PACIFISM TO CONFRONTATION: CONFLICT DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR CONTENDERS (INDIA-PAKISTAN)

Abstract

India and Pakistan have been attempting to settle disputes through pacifist means.
Notable attempts include Liaquat-Nehru approach, Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration.
On the side surge in defence budget on both sides of the border designates that possibility of
nuclear clash has not been averted yet. Kargil war was quite alarming but flimsy deterrence
worked and South Asia had a narrow escape from nuclear brinkmanship. Terrorism plagued
both countries as a consequence of war against terrorism. It also increased the risk of nuclear
terrorism. Pakistan and India’s participation in Nuclear Security Summits fore shadows
nuclear confidence building measures but both the countries are strong contenders for
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership and India is seeking permanent membership to
United Nations Security Council too. This paper theorizes that balance of power as well as
the balance of terror between India and Pakistan are the agents of relative stability. Any
asymmetry would likely to push both contenders to armed clash which may turn nuclear at
any point. If deterrence sustains for a half century more, both may sign mutual agreements
on reduction and limitation of strategic weapons. International regimes may also play a
decisive role in furtherance of peace and stability in South Asia.