilities for over 2 years, resulting into colossal loss to life and untold misery.

The Korean War pushed China and the former Soviet Union closer together for immediate tactical and operational convergences, only to be split apart rapidly that otherwise would have been the case.¹⁰³ It accentuated the bipolarity by increasing tensions between the superpowers and making their allies more dependent on them; but also encouraged many third world nations to remain nonaligned and avoid committing to any camp. The UNSC did act promptly¹⁰⁴ and passed a resolution against North Korean invasion of South Korea, yet credibility of the UN as a neutral and effective institution also suffered as Communist bloc viewed US hijacking the UN as an instrument for advancing its national policy (effectively capitalizing on convergence of interests of Western values with the UN charter). China emerged from the war, stronger, and a country to be reckoned with for its reliance and

determination. Internally, it consolidated the rule of CCP through prestige and credibility.

Conclusion

Strategic scan of post-World War-II and pre-Korean War, global and regional dynamics with US outright support to Taiwan (denying recognition to China) with sizable military presence in Japan, suboptimal Soviet politico-military support and Kim II Sung handling of the 'Korean Issue' greatly help understanding the context of Sino-US belligerence materialized, subsequently, on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War left everlasting imprints on regional dynamics. Learning from highly consequential experiences, Chinese quickly realized that the Soviet foreign policy objectives were divergent from those of China despite ideological similarities; hence, greater self-reliance with mass mobilization of society and political consolidation of the Communist power was required for meaningful pursuit of national security imperatives (instead becoming complacent or over-reliance on the dividends of "lean-to-one-side"). Thereon, with redefined parameters, Chinese successfully embarked upon a new journey for revamping foreign policy and national security strategy.

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¹⁵ Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly*, No 121, March, 1990, 95.

¹⁶ For saving next domino, US even managed a quick UNSC resolution (within 36 hours) sanctioning use of force against communist.

¹⁷ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 216.

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²⁰ William Stueck, "The Korean War, An International History," (Princeton University Press, 1995), 34.

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²⁷ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, "Uncertain Partners; Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War," Series: Studies in International Security and Arms Control, (Stanford University Press, 1993), 134.

²⁸ Kim prevailed upon Stalin to support forced unification and Stalin agreed to support this venture upon endorsement by Mao.

²⁹ William Stueck, "The United States and the Origins of the Korean War: The Failure of Deterrence," International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol XIV, No 2, 5.

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³¹ US wanted to keep the war confined to Korean peninsula deterring involvement of other regional players or getting benefitted out of Korean crisis; hence as a precaution moved 7th fleet to interpose between Taiwan and mainland China.

³² Robert Flynn, "The Korean War," 5, www.mconway.net/page1/page6/files/The%20Korean%20War.pdf (accessed May 10, 2017).

³³ Max Hastings, "Korean War," (Simon and Schuster, October 15, 1988), 118.

³⁴ Xiaobing Li, Allan Reed Millet & Bin Yu, "Mao's Generals Remember Korea," First Edition, (nce: University Press of KansasLawre, 2001), 40.

³⁵ Zhou was credited for Chinese intervention in the name of 'volunteers' to avoid openly declaring war against US. Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition." (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 83.

³⁶ Refworld, UNHCR, The Refugees Agency, "Security Council resolution 83 (1950) [Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea]," <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f20a2c.html> (accessed April 9, 2017).

³⁷ Max Hastings, "The Korean War," (New york: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 79.

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⁴⁰ Xiaobing Li, Allan Reed Millet & Bin Yu, "Mao's Generals Remember Korea," First Edition, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001).

⁴¹ Ibid, 14.

⁴² For the first time in modern history, China had succeeded in confronting a coalition of Western powers and emerged undefeated. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 221.

⁴³ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 128.

⁴⁴ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition." (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 151.

⁴⁵ Chen Jian, "Mao's China & The Cold War," (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 11.

⁴⁶ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition." (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 78.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Mearsheimer, J. J. "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," (New York and London: W W Norton & Company, 2001), 36.

⁴⁹ Pounding of existing western dominated international order including defeating US led coalition in Korea has been identified as one of the Chinese foreign policy objectives by Chen Jian, "Mao's China & The Cold War," (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 116.

⁵⁰ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition." (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 80.

⁵¹ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15.

⁵² Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 141.

⁵³ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China," Second Edition, (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 77.

⁵⁴ Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly*, No 121, March, 1990, 95.

⁵⁵ To address Chinese vulnerability, Stalin agreed to assist China militarily; nevertheless, much expected air support from Soviets never materialized except towards terminal stages of war.

⁵⁶ Xiao Jingguang, *Xiao Jingguang huiyilu* (The Memoirs of Xiao Jingguang), II, (Beijing: The Press of the People's Liberation Army, 1990), 26; Zhou Jun, "A Preliminary Exploration of Reasons Why the PLA Failed to Carry Out the Taiwan Campaign Plan after the Formation of the PRC," *Zhonggong*.

dangshi yanjiu (The CCP History Study), No. 1, 1991, 72.

⁵⁷ Existence of Kuomintang remnants along Sino-Korean Border was worrisome as Mao always considered the presence of US or a regime supportive of it, a significant security threat.

⁵⁸ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China," Second Edition, (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 174.

⁵⁹ Some scholars in the west widely project that China's policy was aggressive, violent and irrational, nevertheless, this assertion does not stand the dispassionate and unbiased analysis. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2.

⁶⁰ Ease of logistic support in Korean peninsula as compared to Taiwan and Vietnam has also been highlighted by Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China," Second Edition, (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 81.

⁶¹ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 131.

⁶² Attributing Chinese intervention to Mao's aggression and temptation for using military means for political ends being a revolutionary leader who had a myopic world's view and always believed that the power flows from the barrel of the gun.

⁶³ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 217.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 192.

⁶⁵ US defeat at the hands of an embryonic communist Chinese state was surely not palatable under the obtaining regional and global environment for a nuclear armed superpower with uncontested leadership of western hemisphere.

⁶⁶ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 126.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 79.

⁶⁸ Chen Jian, "Mao's China & The Cold War," (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 116.

⁶⁹ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 130.

⁷⁰ Zhou went to Stalin, not to call off Chinese involvement in Korean war but to secure the best possible deal. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 199.

⁷¹ Area from 38th Parallel to Yalu River acting as buffer zone for China's eastern border is presently being guarded by North Korean government as one of the most militarized border region (along 38th Parallel) thus saving billions for Chinese generations.

⁷² Xiaobing Li, Allan Reed Millet & Bin Yu, "Mao's Generals Remember Korea," First Edition, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 40.

⁷³ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 133.

⁷⁴ Mao was not cowed down even after an unveiled threat by MacArthur for nuking China and strategic bombing of Manchurian industrial zone for swiftly ending the war similar to Japan. Instead, till very end, the aggressive spirit never died down and even days before signing of final armistice, Chinese successfully executed a number of tactical and operational manoeuvres inflicting heavy casualties on enemy availing even the last available window of opportunity for such actions.

⁷⁵ Carl von Clausewitz: Excerpts from *On War* (1832) "The German History in Documents and Images," Volume 3. From Vormärz to Prussian Dominance, 1815-1866, 21.

⁷⁶ Clausewitz says in his book *On War*, “Should policy place demands on strategy which it is unable to address than the policy is at fault and not the strategy”.

⁷⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, “*On War*,” Chapter V, *Culminating Point of the Attack*, (Library of Alexandria, 1832). Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976/84).

⁷⁸ J.F.C. Fuller in his famous treatise, “*Conduct of War*” terms ignominious peace as only a temporary suspension of arms against which men of courage ought to rise at the first available opportunity. J.F.C. Fuller, “*The Conduct of War 1789-1961*,” (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, Mar, 1992).

⁷⁹ Chen Jian, “China’s Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 190.

⁸⁰ Lu Ning, “*The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition*.” (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 8.

⁸¹ Mao with an impeccable record of military successes during the Chinese civil wars, commanded tremendous respect among his CPC colleagues and PLA commanders who despite personal reservations were willing to support him once he made up his mind.

⁸² Mao emphasized importance of ‘human factor’ in modern warfare but also vouched for China’s development of atomic weapon, so that China’s ‘Spiritual Atomic Bomb’ would be reinforced by real bomb. Chen Jian, “China’s Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 223.

⁸³ Michael M. Sheng, “Beijing’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: A Reappraisal and New Document,” *Korea and World Affairs* 19 (Summer 1995), 294–313; “The Psychology of the Korean War,” *The Journal of Conflict Studies* (Spring 2002), 56–72; and “Mao and the Korean War: A Personality Account,” *The New England Journal of History* 60 (Spring 2004), 212–226.

⁸⁴ Mao prevailed all opposing voices in enforcing his decision for military intervention in Korea. Lu Ning, “*The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*,” Second Edition, (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 82.

⁸⁵ One of Peng Dehuai’s statements, with which Mao fully agreed, says “it is necessary to send troops to assist Korea. Even if we were to be defeated in Korea, this would be no worse than that our victory in War of Liberation would come several years later. Chen Jian, “China’s Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 193.

⁸⁶ Chen Jian, “China’s Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 165.

⁸⁷ Chinese generals pleaded Mao for operational pause to consolidate and re-supply as from late October to early December, the Chinese People’s Volunteers had lost 100,000 troops, only 260 of its trucks remained. Supply line had been greatly extended all the way to the 38th Parallel. Over 30,000 soldiers in the 9th Army Group were severely frostbitten due to inadequate resources. The shortage of ammunition and food was also alarming.

⁸⁸ While advancing from 38th Parallel to 37th Parallel CPV suffered 70,000 casualties within 7 days in April 1951 and 90,000 casualties within four days in May 1951. But Mao always believed that an army with higher morale could beat an enemy with superior equipment. Chen Jian, “China’s Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 202.

⁸⁹ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 219.

⁹¹ Mao wanted completion of victory against Kuomintang and capture of Taiwan whereas; Stalin sought Eastern Buffer and isolation of China from Western Powers and US. While bond between Chinese communist party and North Korea grew, Stalin saw an opportunity to exploit this bondage to create further distance between Beijing and Washington.

⁹² William Stueck, "The Korean War, An International History," (Princeton University Press, 1995), 36.

⁹³ Harry S. Truman, "Foreign Affairs," Miller Centre, <https://millercenter.org/president/truman/foreign-affairs> (accessed April 9, 2017).

⁹⁴ China becoming an adjunct to USSR was hotly being debated as fundamental failure of US foreign policy.

⁹⁵ Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 170.

⁹⁶ Lu Ning, "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision making in China; Second Edition." (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 94.

⁹⁷ The Joint Staff concluded that Soviet Union would not agree to an acceptable plan to end the division of Korea and that the Congress would not allocate adequate funds to maintain US forces in the Peninsula. Militarily, Korea was not of a great significance to US; hence a policy of containment of China and Russia from a chain of Islands in the Pacific with US naval power was contemplated.

⁹⁸ Soviets offered an Olive Branch for cessation of hostilities after liberation of South Korea by UN forces but US turned it down and instead successfully managed a UN resolution for occupation of the entire Korean peninsula to settle this question for good.

⁹⁹ Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1st Edition, November 2007), 59.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 61.

¹⁰¹ With deep rooted suspicion on both sides, western values of liberty and freedom were viewed as a hoax by Mao's China and instead he vowed to struggle for oppressed people. Both sides did not understand each other politically. Even in October 1950, CIA and US leadership were convinced that it would be sheer madness on the part of Chinese to enter Korean War and the best time for intervention is already over. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 169.

¹⁰² From the beginning of the war until the conclusion of the armistice agreement, US leaders assumed North Korea-China and USSR as one axis. The aggression was Soviet in nature and origin and its victim was the entire free world. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 171.

¹⁰³ Chinese would not forget Stalin's 'betrayal' at a crucial juncture. Chen Jian, "China's Road to Korean War; The Making of Sino-American Confrontation," (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 125.

Conceptualizing the Energy-Military Security Connection: Implications for Pakistan

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Abstract: Security is a prime concern of every nation state. But, the concept of security is quite complex as it is difficult to determine its nature. The concept is debated as the security from whom? From states, groups, individuals, non-state actors or nature itself? A holistic concept of security, incorporates an infinite variety of securities: ranging from human security, non-military security and military security, non-traditional security, gender security, economic security, environmental security, food security, and of course, energy security, which is the main focus of this paper. Though, there is no agreed definition of energy security available in the literature, a somewhat acceptable definition of energy security is that 'its availability must be uninterrupted, in abundance and affordable.' An ideal energy security posture is a country's self-sufficiency in it. In spite of this ideal posture, it is argued that no country in the world can ensure its energy security without exercising its military security. Military force has always been used in the world to ensure uninterrupted, sufficient and affordable access of energy by the energy importers and also by the energy exporters to secure their sovereignty and protect their energy assets against any perceived threat. That is why there is a very close connection between the two concepts. Pakistan is struggling to meet its energy needs and also forced to employ its security forces to ensure the security of its energy installations, gas pipelines and the CPEC ventures, including a number of energy projects under its umbrella.

Keywords: Security, Energy, Energy Security, Military Security, Terrorism.

Introduction

The importance of energy security cannot be over-emphasized as it requires for human growth and development, which ultimately contributes to the economic progress of a country. Dilemma is that energy is available in limited quantity, but its demand is growing with the growth of human population. A country can be termed as energy secured, if it is energy rich (having self-sufficiency in hydrocarbons, nuclear or any other commodity required for power generation) either or can afford to ensure abundance and uninterrupted inflow of it from abroad. But, at the same time to ensure the uninterrupted availability of energy, the use of military or security forces has been in vogue since the World War I to date. The element of terrorism, piracy and the ferocity of the non-state actors in any form has enhanced the use of security forces in the realm of energy security manifold. Pakistan is energy starved that is why it is struggling hard to meet its minimum energy needs by importing oil,

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gas (in the form of LNG) and even coal by expanding huge sums of its hard-earned forex. In this scenario, this paper tries to elaborate the concept of energy security. It also determines whether energy security can be ensured without using military force or otherwise.

What is Security?

Security has always been a prime concern and the central issue in international politics. 'Each national government perceives its country as reasonably secure in the world community'.¹ Traditionally, 'it meant security of a state under attack from another state, which could result in war'², and consequently, would engage the armies of the two states against each other. Barry Buzan, defines security as a pursuit to get rid of the threat from outside and suggests that states and societies should muster up their strength from within, against the perceived forces of hostility. According to Buzan, "security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile."³

Pragmatically, with the ever-increasing lethality of conventional weapons along with gradual induction of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to military arsenals and introduction of new military doctrines, since the end of the cold war, security has become a serious concern among nation states. Moreover, it has become a contested concept. Security for whom; states, groups or individuals? Security from whom; states, non-state actors or nature itself? As the debate continues, there is an increasing acceptance of a broad, holistic understanding of the term that incorporates what is variously called comprehensive security, human security, non-military security, non-traditional security and so on. It is, thus, perfectly legitimate to speak of gender security, economic security, environmental security, food security, and of course, energy security.⁴

Connotation of Energy and Energy Security

Energy is required to fuel economic growth and human progress. Here, energy means hydrocarbons (oil, gas, coal), nuclear, renewables (hydel, solar, wind) and all other 'known sources' of power generation, which could help running the households as well as growing and expanding the economies of the world. But, once it is talked about the term 'energy security', there is not an agreed, single or a concrete definition available in the literature. According to Bernard D. Cole,⁵ Energy security is a simple phrase that describes complex issues. A widely accepted definition is 'the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices'. The phrase may be usefully broken down to encompass two lesser, but still, broad definitions of security. The first definition is most conveniently

verbalized as ‘military security’: protection or defence against attack by overt military means, sabotage or other media of physically constraining the availability and affordability of energy supplies encompassing piracy and terrorism.⁶ A second definition is more complex and difficult to appreciate: maintaining the availability and affordability of energy supplies. These two definitions are, respectively, the military and economic facets of a discussion of energy security. The security of energy resources has been a primary concern of mankind since fire first began to be used.⁷

The connotation of energy security, however, could vary from nation to nation and region to region. It could be different for energy rich nations and for energy starved nations or regions, or energy consuming/ demanding/importing countries and energy producing/supplying/exporting countries or regions. For instance, Saudi Arabia as an energy superpower or the Middle East as an energy-supplying region will view energy security entirely differently as compared to an energy-demanding nation, such as, China, India or Pakistan, or an energy-demanding region like South Asia.

Self-Sufficiency and Embargo as Security Threats

For a country, “the ideal energy security posture may be self-sufficiency in fossil energy, but it is possible that one country’s self-sufficient nuclear program may be another’s security threat.”⁸ The Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal can be quoted as a classic example here, which is viewed as a serious threat to its security by Pakistan. However, “an importing country is primarily concerned with the security of its energy supplies; each importing country may view foreign energy supplies as more or less vulnerable to interruption.”⁹ Hence, for an energy importing country, energy security may be defined as “availability of uninterrupted, abundant and cheap energy supplies.”¹⁰ But, all these three aspects of energy security (its uninterrupted flow, its abundance, and its affordable price) given in this definition could seriously be threatened in case an energy embargo is imposed on a consumer country by a single supplier country or a group of suppliers, such as, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Embargo not only can interrupt or reduce abundance of supply, but can also increase the prices of energy. The Arab oil embargo on the US and against other supporters of the Israeli cause in 1973-74, as a result of the Arab-Israel conflict, is the most apposite example in this regard. Similarly, in the wake of the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal of July 2006, India has to rely on the US for supply of uranium, which could be stopped or hindered by any politically motivated nuclear fuel supply interruptions.

Energy Security as National Sovereignty

An energy exporting country, on the other hand, may view energy security as 'national sovereignty over its energy resources'.¹¹ Here, national sovereignty has two dimensions: security against military intervention to deprive a nation of control over its energy resources; and freedom from external interference in national decision-making regarding exploitation of those resources.¹² As far as, the first dimension is concerned, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, can be referred as a suitable case here. The goal was not only conquest of a sovereign state, but also the capture of its riches.¹³ The fear of deprivation of a nation's energy resources, once again, proved true, when "the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, not only disrupted international oil supplies, but created price and market fluctuations that continue to have a deep impact on the global economy and to pose particular challenges for world's energy producers."¹⁴

For explaining the second dimension, let us take the example of Mexico; at 26.9 billion barrels, Mexico's proven oil reserves are the third largest in the Western hemisphere after Venezuela (77.7 billion) and the USA (30.4 billion).¹⁵ About the US interference in Mexico's decision-making regarding its oil production, a Mexican, Dr Jose Alberro, at the University of California says, "the USA wants Mexico to increase oil production to decrease its Middle East exposure".¹⁶ Moreover, according to Alberro, the US, under its own interest, pressured Mexico that "opening the energy sector to foreign investment was in Mexico's self-interest."¹⁷ It is, as a matter of fact, contrary to the Mexican constitution, which "blocks ownership participation in oil and gas fields by foreign entities and Mexico's oil workers unions are heavily set against any foreign participation."¹⁸ Hence, "the recognition and observance of national sovereignty over natural resources seem to be necessary security conditions for every country."¹⁹

Demand Security vs Supply Security

An exporter's security will also depend on the extent of its energy resource base²⁰, and yet, most importantly a guaranteed access to foreign markets' and 'security of demand.'²¹ The same, in case of Iraq, for instance, was denied by the UN in the 1990s, when the "sanctions were imposed on Iraqi exports after the Gulf War. Oil production was limited to 0.5-0.6 mbpd (million barrels per day) for internal consumption only",²² which, as a matter of fact, "averaged about 2.4 mbpd in the 1980s."²³ The fact, therefore, cannot be denied that importance of demand of security to an energy exporting country carries the same weightage as providing (supply) security to an energy-importing country. This fact can possibly create mutually beneficial energy security equilibrium between the importers and the exporters. For instance, Pakistan, India and Iran, all three stake holders of the

proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline (had it not been shelved) could have been equal beneficiary of the proposed project as they had successfully concluded an agreement, based on the overlapping areas of demand-security and supply-security. In terms of demand and supply, energy security, or security of supply, is “the ability to supply energy to meet demand at a price that protects economic growth.”²⁴ Hence, the centrepiece of the debate is that the consumers view energy security as ‘security of supply’, and the producers as ‘security of demand’. The answer, of course, is that energy security is both with stability and reliability as common denominators in a world that is more interconnected than it has been ever before. Both producers and consumers alike want stability in prices, and both want reliability, consumers on the supply side, and producers on the market side. In fact, “balancing the needs of producers and consumers is at the heart of global energy security, and it is one of the great challenges of the time.”²⁵

Use of Force to Ensure Energy Security as a Legitimate Option

The concept of energy security, contrary to other non-military concepts of security, has had the most direct connection with the narrow, military concept of security.²⁶ Throughout the history of mankind, the foundations of civilizations have rested heavily on their energy supplies. Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs, Athenian Greece under democracy, and the American South before the Civil War depended on human slaves as a primary energy resource.²⁷ Dependence on energy supply, therefore, is not a novel idea. It has, however, taken a new phenomenal shape ever since the mankind kicked off the industrial revolution.²⁸ The Industrial Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which initially took place in Europe and America, was powered with supplies of coal, and subsequently, with discoveries of hydrocarbons as new sources of energy, such as, oil, gas and other petroleum products in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But, pragmatically, each source of energy is limited, therefore, human society’s mounting demand for energy supplies, on one hand, gradually diversified the sources of energy varying from coal, oil, and gas to hydroelectricity, nuclear, solar, wave, wind power, etc. (Energy from alcohol, gaseous wastes, and most importantly, the power of hydrogen might become the sources of energy supplies to mankind in the 21st century).²⁹

The fear or concern that how to ensure the continuous supplies of the desired quantities and categories of energy for energy consumers, on the other hand, often led to the use of the military force. This aspect of the energy security concept brings it closer to the military concept of security. That is why, when the British Royal Navy, a symbol of Britain’s Imperial Power, started replacing coal with oil in 1913, it had “to depend on distant and insecure oil supplies from Persia, as Iran was then known.”³⁰ Churchill, the then British Admiral, decided that Britain would have to

base its naval supremacy on oil and, thereupon, committed himself with all his driving energy and enthusiasm to achieve that objective.³¹ In the same context, it is significant to learn that the former French Prime Minister Clemenceau once stated, “a drop of oil is equal to a drop of our soldier’s blood.”³² It proves that the use of force was considered as a legitimate option and the world community had recognized the importance of energy security even in those years.³³

During the WWI, the supremacy of oil was clearly established as an ‘element of power’ in the battlefields, especially when, the internal combustion machine overtook the horse and the coal powered locomotive.³⁴ Throughout the course of the WWII, oil played, not only the central, but also an enhanced and decisive role as far as the outcomes of war were concerned, both in the Far East as well as in the European Theatres. Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbour to protect their flank as they grabbed for the petroleum resources of the East Indies. Among Hitler’s most important strategic objectives in the invasion of Soviet Union, was the capture of the oilfields in the Caucasus.³⁵

The Conservation Theory

Despite the fact that America’s predominance on oil, proved decisiveness at the end of the WWI in the US, the fear about the adequacy of its own oil reserves,³⁶ and during the WWII, the belief that the US might run out of oil,³⁷ resulted in the so-called Conservation Theory. According to which, the US would need to acquire and develop sources of oil outside the country in order to conserve the nation’s domestic reserves for the future, possibly for a future war.³⁸ In pursuance of the same theory, in December 1943, the Petroleum Industry War Council, a broad based advisory group, which linked US government’s war time Petroleum Administration to the oil industry, recommended that the national policy of the US should aim at securing for American nationals access to world’s oil resources.³⁹ Subsequently, in February 1945, shortly after the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on a US warship in the Suez Canal, and it is generally believed that he offered him military support to put down any external attack or internal challenge to King’s rule, in return for privileged access to the Kingdom’s vast oil resources.⁴⁰ The Suez Crisis of 1956, which emerged as a result of Israeli attack (backed by France and England) of October 29 on Egypt, was as much about oil as anything else.⁴¹

Carter Doctrine and Creation of US Central Command (CENTCOM)

The Carter Doctrine was enunciated as a declaration in the wake of the two ‘oil shocks’ of 1973 (when Saudi-led OPEC imposed oil embargo due to overt American support to Israel against the Arabs) and of 1979 (caused by the Islamic Revolution of Iran that resulted in unprecedented oil price rise up to US\$80 per barrel followed by

the interruption of oil supplies due to outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in October 1980). On 23 January 1980, in his annual State of the Union address, Carter announced that any “attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”⁴² The declaration was backed by the creation of an ‘110,000-strong, fast-moving, hard-hitting Rapid Reaction Force’ based in the US, but on high alert for any necessary military intervention in the Gulf. George W Bush’s Iraq War, as a matter of fact, is the culmination of the Carter Doctrine to ensure perpetual domination of the Persian Gulf and its prolific oil fields.⁴³

Significantly, the Carter Doctrine stretches far beyond the Persian Gulf. It is the blueprint for the extension of US military power to the world’s other oil-producing regions. Just as existing US policy calls for the use of military force to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, an extended Carter Doctrine now justifies similar action in the Caspian Sea region, Latin America, and the West coast of Africa. Slowly, but surely, the US military is being converted into a global oil-protection service.⁴⁴ It will be interesting to note that the implementation of this doctrine was accelerated in 1983, when Reagan transformed the joint task force into the US Central Command (CENTCOM), giving it the status of a major unified combat force like the US European Command, the Pacific Command, and the Southern Command. CENTCOM’s principal mission is to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the US and American allies around the world.⁴⁵

In addition to protect the flow and transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf, the CENTCOM forces have also been given the responsibility for the protection of energy supplies in Central Asia and the Caspian region.⁴⁶ Not only this, the forces from the European Command are helping to protect oil pipelines in the Republic of Georgia and oil-rich waters off the coast of Africa. Forces from the Pacific Command guard the oil lanes of the South China Sea, and troops from the Southern Command are helping to protect pipelines in Colombia.⁴⁷ Particularly, US relentless drive to secure energy by the use of military force in the Central Asian region is termed as the New Great Game.⁴⁸ All these endeavours and the US projection of power and its extensive military presence around the global energy rich regions to secure energy supplies by military means demonstrate the energy-military nexus in the security field.⁴⁹

Piracy and Terrorism Factors

It is hard to debate that pirates, terrorist outfits, insurgents and other non-state actors are involved in sabotaging and destroying the energy-related targets. Mostly,

pirates make the cargo and energy laden ship their chief targets for ransom, while these ships pass through the narrow or choke points of the sea lanes of Pacific and Indian oceans. Significantly, the Indian and Pacific oceans are the world's main medium for the transportation of energy, primarily, oil and gas from the resource periphery comprising the Middle East and parts of Africa to the 'demand heartland' comprising mainly India, China, Japan and South Korea.⁵⁰ It will be interesting to note that more than 100,000 commercial vessels transit through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) each year, and crude oil is the biggest single cargo in terms of volume through these sea lanes of communication (SOLCs), which are viewed by energy-dependent states as their very lifelines.

At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is only 21 miles (33.7 kilometres) wide. The Strait of Malacca is only 1.6 miles (2.7 kilometres) wide in the Phillips Channel, creating a natural bottleneck as well as potential for collusion, grounding or oil spills,⁵¹ thus, making the ships most vulnerable to the pirate's attack, because at this choke point, the ships pass through at a very slow speed to avoid any sort of accidents. As a matter of fact, the Indian and Pacific oceans waterways, in particular, a whole range of security threats to energy and trade flows from maritime terrorism, piracy, arms and drugs trafficking to conflict within energy exporting states and instability in fragile states.⁵² Therefore, the blockage of a choke point, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy-prices as well as to severe energy crisis.⁵³ Pirate activities have become extremely active off the African coast since the early 2000s. Vessels of many countries including China have been frequently attacked by pirates on high seas. In 2008 alone, more than 100 ships were attacked by Somali pirates and over 240 sailors were held for ransom.⁵⁴

A Chinese vessel carrying coal and 25 crew was hijacked by Somali pirates in October 2009, and was held for over two months before being released with a reported ransom payment from China. In December 2008, China sent two warships to the Gulf of Aden and waters of the Somali coast to counter piracy and defend China's commercial ships passing through the region. The US welcomed China's move and expressed its interest to cooperate with China. Admiral Timothy Keating, head of the US Pacific Command, held out hopes for a revival in military exchanges: "I hope the Chinese do send ships to the Gulf of Aden and we will work closely with them."⁵⁵

Keeping in view the growing instability and increased terrorist activities in the Middle East, Mr Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Iranian Parliament (*Majlis*) has rightly pointed out that the factor of extremism is a great and common concern for both, the energy exporting as well as energy importing countries. According to Ali Larijani, "Energy importers and exporters are concerned about their future due to the

fact that the security crisis in the Middle East has never been this severe since the end of Second World War."⁵⁶ Emphasizing the growing threat of extremism, he asserted, "Security issues have overshadowed energy resources, energy production and the energy industry in the region."⁵⁷

In the given environment, being conduits of energy, the gas pipelines have assumed a critical role in international security affairs. American soldiers are now helping to defend such conduits against attacks in Iraq, Colombia and Georgia. President George W. Bush had authorized the deployment of US military personnel in Georgia to help train the Georgian Troops that could be responsible for protecting the Baku – Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTC) lines.⁵⁸ On the other hand, pipeline protection has become a major concern for Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, Burma and other strife-torn producers. In the Middle East, Qatar is also struggling hard to protect its energy installation. Located roughly 80 kilometres North of Doha, Ras Laffan in Qatar is heavily guarded industrial city producing liquefied gas and gas to liquids.⁵⁹ The Qatar authorities taking all possible measures against unexpected sabotage activities.

Against the contextual of turmoil, during the Arab Spring in 2011, Saudi Arabia began to deploy a 35,000-strong specialized protection force to guard crude processing plants Oil fields and pipelines.⁶⁰ In Nigeria, over 200 incidences of crude oil and gas pipeline vandalism were recorded in six months till February 2015, according to the Nigerian Federal Government. Until the Arab spring, Israel was a buyer of Egyptian gas through a spur connected to the Arab gas pipeline via the Sinai. The pipeline was deeply unpopular in Egypt. After the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak government, the infrastructure was repeatedly attacked, cutting the flows both to Israel and to Jordan, another recipient of the Egyptian gas. In Jan 2013, militants raided Algeria's Amenas gas field, sparking a crisis that ended with deaths of at least 37 hostages.⁶¹ The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is in control of gas fields in the central Syria, and has left the gas stranded. It is reported to have blown up a gas pipeline from Eastern Syria to the suburbs of Damascus that generated electricity and provided heating in homes. The instances quoted here do not include all the acts in all parts of the world that have happened. They are only examples of the trend and expanse of the phenomenon.

The Indian government went a step ahead, and while, adopting legal steps, the Indian parliament has passed the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Amendment Bill 2010, that provides for a minimum of 10-year rigorous imprisonment for acts of terrorism, and makes such activities punishable by even death sentence. Moreover, the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) has decided to deploy drones to guard pipelines to raise safety standards

after a major explosion in a gas pipelines.⁶² What is extremely alarming is the cyber-attacks on the computer networks of gas pipeline systems in the US. The US Congress passed the Cyber Security Act in February 2012 specifying threats of interruption to the life-sustaining services, including energy, water, transportation, emergency services or food. It asked for annual reports from the Department of Homeland Security, summarizing major cyber incidents and aggregate statistics on the number of breaches of networks of executive agencies.⁶³

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan is a country facing acute shortage of energy as well as an energy importing country. An ideal energy security posture, as already discussed, could be self-sufficiency in hydrocarbons, nuclear and other renewable energy resources. But, unfortunately, Pakistan is not self-sufficient in any form of energy resources rather extremely dependent on imported energy, and this dependency is growing with the increasing demand of energy. The current energy scenario does not show a rosy picture of Pakistan as it is struggling hard to overcome its huge demand-supply gaps of electricity, gas, oil, high quality coal and other power generating resources. Predominantly, electricity supply-demand gap (which remains at an average shortage of 4000-MW throughout the year)⁶⁴ has touched the highest 7000-MW in May 2017.⁶⁵ However, with advent of CPEC energy projects, load-shedding has been gradually reduced and government officials believe that Pakistan shall be able to get rid of long hour's power outages by the mid-2018, with the accomplishment of the priority energy projects under the CPEC, which will add around 10400-MW electricity by then.⁶⁶ On the whole, energy shortage has adversely affected all sectors of the economy resulting in an annual loss of up to three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁶⁷ Import of 1000-MW of electricity from the Central Asia South Asia (CASA) project is still a dream and will take time to come true.

Pakistan's indigenous energy resources are limited. The existing oil and gas producing fields are on continuous depletion and the new discoveries are not making any significant addition to domestic production.⁶⁸ Pakistan's indigenous crude oil production is meeting just 15% of daily requirement, rest 85% of crude oil and petroleum products are imported at a cost of US\$12 billion per annum.⁶⁹ The situation has become even critical as the most awaited Iran-Pakistan (IP), and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines are not likely to be materialized in near future due to international politics, financial constraints and turmoil in the region. To lessen the gas demand-supply gap, Pakistan is importing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). According to Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, ex-Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, the country's current natural gas production is around 4.0 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/day), while the demand has already

crossed 8.0 bcf/day mark.⁷⁰ Pakistan will be importing a cumulative of 3.0 billion cubic feet per day of LNG by 2018 to bridge the demand supply gap.⁷¹ It is important to note that the LNG import bill was US\$ 579 million in 2015-16. In the first 10 months of 2015-16, LNG imports were worth US\$443 million. They doubled to US\$965 million in the same period of the current fiscal year, which suggests the annual import bill may touch US\$ 1 billion.⁷² Hence, the current energy scenario reveals that Pakistan is mainly dependent on imported energy.

It is true that Pakistan is energy hungry, but not an energy giant, means it does not have a large appetite for energy consumption. Pakistan's total energy supplies (TES) are just over 70-mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent)⁷³ in the year 2014-15, as compared to those of India 775-mtoe and China's 3000-mtoe in the year 2015-16.⁷⁴ Therefore, at first place, for Pakistan's energy transportations or shipments, being small and can, conveniently, be managed. Secondly, these shipments do not have to traverse the long sea-lanes as its major suppliers are Saudi Arabia for oil and Qatar for LNG. Rest of the oil is imported from Iran and Kuwait. All four countries are located in the vicinity just across the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf. But, significantly, Pakistan does have the sensitive and vast energy-related installations and infrastructures, which can be enumerated as under:

- Nuclear power installations: KANUPP (137 MW), Chashma-I (C-1), Chashma-2(C-2), 325-MW each; Chashma-3 (C-3) and Chashma-4 (C-4), 340-MW each, and in Karachi K-2 and K-3 of 1100-MW each, are also in progress being managed by the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan.⁷⁵
- Oil fields and natural gas installations: Well laid out and a vast pipeline infrastructure, gas wells, compressor plants, distribution units being managed by OGDCL, PPI (Pakistan Petroleum Ltd), Sui Southern and Sui Northern Companies.
- WAPDA installations and high-power transmission lines.
- Gwadar Port, CPEC and the energy plans are completed and operational, and in progress under the CPEC including hydel, coal, solar and wind energy projects.

At the same time, Pakistan is one of the top most terrorist affected countries of the world. According to the Global Terrorism Index report in 2015, Pakistan was ranked fourth among countries most affected by terrorism.⁷⁶ In 2016, Pakistan, along with Afghanistan and Syria, is among the top five countries most hit by terrorism.⁷⁷ Since most of the energy related installations and infrastructures are located in Balochistan, and then in Sind, it is extremely alarming to know that, in 2016 alone, in Balochistan, the terrorists launched 151 attacks in which 412 persons got killed and 702 injured including people working on CPEC

projects. In Sui area of District Dera Bugti, Balochistan, according to a senior security official in 2010, five wells of gas were blown up by the miscreants. In terms of money, the loss of one well costs worth 2 billion Rupees, and rupturing of one gas pipeline costs 30 million Rupees to the public exchequer. Table given below shows the number of terrorist attacks launched to rupture the transmission gas pipelines of 18”/12” in Sind and Balochistan.

Table 1: Transmission Gas Pipeline Rupture Cases of Pipeline (2010 till date)

Year	Shikarpur (Incidents)	Quetta (Incidents)	Sibi (Incidents)	Total (Incidents)
2010-11	3	1	2	6
2011-12		2		2
2012-13	2			2
2013-14		2	4	6
2014-15				
2015-16		2	2	4
2016-17		1		1
G. Total				21

Source: Sui Southern Gas Company

The data shows that 21 attacks were launched to rupture the gas transmission pipelines, thus, hindering the uninterrupted supply of gas to the consumers. Security forces employed to guard energy related installations/pipelines, include the armed personnel of Frontier Corps (FC), Defence Services Guards (DSG) and Rangers. ‘The government has deployed 15,000 military personnel, as part of the Special Security Division (SSD), and Maritime Security Force (MSF) to protect projects under the umbrella of the CPEC. Both forces will work under the Interior Ministry, in coordination with the safety of locals and foreigners working on CPEC projects.’⁷⁸

The SSD had been deployed in six zones from Gwadar to Gilgit-Baltistan, including all four provinces and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The SSD is responsible for the security of the area within a 5-kms radius of CPEC-related projects, while the MSF safeguards the Gwadar Port and other coastal areas of the country.⁷⁹ Both the SSD and MSF were formed in view of possible threat to the CPEC and the foreign nationals, presently, engaged in infrastructure and power generation projects being commissioned under its umbrella. Both forces are equipped with state-of-the art weapons, equipment and vehicles.⁸⁰ All these developments further strengthen the argument that in case of Pakistan too, there is a very close connection between energy-military security.

Conclusion

This article mainly tried to explain and analyze the relation between the concept of energy security and military security. It has been learnt that the concern how to ensure the continuous supplies of the desired quantities and categories for every energy consumer and every energy producer undoubtedly remains the biggest concern. It has also been observed that in order to meet the energy security, the use of military force has always been considered as a legitimate option, especially by big powers, such as, British and the US. The development of the Conservation theory and the application of the Carter Doctrine remained instrumental in permanently dominating the Persian Gulf and its productive oil fields and even beyond that.

By applying the realist approach to protect the continuous flow and facilitate the transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia and the Caspian region, the US CENTCOM force was assigned the responsibility for the protection of energy supplies. The oil rich countries of the Middle East have been using their military force to protect their assets from the eminent threat of terrorists. China, however, behaved like a smart power and carried out successful operations against the Somali pirates to secure its energy flow through Indian Ocean sea lanes. Pakistan has a small appetite for energy vis-à-vis its giant neighbors, but is forced to use its security apparatus against terrorist activities to ensure the continuous supplies of gas and protect its high-power transmission lines, particularly in Sind and Balochistan. Moreover, Pakistan has employed a full-fledged Special Security Division and Maritime Security Force to ensure the security of CPEC projects and its associated energy projects. It is, therefore, established that energy security is hard to ensure without military security.

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Importance of Personality Development and Learning Environment for Deradicalization in Pakistan

Shahid Yaqub Abbasi and Ali Basit*

Abstract: Personality development and learning environment are combination of all those factors that influence or create a bent of mind of a child or student. A child is influenced by parents, peer, school, and environment. All these factors are responsible for child's idiosyncrasy and personality development. Apart from these factors, the most influential factor is institution, its curriculum design, advance teaching methods, teachers' training and conducive teaching-learning environment. This article attempts to focus on various aspects related to the personality development and learning environment, including factors determining it, ways of evaluating it and suggestions for improving it in Pakistan's perspective. Apart from above findings, authors have made a special attempt to create a linkage of deradicalization with personality development and learning environment in Pakistan. The analysis is operative and conclusions drawn may be applied by the policy makers in the state apparatus.

Keywords: Personality Development, Learning Environment, Deradicalization, Education, Teaching-Learning Process.

Introduction

Pakistan's strength lies in the diversity of its cultures, languages, beliefs, terrain and cuisine. This diversity also prevails in education system, ranging from private institutions in mega-cities to public-sector institutions in rural Sind, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. These institutions provide an environment extending from fashionably innovative to traditionally entrenched people of this country. It is assumed that each kind of institution would have a direct effect on the quality of learning and its product, i.e., students.¹ According to various research studies, classroom milieu is one of the significant elements in a student's accomplishment. In Pakistan, the published data is not sufficient or lacks to define how learning environment differs from one institution to other. Also, how this environment affects a student's achievement, growth and personality is not undertaken.

The most dynamic factor in the nation building is education as mentioned by our founding leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while addressing a group of students: "Pakistan is proud of her youth, particularly the students, who are nation builders of tomorrow. They must fully equip themselves by discipline, education, and training for the arduous task lying ahead of them."² However, the subsequent actions showed that the priority to learning and nation development could not run beyond rhetoric.

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Many policies and strategic plans have been implemented since the beginning, but could not achieve the desired results. Till the 18th amendment in the constitution, which announced education as the fundamental human right, there was very little changes observed.³ Enormous problems of access to education system, inequality of opportunity and infrastructure remained common. The issues being faced by the nation are the by-product of negligent attitude of policymakers towards education system. In order to fill this vacuum, new educational policies must be introduced and implemented by involving all the stakeholders including parents, teachers, principals, researchers, intellectuals, educationists and renowned academicians.

An Overview of Personality Development and Learning Environment in Pakistan

Personality is comprised of all physical, mental and emotional attitudes, whereas, learning environment is a combination of various physical locations, peculiar surroundings and cultural setups in which learners learn.⁴ Therefore, personality is an aggregate of physical and mental qualities, enthusiastic state of mind, rewards and motivational components, though, learning conditions refers to the assorted areas along with settings and social orders in which students learn. Since many studies, it may learn in a wide collection of settings, for instance, outside-of-school territories and outdoors conditions, the term is usually used as a more exact or differentiating alternative, when it comes to the classroom.

The natural factors that apply weights on our personality development are the way of life in which we are raised, our initial moulding, family standards, social gatherings and different impacts that we encounter. Nature to which we are uncovered, assumes a generous part in moulding our personalities. Personality, as indicated by the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, is the entire nature or character of a man.⁵ It expounds that how a man acts, feels and considers, and how he acts in a given arrangement of conditions is to a great extent dictated by the condition of his psyche. Insignificant outer appearance or a man's discourse or peculiarities are just edges of one's personality. Personality development in the true sense alludes to further levels of a man. Hence, an investigation of our personality should begin from an unmistakable handling of the ideas of our brain, and how it capacitates.

Personality trait is a unique quality, which makes a person distinctive from others. In Pakistan, parents and teachers do not appear to take an interest in matters related to temperament, character, and environment required for the personality development of the students. Teachers understand where parents either have no time or insufficient knowledge to be engaged in their children's schooling. The

education system of Pakistan does not take it into account and neglects profile building of students as productive and responsible members of a modern society. This problem relates directly with the curriculum being taught in educational institutions. The contents of curriculum, being taught to students, have vital importance as education is not just the content of textbooks poured into students' minds like empty barrel, rather its main purpose is grooming, character building and personality development that educates, trains and grooms young minds.

On the other hand, education system in Pakistan promotes cramming, which impedes learning and effective personality development. Another missing link in our instructional framework is that it neither perceives substitute according to psycho-social and financial prerequisites of our country nor it distinguishes the ability of students for specialization. There is still an ambiguity that whether to give emphasis to ideology and distinct values or propagate modern and liberal thoughts. The stages in which a person's personality develops, includes infancy, early childhood, play age, school age, young and adult age, and old age. Whereas, our society does not pay any heed or consider these stages an important vehicle in making the society as a whole. The major five personality traits, common in a society, are extraversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism.⁶ These attributes are persevering qualities, which are not one or the other great or awful. Early on, parents can work with the kid's variable traits instead of contradicting them that further leads towards a breaking point. Afterward, as child grows up, parents can help to adjust to his or her own particular world regardless of characteristic dispositions.⁷

Today, Pakistan is confronted with various issues like poverty, fear based oppression, sectarianism, and radicalization. The major causes are illiteracy, lack of appropriate education system, and unawareness developed by inadequate learning opportunities. These essentials of a befitting learning-framework are neglected altogether in Pakistan. There are some other factors, which causes uncertainty in Pakistan, but weak education system is one of the most contributing factors. Thus, Pakistan's education system is having multifarious weaknesses and extended problems.

During the last 70 years, numerous policies and plans have been implemented in Pakistan, yet the most pivotal is Education sector, whose multi-natured problems are still waiting for suitable and speedy solutions. These problems include ill-planned policies, allocation of insufficient funds, deficiency of physical infrastructure, weak examination system, untrained and inexperienced teachers, continuous political obstruction, obsolete educational programs, poor administration and supervision, absence of research-work, and inadequate training facilities. Keeping in mind the end goal to address these issues, there is a dire need to

redefine national objectives, adopt modern approaches in implementing comprehensive overhauling plan, and in addition, suitable instructional framework. Unfortunately, Pakistan's educational system does not provide an ideal teaching-learning environment and equal opportunities of education to everyone across the country. Due to having diversity in education system for the last 70 years, a wide gulf has been created between haves and have not. This difference is ultimately benefitting and facilitating the elites, who are ruling the country as well as the poor masses, resultantly, numerous social divisions and strife have emerged.

The world, at large, is spending a major chunk of development budget in education sector, but in Pakistan, the amount allocated for this important sector shows downwards trend throughout budgetary history of the country. As indicated by the International Crisis Group, Pakistan is of just 12 nations that spends under 2% of its GDP on education.⁸ The leading countries strives for enhancing the quality of its human resource with persistency, whereas, Pakistan is constantly being criticised for paying less heed and not considering the education sector as an important area. However, in the recent past, a marginal rise has been observed in budget allocation for education sector. Since 2015-16 till current spending plan, the planned expenses increased by 21% from PKR 59,260 million to PKR 71,716 million, bringing about a compound yearly growth rate (CAGR) of 10%. This is 1.7% of general spending plan.⁹ In this backdrop, Pakistan's educational system highlights various substantial and alarming issues. Personality development of students is dependent upon the contributions being made by education institutions, where facilities are still very less due to which the execution phase remains unfulfilled and desires results are not attained.

The limited research facilities available in Pakistani educational institutions are also of not required standards. It is because of non-availability of funds. Most of the universities do not have resources to purchase technological equipment to equip their labs. The research and experimental equipment, which is present in few universities, have been provided by various countries as an aid. In such a situation, it has become very difficult for the teachers to show practical demonstrations and conduct research based activities in an appropriate manner. Institutions, which have somehow managed to buy instruments, are mostly owned by the private sector and poor students virtually have no access to them. Moreover, fee in private schools is soaring very high. Up till now, government has not paid any attention to this problem. It has only estimated the cost of giving free education to children for the next four years, which stands at PKR 230 billion. However, chances of spending that amount are very less due to looming economic crisis. A majority of parents do not afford to send their children to private schools, being expensive. Ultimately, the

choice left behind is either poorly managed public schools or madrassahs, where education is either less expensive or free. Resultantly, these madrassahs churn out yet another class that is usually unaware of the world outside their own.

Moreover, teachers are poorly trained in government schools and majority of them opt for this profession as a last resort. Their competence level and command on key subjects remain weak. Most of them are unaware of effective teaching methods. Rote-learning is, thus, a common practice across the country owing to still following outdated and redundant teaching methodologies without having proper facilities and teaching-learning material. Another pressing problem is dearth of well-trained teachers and non-merit based enrolment. Teachers lack proper training and know-how and the ultimate sufferers are the students. Although, enrolment of teachers in education institutions is increasing, but still, a wide gulf between student-teacher ratio exists.

In Pakistan, the emphasis is usually given on quantity than quality. The same approach is also reflected in curricula, which is not based on true objectives, resultantly, students are unable to develop their thinking-power. It has also broken linkages with practical life, due to which students face difficulties while interacting with the society. Our national survival in terms of economic uplift, boost in defence and scientific revolution is entirely depended upon the kind and quality of education, we deliver to our children. In this regard, curricula are still lacking behind the international standards, and also not promoting the students' interest in practical and scientific fields.

Another sour point is the examination system, which is to test the students' innate knowledge and standard of academic learning. Continuous malpractices and usage of unfair means in examinations, have almost spoiled the set objectives and its outcome. The issue of unfair means has deep-rooted concern for the invigilators, students, parents and examination boards. Pupils look upon a degree as an identification to work, which can be obtained on the off chance that you pay the cost. Sadly, parents do not discourage their children in utilizing unfair practices to pass the examination, however, the most worrisome is that our educationists have likewise been polluted by the toxic substance of this underhandedness. The corrupt practices are not only spoiling the set objectives of education in the country, but also promoting the culture of uncertainty, chaos and criticism.

Characteristics of a Learning Environment

Learning environment is an important component of teaching-learning process. It is the healthy environment that plays a vital role in vertical growth of students. Conducive environment can only be created in education institutions, when teachers

pay special attention towards teaching-learning process and develop trust and harmony among their students. This trust further leads to true participation and attraction towards positive learning and establishes safe and supported environment. In order to create healthy environment, teacher's role is the most crucial and pivotal. It starts with the self-reflection, proper planning and continuous dynamism, while implementing the set objectives and curricula. Few strategies may be considered for creating conducive teaching-learning environment in a classroom:

Know Yourself

Knowing yourself is the ultimate reality to pursue specific goals and plans. Before going into planning phase, the teachers need to know themselves in depth about their beliefs, values, behaviour, and attitudes. The students' personality is shaped simultaneously with the reflection of their teachers' conduct and behaviour.

More Accentuation on Questions; not the Appropriate Responses

Curiosity is a positive sign of learning. If quality questions are asked by students then learning takes place in a befitting manner. However, students should be encouraged to ask questions rather gauging them by their answers.

Be Interested in Thoughts

Creativity is the hallmark of quality learning. Ideas, critical thinking and imaginative thoughts are originated from anyone. It is a sure-fire way to keep your students inspired as well.

Teaching-Learning Environment

Classroom activities have great importance in a teaching-learning environment. There is a dire need to adopt modern teaching techniques, which certainly enrich learning experience of the students. It can be inquiry based learning, instructions directly or e-learning.

Customize Learning

From the beginning of an academic session, an honest endeavour is required to explore the innate talent of students, and then, attention should be drawn to weaker ones. The learning levels need to be distributed systematically for the consumption of students. Such considerations help achieving the excellence and also helpful to customize lesson plans. This system is supportive to achieve the desired outcome.

Get Rid of a Clinically Based Appraisal Design

In order to assess the set objectives and goals, it is important to distinguish 'good students' from the 'good thinkers'. Clinical-testing techniques are considered to be little out-fashioned. Students should be clear about their testing procedures.

Guarantee that Students Comprehend Criteria for Progress

Prepare an appraisal design and plan it in the light of classroom environment, students' cooperation, and testing-system to influence students appropriately. This is the beginning, where the correct assessment plan and its execution are carried out for positive output.

Relearn Learning Tendencies

There are number of teaching-learning approaches available and the learners should get an opportunity to get benefit from them. A creative approach leads to better learning and critical thinking; therefore, innovative techniques and brainstorming sessions are helpful for students' learning.

Urge Students to Make Inquiries

Regular interaction between teachers and students is a healthy sign with addition of critical thinking and curiosity. This is the best identification of teaching-learning environment as well the teachers' effectiveness. Students should be encouraged to rediscover themselves with the habit of inquiring and asking questions.

Personality Development and Learning Environment – An Analytical Perspective

Personality development of students and learning environment go side by side in any education institution. Their relationship is deep and interwoven. An analytical perspective of the personality development and learning environment in Pakistan underpins followings:

- The existing system does not provide any social, spiritual and political need of the society.
- It does not inculcate unity, patriotism and desire for a welfare state in young minds.
- It does not promote cultural and ethical norms and religious tolerance.
- It does not create responsible members for the society.
- Allocation of funds for the education sector does not guarantee transparent spending on educational projects.
- Lack of trained teaching-staff, because of poor intake and politicised induction system, directly affects the quality of teachers.

- Capacity-building issues are the core concern, which must be on government's priority to eliminate this menace.

The declining standards of education is owing to inadequate policy initiatives and deteriorating teaching-learning environment in Pakistan, thus, resulted into poor outcome.

Deradicalization and Role of Education in the Society

Radicalization is described as a process, whereby, an individual or a group of individuals is engaged in violent terrorism or extremism. Such activities further lead to destruction, destabilizing a State and its apparatus. However, deradicalization is referred to reverse the radicalization process and curtailing the ongoing risk to the society from extremism and terrorism. The phenomenal rise of radicalism in Pakistani society has badly damaged the State's infrastructure and its citizens as well. There are many visible factors responsible for wide-spreading of radical trends and poor education system is one of them. "If a society is educated, enlightened and economically prosperous, the prospects of extremism, transforming into militancy, radicalization, violence and terrorism become proportionately dim. But, if the society is backward, under-developed and illiterate, the challenge of extremism becomes serious."¹⁰

The role of education is, therefore, of tremendous importance in carving the bright future of any nation around the world. Education performs a pivotal role in shaping the general outlook and behaviour of the people. It ultimately broadens the horizon and purges out the anti-social trends and develops personality of individuals. Unfortunately, education has never been a top priority in Pakistan and its negative outcome is evident. In order to improve the existing education system and its quality, followings are recommended:

Methodical Reforms

Reforms must be specific and methodical in nature, highlighting the set areas and addressing the key issues simultaneously. The areas, which can bring into focus, may be economy, fiscal resources, governance, human resources, infrastructure, curricula and delivery. These areas are interwoven and in case of leaving any one of them may hinder the long-term objectives.

Standards of Excellence

An Institution's standards of excellence ought to be crafted to serve the purpose. Any system is viewed as excellent, if it encompasses variety of purposes. This is to say that when an institution achieves its set goals, while managing its resources

effectively, it produces desired results. However, ambitions for system-excellence must not impose uniformity in performance-standards by all institutions.

Classroom Environment

Teacher in a classroom needs to be assigned the task of motivating and inspiring students. This kind of environment is very much conducive for learning, where teachers motivate and expect students to deliver and rewarded. It is a chief characteristic of an effective school, because motivation to learn results in academic achievement of students.

Teachers Training

Teachers training needs to be standardized. One cannot expect improvement at later stages, if pre-service training is not incorporated in the existing system. In fact, teachers are keen to go through a standardized training to learn and improve their performance. However, they do not have enough opportunities for in-service training to improve. This indicates the fact that teachers are not lacking motivation and interest; it is the lack of supportive mechanism and structure to help them in overcoming their weaknesses. Organization of special training programs and workshops with an aim to facilitate teachers to enhance their abilities, is one of the most important elements in improving the standards of education in the country.

Quality Enhancement

The quality of education needs to be improved. It should not rest upon the achievement of high numerical values. For this, our institutions must provide conducive environment that supports and promotes creative learning, and focus should be on finding answers of the questions that are or likely to be posed by present and future and not of the yester years.

Expenditure on Education

Presently, the overall investment in education sector is at 2.2% of the GDP, while investment in the higher education stands at 15% of this outlay. The investment in the education sector needs to be enhanced. Ideally, in the next four years, this investment needs to be 4% of GDP in which there should be 18-20% rise in the share of higher education. This is important because various developed countries dedicate nearly 17% of their budget to education sector.¹¹

Medium of Instructions

Absence of a uniform education system is yet another issue. Currently, there are three main systems: English-medium schools, Urdu-medium schools, and religious Madrassas. Each one of them has their own methodologies and subsequent products

resulted into social division and in some cases conflicts. Therefore, there is a dire need to introduce a uniform system of education for all citizens.

Improved Curricula

Curricula-development is another issue, which is not effectively managed. Usually, the contents of curricula are inappropriate or inadequate, which do not help in setting and subsequently achieving the intended goals. This happens because the task of curriculum-development is undertaken by non-professionals, which is totally unjust and unacceptable. It is an expert's job and needs an experienced hand, who can understand the importance of education institutions and serve national purpose accordingly.

Research Initiatives

The absence of research-based learning is another ignored area in our educational systems. In developed countries, it is viewed as a key to promoting, developing and enhancing the abilities of student. However, in our part of the world, this is not the case. For this, an institution at national level needs to be in place with a view to attract and facilitate students to undertake research. It will help students to familiarize themselves with their societal and national issues, and subsequently, they can come up with new ideas and solutions.

Numerous countries have been through the tumult of radicalization, and majority of them have actualized significant deradicalization programs. It requires political will, diligence and a composite State-reform agenda to implement deradicalization measures effectively, particularly in the field of education. Radicalism and terrorism are serious issues for Pakistani society, and deradicalization endeavours cannot demonstrate quick quantifiable outcomes without reforms in education sector, which resultantly create landmark impact on personality development of a student. At the same time, efforts must go on and get enough momentum to remain maintainable until the menace of terrorism is exterminated through an effective and vibrant education system. Pakistan needs to developed a comprehensive deradicalization strategy including educational reform-agenda and execute it in its true sense. For this purpose, a well concocted and deliberate social-building activity is required in the domain of education.

There is a significant presence of urban civil society in Pakistan, which has intellectuals, organizational capacity and experience of social activism. Being a noticeable social-force, this civil society can play an effective role in setting-up a progressive Islamic State. Also, gigantic changes in basic structure of education of the country are required. Dealing with radicalism is a deep-rooted responsibility, but

education is the most easy and permanent solution. Deradicalization through education initiatives must be executed on war footings. It also needs to be supported and backed by all stakeholders, because at this moment, Pakistan cannot afford to lose its fight against the forces of radicalism and fanaticism. Pakistan can emerge as a peaceful, stable and progressive State, if education reforms are introduced immediately, as envisioned by its Founding Father.

Conclusion

Lack of quality education is directly responsible for incoherent and poor development of students' personality in the country. Pakistan left behind in the comity of nations because of inconsistent education policies. At present, different educational systems are operating in Pakistan, which are paradoxical in nature. Instead of supplementing each other, these are diverting students in different directions. Element of teachers-training is also missing in educational institutions. However, there are certain teachers-training programs, but these training arrangements are unable to give measured response to contemporary needs. Therefore, there is a dire need to remove all types of perennial paradoxes present in existing syllabi and must rediscover the variables to create linkages between deradicalization and education system. It can only be done, if our education system is more oriented towards personality development of students and provide conducive learning environment. If these variables are applied practically by the State apparatus, it will result into a new vision of a nation.

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CONFERENCE PAPERS

Applicability of Hybrid Warfare to Pakistan: Challenges and Possible Responses

*Andrew Korybko**

‘Hybrid Warfare’, a relatively new term, which is not entailing a universally recognized definition in the first place; it is mostly being used as a catchall phrase to describe any sort of clandestine non-military destabilization efforts. Whether it is economic subversion or propaganda dissemination, all of these techniques have already been around for ages, and there is nothing novel in them nowadays, except may be in terms of how these techniques have adapted to incorporate modern-day technologies. The term itself is, therefore, highly politicized and aimed at conveying subliminal inferences, thereby, making the word ‘Hybrid Warfare’ a form of ‘Hybrid War’ itself.

The concept of Hybrid Warfare is completely different from anything being discussed in the West, and it is much more practically relevant since it is not designed to be a propaganda tool like the term itself has regrettably become. Instead, US-own state-of-the-art warfighting techniques in building an original model, which describes how and why the US is the one, who is actually waging asymmetrical conflicts all across the world through the hybrid utilization of a variety of proxy forces. However, the model, under discussion, allows to actually predict, where the next Hybrid Wars will be launched as well as provides a list of indicators for what to expect in the run-up to any imminent destabilization operation.

Throughout the course of this paper, a wide array of topics is going to be discussed, which all contribute to Hybrid Wars, whether through their tactical manifestation or the broader strategic environment in which they operate. Pakistan urgently needs to understand the essence of Hybrid Wars, because this model indicates that there is no other place in the world right now, which is more likely to be victimized by this stratagem, and in fact, Pakistan is already caught up in the destabilization web and has been for some time already. It is going to make sense of

* Andrew Korybko, a prominent Russian geopolitical commentator, presented this paper during his visit to the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad on 18th April 2017. This paper is based on his book titled *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change* published by the Institute of Strategic Research and Predictions at the People’s Friendship University of Russia; and *Oriental Review Article Series*, both of which are accessible at orientalreview.org.

what has happened to Pakistan over the years, what it is going through right now, and where it is all headed.

The complexity and variety of ideas discussed in this paper might give the impression being longwinded or going off on some unrelated tangents, but this all comes together in explaining the essence of Hybrid Wars. Starting from the definition of Hybrid Wars, it will discuss the recent historical progression of the model, which involves a heavy degree of geopolitics. This is important in order to arrive at the contemporary context in which these conflicts are unfolding, including in Pakistan with CPEC. Once Hybrid Wars theory is explained, it will segue into discussing Pakistan's vulnerability to this model and some suggestions about what it can do to preemptively defend itself.

Of course, in doing so, it is going to naturally touch upon some very sensitive issues in Pakistani society, and accordingly, will present questions that Pakistanis will have to deal with in striking the perfect balance between safeguarding against this asymmetrical threat and preserving civil society traditions. It is not to inject into some of Pakistan's most intimate and divisive issues, but that can make people reconceive of them through the prism of Hybrid Warfare in spotting the inadvertent threats that they may entail, if they are irresponsibly dealt with by society or the state. There are hostile forces, which are waiting to exploit any opportunity that naturally or artificially arises in order to destabilize Pakistan, and that they usually begin by using the seemingly subtle methods of perception management techniques in order to open the door to unleashing a Hybrid War later on.

Hybrid Wars can be defined as “externally provoked identity conflicts, which exploit historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences within geostrategic transit states through the phased transition from Color Revolutions to Unconventional Wars in order to disrupt, control, or influence multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects by means of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and/or Regime Reboot.” It is a long and very deep definition, therefore, it can be easily understood, once it will be deconstructed to go through each part separately. The first thing is that Hybrid Wars are externally provoked identity conflicts, which is certainly the case, but they are both a combination of natural and manufactured ones.

There are pre-existing identity conflicts within every single country in the world, though, they might not get to the level of catalysing political change unless provoked by outside elements, which is a key point. The methods through which external actors seek to influence their domestic targets vary, but they can roughly be divided into two broad and interconnected categories – NGOs and Infowars. It is not the case that all NGOs are hostile foreign intelligence-backed entities or that every

single international media outlet is a Hybrid War weapon, but to raise awareness about how these two mediums can be exploited for political purposes. There is a need to understand that there are many positive uses for NGOs and information outlets and that they ultimately do a lot more good than bad, but as the saying goes, it only takes a few rotten apples to spoil the whole batch.

Here, the reference is a broad segment of organizations that are official and informal, international and domestic. They can be anything from the Global Soros Foundation – which is often the main driver in one way or another behind most Color Revolutions – to a local neighbourhood effort to clean up the city's streets. NGOs do not have to be overtly involved in politics, either, as there are many genuine civil society initiatives, but what need to realize is that all NGOs – even those, which do not intend to be involved in politics – could either be deliberately instrumentalized for this purpose or misled into becoming politically active. An NGO, in other words, is a platform – whether physical or social – which organizes people together for a common goal, and operationally speaking, they can serve as cells for laying the foundation for Color Revolutions and later carrying them out.

Before discussing Color Revolutions, we need to accept that pre-existing identity divisions within targeted states can be exacerbated and manipulated for political and often times violent ends, whether by NGOs and information outlets, or just regular citizens. All countries are vulnerable to at least one of the five identity indicators that are historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences. These differences do not even have to be presently active in any given society, but just that the grounds for them exist, which could then be manipulated by others to create artificial conflicts. For instance, historical differences, which every country has to various extents. These might relate to decades-long political rivalries between different factions, or to recently acquired territory. Then, there are ethnic conflicts, which everyone is aware, are between or within different groups. Next is religious differences, which broadly manifest themselves as sectarianism in the Islamic world, while socio-economic ones deal mostly with inequality and systemic economic and institutional challenges. The last set of identity differences, geographic, can be subdivided into two categories – physical and political. People living in the mountains, for instance, usually have a different identity than those residing in the plains, just as people living in one political unit sometimes feel different allegiances than those living in other ones elsewhere in the country.

At this point, we are at externally provoked identity conflict in geostrategic transit states, which raises the question about what exactly is meant by transit state. Before elaborating the concept of transit state, its reference to the multipolar transitional connective infrastructure projects should be discussed. The transition of

Color Revolutions to Unconventional Wars should be understood here, first. Color Revolutions are basically “people’s protest movements”. Not every people’s protest is a Color Revolution, but every Color Revolution gives off the cleverly crafted veneer of looking like a “people’s protest”. They all have some sort of trigger event in common, be it a controversial law being passed or defeated, a supposedly rigged election, an anti-corruption crusade, or a civil society issue, such as, a spike in utility prices, and each of these can be naturally occurring or provoked by outside influences, whether intelligence-related or operating independently for their own interests. Again, there are legitimate and plausible reasons for people to organize in protesting against any of these issues, but they become a Color Revolution once they advocate for political changes and are linked to foreign forces, and this is where the NGOs and foreign information outlets come into play. Both of these can have financial, personnel, or direct links to outside actors, which have an interest in destabilizing the state, and often times work to engineer citizen-versus-state provocations or exploit pre-existing natural protest movements by infiltrating and later controlling them. Color Revolutions succeed not by a bunch of people holding play cards and shouting slogans until the authorities step down, but through urban terrorism; the most dramatic example is of “EuroMaidan” events of late 2013 and early 2014. There’s a big difference between peacefully protesting and violently agitating, and it is the latter, which is the end goal of Color Revolution organizers, which include NGOs, information outlets, and on-the-ground operatives. Color Revolutions succeed not because every single person involved is treasonously trying to overthrow the government, but due to the natural mechanics of crowd control psychology and the strategic actions of the core organizers.

Sometimes, all that it takes is a small and dedicated group of provocateurs to spark clashes with the authorities, which in turn are misleadingly reported on by hostile anti-government outlets in order to craft the perception that the police are randomly attacking “peaceful protesters” for fun. The whole point is to engineer a completely artificial narrative of “democratic freedom fighters” resisting a “tyrannical dictatorship”, which serves the dual purposes of encouraging more citizens to join in the growing riot and to generate support from abroad. It is important to state that “support” does not just mean favorable media coverage, though, that is a part of it, but also the threat of sanctions and diplomatic isolation from the so-called “international community”, which in this case mostly means the West. It can also be extended to clandestinely include material assistance to the “protesters” such as the weapons that they will need to help their Color Revolution evolve into an Unconventional War.

Unconventional War, by its definition, is a conflict, where one of the participants is not in an official uniform, so it could mean terrorism, a rebellion, an

insurgency, or anything like that. We can also see that in the leaked document of 2012 called the US Army Training Circular 18-01, which comprehensively describes how the Pentagon views Unconventional Warfare and actually trains its own soldiers for waging it. The connection between Unconventional Warfare and Color Revolutions is that the presumable “people’s protests” progressively escalate into an Unconventional War as the organizers and their foreign backers seek to put more pressure on the targeted government, because, a bunch of people standing around holding signs do not overthrow governments, actual security threats do.

As Color Revolutions either fizzle out due to effective government countermeasures or escalate into violence, when organizers sense state weakness, the logical progression is for them to morph into Unconventional Wars, understood in this sense as urban insurgency and terrorism, which are the next step in advancing the political goals of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and Regime Reboot. The examples of most well-known and successful Color Revolutions since the end of the Cold War, are Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, in which it is clearly observable how the transition of Color Revolution to Unconventional War takes place.

The Kyrgyz Color Revolution in 2010 was the first success in transforming a Color Revolution into a brief Unconventional War, and the lessons learned from this experience were applied the year later in the theater-wide “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions, notably in Libya, Yemen, and of course Syria. Then, of course, we had the outbreak of urban terrorism known as “EuroMaidan” in Ukraine at the end of 2013 and early 2014, which was in many ways a European example of the “Arab Spring”. At that very moment, the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov said in May 2014 that the “Arab Spring” was really a theater-wide Color Revolution and that “EuroMaidan” was the most recent iteration. This proves that there is an undeniable continuity between the events in the Mideast and what broke out in Eastern Europe, as well as the patterned transition of failed Color Revolutions mutating into Unconventional Wars of varying intensity and length.

General Gerasimov elaborated further, by citing the NATO War on Libya that the ultimate goal of Color Revolutions is to develop into Unconventional Wars, which serve as a pretext for a large-scale conventional military conflict waged by foreign powers. Hybrid Wars, which is basically a phased transition, do not need to always result in Libya-like conventional wars by NATO, since these are sometimes impossible for them to carry out in nuclear-armed countries like Pakistan or in states very close to their vicinity, such as in Russia and China’s Central Asian neighbours. There are also other practical geopolitical reasons behind their avoidance of conventional military operation, such as, troop limits and a fear of military

overstretch, which explains the reason that hostile governments sometimes opt to purposely keep the conflict threshold just below the level of conventional intervention.

In such cases, the concept of manageable or weaponized chaos, or in other words opening up a Pandora's Box of problems with the intention of having it deliberately destabilize the target and its surroundings, could be a goal in and of itself, which would also further the objectives of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and Regime Reboot. Sparking a seemingly self-perpetuating and autonomous cycle of conflict, such as, the one in Syria for the past half a decade, is designed to put enormous pressure on the state authorities and get them to enter into a series of political concessions, or Regime Tweaks, demanded by the outside aggressors. If that fails, then the next step is to push for Regime Change, which could ultimately be taken to the extreme of a Regime Reboot in fundamentally reorganizing the internal affairs of a given country through 'constitutional reform' and the promulgation of "Identity Federalism". This outcome is, when the differing identity-centric fighting forces are rewarded with their own quasi-independent statelets, such as, what happened in Bosnia after the war and what might be awarded to the Kurds as part of the post-Daesh 'political solution' in Syria.

In order to sustain the Hybrid War throughout its Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and Regime Reboot phases, a broad coalition of countries partner together to provide assistance to their allied fighters, with the entire operation being directed by the US through the Lead from Behind stratagem, which is the international division of labor behind this prolonged destabilization.

Not all Color Revolutions lead to Unconventional Wars, however, with the so-called "Green Revolution" in Iran in 2009, the Mainstream Media-labelled "Electric Yerevan" in Armenia in 2015, and the recent two-year-long drama in the Republic of Macedonia being prime examples. This can be explained by two reasons. The first one is that the operations in question were never intended to develop into full-fledged Hybrid Wars backed up by a Lead from Behind coalition, but were instead probes to identify structural weaknesses and state responses in order to perfect the most optimal plan, which would later be unleashed at a more convenient time. Any resultant state destabilization, which might prompt government over reactions and the further exacerbation of violence would be welcomed, because it could make it easier to enact political concessions, or prompt Regime Tweaking, from the targeted state, but it might not have been originally anticipated to produce such results.

Correspondingly, effective counter-Color Revolution measures can also be attributed to preventing the emergence of a Hybrid War in these countries, but they should not always be seen as the sole reason behind why this did not happen. As per

the doctrine of weaponized or manageable chaos, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently acknowledged that the US might continue giving support to its proxies even if they are on the verge of defeat in order to prolong instability in the targeted state. This is not always the case, as even the US only has limited resources and that not all of its partners are eager to join in a Lead from Behind Hybrid War coalition, such as, the one that was used against Syria, but it is still an important factor that must not be discounted. Ultimately, the reason behind failed Color Revolutions, which never quite materialize to the Unconventional and Hybrid War stages, is always discovered in hindsight on a case-by-case basis.

Hybrid Wars are externally provoked identity conflicts, which aim to transition failed Color Revolutions into Unconventional Wars for the purpose of disrupting, controlling, or influencing multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects. In a nutshell, multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects are the New Silk Roads, which collectively contribute to China's One Belt One Road global vision, of which CPEC is the flagship project. The US has a grand interest in disrupting, controlling, or influencing the Silk Roads and CPEC, because of their geostrategic significance for China in the New Cold War, so in order to understand everything a little bit better and see how this all fits together, there is a need of understanding that why Washington is so strongly against multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects, which are outside of its grasp.

Right now, the world is in the midst of a massive paradigmatic transition, whereby, the existing Western-dominated global institutions and power centres are being replaced by non-Western competitors, with everything roughly being summed up as a competition between the unipolar US and its allies to retain their influence in the face of a rising Russia, China, and their trusted multipolar partners such as Pakistan and Iran, for example. The multipolar forces want to reform the world system in order to make it more equitable and just, while the unipolar ones want to protect their institutional advantages. This struggle can be seen as the New Cold War, and while it was in the making for some time ever since the end of the Old Cold War, it really kicked into high gear in the late 2013 and early 2014.

During this time, the US unleashed the "EuroMaidan" Hybrid War against Russian interests in Ukraine, which was foreseen as being the fledgling Eurasian Union's irreplaceable bridge to the EU, or in other words, Moscow's multipolar transnational connective infrastructure project, which overlaps with China's Eurasian Land Bridge initiative. At the same time, the US began provoking China in the South China Sea and tried assembling a Lead From Behind coalition to challenge its interests there, which presented a threat to the maritime portion of OBOR. The

US' simultaneous indirect proxy warfare against Russia and China's chief national security interests is what brought them closer in an unprecedented Eurasian partnership, which brings us to the present day. Russia confronts the US militarily, while China does so economically, and these two Great Powers are, thus, a perfect pair for one another, and therefore, decided to pool their resources and coordinate their actions in order to facilitate the global transition from unipolarity to multipolarity; all the while constructing alternative governance systems and institutions such as BRICS, the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the BRICS Bank. Pakistan's future is more directly tied in with China's economic efforts than Russia's military ones.

China is a colossal Great Power with the world's largest population and biggest market, so it needs consistent economic growth in order to remain stable. Any significant economic down turn could lead to socio-political unrest such as protests, strikes, Color Revolutions, and Hybrid Wars, which is why China must prioritize its economic security as one of the main pillars of its national security. The only way to ensure continued growth is to enhance connectivity with all of its global partners, since this will also provide a market outlet for China's over production, and therefore, keep large state-connected firms in business. Of course, China does not expect for underdeveloped and impoverished countries to be able to serve as dependable market places, which is why it has a self-interest in helping to develop and enrich its partners as part of this process in the ultimate "win-win" arrangement. These inter-connected economic motivations are the guiding concepts behind OBOR, which naturally has a geostrategic dimension as well.

Most of China's Eastern Hemispheric trade is conducted via maritime routes, which link it to the EU, Mideast, East Africa, and even neighbouring Southeast Asia, so it is very vulnerable to any sort of American naval interference, especially in the bottleneck areas of the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and the two Suez Canals. In order to get to any of these regions, however, China must first traverse the South China Sea, which explains why the US is so interested in destabilizing that part of the world right now and why China is so adamantly defending its interests there. Therefore, as part of a long-term plan to partially mitigate its strategic vulnerabilities on the global waterways, China wants to pioneer an ambitious trans-Eurasian network of high-speed railroads in order to directly connect with each of its partners via overland routes – except for East Africa of course – which are safe from the US' naval obstruction.

The flip side of this strategy, however, is that the new mainland transit states are instead vulnerable to Hybrid War, this stratagem can be described as provoking identity conflict in geostrategic transit states that are along the route of multipolar

transnational connective infrastructure projects or New Silk Roads. Ukraine and Syria were two such states, with the first being integral to Russia's Eurasian Union project, and the second one being the terminal location of the prospective Friendship Pipeline, which was supposed to send Iranian gas through Iraq and to Syria for sale on the European marketplace. Each of these initiatives aimed to achieve very powerful multipolar goals, which is why the US so determinedly opposed them. "EuroMaidan" was launched in order to 'poach' Ukraine out of the Eurasian Union and deal a heavy blow to Russia's integrational efforts, while the "Arab Spring" theater-wide Color Revolutions, which were initiated for grandiose geostrategic reasons, such as, to see a Turkish-backed Muslim Brotherhood Arab super-state come into fruition for proxy use against Iran, also served the immediate purpose in Syria of sabotaging any hope that the Friendship Pipeline would be built.

The US has obvious geostrategic reasons to subvert other Silk Roads and related multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects, which can unleash Hybrid Wars by first identifying China's most important OBOR plans, both active and prospective. There is ongoing work being done in Russia, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, and East Africa on several New Silk Road projects and initial plans are being considered for Central Asia at the moment too, with each affiliated state in these regions being vulnerable to Hybrid War destabilizations as per the five identity conflict variables, namely historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences. These become more pronounced and easier to manipulate the more non-Western that a given transit state is. The keystone of OBOR, however, is not in any of those aforementioned regions, but in South Asia and right here in Pakistan with CPEC, which unites all of those through the Zipper of Eurasia and Convergence of Civilization concepts. As a result, Pakistan is poised to become the world's top Hybrid War battleground in the coming future. In order for this to make sense and not sound like baseless fear mongering, it should be observed why CPEC is the cornerstone of OBOR, which makes it the most important project for ensuring China's economic and strategic security, and therefore, turns it into the main target of American destabilization efforts through Hybrid War, including in conjunction with the US' new military-strategic ally, India.

CPEC is much more important than even the record-breaking \$50 billion, already allocated to it, would indicate, since it first and foremost achieves very tangible geostrategic objectives for China. The first is that it aims to connect to Xinjiang, and therefore, develop a West-East trade route across the entirety of the People's Republic, which is expected to bring development to the country's most obscure and impoverished corners. This would not happen, though, if companies along the Eastern Chinese coast do not utilize this route, which means that they must have some sort of incentive in doing so, otherwise this ambitious plan would

not amount to anything. There is a very convincing argument behind why China's mega cities and economic centres should use CPEC, and that is simple geopolitics and common strategic sense. The US' disruptive activities in the South China Sea could eventually pose a threat to Chinese shipping, and moreover, the Strait of Malacca could very easily be closed to China's vessels in the event of a conflict or the run-up to one. This would strangle China's Eastern coast and could dangerously prompt the sort of socio-political unrest that Beijing wants to avoid. However, if a reliable overland route were to be pioneered in linking east China with the Indian Ocean and detouring around the Strait of Malacca bottleneck, then any future crisis of this nature could be largely averted. CPEC satisfies this pressing geostrategic need by giving China dependable and safe access to the Indian Ocean, from where it can then trade more freely and uninterruptedly with the Mideast, East Africa, and EU. As for the other chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canals, China's "win-win" diplomacy with the relevant regional stakeholders of Saudi Arabia and Iran, Djibouti, and Egypt, respectively, gives them a self-interested reason to ensure freedom of navigability for China's ships.

The key objective that China needs to attain, therefore, is to reach the Indian Ocean, since everything else afterwards would be comparatively less difficult to deal with. Access to this body of water is also crucial for guaranteeing China's robust economic engagement with East Africa, which is expected to become one of the defining trade partnerships of the future. It is to keep in mind that for as far-reaching and impressive as China's trans-Eurasian Silk Road projects in Russia, Central Asia, and the Mideast are in trying to link East Asia with Western Europe, it is going to take many years to construct these desired corridors, and there are also so many Hybrid War vulnerabilities inherent with these routes that some of them will probably be successfully disrupted, controlled, or influenced by the US. This in turn reinforces the fact that the vast majority of the international trade on which China so desperately depends for ensuring its future socio-political stability will be conducted via the global waterways in one way or another for the next foreseeable decade or two at least.

What CPEC does is give China a fighting chance to maintain its economic growth without fear of having it held hostage through the US' manipulations in the South China Sea or the Strait of Malacca. CPEC guarantees China's strategic freedom and flexibility in the face of the US' naval threats and nullifies all the trouble that it is causing along its southern maritime borderlands. The project helps China wean itself away from its existing dependency on South China Sea-traversing trade by giving it more secure options via the overland portion of CPEC. Importantly, CPEC also connects with the maritime routes of OBOR, which thus, makes it doubly pivotal for China in serving as its mainland-maritime interface for conducting EU, Mideast, and

East African trade. Because of the premier geostrategic importance of the Indian Ocean and CPEC in China's grand strategic calculus, and evaluating the shifting concentration of global power from West to East, it is fair to say that the future is not just an Asian one or a Pacific one, but an Indo-Pacific Century, which Pakistan is literally located right in the middle of.

Approached from the US' perspective, Washington has every reason that anyone could think of to destabilize Pakistan through identify-driven Hybrid War because this would allow it to disrupt, control, or influence CPEC and henceforth indirectly acquire a strategic advantage over China's economy. It would also allow the US to guide events all throughout the Indo-Pacific Century after having obtained control over the last multipolar and independent state in South Asia, whether through Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, or a Regime Reboot. Pakistan is the US' top target for Hybrid War because of its participation in CPEC and location at the geographic center of the Indo-Pacific Century, both of which give it globally relevant significance in serving as the multipolar breakout point for China in Eurasia. The New Cold War competition between the US and China is being fought all across the world in various ways, especially in Africa for example, but nowhere is it more important than in Pakistan for the reasons that has been previously discussed and the US' method of fighting this proxy conflict is through Hybrid War.

External actors seek to provoke identity conflicts in states that occupy important transit routes along the New Silk Road, and they do this through a strategic interplay of NGOs and information outlets. The most cost-effective way to presently wage a war is not to do so directly, but to indirectly provoke what appears to be a "civil war" in the targeted state. This is achieved by using the said NGOs and information outlets to spark identity conflict, taking advantage of historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences in bringing this about. Usually, this takes the form of a Color Revolution progressively phasing into an Unconventional War, but other times the process might be the reverse, with a prolonged Unconventional War of attrition in the countryside leading to a Color Revolution in the urban centres.

Either way, as the state becomes embroiled in various degrees of internecine warfare, the external organizers assemble a Lead from Behind coalition to sustain the destabilization by feeding their proxy fighters weapons and other sorts of required assistance to prolong the conflict. During this time, the hostile actors hope that the targeted state will resort to their desired Regime Tweaking, or political concessions, as a trade-off for lessening the intensity of the Hybrid War. In practical terms, this could result in allowing the US and its allies to control or influence the New Silk Road projects, in this case, CPEC, in one way or another. Should Regime

Tweaking not be possible due to the government's unflinching resistance to Hybrid War blackmail, then Regime Change becomes the next option, just like it was pursued against President Assad and former President Yanukovich. If that fails, as it stands to do in Syria, then a Regime Reboot is the last recourse for the Hybrid War organizers, whereby, they seek to turn the formerly unified country into a checkerboard of quasi-independent identity-based statelets as part of their divide-and-rule strategy. All of this is disturbingly very applicable to Pakistan, which is being targeted, because it is the Zipper of Eurasia, and therefore, Convergence of Civilizations, crucially located in the geographic center of the Indo-Pacific Century and of irreplaceable strategic importance for China's national security.

Beginning with the first point, it is safe to assume that there are certain NGOs and information outlets in Pakistan – just like in any country – which wittingly or inadvertently contribute to national confusion and subsequently raise the risk of political conflict, whether or not they are doing this on behalf of an external patron or on their own self-interested initiative, no matter what their intentions may be. This is a very sensitive issue in any country, because it touches on the very essence of civil society and democracy, these sorts of threats do exist and they have proven their lethal efficacy all across the world in numerous instances, especially during the theater-wide “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions and the outbreak of urban terrorism popularly known as “EuroMaidan”. The events in Syria and Ukraine are classic examples of Hybrid War, and they owe their organizational genesis to hostile NGOs and information outlets.

Pakistan is rife with historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences, which could be manipulated in order to engineer violence and set a Hybrid War scenario in motion. The awareness of how certain threads of national fabric can be used against Pakistan by outsiders, including through the indirect manipulation of otherwise well-intentioned and unwitting actors by NGOs and information outlets is very important.

The first and foremost issue of Pakistan's origin story, which is controversial to some because it is seen as religiously exclusionary. In select cases, individuals might associate more with Islam than with Pakistan, which is, of course, a personal choice, but might make them vulnerable to external manipulation by foreign countries or non-state actors such as radical clerics. There is also the fact that some territorial issues came up right around the time of Pakistan's independence, with Kashmir understandably being the most important of them. Kashmiris and those living in what is nowadays Gilgit-Baltistan are very loyal to and thankful for Pakistan, but that does not mean that India and others would not stop trying to get some of the more extreme nationalist elements of the latter to embrace their separate identity

and militantly resist the central state. This narrative is somewhat along the lines of what the terrorists in FATA relied on in emphasizing the anti-state concept of a transnational or Afghan-expansionist “Pashtunistan” on the supposed grounds that the Durand Line is an artificial international boundary. There is also the case being advanced by the most extreme Baloch nationalists, which argue that they did not want to be part of Pakistan and that their inclusion in the state was the result of force and coercion. If, these two narratives of radical Pashtun and Baloch narratives are paired together through their commonality in refusing to recognize the Durand Line and their subsequent inclusion in Pakistan, a conclusion can be drawn that both of the frontier populations could be exploited by outside forces based in Afghanistan, which might one day intend to change Pakistan’s borders so as to promote an artificial concept of “Greater Afghanistan”, whether de-jure internationally, which is unlikely or de-facto through some sort of “Identity Federalism” following a forthcoming conflict. These ideas are real and can be weaponized to use against Pakistan, which is why it is absolutely essential to understand them in order to devise the best strategies for counteracting these threats. One of them can be by deconstructing Pakistan’s inclusive national identity into exclusive sub-national parts by drawing attention to Punjab and Sindh, both of which – just like most of the country – can be further subdivided into different cities, clans, and tribes, which could in turn be mobilized around different political or NGO forces, attracted or guided to them by manipulative identity-centric information outlets.

On the topic of Punjab and Sindh, their prosperity relative to the rest of the country could make the peripheral populations vulnerable to falling for the demagogic narrative of regionalism, which is manifested nowadays by the claim that Punjab will be the only part of the country to benefit from CPEC and that this is part of some corrupt conspiracy by the Punjabi political elite. From the reverse angle, and to be a bit provocative here, people in Punjab and Sindh might become for lack of a better description, “regionally arrogant”, be it through their official policies or individual attitudes, and unintentionally further divisive narratives, which only fuel the fire of identity conflict and set the stage for Hybrid War sentiments. It should be recognized that the seeds of identity conflict are planted within one’s mind and manifest themselves as ideas before transforming into action with time.

In a sense, any identity conflict-prone individual – which includes every single human being on this earth – can be compared to a potential “sleeper cell”, to use conventional terrorist terminology, because just like people who believe in an extreme and violent interpretation of religion, those which hold the same views in accordance with other identity variables – be it history, ethnicity, socio-economic issues, or geographic affiliation – do not always exhibit visible signs of their radical beliefs until the run-up to acting on them, which could take a long time or be

triggered within a short notice depending on the stimuli involved. The catalyst for action could be something as drawn-out as a prolonged political crisis or as sudden as an on-the-street provocation, but either way, it aims to compel the individual to act on their ideas in a certain way, one which promotes the objectives of the Hybrid War organizers even if the participants are largely unaware of this.

Approached from the reverse perspective, people naturally have all sorts of benign and passive ideas – whether political or otherwise – and might be moved all of a sudden by an unexpected stimulus to act on them by protesting, which is perfectly alright so long as it is legally sanctioned and does not descend into rioting. Color Revolutions, which are oftentimes but not always the first stage of Hybrid War, rely on crowd control techniques and strategic provocations in order to accrue critical mass and become a real threat to the existing power structure. Sometimes, Unconventional Wars in the periphery can eventually create enough instability in the interior that they prompt Color Revolution unrest after the fact. In both cases, stereotypical terrorist attacks like suicide bombings are meant to accelerate the phased progression to Hybrid War.

To apply all of this to the Pakistani context, each of the many identity conflict variables, described earlier can inspire ideas of exclusive separateness within the minds of the country's citizens at the expense of their inclusive patriotism. Many people might associate themselves more strongly with their historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and/or geographic identities than their national one as Pakistanis, though it is almost impossible to discover that this is the fact until the individuals in question begin to politically or militantly act in response to these exclusive identity motivations. There is a big difference between inclusive sub-national patriotism, such as, being a proud Baloch, Pashtun, or Punjabi member of Pakistani society and exclusive sub-nationalism, such as, rejecting the common Pakistani identity, which binds the country's diverse population together. The first one greatly enriches society and makes the state stronger, while the second one weakens the state by advancing separatist inclinations or provoking conflict with other identity groups.

There might be certain patterns that can be discovered between an individual's behavior and intentions prior to joining in protests or militant groups that is why sociologists and cultural anthropologists are so important in today's world, especially from the perspective of Hybrid War. Professionals in these fields and other related ones contribute to a deeper understanding of the connection between identity and political or militant activity, and their valuable findings can help the state craft effective informational countermeasures in preemptively avoiding some of the Hybrid War scenarios through the fostering of a more inclusive sense of national

identity or patriotism. On the other hand, however, a keen sense of how and why various groups join protests and militant organizations can also be taken advantage of and instrumentalized by ill-intentioned forces in order to encourage these very same scenarios.

What Hybrid War basically comes down to is the state's defensive efforts to cultivate and develop an ever-growing sense of inclusive patriotism, while its opponents – whether internal or external – strive to do the opposite by inventing enticing narratives, which encourage identity separateness and offensive physical action against the state, be it political or military. There is a difference between legitimate and legal protests, and those which are prompted under manufactured pretexts and might even be illegal. In both cases, many of the participants might not have any hostile intentions against the state and are unaware of how their participation in either event could be exploited by a well-organized core of individuals hell-bent on destabilizing the country. The same goes for NGOs and information outlets, including those linked to abroad. Nobody can immediately judge someone, something, or some event right away until by getting more information about them and their intentions, which is why it is so important for the state to do its job in collecting the necessary information about them, which can help the authorities arrive at the proper determinations.

In doing so, very sensitive domestic issues must be taken into consideration, which somehow affect or are affecting every citizen regardless of the country that they live in. People must not ever be afraid of voicing their opinion, and a robust civil society demands that they be able to offer creative solutions and engage in active discourse without fear of being threatened or overstepping the line, but having said that, there are civilizational standards and a level of cultural decency, which have to be followed. In Pakistan, people cannot commit blasphemy, while in Russia, they cannot promote Nazism. Each of these two prohibitions might contradict the freedom of speech principles enshrined in the theoretical conception of democracy, but the reality is that there is no such thing as a “perfect democracy”, and that its execution in practice is always somewhat different than how it is idealistically portrayed. Even the US and Western Europe have formal or unofficial limits on what people can say, with the latter being termed “political correctness” and often times being abused nowadays.

How all of this relates to Hybrid War is that there is a distinction between harmless statements issued to advance certain political or identity causes within the context of a given state's existing system and power structures, and harmful ones, which are designed to subvert the system and eventually produce the results of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and Regime Reboot. Neither of these are

necessarily bad, if advanced peacefully and through constitutionally legitimate processes, but are national security dangers, if promoted by outside forces and through illegal and violent means.

A legal anti-corruption or other sort of protest, which demands that a politician – whether national, regional, or local – enact concessions (Regime Tweaking), resign (Regime Change), and/or amend the law (Regime Reboot) is not in and of itself anything out of the ordinary in a democracy, but it could become a troubling sign of Hybrid War under several circumstances. The first is that outside forces, somehow, engineered the protest trigger event through selective leaking or street provocations in order to produce the expected and desired action to advance their Regime Tweaking, Change, and/or Reboot objectives.

Another factor to be wary of is the hijacking of the protest movement – even if it began on peaceful, legitimate, and legal grounds – through the tactics of crowd control psychology and premeditated provocations, which aim to transform it into an anti-state Hybrid War instrument, is designed to fulfil broader geostrategic goals, such as, disrupting, controlling, or influencing the multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects or New Silk Roads, which pass through the targeted transit state. Hybrid War is not only conducted on the national level, but also on the regional and local ones too, and its transnational manifestation through the theater-wide “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions. All strata of society far and wide are vulnerable to externally provoked identity conflicts and the manipulation of legitimate protest movements into anti-state insurgencies, but not all protests lead to Color Revolutions, and not all Color Revolutions lead to Unconventional Wars. Overreacting to what could have otherwise been an ordinary protest movement or a Color Revolution probing attempt might inadvertently catalyse the very same Hybrid War scenario that the state hoped to avoid in the first place. The trick, then, is in how the state responds to provocations, be they violent attack against the police or peacefully breaking administrative laws against holding unsanctioned rallies, since it is these events, which escalate the situation by prompting the authorities to physically engage with the protesters.

It is at this point, where perception management techniques come into play, when hostile forces deliberately mischaracterize their ‘reporting’ and video footage of the incident as an “unprovoked and brutal attack by the dictatorship’s troops against unarmed and peaceful civilians”, the artificial narrative of which could set into motion the larger Hybrid War chain of events in relation to the pressure that other countries can then put on the victimized state. There is no one-size-fits-all approach for dealing with these situations and each one needs to be assessed and individually dealt with on a case-by-case basis every time. This is because every

encounter between authorities and protesters is unique, whether in Pakistan or elsewhere in the world.

What might work in dispersing riotous Color Revolution protesters in Islamabad might not be the same approach that should be relied upon for calming tribals whipped up into an angry frenzy by demagogues, just as neither of these techniques might have been appropriate for handling the early stages of the “Arab Spring” or “EuroMaidan”. By the same token, one Color Revolution disturbance in Islamabad might need to be dealt with differently than its earlier iterations owing to changed situational circumstances, which is why it is impossible to devise a strict code of conduct for responding to these incidents. The only thing that can be offered then are basic guidelines in advising the state about the general parameters of what it should and should not do, though, understanding that the actual circumstances might require some flexibility in devising the most optimal approach to any given provocation.

As for those guidelines, they aim to make it easier for the state to discern the difference between a legitimate people’s movement and a Hybrid War setup, a crucial determination, which then helps the authorities decide how to respond to the situation. This is very important that the state does not over react to legitimate and legal people’s movements by seeing foreign conspiracies everywhere, since this could counterproductively lead to the exact same Hybrid War scenarios that they so desperately want to avoid.

The first stage of Hybrid Wars usually involves NGOs and informational outlets, the most effective of which are foreign-funded and somehow linked to abroad. They might not necessarily have a known physical presence in the country, because it is possible for them to conduct some of their organizational operations via cyberspace or clandestinely, and in those cases, the appropriate security professionals will have to decide whether to block those pages off the internet or conduct raids in busting them, respectively. They might be difficult to detect and defeat, however, since the popularity of social media platforms, such as, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube make it likely that the authorities will always be one step behind the Hybrid War perpetrators unless they outright ban these services, which is not wise to do on a permanent basis and is best employed for short periods during times of crisis or imminent threats, if at all, that is. However, what can be more effectively dealt with are foreign-funded NGOs within the host country, all countries could learn a lot from Russia’s recent legislation a few years ago, which mandated that this class of supposedly non-governmental organizations publicly register their status as foreign agents. What this means in practice is that all of their publications must carry some notice that they are legally designated as a foreign agent, which can

help to deter naïve and well-intentioned individuals from getting mis-led into following their Hybrid War schemes. Although harshly criticized by the West, this method actually does not harm the effectiveness of any NGOs, which do not intend to organize or provoke physical rallies. Average citizens usually do not care, if the animal rights or environmental organization that they are donating to is sponsored by a foreign entity, but they will definitely have second thoughts about accepting the political advice put forth by a foreign-funded entity, especially if it is trying to convince them to protest against their own government.

Not much can be done in countering foreign media outlets, which desire to stir up trouble within the targeted state. Of course, the simplest and most immediate way to deal with them is to ban the channels or websites, which are making problems or spreading fake news, but nowadays many citizens across the world think that censorship implies that the government is hiding something and that the censored outlet is speaking a forbidden truth, even if they are not. While, it is totally reasonable to ban fringe extremist websites, which call for violence and terrorism, it might be questionable to people if a major international broadcaster is taken off the air or online. Plus, people can use alternative workarounds to access that information, if they really want to. There is another way to avoid such condition is that patriotic civil society organizations, whether financially independent or financed by the state, engage in detailed fact-checking of everything that the media outlet in question talks about. If certain coverage is revealed to have been biased, misleading, or fake news, then the organization can debunk it and have its findings broadcast across national media outlets, alternative blogs, and social media. This is a lot more effective of a way to counter false narratives than to simply censor them, sometimes very dangerous and outright false ones need to be strictly removed from the public discourse owing to the latent or imminent threats that they pose to national security. Apart from those, however, the big-name outlets that are most likely to disseminate misleading, provocative, or false information inside of Pakistan should ideally be responded to with civil society fact-checkers.

The next component of Hybrid War, which needs proactive measures to resist is the threat of identity conflict between the states' various groupings. It is impossible to craft a cookie-cutter strategy for dealing with this owing to the diverse array of demographics living within a given state, so it is suggested that the authorities work with competent sociological, cultural, and other experts in identifying the most likely situational triggers and infowar narratives, which could prompt these groups to engage in political or military activity against the state. Armed with this knowledge, the authorities can then work on taking the necessary steps to preempt the situational triggers, which could lead to this outcome, as well as immediately dealing with them right when they first recognize the signs of this

happening. They can also work on devising appropriate counter-narratives, which emphasize inclusive sub-state patriotism and diminish the appeal of its exclusive separatist or conflict-prone nationalist counterpart.

Along the same vein, what every state can do is invest in its internal soft power capabilities to promote an inclusive patriotism, which seeks to unify all identity groups within its territory for the sake of the common national good. Methods for achieving this could range from patriotic education in schools and extracurricular youth organizations, to public rallies and the media's positive reinforcement of the national narrative. Correspondingly, patriotism must not ever get out of control and develop into nationalism, which is a fine line to balance but one which must be paid attention to at all times.

According to Russian scholar Dmitry Likhachev, "Nationalism is hatred of other peoples, while patriotism is love for your motherland." In the Pakistani context, nationalism can take two forms – both that of the nation itself and the inclusive Pakistani identity, or the many sub-national identities, which inhabit this country, such as Baloch, Pashtun, Punjabi, and Sindhi, to name but a few. Pakistani nationalism could dangerously veer off or be hijacked in the direction of anti-Chinese sentiment, especially if this is paired with a universalist worldview of Islam, which condemns the country's number one international partner for its official atheist practices. The other form of nationalism ends up provoking identity conflict, separatism, and even terrorism at its most extreme manifestations, and both are equally dangerous to Pakistan's national security and fundamentally contradict its core geostrategic interests.

It requires regular upkeep and narrative maintenance, but the state must always reinforce, promote, and grow its inclusive patriotism because this is the most effective structural deterrent against Hybrid War. It would not stop foreigners from trying to destabilize the state, but it provides the most reliable way to reduce the chance that regular citizens could be misled into joining anti-state activities. If people truly feel as though they are equal stakeholders in their country's success, then they are less likely to turn against their government and be enticed by the allure of political and/or militant identity separateness, whether predicated on their history, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, or geographic affiliation. Instead of allowing these variables to be manipulated as tools of exclusion for dividing society along these lines, they need to be brought together in forming the inclusive glue for uniting it, which is the very essence of true patriotism.

Ultimately, Hybrid War comes down to being an ideological battle between the state and its foes for the loyalty of the citizenry. The government is always on the defensive and must continuously deliver results to its stakeholders through

development, jobs, justice, and security, all of which reaffirm the citizenry's belief in inclusive patriotism. On the other hand, anti-state forces are always on the offensive and try to convince the people that the authorities are not fulfilling their promise to deliver on what is expected of them, instead suggesting that some members of the citizenry would do better, if they embraced the perceived attractiveness of counter-narratives, such as, identity exclusivism and took concrete political or military action to resist what they have been led to believe is an ineffective and/or illegitimate government.

It is natural that internal political factions within a democracy engage in all of this rhetoric with the exception of militant and anti-state slogans, but the moment that they begin hinting at any sort of illegal activity is when they have clearly crossed the line and start constituting a security threat. It may not be a Hybrid War one, though. the deliberate encouragement of illegal behaviour could easily lead to the sort of state-protester engagements, which are vulnerable to exploitation by even more hostile and nefarious actors. The key variable in deciding, if an incident is related to Hybrid War, however, is to identify whether any foreign trace can be discovered. This could manifest itself through financing, training, or material assistance, for example, but these might not be immediately apparent and could take time to prove in the middle of a sudden crisis. Instead, if the state is pressed to urgently act under time-sensitive circumstances, then it would do well to quickly consider whether the given provocation has any connection to larger geostrategic designs.

Herein lies the connection to the broader global concepts, which relate to the Law of Hybrid War by referring to the hostile force's desire to disrupt, control, or influence multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects, or in other words, OBOR and its New Silk Road branches including CPEC. To continue with the Pakistani context, It is very obvious that CPEC traverses through Gilgit-Baltistan and terminates at the Gwadar port in Balochistan, so it can be strongly inferred that disturbances in these two regions run the chance of destabilizing CPEC and, thus, accomplishing the geostrategic goals of country's rivals. Not every protest or civil society action in these parts of Pakistan are part of a Hybrid War plot, and not every person participating in peaceful or even irresponsible movements are doing so under the direct and witting orders of foreign parties, with the exception being armed terrorist groups, of course. It is possible that regular people are being manipulated by outside actors without their knowledge or that their initially legitimate protest movement was hijacked and turned into something which it was never intended to become.

This is why the state must exercise caution in dealing with events in these two parts of the country, because an overreaction could inadvertently provoke the same sort of Hybrid War scenario, which Pakistan is trying so hard to avoid. The worst thing that can happen is if people in these two provinces become convinced that they no longer have a stake in supporting inclusive patriotism and instead turn towards exclusive nationalism. It is assumed that foreign NGO and informational actors are trying each and every day to push the people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan in this direction, but the most powerful force, which could contribute to this process, is ironically the state itself if it overreacts to disturbances enough times and unintentionally cultivates the perception among these communities that it is against them and their interests. Actions speak louder than words, and all that it takes are several high-profile mishaps to enact self-inflicted wounds to the principles of Pakistani patriotism and spike the likelihood that these groups will embrace exclusive nationalism and the direct foreign support, which always accompanies it.

There is nothing inherently wrong with political concessions, leadership changes, or legal and constitutional reforms, especially when they concern local or regional issues, but only so long as they are carried out in accordance with the law and without any element of foreign interference. The moment that foreign traces are connected to any of these moves or the rising pressure to enact them is the second that the state knows that a Hybrid War plot is being executed. This compromises the original civil society movement no matter how legitimate its initial objectives or internal composition may have been, though, it might unfortunately end up discrediting what could have otherwise been some reasonable and decent proposals. In this case, average citizens, who support these initiatives might lose hope that they could ever legally advance these goals, which might consequently diminish the luster of inclusive patriotism. It is both impossible and irresponsible to speculate on the details of this scenario in the Pakistani or any other context, but this eventuality could partially be avoided, if states have efficient governing structures, feedback loops, and accountability to their citizens. In a sense, what is needed to prevent legitimate calls for political concessions, leadership changes, and constitutional reform from being exploited by Hybrid War saboteurs is to have a well-oiled democracy, something which takes time to build and is never fully accomplished no matter which country it is or how long they have been pursuing this goal. No country is perfect, not Pakistan, Russia, China, the US, or Germany, but each of them aspires to be as efficient as they can in terms of their internal structures so as to prevent outside forces from manipulating their democratic processes for Hybrid War ends.

A trusted and well-functioning partnership between civil society and the government within a flourishing democracy, which regularly promotes inclusive patriotism is the most effective means for defending against Hybrid Warfare, which

is externally provoked identity conflicts, which exploit historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographic differences within geostrategic transit states through the phased transition from Color Revolutions to Unconventional Wars in order to disrupt, control, or influence multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects by means of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, and/or Regime Reboot. Pakistan is the main target for Hybrid War right now because of how CPEC endows it with an irreplaceable geostrategic position in being the Zipper of Eurasia, the Convergence of Civilizations, and the center of the Indo-Pacific Century, all of which directly impact on China's grand strategic vision and give the multipolar world a powerful advantage in the context of the New Cold War.

Hybrid Wars are not just preemptively defended against through democratic institutions and inclusive patriotism, but also through advance knowledge about how they function and what they entail, so the more people who are aware of this, the less potential recruits that the foreign organizers have for potentially luring into their scheme. Furthermore, if the citizenry is educated about Hybrid War, then they can help serve as the state's eyes and ears in its most remote regions or crowded neighbourhoods, thereby improving Pakistan's efficiency in spotting and proactively countering any signs that a Hybrid War is being cooked in the country. Identity conflict does not work, if the people are united, and this includes not only Pakistanis in general, but also the sub-national identity groups, which are most directly targeted by this stratagem. If all forces of society are aware of what Hybrid War is and how it functions, then they are much more likely to come together in opposing it when the crucial time arrives to do so.

Pakistan in the 21st Century – Perception Management

*Andrew Korybko**

‘Perception Management’ is an important concept that a country protects and promotes its reputation, and there are more ways to do it nowadays than ever before. Soft power brings respect, which in turn invites investment, development, and sociocultural growth, all of which improve the lives of ordinary citizens and sustain the country’s political stability. Pakistan has an historic opportunity to finally achieve all of these at the level that they are enjoyed by many leading countries today, but it must not let this God-given chance slip through its fingers.

CPEC is poised to fundamentally transform Pakistan, but the consequences will be entirely dependent on how this country choose to use this opportunity. If, it is taken for granted that the Chinese will do everything for Pakistan and that foreign investors will all of a sudden flock to Pakistan, then this mistaken belief will lead to nothing, but false hopes and failure. On the other hand, if Pakistan takes the initiative and uses CPEC as a springboard for robust global engagement, then this project will turn into one of the best blessings that Pakistan has ever received. Now, the point is how CPEC can form the core of Pakistan’s rebranded 21st-century identity, and what are the reasons and methods for bringing this about. Generally, a country moves from geopolitics to economics to information wars in achieving its objectives, but all of this is strongly interconnected and fits together.

Today, the world is in the midst of the ‘New Cold War,’ which can be simplified as a multifaceted struggle between the unipolar and multipolar forces. The first one led by the US and its traditional allies, and the second one represented by Russia and China. The world system is undergoing fundamental changes as the US erstwhile dominance over the globe after the end of the ‘Old Cold War’ is coming to an end. This process is occurring for many reasons, mostly owing to the US own inefficiency and overreach, but also the inevitable rise of non-Western countries, which seek to carve out a more just and equitable World Order to accommodate their national interests.

Russia and China are the two leading countries, which fit into this category, and they each realized in the 1990s and especially over the past couple of years that they would have a lot more to gain by working together than continuing their historical rivalry. Moscow has more military potential in carrying this out, while

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Beijing relies on the economic element of power in promoting its objectives. These two complementary sides began an unprecedented strategic convergence ever since the US simultaneously threatened their core national security interests in Ukraine and the South China Sea. The resultant Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership has sought to pool each party's relevant resources in pushing back against the US and its allies' aggression in the best way that they're able to, which is evidenced by Moscow's anti-terrorist intervention in Syria and Beijing's ambitious globally transformative economic plans.

It is the Chinese vector, which is most directly relevant for Pakistan. China's 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) global vision seeks to build a network of New Silk Roads all across the world premised on the belief that interconnected countries are less likely to fight with one another. By increasing the number of stakeholders in this new apolitical global system, it is believed that everyone will gain some sort of benefit from each other's development, thereby, epitomizing the ultimate "win-win" outcome. Prioritizing the modernization of dozens of non-Western countries, such as, Pakistan with Chinese capital is anticipated to gently introduce them to this alternative global system that is being built in parallel with the weakening of the existing Western-dominated one, thereby, allowing them to progressively transition from the exploitative and double standards-infested one run by the US to the equitable and just system being spearheaded by China.

CPEC is OBOR's flagship project, and it is much more important than any number of financial figures would indicate. This corridor is absolutely vital to the future of China's New Silk Roads, because it provides the People's Republic with its only reliable non-Malacca access route to the Indian Ocean, from where China can then more freely trade with the Mideast, Europe, and importantly East Africa without having to worry about the US possibly obstructing its East-West bottleneck in Southeast Asia in the event of hostilities. As for the other chokepoints, such as, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canals, China has entered into fast-moving and high-level partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Djibouti, and Egypt respectively, over the past couple of years in order to ensure free access across these routes.

By detouring around the Strait of Malacca and correspondingly avoiding the ever more contentious South China Sea, CPEC provides China with its most reliable maritime gateway to the Western half of the Eastern Hemisphere. Together with this project, it is envisioned that China will eventually streamline a series of high-speed railroads across mainland Eurasia through Central Asia, Russia, and the Mideast, in order to connect East Asia with Western Europe and completely eliminate any threat that the US Navy could ever pose to Beijing's globally transformative OBOR vision.

That, however, is still at least a few decades away, and Hybrid Wars – externally provoked identity conflicts – could be employed to destabilize strategic transit states and stalemata these plans. Thus, for all intents and purposes, CPEC is and will always remain the most important New Silk Road project for the geostrategic reasons, and this immensely works to Pakistan's benefit.

Since, it bridges the mainland and maritime components of OBOR, as well as opening up the prospect for trade to traverse across the entire West-East distance of China, CPEC can be described as the “Zipper of Pan-Eurasian Integration.” The concept is that the full geographic development of CPEC will allow for the linkage of North, South, East, West, and Central Asia via Pakistani territory, thereby, helping to zip together the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and its Central Asian members, China, Iran, and SAARC member Pakistan through a single extended economic corridor. All of these countries are in one way or another associated with the SCO, and most of the region coincides with the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), so this provides yet another layer of overlap between all of the most directly involved prospective countries and advances the argument that CPEC is integral to fostering deeper integration in the Heartland of Eurasia.

Complementary with being the Zipper of Eurasia, Pakistan will also become the Convergence Point of Civilizations, which could go a long way towards mitigating the prospect for a so-called “Clash of Civilizations.” Considering how Pakistan will be the common ground through which a diverse variety of cultures will intersect – be they Persian, Arabian, Russian, Central Asian, Chinese, South Asian, and even East African – it goes without saying that the country will function as one of the most pivotal locations in the world for civilizational connectivity. The pragmatic and “win-win” interaction of multiple cultures across Pakistani territory, motivated chiefly by trade and similar interests, could provide the foundation for enhanced multilateral partnerships between them. This might sound very theoretical at this point, but Pakistanis must take the time to ponder their future role and how they plan to leverage it, if they are to ensure that the civilizational exchanges taking place on their territory are to everyone's ultimate benefit.

Socio-cultural, academic, civil society, media, and other sorts of cooperation could flourish so long as Pakistanis recognize the opportunity that they have to transform CPEC's economic attractiveness into tangible soft power dividends. In order to get to this point, Pakistan must accept and work towards attaining its future dual roles in being the Zipper of Eurasia and the Convergence of Civilizations, and after feeling comfortable with these newfound and inevitable responsibilities, the country will then understand its irreplaceably powerful position in being the heart of Greater South Asia at the center of the Indo-Pacific Century. This pronouncement

sounds dramatic, and in a sense, it is, but it is not hyperbole. If it is accepted that CPEC allows Pakistan to zip or integrate Eurasia, and thereby, serve as the Convergence of Civilizations, then it is fair to say that this will also expand Islamabad's influence across these geographic domains.

The SAARC group has been heavily politicized by India and it is known that how New Delhi sabotaged last year's gathering, the effect of which was to prompt Pakistan to look Westward, while, India sought to move in the opposite direction towards the East. Just as Pakistan is rapidly building its relations with Central Asia, India is doing the same with Southeast Asia. Taken together, these dual cores of South Asia are visibly expanding their sway across a broad spectrum of the Asian landmass. If we incorporate Pakistan's longstanding relationships with the Mideast, project that East Africa will increasingly trade with China through CPEC, and take a look at how India is slated to compete with China in this part of Africa too, then it is fair to say that Greater South Asia will include parts of Central, West, and Southeast Asia, as well as East Africa, or in other words, is a mainland expansion of the broader Indian Ocean Region.

It is mentioned earlier that China relies more on the Indian Ocean than ever before, and CPEC is designed to give the People's Republic dependable and direct access to this ocean. China conducts all of its trade with Africa in one way or another through the Indian Ocean, and the lion's share of its commercial relations with Western Europe and the Mideast also go through this body of water as well. Sure, China aims to build a series of high-speed railways all across the Eurasian landmass in the coming century, but these will take a lot of time to complete and could be offset by the identity-driven Hybrid Wars.

Therefore, recognizing that CPEC will become China's main access route to the Indian Ocean, and appreciating the role that the Indian Ocean and the concept of Greater South Asia will hold for global politics all throughout the 21st century. It is not an Asian Century or even a Pacific one, but in an Indo-Pacific Century, which sees Pakistan located smack dab in the center of the most important global geopolitical processes. Pakistan's position as the Zipper of Eurasia and Convergence of Civilizations makes it one of the most important states in the world, and every Pakistani needs to understand and embrace this in order to have a chance at receiving all of the future benefits that this entails. Correspondingly, Pakistan must explain these concepts to its foreign friends and work on rebranding its international image in order to intimately associate itself with all of these interconnected ideas. To reiterate, they are CPEC, OBOR, Multipolarity, the Zipper of Eurasia, the Convergence of Civilizations, Greater South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Century.

Only, when Pakistanis finally understand and identify with these concepts can the country begin the process of rebranding itself in accordance with these ideas and promoting a brand-new image, which is positively received by the rest of the world in the 21st century. None of the points that are mentioned – CPEC, OBOR, Multipolarity, the Zipper of Eurasia, the Convergence of Civilizations, Greater South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Century – are divisive, controversial, or exclusionary, but to the contrary, they are unifying, agreeable, and inclusive, and therefore, attractive to foreign partners. These points should form the basis of Pakistan's 21st-century image and should serve as the prism through which the rest of the world perceives Pakistan. The steps that need to be taken in order to improve Pakistan's international reputation for the better and surmount some of the negative stereotypes, which are unfortunately still associated with its name to many non-Muslim Westerners.

The challenges and opportunities inherent with this nationwide rebranding effort, which have been proposed for Pakistan, beginning with the reputational benefits, which the country has inherited. It is already described that the future geostrategic prospects that Pakistan is poised to attain, which to go over them once more, are CPEC, OBOR, Multipolarity, the Zipper of Eurasia, the Convergence of Civilizations, Greater South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Century, so there's no need to explain them any further, though, they should always be kept in mind. Apart from these forthcoming opportunities, there's also the fact that Pakistan is one of the most important leaders of the global Muslim community, or Ummah.

Pakistan has a large population, which correlates with an enormous investment, production, and market potential, and it is at the center of the Indo-Pacific Century through CPEC and all of the other related concepts, which have already been described. On top of that, Pakistan military is top notch, both in the conventional and unconventional senses, the latter of which was proven through retired General Sharif's anti-terrorist successes in the legendary Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Pakistan is also the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, which must not forget. In addition, Pakistan is equal partners with China, the world's leading economic engine, and Saudi Arabia, the symbolic leader of the Ummah and the location of the two Holy Mosques. This makes Pakistan trusted and respected, which explains why Pakistan has always been sought by others to serve as a middleman in different Great Power arrangements, such as, what happened in the contextual run-up to the Saudi King's visit to China recently, and what might be in the cards as regards future Russian-Saudi relations.

It is well-known fact that Muslim countries are becoming more influential and acquiring extra attention from the rest of the world nowadays, for better or for

worse, so it's foreseeable that Pakistan's diplomatic skills will be relied on by non-Muslim countries more and more in the future as they seek to make inroads with some of their non-traditional Muslim counterparts. Pakistan's relationship with and prominence within the Ummah is something that it has a lot to be proud of, and rightfully so. The country must continue to flaunt this advantage on the international stage in order to reap the resultant strategic benefits. Islam is perhaps one of the most well-known characteristics of Pakistan's overall national identity, though, it is by no means the only one, but this has also had the inadvertent effect of promoting negative stereotypes about the country in the eyes of those, who misunderstand the religion.

There are many people in the West, who hold the inaccurate view that Pakistan is a country rife with Islamic fundamentalism and, therefore, a dangerous hotbed of terrorism, relying on talking points from the 1980s and the country's assistance to the Afghan Mujahedeen in order to back up their misleading claims. It is not about racists and Islamophobes here, since it's unlikely that their views will ever change no matter what factual evidence they are presented with, but average well-intentioned individuals, businessmen, and government officials, who have been led astray by the Mainstream Media's fake or over-exaggerated 'reporting' about Pakistan. There are a lot of people, who associate the name of Pakistan with the Taliban, Islamic terrorism, and Osama bin Laden, and many of them see Pakistan as being important only in relevance to Afghanistan, hence, the media-driven neologism of "AfPak".

These negative perceptions need to change if Pakistan is to fully grow into its new 21st-century role. Instead of conjuring up outdated and decontextualized images of terrorist-inflicted devastation along the Afghan border regions, people need to think differently about Pakistan, which is a thriving, developed, and safe place. It's not by accident that many non-Muslim foreigners think of negative stereotypes, when they hear the word Pakistan, as this was all done on purpose as part of a larger information war against Pakistan, which is, nowadays, also reinforced by the powerful influence that India exerts on the Mainstream Media's discourse. What Pakistan needs to do is debunk these stereotypes through a multifaceted approach, which combines all elements of soft power, both high and low, and the first place to start is by emphasizing several key points.

The first one is that the Pakistan of 2017 is not the Pakistan of the past, and whatever impressions that most outsiders might have about her are probably outdated. Pakistan is no longer supporting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, as it was a case in the 1980s. The tribal areas along the border have been largely pacified and stabilized, and far from being the seemingly backwards failed state that the West

portrayed Pakistan as in the 2000s. Forbes recently announced that Pakistan has one of the best performing markets in the world. The point here is that past perceptions – whether accurate or not – are not always reliable in judging the present. As a few good examples, modern-day Russia and Germany are not the Soviet Union and Nazis, just as China under President Xi is not the same country that it was under Chairman Mao.

Relatedly, the next point that needs to be promoted is that Pakistan, like all mature societies, has moved past the controversial periods of its history and is embracing a new era of relations with the world. Too many outsiders are so fixated on Pakistan's role in supporting the Mujahedeen in the 1980s and later the US in Afghanistan in the 2000s that they are almost incapable of comprehending that Pakistan could have any other interests at all, let alone imagining that previous ones from a different time period could change in the present one. This is relevant to bring up because Pakistan is still being judged according to what it did in the past, and its enemies are exploiting this in order to craft false narratives about it. What immediately comes to one's mind is how Indians, and those sympathetic to them and/or hostile to Pakistan, went on a very intense social media campaign to demonize Pakistan on Russian-friendly Facebook pages in the run-up to last fall's Druzhba joint military exercises.

Some of the hostile comments on Facebook include "remember the 1980s!", "Pakistan never changes!", "Russia can't trust this terrorist state!", and other sorts of brainless slogans, which interestingly, caught on with a lot of people. It is now realized that Pakistan has not yet explained its new position in the world, nor its changing relations with Russia and other states. Sure, Pakistan's governmental counterparts in Russia and other places understand the true and pragmatic nature of the relationship and no elaboration is necessary for them, but there is a considerable gap between the state and civil society, and Pakistan has not yet conveyed a cohesive narrative, which fills in the space between the past and the present. This is where the media comes in, and it is now Pakistan's job to help people understand what's changed and why.

Here, it is not the domestic audience, which is referred rather those Pakistanis, who are living abroad, since that is where these impressions will matter the most in the coming century as Pakistan rebrands itself according to the CPEC-related concepts outlined earlier. However, Pakistanis should do it in their own individual-way. Pakistanis need to express the fact that other mature societies have also overcome difficult moments in their bilateral relations with others, such as, Russia and the US as two separate sets of examples. Unlike in past periods, Russia is now very close with Germany, Turkey, and China, just like the US is now partnered with

Germany, Japan, China, and India, despite each pair of countries having previously experienced differing degrees of problems with one another at various stages of their shared histories. With this in mind, there's nothing strange about Russia entering into a mutually advantageous rapprochement with Pakistan nowadays. Russia is not the Soviet Union same as Pakistan; both countries have changed.

Another key point to emphasize is how Pakistan has been one of the world's top victims of terrorism alongside Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is not an exporter of terrorism like India says, but a victim, and tens of thousands of innocent people have been killed, because of it. Pakistan needs to communicate this more clearly to the global audience, and while, it already does this through the UN and other official channels, it does not seem to have seeped through to the general public. There is a need to highlight the brilliant anti-terrorist successes of retired General Sharif during Operation Zarb-e-Azb, as well as the recent Radd-ul-Fassad under present Chief of Army Staff General Bajwa. The audiences, which are already receptive to Russia's anti-terrorist gains in Syria will likely also be eager to learn more about this, while, those which are hostile to Moscow will probably be much more difficult to get through to.

This is because Westerners, who are trained to dislike or distrust Russia usually also hold the same feelings about Pakistan too, and that is because both countries are independently minded and strongly sovereign states, which advance their own interests in a manner that unnerves the West, hence the heavy-handed information warfare campaigns against both in feverishly attempting to tarnish their international reputations. On the topic of Russian-Pakistani convergences once more, there is obviously no avoiding Afghanistan, but as a supplementary point, it could not hurt, if the idea was informally expressed that Pakistan learned how its former support of foreign insurgents backfired against it many years after the war. Pakistan does not have to apologize for anything.

Continuing along, Pakistan and its media need to promote the image of a stable and developing country in order to debunk the clichéd stereotypes of it being a terrorist-riddled failing state. Like, it is mentioned before, the false perceptions about Pakistan were deliberately propagated through the mainstream Media repeatedly pairing country's name with on-the-ground footage from the aftermath of American drone strikes in the borderland region. Viewers, who were extra impressionable in the immediate post-9/11 period, were left with the perception that all of Pakistan is like the tribal areas, even though this is just a small portion of the country and one which was victimized by terrorism at that same time anyhow. It cannot be repeated enough that while, Pakistan's periphery was chaotic and lawless at times, that is because the country is one of the world's top victims of terrorism,

but that it is moved past those dark days and is now on pace to have one of the most impressive-performing markets in the world, according to the universally respected Forbes magazine.

If Pakistan was really as “backwards” as some people inaccurately think that it is, then why would one of the top economic publications in the world laud it for its high-performing equity markets and other attractive structural factors. The cognitive dissonance that this single fact brings – carried by such a well-regarded outlet as Forbes – should be enough to make ordinary people think twice about whether their longstanding stereotypical impressions about Pakistan are accurate, which could make it an irresistible lead-in for informing people of the truth about Pakistan today. Let’s not forget that the country is located at the geographic center of Greater South Asia and is poised to play a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific Century. All of Pakistan’s economic and corresponding reputational benefits in the future derive in one way or another from CPEC, which in turn endows the country with strong economic growth potential given its role as the Zipper of Eurasia. This is not a slogan, but an economic-strategic fact, and one which needs to be repeated and explained enough times that other people finally begin to understand it.

Underscoring the importance of CPEC to Pakistan’s strategic vision, China’s global one, and the present Indo-Pacific Century will also carry with it important security undertones. The premier role that this project is slated to play in the future means that it must be protected, so how can one still believe that Pakistan is some kind of insecure ‘third world’ country, if it is supposed to host such a major game-changing transport and investment corridor. It does not make sense, and that is the point; the more people learn about CPEC and its significance, the easier it will be for them to accept that their former stereotypes about Pakistan were wrong, and that it is much more stable and secure than they previously thought. After all, if it was not, the stereotypically wise, prudent, and far-sighted Chinese would not be investing over \$50 billion in constructing a South Asian shortcut to their country and the future Convergence Point of Civilizations.

So, with all of that in mind, some actionable proposals include followings: Conferences and workshops have an important function in changing perceptions, but they do not mean much, if larger audiences do not know about them, and this is where the media comes into play once more. Whether, it is an international academic, business, professional, or civil society event organized in Pakistan around CPEC or any of its derived concepts, it absolutely must be reported on not only in the Pakistani press, but also internationally. This is difficult to do if not having contacts with, or the direct participation of, the intended media outlet, whose audience are required to reach. For this purpose, their representatives should be identified

beforehand and invite them to participate in such events. Although, there are already all sorts of CPEC-related functions going on in Pakistan, but what should happen is that a brand-new, high-level, much-publicized, and yearly international forum be launched in Pakistan in order to attract the necessary global attention. As a starter, Gwadar be chosen as the location to host these prospective events.

There's no city like Gwadar which better epitomizes the CPEC vision and everything related to it, and it would serve as the perfect place for such events. The "Gwadar-Gathering", a tentative name for this proposal, should incorporate a mix of expert discussion panels and civil society events, being a Pakistani version of the American SXSW Conference in the sense that it aims to bring together all levels of international society for a common purpose, that being the advancement of the larger strategic concepts, such as, the Zipper of Eurasia, the Convergence of Civilizations, Greater South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Century. To this end, the "Gwadar-Gathering" should aspire to become as prominent as the Boao Forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, including civil society, media, academia, and other such events in order to hammer home the point that Pakistan is a globally significant actor capable of bringing together a diverse array of parties for the common multipolar good.

In short, Pakistanis need to rethink their country's global geostrategic significance and embrace the interconnected concepts of the Zipper of Eurasia, Convergence of Civilizations, Greater South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Century, which all derive from CPEC in one way or another, and urgently embark on a fresh marketing campaign to dispel old and inaccurate stereotypes in order to promote and reinforce new narratives. Full-spectrum engagement of all levels of the intended audiences, from high-level experts to the casual man in civil society, needs to be prioritized, and the optimal outreach techniques, strategies, and guidelines should be adopted. By doing so, Pakistan will be able to successfully rebrand itself in the 21st century, and the international perception associated with Pakistan will greatly improve in the coming years as more and more people become receptive to the allure of CPEC and everything associated with it.

America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History

ISBN: 9780553393934

Written By: *Andrew J Bacevich*

Review By: *Noman Omer Sattar**

As a world power, the US has fought many wars in its history. It has interests all over the world, and these have shaped its policies, occasionally leading to wars and interventions. The Middle East has been in focus, at least since the Second World War. The cold war and its end kept the oil rich, volatile region in focus of US leadership. *Americas War for the Greater Middle East* is an account of America's role and involvement in and around the Middle East. Bacevich has been an officer in US military, and a professor of history and IR at Boston University. He has a PhD in diplomatic history from Princeton University.

He starts off saying, "...America's War for the Greater Middle East was a war to preserve the American way of life..." (p.3). But, there are other more complicated reasons for this policy, political, military as well as strategic. Bacevich builds his case from the 60s and 70s, with the observation, "the first round of proposals to militarize US policy in the Middle East found little favor in the Pentagon." (p.8) 'Instability' in the region made it a 'strategic imperative' to devise policies to cope with the region.

The Iranian Revolution was one signal prompting a major shift. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration was willing to engage 'in a variety of military and paramilitary operations on several fronts across the Greater Middle East. (p.50) The Operation Cyclone reflected an irony in Americas' War for the Greater Middle East: "...the unwitting tendency, while intently focusing on solving one problem, to exacerbate a second and plant the seeds of a third..." (p.52) Thus, the Reagan

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administration's support for the 'noble savages' (*mujahedin*), in the insurgency (*jihad*) in Afghanistan.

Another involvement was in Lebanon, where Reagan dispatched US Marines, where radical Islamists "inflicted the largest tactical defeat on the US military since the Koran war." (p.62) Reagan did not stop there; invoking 'freedom of navigation,' US airpower challenged Libya (and its forces) over the Gulf of Sidra in a major international incident.

Interestingly, under a directive 'Combating Terrorism', Reagan asked the Pentagon to develop a military strategy "in support of an active, preventive program to combat state-sponsored terrorism." (p.80)

Iraq's Saddam Hussein became a pain and a threat for the US in the 90s, but for Bacevich, coming to Saddam's aid—indeed, to his rescue— "formed part of Americas War for the Greater Middle East." (p.87)

Bacevich provides details of the US policy that included opening up a "secret channel to provide Baghdad with sensitive intelligence, including satellite imagery" against Iran. (p.93) But, the Iran-Contra affair made it a perilous game.

Since Bacevich is writing about military history, reference to Vietnam is in order; he refers to Desert Storm as 'Vietnam-done-right.' He poignantly quotes Time in terming Desert Storm, "the end of the old American depression called the Vietnam syndrome..." (128), and gives the verdict: "Operation Desert Storm accomplished next to nothing." (p.134)

There is discussion of a 'humanitarian intervention', Operation Provide Relief/Restore Hope, and intervention in the Balkans. One is not sure, if the two cases fit into the framework of "War for the Greater Middle East," except for pointing to "a serious failure of political will and military judgment." (p.159)

US war against al-Qaeda is another case in Bacevich narrative. Starting in December 1992, with al-Qaeda attempt to kill Americans in Yemen. He rightly observes that from the vantage point of 9/11 attacks, these were "unheeded warnings of what lay ahead." (p.204) US impulsive and foolish response to "bin Laden's declaration of war with a de facto declaration of its own..." led to a "phony war," (p.210) climaxing in attacks of September 11.

Bush administrations' invasion of Iraq "situates the Third Gulf War of 2003-2011 within the larger context of Americas War for the Greater Middle East." (239) It became the task of Bush and Obama administrations to manage the two conflict zones, and to withdraw from both. While, this was done, in both cases, the major problem remains far from settled.

Bacevich account reads well as military history, with linkages from the past, from the World War II as well as the Civil War. But, the framework of ‘War for the Greater Middle East’ appears tenuous to be able to explain almost all of Americas wars since the 60s. And, what exactly does the phrase connote? American presence or hegemony in the greater Middle East, or its “wars”?

This voluminous work chronicles America’s recent military history, and engagements. It answers questions like, what led to US entry into wars (and conflict). How it was explained? And, importantly, the political and military decision-making dynamics. The account also offers insights into the traits of military leaders; for instance, “to an unhealthy extent, Schwarzkopf also shared McArthur’s penchant for theatrics. As with Patton, maintaining his emotional balance required a constant struggle. Like Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf had a volcanic temper, which (unlike IKE) he made little effort to keep in check.” (p.120)

The conclusion appears as a truism, “Perpetuating the War for the Greater Middle East is not enhancing American freedom, abundance and security. If anything, it is having the opposite effect.” (p.370) That may be true in a way, but, how is the US to react to the threats to its freedom, abundance, and security. As a book of military history, and International Relations/Foreign Policy, Becevich’s work has a lot to offer to students of US military history and foreign relations.

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Pakistan-Sri Lanka Relations: A Story of Friendship

ISBN: 9789697671021

Edited By: *Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Imran, PhD and Bhagya Senaratne*

Review By: *Fatima Saleem**

Despite geographical and religious barriers, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have always been trusted-partners of each other with historical linkages dating back to the period of Gandhara civilization, from the first to seventh-century AD. Their friendship strengthened during the war of 1971, when Pakistan's jets were allowed to refuel on Sri Lankan territory despite Indian furore. The equation of trust and friendship further developed during the crisis of Jaffna, when Pakistan obliged to Sri Lankan request for military aid and airlifted Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) in an emergency from Karachi to Colombo. This helped the Sri Lankan military to push back LTTE rebels and secure Jaffna. This shows that both countries not only share cultural heritage, but also have a shared history of internal instability created by the actives of non-state actors. This, as a result, gives both nations an insight to each other's problems, stemming from internal and external players. Historically, Sri Lanka has never wanted India to dominate the region, both economically and militarily. Thus, the resilient nature of both states in face of adversities and shared objectives makes them natural allies.

The current dynamics of shifting of power-centres places much focus of the international community on Asia. With the strategic location of Sri Lanka, as the East-West sea corridor link, and Pakistan, as the conduit for world economies via CPEC, both countries are poised to become international trading hubs. The formation of new alliances in the region to maximise power of states provides new opportunities for both countries to join hands and integrate with the world as leading economies.

This book, *Pakistan-Sri Lanka Relations: A story of friendship*, is an effort in the same direction and has been published by the Institute of Strategic Studies Research and Analysis in order to harness the full potential of relations and growth between both states. It is thematically sectioned into the historical, geostrategic and defence, economic and socio-cultural perspectives. It breaks new grounds being the first publication that has documented relations between both countries beginning

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from the pre-partition days and provides an in-depth analysis of the culmination of relations with time.

The opening theme of the book provides a detailed narrative of historical events that have shaped the current dynamics both nations share. The authors have highlighted the inherent role of *regionalism*, *pan-Asia*, and the *Indian-centric* approach of South Asia in the unfolding of events over the decades. The neutral role played by Sri Lanka between India and Pakistan during times of crisis has been pivotal in maintaining the delicate balance of peace and regional stability, thus, showing the significance of India in Sri Lanka's and Pakistan's policy contours.

The geostrategic and defence dimensions deal with the various facets of foreign policies of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, hedged on the premise of national security, overlapping economic interests, preservation of ideology, peaceful coexistence, Non-alignment, bilateralism and support to the UN charter. The era wise description of political relations between the two states not only provides with an in-depth description of the shared strategic interests of both nations, but also makes it easier for the reader to simultaneously compare, analyse and relate the regional and international political developments of that particular period.

The authors have been able to aptly demonstrate the significance of geopolitics in Pakistan and Sri Lanka relations, thus, illustrating the dependence of each country on itself and each other. A detailed analysis of Pakistan and Sri Lanka approaches towards regionalism highlights the evolution of the foreign policies of both countries and interests in the fields of access to energy resources, countering terrorism and facilitating trade.

The deliberation on naval power by using the Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory on elements of sea power highlights the significance of navy in geopolitical strength of a country. Later in the chapters, the authors have discussed how enhanced mutual cooperation in the realm of defence and counterterrorism can be used by each state to not only learn from each other, but also maximise its power and influence.

Despite the robust nature of Pakistan-Sri Lanka political and military relations, both countries lag in the realm of the economic affairs. The third theme of the book consists of two chapters, discussing in detail the economic relations from both Sri Lankan and Pakistani perspectives. These chapters discuss at length the current volume of trade, trade potential that exists and needs to be exploited, main trading items, loopholes in the trade agreements especially the free trade agreements between both countries, market dynamics of both countries, the customer psyche, and other trade dimensions.

Lastly the book discusses the socio-cultural aspects of Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations and lays emphasis on people-to-people contact. It highlights the similarities and differences in culture, traditions and thinking of both nations, thus, giving an understanding of the psyche of people on both sides. The authors manage to move beyond the conventional interactive techniques and focuses on informal contact between the public of both states via sports, education, music, cinema, religion and cultural interactions.

The way forward at the end provides an objective and comprehensive conceptualization of relations that are the requirement of current times in order to help promote cooperation and collaboration at all levels between both nations.

The book is written by authors of both Sri Lankan and Pakistani origins, thus, quelling bias in the presentation of perspective and narrative. Also, the perspective from both sides helps the reader understand all facets of the relationship between Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which can prove to be of much importance to matters of policy. The authors have been able to comprehensively construct the perception of both states not only towards each other, but also other states, especially India. This helps the reader view relations in the broader spectrum of regional and international politics.

The tone adopted by the authors is both descriptive and engaging, which keeps one riveted from beginning till the end. The description of relations is objective in nature and is a direct reflection of issues both countries face both at micro and macro scale, while, simultaneously indicating the necessary steps required to overcome them. The pictures, tables and charts create visualizations that help the reader manage, incorporate and analyse the data with ease. The book, however, lacks in quoting relationship glitches and difficulties, which would have provided the readers a better penetration into the friendship story of Pakistan and Sri-Lanka, thus, allowing readers to learn from past mistakes and establish ties based on non-repetition of past behaviours.

This book serves as a communication link not only for government institutions, but also the public of both countries hailing from all backgrounds. It will help both nations build stronger ties through areas of mutual cooperation in all spheres of development. This book can also be used as a reference for academic research in this field.

Reference

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Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures

ISBN: 9780231173063

Edited By: *Christophe Jaffrelot*

Review By: *Tooba Zaidi**

The Obama administration considered Pakistan ‘the most dangerous country in the world’ and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff worried about insurgents gaining control of nuclear weapons. One of the challenges of thinking and writing about Pakistan is to understand how the scar tissue of its short history influences policy today. The traumas of Partition are well known, but several other historical events helped shape modern Pakistan. The India–China war of 1962 led directly to China becoming Pakistan’s ‘all weather friend’. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 was a crushing blow and prompted the Army to adopt the role of guarantor of territorial integrity. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the terrorism and Kalashnikov culture in Pakistan. Is Pakistan at a crossroads or does it remain on an inexorable path towards disaster? Was the Army Public School massacre of 2014 really the moment, when the army decided that ending internal subversion was the main national security priority, ahead of countering India? This book helps to answer these questions.

This edited volume is a work of renowned scholars, who have assessed the politics and economics of Pakistan and the challenges faced by its military and civil leadership, domestically and diplomatically. This book will not only shed some light on the domestic problems, which Pakistan is facing; in fact, it will also discuss the external threats and the diplomatic relations of Pakistan with different countries. It is divided into two parts: Part I deals with the domestic scene, as the title depicts, and explains the domestic issues, which Pakistan has been facing since its inception. Part II of the book deals with international dimension discussing the diplomatic relations of Pakistan with its immediate neighbours as well as the US, China and Saudi Arab.

The chapter ‘The Military and Democracy’ has discussed the civil military relations and the mode of military disengagement from politics and how military remained strong enough to maintain its strategic and political influence in the post authoritarian content. The major source of friction between civil-military relations

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were the exercise of military prerogative especially in the management of National Security Policy. This friction led to political instability in Pakistan after Musharraf's regime. The other chapter 'Operational Dynamics of Political Parties in Pakistan' describes that political parties have kept a modicum of democracy in place in Pakistan as a source of legitimacy through the Parliament. They structure the political conflict by rationalising the message of contending forces providing a sense of order to the fluid situation. Philip Oldenburg has focussed on the rise of judiciary from 2007-2009. According to him, though, the gains of judiciary are fragile, but now it enjoys the same status as military and government and it has succeeded in earning the trust of public. Therefore, it can play a significant role in putting Pakistan on the road to an effective and genuinely democratic government.

Discussing about the turmoil in FATA, Mariam Abou Zahab has given the analysis about the dynamics of Talibanization in FATA by pinpointing the socio-economic factors and discusses the issues regarding population displacement and its consequences. Shahid Javed Burki, in his chapter on the economy, argues that Pakistan could have been a BRIC nation, had it not been for the bouts of political uncertainty. Disconcertingly, however, the best growth rates were recorded during the periods of military rule under Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf. Burki also points to Pakistan's inability to raise sufficient taxes and its tendency towards dependence on overseas support.

Avinash Paliwal has discussed how the policy of India has changed after 2001, despite of signing the agreement with Afghanistan on Strategic Partnership during Karz's government, India remained resistant in providing lethal weaponry when asked. After the departure of Karzai, the marginalization of India in Afghan affairs is apparent. Afghanistan's stance on whether to accommodate demands of Pakistan or develop a combat strategy, is now very clear. It is applying dual policy. On one hand, Ghani government was engaging with Islamabad diplomatically, whereas, Afghan Chief of Intelligence Rahmatullah Nabil was building capacity and growing links with Latif Mehsud, number 2 in the TTP hierarchy. Though, it was handed over to Pakistan by the US later. So, this all gives a clear image of dual policy of Afghanistan and we can assume that there seems to be no end game in sight for Pakistan in Afghanistan.

While, discussing US relations with Pakistan under Obama administration, Christopher Jafferlot named it as 'clientelistic' relations, which is not very right as both were involved in Soviet-Afghan war-1979, and after 9/11, Pakistan accepted US assistance on its own terms. During the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan required all US aid to flow through government agencies. And after 9/11, Musharraf adopted the twin-track 'compartmented' approach, which enabled

Pakistan to provide vital assistance to the US in tracking down al-Qaeda terrorists, while, ensuring that groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba remained relatively untouched. There is also a misconception in this chapter regarding Pak-China relation, which states that Pakistan kept oscillating relationship between the US and China, which is wrong as the later has been constant since Sino-Indian war-1962. This chapter has discussed how China became all weather friend for Pakistan after this war. In the last chapter, Sana Haroon has discussed the relations of Pakistan with Muslim world especially with Saudi Arabia and Iran and their political, religious and economic development since 1947.

In nutshell, this book has assessed Pakistan as an 'eye of storm' because of the challenges, it has been facing since its inception, and its geostrategic positioning in regional and global politics. Advertently, the arguments debated in this book are not much sustaining the facts on ground, such as, portraying Pakistan's foreign relations as 'clientelistic'. Pakistan is a sovereign state with independent foreign policy objectives and upholds its resolve to eradicate terrorism domestically, regionally as well as internationally.

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Christophe Jaffrelot, ed. *Pakistan at the crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

Pakistan's Enduring Challenges

ISBN: 9780812246902

Edited By: *C.C Fair and Sarah J. Watson*

Review By: *Seemab Zafar**

It is a harsh reality to accept that Pakistan is facing different external and internal challenges since its inception. These challenges have tangled the state in its own contradiction, ranges from political instability to economic uncertainty. It inculcates exacerbated sense of insecurity and sense of deprivation among people. Non-state actors have cashed these circumstances efficiently as well as effectively and tried to portray Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorism. This factor has changed the overall outlook of the state and made it to indulge in this proxy war, whereas, positive social developments remain aside. It has also given birth to several challenges, both at the domestic and international level.

This edited volume is an effort to project these challenges faced by Pakistan in terms of security and prosperity, especially after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan as well as its relations with foreign states, such as, the US, China and Saudi Arabia. Every challenge has been compartmentalized in three sections, whereas, root-cause of each issue can be traced back to a common-threat, posed by non-state actors. It invites the state to nurture its policy options to cut-out domestic instability and security threats along with the opportunities to develop more trustworthy relations with other nations. While, exploring all avenues, one of the chapters chases economic tail in order to fast-track the correction process regarding mismanagement and profligacy.

The moot-point of this book revolves around the creeping expansion of Jihadist influences and different shapes that militant juggernaut may take after US withdrawal from Afghanistan, both in terms of sectarian and identity basis. It proposes to adopt a forward-leaning posture not only for Pakistan, but for the stability of whole region. Secondly, it sheds light on different ideologies and how these ideologies are being interpreted in different ways by using the Quranic verses to achieve target-goals by militants. This argument raised the question that if there are such religious ideologies, exercised by non-sate actors, then why there is no

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religious party has been able to form the government up till now. Therefore, this percept of radicalization needs to be reviewed.

While suggesting the countermeasures for elimination of such elements, this book, in one way or the other, justifies US drone program in Pakistan. It entails the argument that this program is being supported by implicit consent of concerned authorities despite the fact that the Pakistan's government has been raising its voice against such attacks. It further elaborates the legal aspects of drone attacks, which is, in fact, contrary to true international law perspective. Besides highlighting drone causalities, this part of book also touches upon the sensitive topic related to Pakistan's nuclear security arrangements by arguing that the strategic choices may come to surface due to the problems emanating from neighbouring states and violent extremism. This logical reasoning requires the state to put forwards the counter argument.

Referring to the second part of this volume, it has augmented that how civil-military relations have been evolved over the period of time. The changing political scenario in the country involves judicial activism, media and provincial autonomy and how foreign policy is being formulated within the security ambit. It covers the technological aspects along with its positive and negative effects depending upon its use. As proposed, social media can be served as a medium to bring forth public awareness and voices to formulate policies that display best narrative, however, it is being used to amplify the radicalization factor. Identification of the flaws in administration due to ineffective policies and corruption, which has most probably led the country to be more dependent on foreign sector to boost its economy, is important to tackle with.

The last part of the book argues that Pakistan's relation with the US, especially after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. This withdrawal would create problems for Pakistan in handling terrorism, however, Pakistan would avail this opportunity to dominate the region. It projects that the withdrawal of US forces will do much better to reduce anti-American sentiments and help to improve Pak-US relations. This part unravels the relations of Saudi Arabia and China with Pakistan through shedding light on interests and how these relations have reached to a degree of mutual understanding in a time of need. It provides the historical analysis to look into Pak-Afghanistan relations and how non-state actors have affected these relations over the time.

It can be deduced that most of the contributors emphasized on US withdrawal from Afghanistan that will give birth to security and economic challenges for Pakistan, which ultimately lead to regional instability. This has been illustrated descriptively, while keeping the readers engaged. However, some arguments of this

volume are debatable as they are contrary to Pakistan's own perspective, because Pakistan is not a part of any race to be a regional hegemon rather it is a peace-loving state. Pakistan has never shown soft corner for any such element that are destructive and violent in nature. The National Action Plan can be served as an example to support Pakistan's stance on it. The argument that Pakistan is supporting militancy for waging proxy war against its rivals is, in fact, a myopic statement. Pakistan always speaks for the stability of Afghanistan both at the national and international level. There is no such evidence exists to support this self-created perception that Pakistan is likely to continue meddling in Afghanistan and targeting India.

Referring to the safety of Pakistani nuclear arsenals, these strategic assets are under strict command and control regime, which cannot be compromised in dealing against internal and external threats, even if left in isolation. It is not an easy task to deal with each and every challenge that is being faced by any state. However, this volume tried to give an overview of different challenges comprehensively under one umbrella. Despite the fact that there is a need to make Pakistan's position clearer so that to keep the reader's option open for themselves, when analysing multiple perspectives rather than the resilience on one side only.

This volume serves as a guideline for the government representatives to deal with security issues. It is an area of concern for the policy makers to ponder upon such detail. However, this study can also be a route forward for academic research in the concerned field.

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Fair, C. Christine, and Sarah J. Watson, eds. *Pakistan's Enduring Challenges*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.

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